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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is deimted to a studly of the com=nist movcment in 
Palestine during the British Mandate with special emphasis on its 
growth within the Arab section of the population. 
.. Chapter one traces 
the developnent of the Palestine Cozm=ist 
Party as an outgrowth of the Zionist la: bo. ur movement and its progress 
during the first ten years of its existence as a predo=inantly Jewish 
-organisation. 
Chapters two and three examine the Comintezmýs preoccupation with 
the necessity of Arabising the Party and trace. - the Part3r's early 
atterpts to penetrate into the Arab ca=nmityl, its reactions, to the 
Comintern! s directives and the actual process of Arabisation and the 
policies pursued therein. 
Chapter four looks at the Party's policies and role vis-a-vis the 
Arab Rebellion of 1936-'zg, and the development of a Jewish opposition 
culminating in the first major split of the Party. 
Chapter five is devoted to an examination. of the Party's position 
during --the SIS-econd World War and 
its faithful adherence to the twists 
-Soviet foreign policy. It also traces the P arty' s and turns of 
increasing involvement within the Arab community as evinced by its 
activity in the labour movement. 
Chapter six deals with the split of the Party in 1943, its 
-origins and the consequent establishment of separate 
Arab and Jewish 
communist organisations, 9 and-the development of the Jewish communists 
UP to 1948. 
Chapter seven examines the establishment of an Arab national 
co=unist movemerd; and looks in detail at communist activity within 
the Arab working class and the intelligentsia. It closes with an 
analysis of the communist response to partition and the attempts made 
to justU 
The primary sources upon which this study is based include the 
-the f ollowing. the publications of the Palestine Com=aist Party and 
National Liberation League., intelligence mports of the British 
2 
Colonial Office and the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem,, the official 
publications of the Comintern, and personal interviews with old party 
ambers. 
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CHAP=R ONE 
The Comirintem and The Colonial Problem 
The policy of the Comintern in regard to the colonial problem 
-and its continued shift of emphasis between East andWest passed 
through a n=dber of phases. Initiallyq the Comintern had its eyes 
fir=ly fixed on revolutionary possibilities in theWest and considered 
4, -. he ErEast only as an auxiliary in the hopefully "3*. =: *Lnent proletarian 
revolution". The victorious proletariat in, -'ýurope would aid the 
hack%, ard camtries of Asia and Africa in the transformation f rom. 
feudalism to socialism without passing through the capitalist stage. 
In the Second Comintern Congress a great deal of attention was 
-Daid to thee question of the colonies and co-operation with the national 
=vement, and Lenin established what was later to become the orthodox 
2 
corr=mist positi-on. He emphasised the necessity of collaboration 
vith the "revolutionary winCý! ' of the national. bourgeoisie. 
3, At, the 
basis of his position was the belief that the anti-colonial struggle 
was a valuable ally-of the new socialist state in, so, far as it was 
directed at imperialism's "weakest link". 
Mhe Third Comintern Congress meeting in June 19219 xvcogaised &W 
that the prospect of immediate revolution in the West had failed. 
-The new phase was-characterised as one of 114%, expomry capitalist 
stabilisation! '. 
4 In a letter to member parties, the ECCI z%emminded 
them- that "withoutt a revolution in Asia, the proletarian revolution 
cartnot be --victorious"5 but Trotsky more accurately su=ned up the 
;: re-occupation of the participants in h4 definition of revolution 
as. flowing along "three river beds., Europeq Americao and lastly Asia 
6 
and the colonial-world". Zionism, interestingly enough.. was singled 
out for criticism. The Palestine project of the Zionist movement 
was candemned as alming "to divert -the Jewish working 7na ses from 
the class struggle and is nothing but a petty bourgeois counter- 
revolutionary utopie. 
7 
1. D. Boersner. The Bols eiks and the National and Colonial Problem he- 
(Paris 1954). p. 272. 
2. S. Schram. Marxism and Asia. (London 1969). p. 26. 
I "Report of the Comnission on the National and Colonial Lenin. 
-Question in On the Unity of the International Cor=unist Movement (Moscow 1966). 
Boersner,, orD. cit. 106. 
5. Protocols of the Third Comintern Congmss. (London 1921) pp. 8-9. 
6. Boersner, loc. cit. 
7. Inpreco 2 August 1922. p. 4.3.1. 
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--The Fourth Comintem Congress meting in 14ovember 19229 was 
Aominated by a defensive state of mind,, and the slogan of the "united 
front" now made'Its appearance. 
8 
The Congress was characterised by 
a marIked "Asian tendency", and voices were raised for collaboration 
with all national movementsp including -those such as Pan Islamism which 
had been conde=ed by Lenin himself in the past. 
9 
The final resolutions 
of the Congress stressed the necessity of fim collabora-16016on with the 
national mmvements irrespective of the absence of a revolutionary 
10 
wing within Ahem. - 
The Fifth Comintern Congress meeting in June 1924 saw an-even 
more detertzined shift towards a strong colonial orientation. 
11 This 
was a direct response to the further defeats inflicted on the 
revoluticxnary movement in Gemany, which convinced the Comintern, s 
--leaders that "CaMita-list stabilisation! ' was firmly established and 
12 a not merely a short term phase. "Lhp resolutions passed by the 
Congress prescribed yet again collaboration with the bourgeois 
--nationalists-on the basis of a "united fro' nt", whose validity - 
encompassed the whole East. Support I 'or the leadership of the 
nationalist inovenent was unconditional.. 
13 
Soon. after# the Fifth 
Plenum of the ECCI declared that it was premaLture to advance the 
slogan of achieving proletarian hegemony in the liberation movewnt, 
of the colonies. The Co=nunist Party' s role lay in supporting 
-the bourgeois-led national independence movements. -Indeed the 
period following the Fifth Congress was characterised by support fmý 
all. and every national struggle, p irrespective of the nature of its 
leadership. This encompassed the struggles in China, India., the 
Arabian peninsula, Syria and Morocco. 
15 
8. Schram, op. ci - p- 4.11. 9. Boersner., op. ci . p. 126. 
10.. - Schram,, op. ci . P. 44. 
12. Outline History of the Communist International. (MoBcCM7 1971) - 
P- 205. 
13- Schram, op. cit. p. 45. 
14. Outline historyp 2p. ci . p. 232. 15- Abdul Karim,, the leader of the Rif rebellion was referred to as 
"the greatest leader of all the oppressed peoples of the world"j, 
see Inpreco N-40 1925- P- 504. 
10 
-Although the end of 1926 saw the ebb of the tide of revolution 
-in the colonies E Cl'plenum of March 1926 had already and an X 
characteriEed the new period in the capitalist countries as one of 
"totter-Ing stabilisation", 
16 the official line in the colonial countries 
vras still in favour of the "united, front from above". 
17 
By October 1927# the political secretariat of the ECCI had arrived 
at a new char-acterisation of developments in Europe. the reformist 
socialist parties were now seen to have gone over to the bourgeoisies 
and the ner tactic put- forward was one of . 
"class against class". 
18 
This was followed by the establisbment of a new sectarian line in the 
. Unth Plenum of the ECCI meeting in February 1928. The new 
demand 
--was for building the united front "fmm below" in opposition to the 
social democratic parties in the West. 
19 ' This new tactic of class 
against class was-held to apply also, in the colonial countries in 
response to the perc-nived betraýyal of -the leadership of the national 
novementsO- 
The Sixth Comintern C=gresss meeting- in July 1928'. formallY 
ushered in the "third period". Essentially, this was a reaction to 
the failure o4A. ' the Comintern in China. 
20 From. this point alliances 
with even the "revolutionary wing of the national bourgeoisielf were 
Ixoscribed, 
21 
and the Com=mist Parties task was to set up independent 
organisations "IXberat, ted f =m the influence of the bourgeois nation- 
alists". 
22 
The Commmist Parties were to prepare for the establilh- 
23 
-zvmt of Soviet power by embarking on armed uprising if necessarY- 
he backward countries were now declared to be. -capable of skipping 
the phase of capitalist development., and "even'the development Of 
ca pitalist relations in general. 112 
3.6. 
17. 
-. lg. 20. 
21. 
22. 
23- 
24. 
J. Haithcox, Commmi= and Nationalism in Inclia: 1T. N. BPI. 
Comintern -r)olic_vl 1920-1M. (Princeton.. -1971) - P- , 
111- 
Boersner, cm. ci . p. l9b. Outline His'%Oor_v,, op. cit. p. 269. 
Haithcox, OD. cit. P. 87. 
Schram, op. ci - p- 59. 
58. 
Haithcox" O. P. ci . P. 108. Prorram of the Comintern ado-Dtecl at the Sixth Congress. 
P. 59. 
Boersner, cro. cit. p. 263- 
3.1 
(g. y. 1929). 
In a further ultra-left turn, the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI meeting 
in July 1929., called on all Communist Parties to sever their relations 
with the nationalist movements and to wage a determined struggle 
against their bourgeois leaderships. 
25 
The advent of fascism in Germany in 1933 brought the Comintern's 
ultra-left policy to a halt. The communists now scought to mend their 
bridges with the social democratic parties. The slogan of the 
"national front" was now raised and the seventh Comintern Congress 
in 1935 officially substituted the slogan of "nation against nation! ' 
.Zs,,. 
26 Once again,, this change in for that of "class against cla . 
-taattics applied to the colonial countries. The Co=waaist Parties 
were instructed to soft peddle the social and anti-i=perialist 
struggle. It was now mnfistory for them to mend their fences with 
-the bourgeois nationalists and-to enter into alliances with them. 
This policy continued apart friom a Drief interval in 1939-1941, to 
be the official line off the Comintern until its dissolution in 1943., 
a- a further "contribution" to strengthening the anti-Nazi democratic 
front. 
The Birth of the Comimmist Ilovement in Palestine 1919-1929 
The covirmini st movement in Palestine was born within the confines 
of the Zionist movement in co=, -lete isolation f rom the Arab 
inhabitants of the country. Its roots went back to the rise of a 
Socialist. -Zionist movement in Tsarist Russia. Jewish life in Eastern 
Europe was influenced both by Maxrxism and the impact of economic changes 
27 
consequent on Russian industrialization and Tsarist oppression. 
D=-ing the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning 
of the twentiet4s Russian Jews had participated in &. 11 anti-Tsarist 
parties, while many of the 'Leaders of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions were 
themselves of Jewish origin. The percentage of Jews, among revolution- 
aries was always greater than their percentage of the populations a 
25. Haithcox, op. -cit. p. 
129. 
26. See Report of Dimitrov, The Working Class against Fasci=, and 
Report of 77ang Yang, The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial 
Countries, in Report of the Seventh World Congress of the 
Comintern. (London. - 1936). -- 
27-_ H. Sachar. A Histoa of Israel (N. Y. 1976). p. 68. 
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fact usually explained by the large concentrations of Jews in urban 
--ereas, the existence of a large Jewish proletariat and intelligentsia, 
and their oppression by the Tsarist regime., not only as proletarians 
but also as a national minority. 
Before the outbreak of the October Revolutions the politically 
consc-4cus section of the J ish working class was mainly attracted to 
'the ranks of the non-Zionist socialist parties. 
28 The predominant 
party among the Jewish working class was the social democratic Bund 
29 
-rhich had taken part in the establishment of the Russian Social 
-atic Labour Party3o but had soon after broken De=: )cz with it over the 
ASsue cf representation of the Jewish proletariat. The Bund evolved 
&-national ideology v-bich, unlike that of Zionism was based on the 
concept of "national cultural autonomy". 
31. While remaining firmly 
opposed to Zionism %hich it dubbed "a bourgeois movement with close 
-iez to anti-revolutionax7 clericalists"s 
32 the Bunds ir, its Tenth 
Congress held in 1910., recognised that the concept ef "nationality" 
33 
applied to the Jevash people, and the national element came to 
assume an increasingly eqial standing with the class struggle. in its 
ideology. 
The year 1905 constituted an important landmark in the history 
-cf Russian Jewry. It witnessed the consolidation of various groups 
c-f Socia-Ust-Zionists and the termination of the Bund' s monopoly of 
the Jewish fields and renewed oppression as a result of the failure 
ef the 1905 revolution. The establishment of Labour Zionism in 
Russia. was an attempt to formulate a socielist solution to the Jewish 
-question. Nachman Syrkin was the first to tr7 to bridge the gap 
between sociallsm and Zionism, and attempted to show that there was 
28. Z. Gitelrtqn. Jemish Nationalitv and Soviet Politics: The Jewish 
Sections of the CPSU, 1911-193 . (Princeton. 1972). p. 71. 29. The General League cf Jewish Workinipen in Lithuania., Poland., and 
Russia, established in 1897. 
A Gitelman, o-D. cit- P- 33- 
31- E. Mendelsohn. Class Struggle in the Pale: The Formative Years 
of the Jewish Wo. king Class in Tsarlst Russia. ri Canbridgep 1970). 
P. ix. 
32. Gitelman, op. cit. p. 40. 
33- Ibid. P- 38. The Bolsheviks conderned the Bundists as "Zionists 
who are afraid of sea sickness". Ibid. P- 35- 
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no contradiction between the two. 
34 It was another Russian Jew 
however., Ber Borochov, who worked out the theoretical principles of 
Labour Zionism. 35 His doctrine of "proletarian Zionism! ' stressed 
the existence of ar. independent Jewish proletariat and characterised 
Zionism an the expression of the objective movement and the interests 
of the Jewish working class., and not the Jewish people in general. 
36 
He further argueCL that the Jewish people, constituting a single 
nation, suffered from a-deformed economic structurewhich he 
sýttributed to the-absence of a. national territory. Borochov's ideas 
became the platform of the various socialist-Zionist groups which 
amelgAwted in 1906-and formed -the Foale Zion (V. orkers of Zion) party. 
37 
Its members were drawn-from two groups: nationalist elements from. 
within the Jewish-labour movement, and socialist elements from within 
the Zi=ist-movement. They were united by a combination of Zionist 
asrirations and a socialist political and economic program. 
The xiseýof Labour Zionism in Palestine can be traced back directly 
to the second wave of Jewish immigration (1904-1914), the background 
to-which was Ithe-failure of the 1905 Russian revolution. While the 
first wave of immigmtion into Palestine (1882-1903) had not been 
predominantly Zionist and did not contain a large number of proletarian 
elements, 
38 the second wave contained latge numbers of young workers 
animated by socialist ideals" and with a past record of activity in' 
the anti-Tsarist Russian labour movement. 
39 
- Members of Foale Zion 
took part in this wave of immigration impelled by the desire to create 
in Palestine a base for the future socialist Jewish state., and on 
their arrival declared themselves "the party of the Palestinian working 
40 
class in creation". Established in Palestine in 1905, Poale Zion 
hades a-cornerstone of its policy the plan "Conquest of Labour' aimed 
at creating conditions for the development of a Jewish proletariat. 
34- Sachar,, o-. cit. p. 69. A Histor of Zionism. See also Tv. Laqueur. 
ki ' i ' e (L d 2 F f 
M2 Sr n sv ews se on on p. or a short su==7 o 7. t3 
A. Hertzberg (ed. ) The Zionist Idea. (N. Y. 19 5 333-350. 7 
T 
pp 
35. Gitelman, op. cit. p. 48. 
36. Ber Borochov. Nationali= and the Class StElaggle: A Marxian 
ar-proach to the Jewish Problem. (Greenwood press 1972ý. pp. 71-72. - -- 
37. Borochov, op. ci . p. 181. 38. Sachar, or. cit. pp. 26-27. Gitelman., oT)- cit- P- 47. 
39. 1. Cohen. A Short Histo;: y of Zionism. n 1951). p. 65- 
40. Sacharj op- cit.! P. 73. 
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It-thus -took part in the establishment of the first orgeLnisations of 
the Yishuv, such as the Gdud (Workers' Batallions) and Shomer (guards) 
in 1909., and the Histadrut in 1920.41 
The Russian and Falestinian sections of Poale Zion were soon Joined 
42 
by similar groups established in Austria, the United States., and Britain, 
vhich eventually led to the creation of a W-orld Confederation of Poale 
Zion in 1907. The outbreak of. the October Revolution posed serious 
problems for the Poale Zion movement. Many of its members were 
syzýýetic to the Bolsheviks and a division soon appeared between pro- 
, and anti- communists. The 
Fifth World Congress meeting in Vienna in 
July-August 1920 saw a split in the r=ks of the movement on the 
question-of affiliation to the Comintem. 
43 The Palestine section 
sided with the rightwing and-chose to remain independent of Moscow. 
In Palestine itself., Poale Zion had in February 1919 joined with 
other independent el nts to form a new o. -ganisation,, Ahdut HaAvoda 
(Unity-of Labour)*44 A small group of Foale Zion members opposed this 
and broke away 
5 
establishing their ow, organisation,, Mifleget Poalim, 
Zozialistit (Socialist Workers Party _ Y2S). 
46 In the first congress 
of k? Si-held in October 1919,47-the split-was characterised as being 
similar to thosewhich had taken place in all socialist parties 
throughout the-world between left and right. 
48 
The new Party was ambiguous in its attitude to Zionism. Declaring 
its allegiance to "proletarian Zionism", it linked the adhievement of 
the Zionist ideal with the victory of the socialist revolution, and 
41. D. Zohar. Political Parties in Israel. (N. Y. 1974. P. 40- 
42. Laqueur., op. _ci p. 
291. 
43- Zoharg op. cit. p. 43. 
44. Y. Shapiro. The Formative Years of the Israeli Labour Party- The 
Organisation of Power, 1919-1930. (London, 1976). p. 25. 
45- Zohar, 
. -op. 
cit- P- 54- 
46. The Co=mi st Party in Israel, dates its formation f rom, this date 
March 1919. See Me Vilner., Lecture delivered on the 50th Anniver- 
sary of the'l sraeli New Ccmm=ist Party p March 1970, in Fif ty Years 
of the Commmist PaKýj in Palestine. (Haifa. 1970). pe 25. See alsoj, 
"Phe Labour Movement in Palestine. In-precor. N. 15.1923- P- 386. 
47. Extracts from the General Conference of the Socialist Workers Party 
in Palestine held October 1919. ISA CS 148. See also, Y. Offenberg. 
Vom Zionis=us zum Internationalismus: Der entstehungs-prozess der 
Commmistischen Partei Palestinas (PEP) 1919-1924. Unpublished Ph. D. 
thesis. Free University of West Berlin. 1973. p. 3.56. 
48. - Extracts from the General Conference .......... loc. cite 
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J, 
ermphami-sed tbat-"the Diaspora will be the spr-ing f rom which we sha-11 
draw our vintage of life inspiration". The novel element in its 
doctrine was the affirmation that the establishment of a Jewish 
socialist com=mity in Palestine was conditional on an understanding 
with the native working class, and the necessity of joint Arab-Jewish 
organisation. 
The-IMPS continued however to regard itself as part of the Zionist 
movement and participated in the Fifth World Congress of Poale Zion in 
Vienna. 49 Its delegate antagonised the Congress by attacldmg the 
Palestine Zionist program as "Illusory" and calling attention t6the 
a native Arab population determined to repel foreign existence oý 
newcomers050 He also launched an-attack on the Zionist policy of 
co-operation with Britain, which he described as being the cause of 
Arab enmity toi%mids the Zionist immigrants. As a result, the 
Palestinian delegate was exTelled from the Congresss and MPS ttself 
51- felt impelled to dissociate itself from his views. 
Relations of the FPS -with other Soci4elist-Zionist parties 'continued 
to deteriorate. 4 though it continued to gather some-support among the 
ý-new immigrants, based mainly on their sympathy with the Soviet Union 
and their rejection-of the Zionist leaders' collaboration with the 
Dritish. 
52 B At the same time the MPS persisted in its calls for an alliance 
"with our Amb brethren"53 and its Third Congress held in April 1921, 
passed an official resolution to this effect. 
54' To the Arabs hovvever.. 
the existence of a Bolshevic party provided them with an extra argument 
in their protestations against Jewish immigration and they exhibited 
strong opposition,. to c==mist activity. 
55 The disturbances of the 
-Pirst of-May 
1921, were the direct outcome of a clash between an official 
49 - ISA-CS. 148. General Staff Intelligence, Cairo 30 Mayp 1922. 50- Letter-from'Y. Yeyrsm. to VPSj, 25 August 1920 In Vilner ap. cit- P- 31- 
51- Vilner, Lbid. P- 32- 
52. ISA. CS. 148. CID Report., 7 May 1921 quotes the number of IMPS members 
as 300- See also CID Report, 12 November 1920,, for the early 
activity of the group. 
53. ITS leaflet (Hebrew & Yiddish) 7 Novemberp 1920. 
54. ISA. CS. 148. CID Report, 17 June 1921. 
55- Letter of Omar Bitar, Head of Jaffa Moslem-Christian Association 
to the High Commissioner, 20 November 1920.. ISA. CS. 148. 
16 
Zionist-procession and an MPS demonstration fihich ended in Arab attacks 
56 
on the Jewish quarter. The outcome was the suppression of ITS with 
the arrest and deportation of most of its leaders57 and the party was 
banned and had to go underground. 
58 
Soon after, YYS disintegrated but this did-not prevent the appearance 
of a plethora of small groups such as the Jewish Communist Party, the 
Vorkers' Councils, the Communist Party o. Palestine (CCP) and the 
Palestine Comim3ni st Party (PCP) which carried on an ideological struggle 
within. their ranks centred on the position towards Zionism and the 
association with the Comintern. 
59 
The groups varied in their rejection. 
-of the Zionist program and in their degree of support for the Arab 
national movement. Some took an extreme viewv calling for the abandon- 
ment of Palestine altogether 
6o 
while others were in favour of the 
establishment of a "Jewimh workers' centre"' in Palestine and condemned 
the raore anti-Zionist-groups as "liquidationir, -Irs". 
61 
,. he two largest groups, the PCP and the CPP eventually came 
together in July 1923 and fonxd a single party. 
62 
For a short time 
followilmg this., some small groups continued to exist and to denounce the 
PCP as cr3pto-Zionist, 
63, 
dvocating the abandonment of the Zionist 
project in Palestine and-calling for total support for the Arab Rovement. 
With the recogaition early in 1924 of the PCP asý the official Comintem 
Section in Palestine, these groups gradually disappeared from the scene. 
The nain issue which had split the World Pederation of Poale Ziong 
-affialiation 
to the Comintemscontinued to occupy the-attention of the 
56. British Government Statement in Miraat al Shark,, 31 lay 19 21- 
-57. 
C. O. 733/5/272. Administrative Report for July 1921. p. 11. 
58- From the Fifth to the Si3fth World Congress of the Comintern. 
Report by the EXI (London 1928). p. 147. 
59. C. O. 733/143/4)+511. Report on Communist Activityx October 1927. P. 8. 
60. Y. Hen-Tov. The Comintern and Zionism in Palestine: An Inauiry 
into the Circumstances surrounding the Comintern's involvement 'in 
the 1929 Riots in Palestine. Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Brandeis 
University. 1969. pp. 199-200. 
61. G. Israeli. ITSPEP. MM: The Storz of the Communist Party in 
Israel. (T ef XýIvj, 1954) p. 22. 
62. The Foundation of the United Communist Party in Palestine. ez"tatement 
of CC's of CCP and PCP. Inprecor (Germian, Edition). N-136. 
22 August 1923- pp. 1187- See also C. O. 733/48/42903- Political 
Report for July 1923- 
63- Memo to the ECCI Drafted by ex-members of the CC of the CCP 
Jaffa-Palestine. lst January 1924. ISA. CS-149. 
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-various výoups of Jewish commmists. A representative of MPS had 
taken part inthe Third Coc: Intern Congress in 1921 as an observer, 
65 
but objection to the "national nature" of the group and Comintern 
demands such as-a change in the Party's name and its repudiation of 
66 
immigration which the Jewish comm=ists were not preptred to accept, 
resulted in the failure to reach agreement. Upon the establidment 
the united party in 1922-3, the PCP again decided to approach the 
Comintern and sent one-of ilts leaders# Wolf Auerbach 
67 
to negotiate 
the terms of affiliation. 
66 
Auerbach encountered some-difficulty 
in view of the fact that the Comintern' s leaders feared that recognition 
of the PCP would give implicit support to -thle Balfour Declamtion. 
69 
Yoreover, they were-critical of the Party's failure to gather support 
among the Armbs, a failure which they attributed to the subjective 
Jewizh orientation of the Party. Mben the Party was eventually-.,. - 
admitted into the Comintem -in Mamh 1924,70 the ECCI stressed the 
importance of transforming it "from an organisation of Jewish workers 
into a truly territorial-party" and outlined its task as one of 
support fo-r the Arabs against bath Zionists, and. -Br-Itish. 
71 
Until the time of the Party's recognition by the Cominterns the 
Jewish commuaists had been divided into three groups. ý There were 
jose who still adhered to the doctrine of "proletarian Zionism" -and 
regarded the Party as the left wing of the Zionist movement. Another 
-group 
desired a break with Zionism but could not bring itself to openly 
denounce the Balfour Declaration and place itself outside the Jewish 
commmity, and continued to regard the Jewish i=dgrantz as the 
64. IU CS. W CID report,, 23 May 1921. 
65. The Communist International, N 16/17.1921. p. 123. 
66. Police Report on Commmist Activity, 1927. loc. cit. 
67. Wolf Auerbacn (also known as Danieli, Haidar,, Ichtiar., Abu Siam). 
Born 1883., arrived in Palestine 1922 already a member of the 
Jewith Section of the CPM. He joined the PCP and was its 
Secretary 1924-1929. He was recalled to Moscow as a result of 
his suspected opposition to Arabisation. Arrested in 1936 he 
reportedly died in 1941 and was rehabilitated in 1957. 
68. YL the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress. op. cit. pp. 66-67. 
69. Letter from Auerbach to PCP, March 1921+p in Police Report on 
op. ci . p. 2-2. Communiot Activity 1927. 
70. From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress. loc. cit. 
71. C. 0.733/96/38648. Police Report on Communist Activity, July 
p. 2. 1925. 
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72 d gmup rejected harbingers of revolution in the East. The thir 
aM form of Jewish presence in the country and its members eventually 
left the Party and the- country. 
73 Such behaviour was completely in 
accordance with a total 'rejection of Zionism by people who were 
-recent imnigrants and had no special ties with Palestine. I ndeed, 
for many cor=anivsts the Party became in its early years a "transit 
camp" an the way to the '. Fýoviet Union. Those v6ho remained and 
accepted the Comintern's instructions, regarding the necessity of 
joining forces v6rith the Arab population in the struggle against 
British ýýerialism were however badly suited for this task. By 
reasons of custom, history, language, -doctrine,, and not least by 
belonging to the Jevdsh coz=-nity. of immigrants, they were hardly 
in Arab eyes from the rest of the Jewish community. 
Communist activity in the early years was mostly concentrated 
in the trade trdon field and -among Jewish workers. , The Frakt 3. a 74 (workers faction) was organised towards the end of 1922. Its 
aims were to penetrate the trade unions affiliated to the 
Histad-rut with the object of separating them from the economic and 
co-operative functions linked-to the Zionist project, and to open 
75 them to Arab menbership. Simultaneoussly-the Fraktzia attacked as 
"liquidationists" those who called on Jewish immigrants to leave 
Palestine and stressed that the correct path was "to fight and not 
76 to nm away". The Fraktzia. was in favour of participation in 
Zionist bodies ancl took part in election for the Histadrut congresses 
but coupled this with the demand for transforming the organization 
Into a territorial professional trade union. It succeeded in 
77 
establishing some contact with Arab workers but in the event was 
72. The onli party leaflet calling for the repudiation of the Balfour 
Declaration is dated 1 May 1923, issued during the unity negotiations 
between the CFP and PCP., and probably under pressure from the former. 
was made up of merbers of the CFP and Workers Circles, 73- This group 
c. o. 733/96, /38648 Police Report on Communist Activity, July 1925- p. 2 
F=m the Fourth to the Fifth .......... op. cit. pp. 66-67- 74- 75- Leaflet of CC/Fraktzia., 3 Januar7 1923- Auerbach in a speech 
at the Histadrut Congress., February 1923 said that the Histadrut 
"should not associate itselfKrith Zionist or nationalist affairs.. 
should establish professional unions". See Police Report on 
Communist activity 1927 ... op. cit. Appendix "A" pp. 1-7- 
76. Leaflet CC/Fraktziav 18 September 1923- 
77. ISA CS. 148 CID Report 23 Tune 1924. 
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-unable to effect their entry into the Histadrut as it was itself 
expelled from the o rganis ation in Apel-l 1924, ostensibly for its 
wifavourable attitude to Zionism and immigration. 
78 
The greater interest taken in the Arab field reflected itself in 
a more careful differentiation of the various groups in the Arab camp. 
While early in January 1924, J. Berger 
9a 
member of the Party 
Secretaxiat wrote that as f ar as the Arabs were concerned "all 
classes of the people are in the struggle against imperialism".. 
80 
a 
few months later a clearer distinction war. made between landowners, 
urban capitalists andproletarian toiler-- 
81 
and "a class struggle 
within the Arab national movement" was disce=ed. 
This characterisation of "class struggle" within the Arab c=p 
wass reflected in the proceedings of the Third Conference of the Party 
-beld in June 1924.82 Pointing to the importance of work among the 
1)-"antss the Conference declared that the extremist tendencies %rithin 
the Party such as had called for-opposition to the Histadrut and to 
Jewish immigration,, had I>een liquidated.. At the saw time,, the Party 
was deemed to be free of any trace of Jewish national chauvinism and 
to be heading towards the realization, of the BOCI. slogan of becoming 
"the territorial party" of the Palestinian working cl&ss. 
83 Zionism 
-was condemned as a movement %hich embodied the aspirations of the 
Jewish bourgeoisie,, while the Arab national movement-was portrayed as 
"one of the main factors in the struggle against British imperialism" 
and to be deserring of suppoe. in so far as it performed this task*84 
Thile the Party should not become a "missionary group" its duties should 
involve influencing the speeay development of the division of classes 
in the Arab movement and gaining the confidence of the oppressed by 
78. CZA S25/7808. Report on Communist ActivitYs 31 October 1929. 
79. Joseph Berger-Barzalai, born 1904,, came to Palestine 1919. In 1922 
he was Secretary of the CFP and war, instrumental in bringing about the 
union vhich took place in 1923 with the PCP- He was until 1929 a 
member of the Party' s Secretariat and was responsible for contact 
with the Condmtern. In 1929 he became the Secretary of the Party until 
he left Palestine in 1932. He held responsible Comintern posts till 
his arrest in 1935. Upon his release from 'Stalin's concentration 
camps in 19,56., he went to Poland and then to Israel where he still 
lives. 
80. Autocracy in Palestinee Inpreco 4t 1924.. P- 32. 
61. The class war within the Arab National Movement. Inprecor. N 32,1924. 
P. 33. 
82. Both police reports and Party sources claim that for the first time 
an Arab member took part in the Party's congress. See Report on 
Communist Activity, 1925. cq). ci . p. 22. Vilner, or. cit. P. 39- .0 63. The Third Conference of the PCP. Jarecor. N 48j I! T22-4-p- 497. 
84. Vilner, loc. cite 
20 
Within the Jewish comanmity., the intervention in agrarian disputes. 
Party pledged-itself to combat "proletarian Zionism" primarily by 
educational activity among Jewish workers and by struggling against 
-manifestations of national chauvinism*85 
In January 1925, Berger travelled to MosecM, to deliver a report 
to the MCI on the PCP' s activity. 
86 The MCI was pleased with the 
progress of the Party and approved its policy. Its instructions to 
the Party-called on it to work among the peasantry in recognition of 
the-absenoe of an Arab proletariat.,, but it should also-pay attention 
to the urban population and to the students. 
67 The attitude of the 
Party to the "landowning feudals" and to the nationalist groups was 
to be conditioned by whether they-were attempting to reachýa 
_-compromise with the British or struggling against them. , In the 
case of the former they were to be exposed, while inýthe latter they 
were to be supported to -the -extent cf fornaing temporary allia, =es with 
them and taking part in their assemblies and meetings. 
Zionism was viewed by, the Party as a pawn in the bands of 
British policy, and as its "watchdog" in the midst of the oppressed 
Arab population.. 
88 Likewise-Arab national leaders were condemnedl, 
in that they tried to diver', 'the Amb movement against the Zionists 
89 
Instead of against British rule* The Party was insistent that 
attacks on the Jews were diversionamy and would only help to 
strengthen Britain's hold on the country, and that the struggle 
should-be waged primarily against-the British. - The Jewish workers, 
recent -immigrants though they-were, and despite the fact that they 
had been brought to, Palestine through the agency of the Zionist 
organisationss continued to be regarded as potential revolutionaries 
-whose interests in no way contradicted those of the Arabs-1 
The ECCI for its part looked to the Istiklal movement. The 
latter called for the indelv. mdence and unity of the Arabs., and had 
85- Police Report on Cam=nist Activityf 1927. op. cit. pp. 11-43- 
86. Police Report on Com=m: Lst Activity, 1927. o]2. ci p. 24.. 
87. E= letter to PCP after having heard . Berger' s report, 
9 May 1925. 
88. The Imperialists and the Revolutionary Moverrent in Syria and 
Palestine. Inpreco .N 40.1925. P- 531- 
89. The Counter Revolutionax7 Role of Zionism. Inprecor. N 69., 
1925. p. 100. 
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played- an- important role --in establishing the Arab goverr=ent in 
Dama cus. The MCI regarded it as the progressive wing of the Arab SO 
national movement and directed the PCP to make contact with it. 
90 
Contact was established with the Syrian rebels9l and Auerbach himself 
'yria. to meet with the leaders of the rebellion, 
92 but travelled to SE 
although help was promised nothing-arpe&rs to have come of the episode. 
Party activity remained largely within the Jewish c=3runity. 
Some success was achieved as with the Gdud Avoda (1, ", orkers' Batallions) 
wýen the group split and a section. emigrated-to the Soviet Union-93 
Yet the Party's attitude towards. Jewish immigration remained ambiguous. 
Berger writing in 1926 - attacked-, the Govex-. =ent for its opposition to 
94 bot. h - the Arab and the Jer=h population. Referring to the latter 
he accused-it of "not helping to give immigrants work. and bread, still 
less -land". As -regards the Histadrut, the Party had changed its 
policy after being rebuked by the ECCI in 1925 for advising Arabs 
not to join the organisation-95 Within the Histadrut., the Party 
now raised the call for entr7, cf Arab workers -and in 1927 . when Arabs 
were admitted as observers for -the first, time -to a Histadrut congress 
this was regarde, 41 as a measure of the Party' s success in influencing 
96 
'' Despite the Fraktzia's both the Histadrut and Arab workers. 
erppulsion from the Histadrut, Ithe Party continued to set up factions 
under different names to propagate its policy within the Jewish workers' 
C ty., side by side idth the organisation-, of demonstrations of the 
vnemployed and the disillusioned in protest against the leaders of- 
97 the Zionist movement. 
90. Le-tterfrom. B= to TCPq 10 September 1925 in C. O. -733/862/214. 
91. Police Report on Cor=unist Activity., 1925- op. ci . p. 16. 
92. Interview of J. Berger-Barzalai with Yediot Ahranot, 15 march 1965- 
See also Police Report on Communist Activity, 1927s 0 Cit P-49- 2R ý! &non t 
nt and F. Shemnli, The History of the Cormnunist Movement 
Al Assifa, No 51v P- -17P and No- 53. - PP- 16-17- 1933- 053- For the relations of the Gdud Avoda and the PCP see A. Shapira. 9 The 
'he Gdud Avoda and the PCP until 1928, in D. Carpi (ed. ) Lef t in t 
Zionism: Studies in the Histor -ovement and of the y of the Zionist K 
Jew- in Palestine (Tel Aviv University 1971) Vol. 2. pp. 148-168. 
94. Palestine Under Lord Plumer. ; Arrikeor N. 19.1926. p. 290. 
95. Letter from Petrof head of Comintern Eastern Section to PCP 7 MaY 
1925 in Police Report on Communi! ýt Activity., 1925., OD-cit- p. 22. 
96. The Histadrut Congress in Palestine, Inpreco IN 46.1927-, P- 1034- See also Police Report on Communist Activitys 1927- 0 Cit- P-38- 
97- CZA S25/536. Jewish Intelligence Reportp 26 August see 
also Zr the Fifth to the Sixth World Congress of Comintern. 
op cit. P. 418. 
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xth Party Conference In September 1926, the Party re- At the Siý 
affirmed the necessity of persisting in its attempts to re-enter the 
Histadrut and for mutual organisation with the Arab working misses. 
98 
Composed of both trab and Jewish members the Conference discussed the 
role of the Jewish working population in Palestine whop it was 
declared were slowly adopting an anti-imperialist position. It was 
also revealed that the Party had been maintaining contact with "the 
left-wing of the Arab national revolutionary movement". 
99 'Wlile 
recognising that the Amb-national movement was petty bourgeois in 
nature and relied on the peasantry in its attempts to secure the 
--necessary conditions 
for free capitalist development in Palestine and thus 
had "nothing in common v. -ith communism". it ms decided to support it in 
.. so 
far as it continued to be directed against imperialism. 
100ý 
The Comintern,, impatient for greater involvement among the Arab 
community, revealed itself dissatisfied with the Party's progress. 
Auerbach, the Party Secretary, travelled to Moscow in December 1926 to 
-attend an -enlarged plenum of the B3CI and found that the Comintern was 
not pleased with the results of-the Party's work. 
101 Their main 
criticism centred on the overwhelming Jewish composition of the 
Party. They pointed out to Auerbach that the Party's main role lay 
in increased activity among the Arabs in order "to M-den and strengthen" 
its ties with the Arab national movement. This was to be accomplished 
without-decreasing the volume of'the Party's activities in the Jewish 
community. 
Within the Jewish street, the Party evolved a new doctrine: 
Yishavism. 102 The Jewish community in Palestine was appraised in 
positive terms and attributed with a major progressive role in the social 
98. The Sixth Party Congress of the PCP. Inpreco .N 68.1926. p. 1184- 
99. Hen Tov. or. cit. P. 117; Berger, interview with Yediot Ahranot, 
loc. cit.; Jewish Intelligence Report, 26 August 1926) loc. cit. 
-100. The Political and Social Movement In Arabia. Inrrecor. N 71j19269 
1237 
3,01. Speech delivered by fterbach on his meeting in Moscow with the 
BCCI at a meeting in Tel Aviv, 8 March 1927 to celebrate the 3rd 
anniversary off the Comintem' s recognition of the PCP, in Police 
Report on Co=nunist Activity, 1927., OP- cit. Appendix 
102. Offenbergs op. cit. pp. 282-293- See Y. Hen Tov., "The Communist 
International-, the PC'-P and the Political Unrest in Palestine, 1929. 
(Worcesteri, 1970). Pamphlet, p. 4. 
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and economic develoramnt of the *country,, while the Jewish labour move- 
juent was regarded as having a positive influence on the course of 
revolution in the East. This doctrine was an attezpt to differentiate 
between Zionism and the Jewish com=aity in Palestine. Miile rejecting 
the tenets of Zionist nationalism and asserting the unity of Arab and 
Jewish interests, the PCP was averse to calls of emigrationand expelled 
from its ranks those who fell victim to this I'liquidationist" tendency. 
It is possible however to explain this positive attitude'to the Jewish 
co=lnity as-an. attempt to make meaningful the Party's pre-occupation 
with the Jewi--h section of the population. Though adherence to this 
doctrine was not-to last long, it continued to raise its head, leading 
to splits and expulsions in the next twenty years of the Party's histozy. 
The-Sixth Congress of-the Comintern introduced a new policy of 
struggle against "national reformism". In its application to Palestine 
this called for a straggle against the leadership of the Arab national 
movement and for replacing the demand for Palestine's Independence with 
that of Arab unity. The leadership of the PCP was severely criticised 
for its failure to apply the Ccmintern' s directives., and for exhibiting 
netional Jewish tendencies in its persisting pre-occupation with the 
Jewish com=ity. 
103 Auerbach.. representing Palestine at the Congress 
came out in disagreement with Bukharin' s report on the declining 
importance of the colonies to capitalism.. and reproached him and the 
entire Comintern leadership for not paying sufficient attention to the 
Arab East. 
1014. But he remained silent on -the question of Arabisation. 
In December 1928 the PCP held a conference to discuss the 
recommendations oil the Comintern Congress. This conference reported 
increased police -persecutions arrests and deportations resulting in a 
veakening'of Party activity. 
105 Resolutions were passed stressing the 
paramount importance of organising Arab workers and reoognising the, 
increasing pro-imperialist orientation of the Arab leadership'. Auerbach 
had attempted to re-organise the Party on his return fIvm Moscow only 
to be met by opposition from some who did not accept that the new 
Comintern line was correct. 
106 The conference condemned the 
103- Hen Tov (pamphlet) oj). cit " P. 9. 
104. Speech of Haydar (Palestine) on Bukharin' s report to the Sixth 
Comintern Congress. in'Preco -N 48.1928. P- 851- 105- The Third Conference of the PCPp December 1928. Inpreco 
N 1.1929. P. 15. 
106. Hen Tov (thesis) op. cit. p. 64. 
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oppositionist as well as "the defeatist mood" permeating sections of 
the Party as a result of the Comintern' s opposition to the PCP's 
political line. In the event it proved'impossible to arrive at a 
final decision and it was resolved to continue the discussion of the 
Comintem's directives in the Party' s literature. 
107 
1929 vvas to prove a difficult year for the communist movement in 
Palestine. The attack on the "reformist Arab leadership" was carried 
out in accordance with the Comintern' s directives. 
108 At the same 
time - 
there was a change in the tone - of the Party' s propaganda. Less 
emphasis was accorded to "the coming world revolution" and more was paid 
immediate cure. The agrarian problem to specific problems and theiz 
Wr_- -the centrepiece of the Party' s progr=. 'Recogn-Ising the absence 
d cf-an. -A-rab proletarik; t., it e=phasised that the coming revolution woul 
land have an agrarian characterp and it called for the distribution of 
'to the peasants and the refusal to pay debts and taxes, with the aim 
of widening the class divisions -within the Arab community. 
log 
-The inte-mal affairs of the Party were not in order. It had been 
hit by a strong wave of arrer: ts and them was a decrease in its 
publizhing activitys Branches were criticised by the CC for relying 
too much on "leafleting! ' and "easy" propaganda, substituting thAs for 
"real contact" with the Arab masses. 
110 The contents of Party' 
literature also came under criticism. It did not relate to the 
-ed and Party activists were conditions of those to whom it was ac1dres. 
characterised as "propaganda team calling the masses to struggle but 
standing aside themselves". The large nunber of arrests was directly 
linked to this zode of activity 
13-1 
and the Party I called for the . 
preservation of trained-cadres raising the slogan of "big gains through 
smll -losses". 
107. This referred to the ECCI Letter to PCP Congress, December 1928, 
pblisbed in In-orO-cor N 29.1929 p. 647. 
. 2m. cit. P. 
10. The Political Situation in 108. Hen Tov (papp-h-3-e-t7- 
Palestine Inpreco -N 50.1929. p. 1056. 
109. Forois,, 19 May 1929. op. cit. p. 61. The First of August in 
Palestine Inrreco .N 42.1929.1.899. 
110. CQ/TCP. Inte=. al Bulletin X 11 (Arabic), addressed to Branches* 
Fraktzia and Youth Section. 
in. It was re-, orted that 6C% of those arresteds were caught while 
distributing leaflets. 
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A plenary-session of the CC held in mid-1929, conde=ed the 
defeatist mood penieating the Party,, and the underestimation of the 
role of the working class in the forthcoming struggles in Palestinp. 
112 
It was clear that opposition existed to the Comint, 
, ern' s slogan of a 
"workers' and peasants' goverment" in Palestine and the Arab countries. 
'The opposit tion regarded the national movement with its current leader- 
-hip as plkying the main rcle in the ntrugZle for a democratic republic. 
The Party' r. role should -be to support this as a transitional demand. 
M-ie CC condemned this viewpoint as fostering "democratic illuions among 
the masses", and as over-estimating the influence of the nationalists 
who were actually -raking capitulatory deals with the British at the 
expense of the Amb populp-tion,, and it called for an intensification of 
the struggle against-the "right wing" of the Party. 
On, the eve PCP -of the August 1929 t; prising in Palestine, the Is 
analysis of the situation and the main protagonists remained ! mchanged. 
-. Britain -required "the aid of a Jevvish national home" to maintain its 
113 hold on Palestine while the Zionists acted. in collaboration with 
Arab absentee landlords in expropriating, the Arab peasants. The 
characte: risation of the Arab national leaders as "sleeping partners 
-with Zionism" eventually led to the growth of defeatist tendencies 
-Y. A. thin the Pa. -ty which resulted in a decrease in its activities. 
114 
In June 1929 however., when nationali-st groups in Jaffa had called for 
a demonstration against land agentss the cccmmmists had supported the 
$ '.. 
"* 
demonstrations and attempted to introduce their own anti-imperialiet 
slogans. 
115 The Party leadership chose to derive encouragement from 
-what it perceived to be increasing militancy among young Arabs and 
vorkers and the recurring violent clashes between the Zionists and 
Arab peasant. 
n6 
- 
This new-mood of Party militancy reflected itself 
in the demonstrations and clashes with the police which took place on 
-August Ist, and resulted in the arrest of more than forty Party membersý117 
This was a shattering blow from which the Party had not yet recovered 
when three weeks later Ambý: Jewish hostilities were triggered off as a 
result of disagreements over the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. 
13.2. The Fight Against the Right Deviation.. Inpreco -N 29.1929. P. 113- The Fight for Lana in Palestine. Inprecor. M138.1929. p. 809. 
111+. The First of August in Palestine. Inpreco . N. 42.1929. p. 899. 115. The Fight for Land in Palestine. op. 
__cit. p. 
810. 
3.16. The Political Situation in Palestine. loc. cit. 
117. The First of August in Palestine. loc. cit. 
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CHAPM R TUO 
THE A=, SATION OF TIME PAIZSMP., 
C012=ST PARTY 
I 
Party Activitv among the Arabs since 1924 and the Position 
of the Comintern on Arabisation 
Mie steps which the DOCI took in the wake of the August, 1929 
events. in Palestine in decreeing the immediate Arabisation of the 
PCP, were the culmination of a politically consistent line which 
stretched back to the period before the recognition of the Party as 
a section of the Comintem in 192J+. 
The leaders of the PCP in t4eir discussions with the ECCI prior 
to 1924,, -, had met opposition to the Party' s, membership on the basis 
-national co=rosition of the group. 
1 The absence of Arab of the 
members-was attributed to insufficient work an the part of the Jemsh 
comvmists and to-a conscious- limitation of their activity to within 
the "Jewish g-hetto", Thus the difficulties encountered in winning 
-were-due primarily to this Comintern-view of the Party recognition 
as "a Jewish gmap confined solely-to work among the Jewish element 
and ignoring the Arab majority". 
2 Then recognition was eventually 
granted in 1924 this was accompanied by the first of the many demands 
which the MCI. was to make on*the Party to Arabise itself. 
3 
The Third Conference of the PCP, 1 held in July 1924, adopted the 
ECCI slogan of -"territorialisation" of the PartY4 and declared the 
readiness of the Party to effect a rapid realisation of this demand. 
A steady increase of activity in the Arab street can be readily 
wing this conference., but the tempo, of this observed in the years follo, 
activity did not greatly -impress the Comintern. Exactly a year later 
the =C9 tabled a resolution criticising the activity of the Party among 
the Arabs. ' 7' ihile reoognising that the PCP had-taken heed of the 
instructions to commence work among the Arabsp the resolution 
ezVhasised that., due to the absence of an Arab proletariat the Party's 
-main work should be aimed at the overwhelmingly peasant population of 
the-country "under the watchword of agrarian revolution". 
Despite the outwaxd acquiescence of the PCP with the ECCI's 
instructionsp the persistent concern of the latter with the development 
1. Police Report on Com=. mist Activity 1927- op. ci - p. 22. 
2. Police Report on Communist, Activity., 1925. op- cit. P. 
3- Conversation of Radek with Auerbach., see Offenberg., op. cit- P- 347-, 
4. The Third Conference of the PCP. Inpr N 48.1924- p. 14097. 
5- ECCI resolution: On the Question of Work In Palestine, May 1925- 
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of the Party indicates that the rate of progress 'continued to be 
regarded as unsatisfactory. An enlarged meeting of the ECCI in 6 
December 1926 again dealt with the problem of activity in Palestine* 
It was pointed out that the p=gress of the PCP had been slow.. and 
that the min reason for this was that theParty was still composed 
of "a few Jewish persons". The ECCI however was not able to offer 
any quick remedies. It rejected a suggestion that activity among 
the Jewish population should be reduced in order to enable the whole, 
cadre of the Party to concentrate on the Arab street. The solution3 
put forward were to increase the published propaganda of the Party 
in Arabic., and the inevitable--exhortations to redouble effort3 in 
order to make the-PartY "Arab in character". 
-The Comintern in its emphasis onvork within-the Arab population,, 
instructed the Party to establish relations with'the-leadership of 
7 
the- Arab national movement. This line was to persist until the 
Sixth Comintem Congress in 1928 when the policy was reversed. The 
new course was explained in a communication of the BOCI to the PCP 
which,, forecasting the outbreak of an agrar*an revolution in Palestine, 
called on the Party to prepare itself for a leading role by entrenching 
itself among the Arabs as the standard bearers of the anti-imperialist 
revolution. The failure of, the PCP to adopt what the Comintern saw 
-as a correct position to theJ*ugust 1929 events,, was siezed. upon as 
the outcome of the mistaken policy of the Party and its refusal to 
abide by the EXI's-instructions. Consequent], y., the Comintern gave, 
up its calls for a progression towards an Arabised Party and instead. 
tcok active steps to ensure the desired transformation. 
Within the PCP two tendencies haa, co-existed from t1he time of 
its recognition by the Comintern until the major shake-up which 
followed the August 1929 events. - The first called for Arabisation, 
and held that the Party should be composed in its majority, of members 
of the population group Ahich was in a position to undertake the anti- 
imperialist struggle. In Palestine this group was perceived to be 
the Arabs. Consequently the Party.. claiming as--it did to stand at the 
6. Speech of Auerbach at Tel-Aviv PCP meeting, 8 March 1927- loc- cit- 
7. Interview with J. Berger-Barzalai, Tel Aviv., 2 January 1974. See 
also Offenbergj o ci P- 355. 
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bead of the anti-imperialist revolutionary movemento could not be 
Jewish. This tendency continued until 1929 to be the minority group 
in the Party., and its platform was not reflected in official Party 
doctrine. 
The second and predominant tendency upheld the doctrine of 
Tishu7ism and attributed to the Jewish community in Palestine a 
progressive role in the social and economic development of the couatry. 
It regarded the economic transformation consequent on Jewish immigra- 
tion as beneficial to the capitalist development of Palestine and to 
the break-up of ancient feudal structures, whichinitsturn would lead 
ifferentiation within the Arab com=ity. Consequently a to class ell 
distinction was drawn between the Zianist movement and the development 
of the Jewish con=unity and an identity of interests was proclaimed 
mities in the countr7. between--the two national commu= Thus the per-lod 
1324-1929 saw an understandable pre-occupation with the problems of 
the Jewish immigrant society. The most active organisations. of the 
Party., the Fraktzia and the Red Aid Society concentrated their vork 
among the Jewish unemployed and the left-Zionist groups. 
Opposition to the Party leadership ca from both the right and 
the left of its ovm ranks. The "right deviation" exhibited itself 
Trior to 1929 as a tendency which underestimated the strength of the 
working class and the mass mvement in the country and which held a 
. "defeatist attitude" towards the possibility of successful work. 
8 it 
denied the validity of the Comintem's forecast of a projected agrarian 
upheaval and mistrusted the revolutionary potentialities of the Arab 
population. It demanded a more active policy within the Yishuv., and 
at the same time the establishment of stronger relations with the 
3. eadership of the Arab movement. 
This position was condemed. by the Party with the full approval 
of the MCI Its denial of revolutionar7 possibilities in the Arab 
street and its position regarding the primacy of activity with the 
Yishuv appeared to amount to a call for revolution based on the 
forces of the Jewish working class alone. Yet these ideas were 
shared by a section of the leadership of the Party, consequently the 
The Fight Against the Right'Deviation in the PCP. Inprec N 29 
1929. p. 647. 
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strugjae -against the "x-ight deviation" continued in the following 
years., to be coupled v6, ith the struggle for Arabisation. 
The perceived threat to the Party leadership came from another 
direction. A small element in the Party continued to echo the 
"heretical"-viewB of the 192. 2 opposition to the existence of a Jewish 
communist party and pointed to the irrationality of the presence in 
Palestine of anti-Zionist Jews., Their policy advocated concentrating 
Party activity on the Arab population only and of maintaining contact 
with the more extreme wing of the Arab national movement. 
9 Their 
policy also clashed -aýrith that of the Party leadership oonceming 
activity within the Yishiv which they regarded as, a holn geneous whole 
with the Jevash workers too closely identified with the Zionist 
colonization project., 
In a statement delivered to the Seventh Arab Congress meeting 
in June 1928t this opposition gmup under the name of-the "Jewish. 
Workers Committee" denounced Zionism as the enemy of the Arab people 
and declared- that the "Arab people living in Palestine are the only 
10 
ones with a right to it". As far as the Jewish inhabitants were 
concerned, the statement declared that "the home of theJew- is the 
place he happens to be bom in".. and it was his duty to struggle for 
his rights in his country of origin. In Palestine,, the daty of 
Palestinian Jews was declared to be to struggle with the, Arabs for 
their common liberation and to extend sup ort for the Arab national lp 
independence movement., The leadership of the PCP saw this as a 
deviation from the official Party line, and was quick to send a 
rebutal to. -the Arabic press denying that the statement of the 
Workers' Committee embodied the communist position,, or that the group 
11 
-was in any way associated with theParty. 
Yet despite the repeated demands of the MCI,, the leadership of 
the Party, vhich had remaineil unchanged from 1924 to 1930 continued 
9. Letter of A. Ka=i in Palastin, 26 march 1929. See also F-0-373/ 
14500/3997. Police Report on Communist Activity,, June 1930- P- 14 
where it was reported. that this group had been expelled from the 
party in 1928. 
0. Statement sent to the SeventbPalestine Congress by the Jewish 
woricers Committee (signed by 53 members). Al Jamia. Al Arabiya, 
25 June 1928. 
Statement of PCP on Seventh Palestine Congress, 6 July 1928. 
Al Jamia Al Arabiya., 9 July 1928. 
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!t 
to pay little more than lip service to the practical application of 
Arabisation. An enlarged Plen= of the Cd which convened in 
December 1928 to discuss the resolutions of the Sixth C=intem 
Congress, was marked by-the complete absence o., &"' any reference to 12 
Arabisation. Not only did the leadership of the Party remain one 
hundred per cent Jewi.: -: h,, but its doctrine was likewise unchanged. 
However both conditions in Palestine and the actual composition of 
the Party itself had began to show signs of change. After a relative 
period of quiet., the Arab national movement towards the end of the 
twenties became restive and showed signs of the advent of a more 
agressive policy vis-a-vis both the Zionists and the British. This 
quelled the voices within the "Party vhich had continued to ignore 
the Comintern's-prognostications. At the some t: bne., the presence of 
Arabs in. the Partyýwas beginning to make itself felt. Although Arab 
members constituted a small minority,, their pz-. scmce was nevertheless 
a novel development and, opened up vistas of new activity in the 
ý- country. 
The first direct appeal of the Party to the Arab populationg took 
the fo--= of a leaflet issued on the first of May 1921 and signed The 
'Libertarian Party of Palestine. 
13 The Party called m Arab labourers 
not to work on that-day and to demonstrate in the streets under the 
banner cal" the red flag. A'fter a general description of the 
international labour movement,, it called on the Arab labourers to 
unite with Jewish workers who, it explained had not come to Palestine 
to -oppress the Arabs but- to struggle jointly with them against Arab 
and Jewish capitalists. The leaflet- ended with a declaration that the 
Jewish workers were "the soldiers of the revolution" and raised the 
Elogan of. "Soviet Palestine". There was no mention of the Balfour 
Declaration or of the struggle against Zionismv and the overwhelming 
e=hP- is -w" On class conflict and the class struggle. 
The Party continued to address itself to the Arabs on various 
occasions., but its propaganda effort was small and infrequent, and 
12. The Third Conference of the PCP., 1-2 December 1928. Inprec 
N. 1 1929. P. 15 
13- Al Hizb Al Ibahi: Arabic leaflet addressed, To All Groups of 
Workers in Palestine, under the general headingj, Workers of the 
World Unite. The leaflet was reproduced in full in Al Nafir., 
14 May 1921. 
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d 14 in-general. its leaflets were badly written and produce indicating 
the absence of Arabs from its ranks. 
After 1924, increased interest was-shown in the Arab field, and 
the-Party made some gestures towards fulfilling the EOCI's instructions 
to win over the Arabs and leave the Jewish ghetto. The breakthrough 
came with the struggle in Affula between the Arab tenants of land sold 
by a vealthy., *. rab family to the Jewish National Fund, and the new 
Jewish owners who attempted to take possession of the land and evict 
th& Arab - peasants. In the affray that resulted.. one Arab peasant was 
killed and -several Arabs and Jews were injured. The PCP rapidly 
4ssued a statement condemning the action of the Zionists in attempting 
15 to evict--the Arab peasants from-their land. It attacked the Jewish 
bourgeoisie for "dipping its band in the blood of, innocent Arab and, 
Jewish workers", and warned the latter that they were being used as 
cannon fodder to further, the ai= of Jewish capitalism. The Party 
stated its determination to disrupt the occupation of the land at 
Affula. and in addition to its agitation on behalf of the Arab peasants, 
dispatched I its members to support them in resisting the Jewish settlers 
-as a-gesture of both support-and defiance. 
16 
This action seryed to further estrange the Party from the Jewish 
community while bringIng it to the attention of the Amb national 
movement. 
17 Previously the Arab press had reported various 
activities of the Party and reproduced its leaflets,, -albeit 
in an 
effort to discredit it and to bring it to the attention of the 
is 
authorities. The action at Affula delivered the Party's propaganda 
to a wider audience that its meagre resources allowed and presented 
it to the Arabs in a positive Ught. Initial contact was made with 
19 
some cf the leaders of the AMila. dispossessed tribes but although 
-olice Report on Co=rnist Activity, 1927. op. ci p. 19. 14. r 
A call from the PCP on the Affula Incident. Hebrew leaflet of 15- 
Cq/paP 29 Novenber 1924. 
: L6. Offenbergl op. cit. P. 338- 
17- The Party's leaflet on the incident was published in full in 
Al Nafir, 9 Decem ber 1924. 
18. e. g. Fa astin, 28 March 1924 published an article on Auerbach's 
speech at the Comintern Congress and described the activity of 
the PCP. 
4 ew See 19. interv with J. Berger BarzaIAL " Tel Aviv., 2 January 1974. 
also police Report on Communizt Activity, 1925. op. cit. pp. 14-17- 
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the Party continued to agitate for anred resistance against Zionist 
land'acquisition, it was not able to exploit its initial contacts nor 
reap szky practical long term benefits from its involvement in the 
affair. 
The real succesr of the Pa-rty in the Arab field during 1924 arose 
from its contact with Ell-44ya Zakkaq the owner of a well established 
Haifa jou, -rmlj Al Nafirt who conducted a financial arrangement with 
the Party to P'roduce a weekly journal puttling forward the general line 
of 'the conm=ists and performing an educational-cum-agitational role. 
20 
The first issue of this journal "Haifa"21 was published in October 1924 
and publication continued somewhat irregularly until the end of 1925. 
The journal, well- wri Itten and produced, dealt with general political 
topics, and concentrated on the affairs of the lebour movement and trade 
union organisation. - It contained translations from Russian and 
articles or. the international labour movement., as well az analysis of 
the political situation in the neighbouring Arab countries. It 
adopted a militantly anti-British line and also attacked the leadership 
of the Arab national movement., but largely iEpored the Zionist movement. 
. L., 
It- main e=-. hasis was on the community of interests between Arab and 
Jewish woeKers. 
22 
--which led it to come out against the attempts made by 
some Arab workers to establish independent Arab trade unions. 
In addition to this legal journal., various attempts were made by 
local Party committees to distribute propaganda sheets 
23 but none of 
these proved to have any staying power. The Party did not bring out 
a regular printed Arabic organ until 1929., by which, time it had gained 
sufficieLit Arab cadres and war. oeLpable of sustaining a regular Arabic 
mouthpiece. 'The first issue of Ella. Al Armam24 attempted to introduce 
the Party to the -. Arp-b public by giving an account of its activities and 
20. Police Report on Co==nis-It Activity.. 1925., Lbid. p. 43. 
21.. faifaq subtitle Majalat al Ummal the Workers' Journal). F1 its 
Seventh issue, 15 January 1925, subtitle was changed to Workers' 
and Peasants' Journal. 
22. 
, 
Haifa, N 18.21 May 1925. pp. 144-145. 
23. e. g. Shabiba (Youth) issued by the Jaffa local co=. ittee,, 15 April 
1924, and Al munabeh (The Clarion) also issued by the Jaffa local 
Committee in 1926. 
24. 'Ella Al Ammam (Forward) Organ of CQ/PCP; Section of the Comintern. 
The first issue was in March 1929. This was a seventeen page 
number, with the hammer and sickle prominent on the front cover 
above the Party' s namie. 
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principles and explaining its links with the international commmist 
movememt. It called on Arab workers to unite with their Jewish 
counterparts and warred them of the attempts made by the British and 
the Arab feudal leaders to divert their attention against the Jews. 
The journal did not introduce any changes in the propaganda line of 
the Party and continued to plece the emphasis on the class rather 
than on the national independence struggle. 
The Party' s efforts in the direction of the Arab population were 
slowly beginning to bear. fruit. On the occasion of May Ist 1925s 
Haifa journal called a general meeting to celebrate the day 25 while 
la on 11, y lst 1926, Arab woricers joizied their -Tev. -ish comrades in Haifa 26 in coming out an strike. ' Contact was established with an Irab 
labour o. ganisation, the Palestine Arab Vi*orkers Society in Haifa in 
27 19259 and the Party succeeded in organising a number of Arab workers 
Jerusalem and Haifa. 
28 The most significant. success of the Party 
in the trade union field was the organisation of the 1hud (Unity) 
29 Movement conference in December 1926 which was attended by sixteen 
Jrab delegates out of a total of eighty-five., and led by two 
prominent Arab cwummists., Rafik Jabbour3' and Abdul Ghani al Karad. 
31 
A pampblet issued soon after the conference declared that its aim was 
25. Haifa. N. 15- 30 April, 1925. 
26. Falast 7 May 1926. 
4 June 1926. 27. Falastin See also Police Report on Communist Activity., 
1927.0 pe "0 
28. Falastin, 15 liovember 1926,13 April 1928,16 May 1929. See also 
Police Report on Communist, Activity, 1925., 
-crp. - ci - P. 
16. 
29. Police Rerýort on Communist Activity., 1927., op. ci - r-p- 32-33- See also Inprecorg N- 3 1927. 
30- RafIk Jabbour (1882-1927) a Journalist of Lebaneze origin who was a 
member of the CC of the Egyptian Communist Party and editor of its Journal Al Hissab. He was arrested in June 1925 and sentenced to 
six months imprisonment and deportation. After a brief stay in Lebanon., he arrived in Jaffa in 1926 and secured employment as a journalist with Falastin. Prior to his death, he had been served, 
with a deportation order on account of his communist activity. 
31- Abdul Ghani al Karmi (iqo6_i974), t the son of an established family 
In Tulkarem. 9 he was one of the earliest menbers of the Party and was 
sent to Moscow in 1927 for a short course of instruction. He 
dissociated himýelf from the Party on his arrival back in Palestine 
3m the same years and in his activity as a journalist wrote 
various articles attacking it. He later became a confident of 
Kind Abdullah of Jordan, and was appointed Jordanian Ambassador 
in Spain. 
35 
to Jay the foundations of a truly intemational. labour movement in the 
country, uniting Arab and Jewish workers. 
32 Here again however, the 
Party-was not able to sustain the break-through, and the Unity Movement 
ti=al death soon after. suffered a nel 
Contacts with 'the Arab national movement were established on the 
recommendation of the ECCI. Initiating with a message of support 
delivered to -the Arab Executive expressing the Party's solidz-, ='ty 
33 
with the victims of an anti-Balfour visit demonstration in Damascust 
contact was established YIth a group of extremist Arab nationalists 
centred round the figure of Hamid Hursseini. 
34 Relations were also 
zet up with one off the estzbliý-ed leaders of the national movement 
35 Jazall Husseini., while in the 1927 election to the Jerusalem 
=micipality, the Party issued a statement calling on the Jewish 
inhabitants of Jerusalem not to cast their votes for the Nashashibi 
faction. 36 
The relations of the Party with the leadership of the Arab 
national movement came to an abrupt end in 192837 as a natural result 
of the ner Comintern, policy decided in its-Sixth Congress. Contact 
-however was maintained with Hamdi HuLseini and his group. The Party 
saw him as the representative of a left bloc within the Amb national 
movement, and as such connected him with the League Against Imperialism 
which was active in Berlin. - Unable to attend the Frankfurt Congress 
of the League as a result c the Egyptian Goverrment' s refusal to grant 
8 
him a visa3 H. Hus-seini. was elected anýhonorary member of the praesidium 
32. Statement to AllWorkers in Palestine. Arabic Pamphlet pr-Inted In 
; 'ý! - - 
Jaffa by the Unity Club (n. d. ) 
The Pax-ty also sent a sm-all financial donation, Falastin, 8 May 1925. -33 Interviews v. -ith J. Berger-Barzalai,, Tel Aviv,, 2 January 1974, and 34- 
with Hamdi Husseini, Gazat 7 &S leptember 1975. Hamcli Husseiniq from 
Gaza., was a teacher and joumalist active in Jaffa. He headed a 
small group of "left nationalists" within the Istikla: L Movements 
and played a prominent role in the Seventh Arab Congress in 
op). osition to the moderate Arab leadership. During the August 
1929 events he came out in opposition to Arab attacks on Jews.. 
and was imprisoned by the Britith on charges of incitation. 
35. Offenberg.. o"o. cit- P- 358. 
A-1 JWnia A-I ArabiYas 7 April 1927. 36. 
On the Occasion of the Seventh Arab Congress. Arabic Leaflet of 37. 
cq/ý? cP, June 1928. See also Letter of PCP to Davar, 4 November 1929., 
CZA S25/3268. 
Telegr= of H. Hu-, seini to Frankfurt Congress of League Against 38. 
Falastin., 25 July 1929. Imperialism. 
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of-the Congress. Howevero Palestine's voice was not absent from the 
gather-Ing. In addition to a PCP delegate, Dr. Khalil Budeiri, a 
Palestinian Arab in sympathy with the Party, addressed the Congress 
3 
and rDundly condemned both Zionism and British Imperialism. '9 H. 
Huzsseini was however able to attend a-meeting of the League in 
Cologne held later in 192940 and f=m there travelled to Moscow with 
the Secretary of thePCP, where he met Stalin. 
41 The connection of 
the Party with Hamdi- Husseini was to last, with few minor . 
1apses, 
until 1948 and the partition of the couatx7. 
The actual gain in tems of Arab cadres which the PCP achieved 
in this period is hard to estimate. The party claimed its first 
Arab member in 1924,42 and as early as January 1925, one of its leaders 
Berger-Barzalai, impressed on the Party the necessity of sending Arab 
students to Moscow's University of Toilers of the East43 an indication 
that the PCP had already secured the allegiance of a rmber of Arabs. 
The first such Arab member to travel to Yoscow was Naiati Sidki 
a1-Alay=*. n: 144 one of the first Arabs to join the Party. 
45 Between 
1925 and 1930, twelve Arabs-travelled to Moscow, most of them for 
short stays of just--under a year, -where they studied conspiratorial 
methods and general political topics. A number of them deserted the 
46 
Party soon after their retu= , vhile a few decided to stay on in the 
'r 
- 
39- Al Ahrar 16 and 24 August 1929. 
40- Inpreco 
:K 26. Rovember 1929. P-' 1330. 
41. vith 11amdi Hus-seini, Gaza, 7th September 1975. 
1ý2. Interview with Yussuf Yazbak, Beirut, 26 October 1974. - See also 
"Police Report on Communist Activity, l9Z5,, _22. ci p. 
9. 
43. Ibid. p. il. 
44. Tlajati Sidid was a clerk in the Post Office in Jerusalem. He 
travelled to Moscow in 1925/6 and returned In 1929. He was 
appointed to the CC in 1930 on the direct intervention of the 1=1 
but was arrested a couple of months after his appointment. After 
serv: Lng two years in jail, he left for Syria and later participated 
in the Spanish Civil War. He remained active in the Syrian 
Co--=mist Party till the outbreak of World War Two, whereupon he 
severed his connections with communism and was allowed to return 
to Palestine where he became a radio journalist. 
45- Interviews with J. Berger-Barzalai., Tel-Aviv, 2 January 1974, and 
with Najati Sidki., Beirut., 15 October 1973- See also letter of 
Ahmad Sidki . Najatil s brother., Falastin 'x 
23 May 1931- 
, L6. Ahmad Sidki and Abdul Ghani al Karmi. 
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Soviet Union. Among the- rest howevers were mýmbers who were to 
become prominent as leaders of the Party in the next tzo decadez47 
and one who was to die in Spain fighting for the'Republic. 
48 Police 
reports reflected this constant trend of growth. Vibile in 1927 
only four na s of active communists were listed, a report in 1929 
listed the names of nineteen Arab co=unists49 while another in 1930 
listed twenty-six. 
50 
The majority of the new recruits came from the 
=all Arrab worldng classq although there was also a fair number of 
educated members, mostly journalists. For some,, especially the 
educated membersr the motive for Joining the Party was undoubtedly 
the anti-imperialist struggle, 
51 but for the majority the attraction 
could only have been the day-to-day economic struggle,, drawn by the 
Party's slogan such as the eight-hour clay., better conditions of rork., 
equal -, ayýwith Jewish workers and many other demands. 
As far as the Comintern -ikas concemed the Party's record was not 
uapressi Ive. In a review of the first four years of the Party' s 
existence the Comintem recorded that its. raain activity had been 
concentrated in the Jewish labour movement, while Arab activities 
consizted of an intervention in the Jerusalem Municipal election 
52 
and the izsuingýof a legal. Arab Journal. This was a grossly 
unf air -resume of the PCPI s strugglýs considering the difficulties 
it encountered im -its work, both as an underground party and as a 
Jewish paity attempting to penetrate a hostile and generally backward 
environment. The'Comintern however, desired to set up an 
influential section in Palestinep and this by definition had to be 
an Arab party. It hoped to employ the Jewish com=nist grouping 
in the country to perform this task. Yet in the six years of the 
Party'-. existence.. it had managed to lay the groundwork by 
; 4J : j; iJ' 
- recruiting an Arab cadre., training it and selecting Arab members for 
47. Najati Sid1d, Mahmoud Noghrabi,, Radwan al Hilou,, Taher Yoghrabi. 
48- Ali Abdul Flialek al Tuwaini, from al Jib near Jerusalem. 
49. Rerort 
' 
of Political Executive of Zionist Organisation on Commmism 
in Palestines 31 October 1929. CZA S 25/7807- 
50. - Police 
Report on Co=mnist Activity 1930- op. ci - Pp. 30-31- 51- Interviews with Najati Sidki,, Beirut, 12 March 19749 and with 
Radwan al Hilou., Jericho, 12 January 1974. 
52. The Comintern Between the Fifth and the Sixth-Wcrld Commesses., 
1924-192 (London., 1928). -PP- 417 418. 
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further instrLction in Moscow, and generally bringing itself to the 
attention of the Arab populstion. At the same time., the Party had 
attempted, by utilizing the Affula incident and similar cases., to 
arouse the peasants., not only against the Jewish settlers. * but also 
against their feudal landlords-and the British, In all this the 
PCP was handicapped by the fact that it had to employ Jewish cadres 
who were hardly suited for such a task. Its difficull. Aes viiich 
arose from conditionz, beyond its control were to continue to hamper 
itv-ac-tl. ivity even after laabisation. Jewish members continued to be 
in the majority and had to be relied upon to -work among the Arab 
popul"st - -4 on. is difficult to envisage Nye the consequent 
Arabisation could have been attempted without the exittence of the 
Arab cadre which the Jewish leadership of the twenties had itself 
-enlisted and trained. 
The PCPI s Characterisation, of the Auvu! ýt 1929 Events in Palestine 
The com"usion, -which characterised. the political line of the PCP 
on the outbreak of disturbances in Palestine in August 1929 can be 
t 
Uraced back directly to -the- changes introduced in the international 
cormmmist movement at the Fixth Congre-ýs of the Comintern in 1928. The 
Party was not unrani=us in its acceptance of the new orthodoxy of an 
impending stage of heightened class struggle in Europe., and revolutionary 
outbreaks in the colonies. ' In December 1928, the ECCI addressed itself 
to the PCP calling on it to wage a struggle against all Arab nationalist 
groups, especially the clerical f eudal, reactionary leader. -. hip of the 
Arab Ational movementP It'also called upon it to repudiate the 
doctrine of Yishuvism.. andother theories of the positive aspects of 
Jewish immigration"into the co-untry. The BOCI put forward a new 
demand for Arabisation which was backed up by a forecast of intense 
radicalisatim cr-P the Arab masses, and by the necessity of relying 
on them in the struggle for the establishment of a Workers' and 
Peasants' Gcve-. mm nt in Palestine. 
53. The Fight Against the Right Deviation. Inpreco .N 29.1929. p. 
647- 
See also forois, 19 May 1929, p. 13, quoted in Hen-Tov (Worcester) 
orp. cit. pp. 10-11. 
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Opposition to the new line of the Comintem and its application 
to Palestine was strong. A group which came to be kncmn as the 
"right deviationists,, 54 rejected the validity of the "third per-iod" 
continued to affirm that while there waz indeed a mdicalisation 
in Palestine,, this should not be overestimated as the growth of 
the revolutionary movement had not yet reached the stage of an 
offensive waged by the wisses against their enemies. 
55 The 
"rightists" held to their demand for a democratic republic and 
estimated that the Party was not strong enough to embark on a 
revolutionary path faced as it was with strong government repression 
and its weak position A ng the Arab population. The differences 
within the Fartty were =altiplied by the recent arrival from Moscow 
of some--of the Arab students previously dispatched, who began to 
--; on vahat thvj regarded as the "Jewish hegemony,,. 
56 
quest They 
de-rmnA d that the Ilowners of" Palestine"57 v&, o understood its people 
better than the Jews, should have-first say in the Partyq and be 
allowed, to at least partake in the Party's decisions and adWnis- 
tration. The Comintern decided to send an emissary to Palestine 
to investigate the Party's affairs and see har, far it had travelled 
58 
along the path of Arabization. 
The outbreak of disturbances at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem 
in October 1928, proved to be a dress rehearsal for the much bloodier 
events'a year later. The Party characterized the events as a "little 
oVmd,, 
59 
and accused the British Goverment of arousing national 
conflicts in Palestine between the Arab and Jewish commuaities in 
order to maintain its dcmination of the country. The Party' s 
response to this 
-. 
Pogx was a call for unity between Arab and 
Jewish -workers, and it appealed to both sides not to let themselves 
be provoked by their respective leaders,, and to reject calls for 
national incitement. The Party did not profess to see any revolutionary 
54- The Fight Against the Right Deviation. loc. cit. 
The Political Situation in Palestine. Inpreco 55. -N 50- 1929. p. 1057- 56. police Reporl on C om3r op. ci, . p. 16. mist Activity., 1930. 
Letter of A. Karmi in Falastin, 26 March 1929. 57 
58- j. Berger-Barzalai. Jerusalem,, August 1929. Keshet,. N 29.1965. 
p. 125- 
59- Inperialist Provocation in Palestine. Inpreco N 73- 1928. 
P. 1330. 
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character-in the events, nor did it regard them as a sign of the 
growing radicalisation of the Arab masses. The compeient Comintern 
authorities did not fault this analysis, an act which was to lead the 
Party to characterise the August 1929 events in the same way, in the 
-evident belief that it had full Comintem approval. 
The outbreak. of the August disturbances came as a surprIze to the 
le&dex--, hip of 'the PCP. , 
The Parl. y had issued a leaflet on the eve of 
the first bloody outbreaks which was pacifistic in tone. 
60 
A 
suggestion to bring out another statement af ter the development of 
the dis"t-arbances was turned dawn by the Secretariat, 
61 
reflecting the 
uncertainty and confusion which pervaded it., and the absence of any 
meaningful analysis of the deep-seated causes of the conflict. The 
CCIs leaflet characterised the troubles as an imperialist p=%rocation; 
Britain, afraid of the unity of Arab and Jewish workersv was 
iaszigating racial hatred-to divide the two communities,, and in this 
it was-aided by the Zionist leaders and the Arab effendis.. The - 
leaflet portrayed the struggle taking place as one between brothers 
and called on Arab and Jewish workers to cease fighting each other.. 
p, nd to - 
direct t-heir -common-eff'Ort-. against British rule and the Zionist 
and Amb. leaders. 
The first authoritative desc. -. -Iption va-itten by a member of the 
Paxtyl s Secretariet gave a contradictory appraisal of the events. 
62 
They -were characteris-ed as both a ""pogrom" and a "general Arab T 
uprising". initially the uprising was seen to have taken an "anti- 
Orewish fox&',, as a result of Moslem clerical instigation. The * 
Supreme-Moslem, Council had "inf lamed the fanatic hatred of the -. 
Moslems- against the Jewish unbelievers", arui the Gover=ent saw to 
it that the flames of national hatred would keep blazings by turning 
a blind- eye and -even supporting the rumours spread by the "frantic 
M,. ses of 111ohanmaden peasants and Bedouins under the leadership of 
obscurantist clericals, feudal chiefs., and bourgeois elements" that 
the Goverment was in support of the massacre of Jews. , 
The report 
60. Do not change the wailing wall to a wall of hatred between you. 
Hebrew leaflet of CC/PCP- 19 August 1929. 
61. Berger-Barzalp-i. Op. cit. p. 129. 
62. The Blood Bath in the Holy Land. (Berger Barzalai. ) Inpreco N 50- 
1929. p. 1058. 
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detailed the massacres of Jeve in Hebron and gilier places and the 
brutal destruction of settlementsz. At the same tivie., Berger pointed 
out that alt, a certain stage, the movement began to get out of the 
hands of its instigators, a fact attested by the attack. - on Britich 
Goven=ent buildingz! in 'the purely Arab town. The reasons which 
Berger presented for this "Goverment inspired pogrom" were 
start33ngly out of touch with reality. They served however to cover 
up the lack cf any serious analy-ris. The Goverment,, he stated., 
vias "trying at any price to destroy the Arab-Jewissh rapprochment 
observable in the recent years". 
63 
In the face of *thist 1, the Party 
r-gain raised the -3q=s of fratemisation of Arabs and Jews and 
daubed- the v. mlls of Jezusalem with slogans calling on the workers 
to t=n again, t the common enemy, instead of murderizig one another. 
On a nore. practical level, the Party acted in accoraance with 
" ": 
"" "-" 
+ 
'" -: - 
the Comintem-1 s emiassax7- v; ho,, by' an unhappy coincidence arrived in 
Palestine a few days prior to the outbreak of the uprising. 
64 
The 
attacks on'theJewish quarter in Jerusalem,, posed the Party with a difficult 
question. If-the movement-engulfing the cOuntrY*was apogrom, then 
it was the duty of the TM -to call on its merbers to defend the 
threatened Jeynish quarters. In the event this was the decision 
of the Party Secretar-iat,, and it was one with which the CominterW is 
emissary concurred. 
65 
The Fecretar-lat' s decision was that "whereas 
there is a danger of a pogrom and massacres, it is the duty of 
members of the PCP and the Frrsktzia, to join the Hagana in those 
. 66 quarters which are in danger". This decision was promptly 
implemented in Jerusalem. Iforeover,, members of the Party met with 
Hagana leaders, informing them of the Party' a decision,, and putting 
at their-disposal the Party's small arms cache. In retrospect this 
was a natural position for the Party to take. It fo3-lowed logically 
from its chameterisation of the nature of the events and ftom its 
isolation from the Arab masses. Taking into consideration the 
63- The Blood Bath in the Holy Land. loc. cit. 
64. Berger-Barzalai, op. cit. p. 125. The emissaxy was Bohumil Smeralp 
a Czech member of the B3CI and a prominent ex social democratic 
leader and member of the Austrian Hungarian Parliament. For his 
activity before joining the Czech com=nist party, see T. Vaughan 
Thomas$ B. ISSmeral and the Czech questions 1904-1914. Journal of 
Conte=orary Histo N 2- 3 July 1976. 
65. Berger-Barzalais op. cit- P- 131. 
66. Ibid. 
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Party' s weak mess and its inability to put itEself at the head of the 
uprising, its role was reduced to that of spectator issuing calls 
for the avo-4dance of bloodshedp and putting the blame on an outside 
party. - the British authorities. This position which lacked any 
real atte=t to place events in their wider political context, where 
it was porsible to regard the racial massacres as a marginal aspect 
of a legitimate national anti-imperializ. t uprit-ing, was soon to give 
way to discuE-sion within the Party on the validity of such a 
characterisation. 
67 
Two documents, both issued by the CC towards the end of September 
1929, a month after the up -rising, reflect the growing confusion within 
Party ranks, and an atte=t to gral? le with the underlying cau es o sf 
68 the upheaval. "The Revolt in Palestine" provided an explanation of 
the background to the uprising and its general causes. The article 
started with tLt British occupation of Palestine, and its fostering 
of the Jewish national home, and described the Jewish community in 
the country as "the most advanced outpost of British imperialism in the 
69 Arabian eountries and one which served to protect the interests 
imperialiýý It portrayed Britain as engaged in a gaze of playing 
the national community off against the other, with the connivance of 
the traitorous Arab and Jer-ish leaders. It went on to list the 
justified gnievances of the Arab peasant masses and their hatred 
towartLs the Jewish settlers, "the intruders who took away not only 
the money and work of the poor peasants, but even what was dearest to 
them of anything, their small holdings". The resultant agrarian unrest 
radica. 3-ised and revolutionised the masses., who were actually on the brink 
of an anti-imperialiEt revolt against the British. - Here, the party's 
comzmmicue felt. impelled to provide an explanation for the "pogromist" 
aspects of theipprzing and rather than look for the cause within the 
framework of Palestinian conditions,, layed the blame on the reformist 
leaders and the imperialist government who spread the rumours of "al 
Doola maena"y7o and converted the impending revolution into a "Jihad" 
67. Berger-Barzolaip op. cit- P- 135. 
68. The Revolt in Palestine: Communique of CQ/PCP. Inpreco N 54 56. 
. 1929. 
69. Ibid. p. 1162. 
70- Ibid. p. 1163 (The Govermment is, with us). 
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where "the Jews had to be killed because they were Jewss". Listing the 
horrific excesses of the uprising, the murders and mutilations of old 
men, women and chi1drenp the statement went on to describe the 
attackers: "the Bedouins singing in religious ecstacy Khile they slit 
abdomms, and struck off the heads of little childr-en". 
71 Yet despite 
-14-, his., the Party was able to see the beginnings of the transformation 
of the movement "into a pan-Arab insurrectionary one, with ainz far 
exceeding 'the ma-sEzacres of the Jews"., 
72 
and one which "almo--t" tumed into 
an anti-imperialist rising. The combined force of the reformist Arab 
leaders, the Zionist "counter-pogr6miEts" and British military inter- 
vention thvarted this. The Party excused its inactivity during the 
whole affray by its "infancy and (it -was) much harassed by conzýtant 
-persecution on the part of the British Government apparatus and the 
Zionist and Arab bourgeoisiell. 
73 
and by its weakness in relation to 
both Arab and Jewish workers. Although it continued to procla the im 
necessity for national peace and class war., it admitted., in so many 
words.. that its calls went. xrheeded, and its stand remained completely 
irrelevant-to the actual state of-affairs. 
The second statement of the Party., "The Bloody War in Palestine 
and the Worldng Class" is a lengthy pamphlet issued in late September 
1929.74 It set out to answer the question "Miat Happened? " and 
provic led a detailed ansv.. er covering all aspects of the uprising and 
the position cf the Jewish co=mmity in the countr y., but remained within 
tlie - generml framework of the previous communique. Although this 
pamphlet. t did not introduce any startling new changes to the Party' s 
previous analysis, it did prcv3c a comprehensive platform e=bodying the 
Pcp1s political standpoint. It proclaimed the necessity of judging 
-the uprising from a class point of view, relating it to the revolutionary 
war aga-inst imperialism, and professed to see the roots of the events 
in the agrarian situation. The Zionists had destroyed peasant*land 
ownership and increased the poverty of the Bedouins. 
75 The reasons' 
71- The Revolt in Pale-tine: Communique of CC/Pop. Inpreco N 54 56. 
1929. 
72. Ibid. p. 1220. 
73- Ibid. p. 1221. 
74. Pamphlet i,, zsued by CC/PCP. The Bloody War in Palestine and the 
1, ýorking Class in Appendix to Political Report on Comrf=ist Activity 1930- 
75- Ibid. P. 2. 
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for the agrar-lan unrest were directly linked to this Zionist policy 
of expropriating land and expelling the peasants. 
76 The feudal Arab 
leaders and the Government,, both conscious of the impending revolutibnary 
agrarian outburst,, resolved to channel it into an anti-Jewish movement 
before it asssumed an inevitably anti-imperialist character. 
77 As 
.; 
ýtners, the Zionist leaders were also held accountable for this 
state of affairsy for through their land policy they had "converted the 
im-ish massez as an object of prey for the bittemers of the peasants" 
and placed the Jewish comm=ity in the front line trenches of 
i=perialism in Palestine. 
The uprising. had proceeded on the lines of "a pogrom slaughtering 
of Jers" while -Gaverrment mroperty was not touched and the Britich " 
molice were not attacked-ý 
8 
But "within the first twenty-four hours 
a ma s movement comenced 
11 ;o develop which over-reached the control 
of -. '. he Government", 979 and the ma ses began their. attacks on the Govern- 
mmt itself This characterisation of the speedy transformation of 
from the Party' s earlier statementj, was not -the movement, absent 
followed up. * The pamphlet moved on to-lay, the blam at the door of 
the Zionists for the national divisicn which existed in the workers' 
movtment, and vdAch was the main reason for the inability of the 
wczridng clazs to 7ut itself at the head of-the peasant masses and 
convert -the move-ment into a struggle against British imperialism. 
80 
The-Zionist movement was-labelled-as historically responsible for the 
81 
pogroms which were "a direct result of the Balfour Declaration". 
'In the absence of the Zionist movement and the national homet the 
ex-propriation. of peasantsip and support for the moderate and pro- 
i=perialist Arab faction., theParty was confident-that there would 
ý_have been-no religious national hatred in the country. Yet it 
affirmed that pogroms would continue to take place "until the British 
imperialists are driven out of the country". The Party insisted-. 
76. pamphlet issued by CC/FCP. The Bloody War in Palestine and the 
Working Class in Appendix to Political Report on Communist Activity 
1930- p- 3- 
77. Ibid. P. 4. 
78- Ibid. P. 6. 
79- Ibid. P. 7- 
80. - 'Ibid. P. 
11 
61. Ibid. P. 13- 
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on- the correctness of its line of joining neither the Zionists nor 
82 
the Arabs, and the mobilisation of its members "in the defence of 
the workers' quarters, and the poor shopkeepers against the attacks 
of the hooliganst'. 
83 It denied any support to the Zionist self- 
defence effort, claiming that it never abided by their orders, 
accepted their authoritys nor consented to the slogan of national 
unity. 'Sttating itz preferer-ce for "the ner, pogrocless revolution"84 
the Party's analysis ended by calling on Jevdsh workers to free them- 
selves from, the control of the Zionist organisation and on the Arab 
masses to rid themselves of the rich Arab landlords and sheiks. 
Thiss initial reaction of the TCP to the Augunt uprising contained 
within At a dual approach. The 'main emphasir was laid an its 
"pogromist" as-rects and the horrific details of the actual massacres. 
At the same time,, in providing the historical background for the out 
break, -the Party laid the-bl=e at the door of tne Z, ioniet movement 
-which by its very -presence and activity had called forth this attack 
on the Jewish community', - thus deflecting the movement from. its 
leg: itimte target., the British--authorities. To understand the 
Party's aversion to the-'Arab-attacks on the Jewish community which, 
according to the Party's own analysis,, were inevitable given the nature 
and aim of the Zionist presence in the country., it must be remembered 
that the Partywas a Jewish grouping holding tenaciously to the 
necessity of differentiating between the Zionist movement and the 
Jewish com=mity in Palestine, and completely alien to the Arab milieu. 
'Looking at the Arab community from the outsidet the Party leadership 
could not t perceive that the religious fanaticism of the Arab masses 
was simply an expression of their opposition-to the foreigners who 
were usurping tU 'heir lands, within the familiar reference points of 
pr -their value system, and _ 
imitive political awareness. The 
slaughter and pogroms were an inescapable reality in any social up- 
heavalp vhile the Party's call-for a ýpogromless revolution" was a 
I by CC/PCP. The Bloody War in Palestine and the 62. pamphlet issuec 
Wýorjdng Class in Appendix to Political Report on Communist 
Activity 1930Y P. 20. 
ibid. pp. 21-22. 83- 
-p. 29. 
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p 
hankering after a "pure revolution" the likes of which have never ever 
taken place. 
Yet the Party had second thoughts about its position even before 
it received the Comintem' s own version of events. Within the leader- 
ship of the Party a disc=-sion had already started85 and voices were 
raised denying that the mo-vement of 'the Arab masses had no anti- 
=perialist significance. In an enlarged. meting of the CC held in 
October 1929, prior to the receipt of a letter from the BCCI,, but at 
a time when the Party leadership had realised the existence of an 
entirely different and oppored interpretation the first voices of 
self-ce-tici= were beginning to make themselves heard. 
86 
1t was 
readilly ad=itted at the meeting that the upheaval had a national 
dimension., and the Haifa local committee of the Party,, which had 
refused to see in the events anything but a pogrom pure and simples 
was censured and re- . proached 
for "purposely overlooking all social 
motives of the movement". 
87 
However the meeting*upheld the previous 
analysis of the Party and reiterated that the movement had been 
deflected into a pogrom., expressing full-support for d confidence an 
in.. the leadership of-the Party. 
'q"ie Co=: inter. nl s Ch-iracterisation of The August 1929 Events 
as a Revolutionary Uprisin 
The different interpretations of events held by the PCP on the 
, one hand, and the rest of the intemational co=mmist movement on the 
other., became clear almost immediately following the suppression of the 
uprising. The Party received a communication from one of its leaders 
who at the time was in Moscow, hinting that the Comintern ealuated the 
, events differently from the Party Secretariat., preferring to see in 
them an anti-imperialist revolt. 
88 
The Party leadership must have 
already had an intimation of the Comintern's position, as the official 
organisation' s mouthpieces Inprecorj had earlier stated that "the Arab 
85. Berge--Barzalais op. cit. p. 135. 
86. The PCP ancl the Arab Revolt. Inpreco .N 61.1929. p. 1321. 87- Ibid. 
88. Berger-Barzalai. op- cit. p. 135. 
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national revolutionary movement has taken on the fom of an 
insurrection", 
89 
and one which it forecast would reverberate through- 
out the Arab world, The first official statement, by a Cominterm 
controlled organisation., was issued by the League Against Imperialism 
and Colonialism early in "-'eptember. 
90 It portrayed the struggle as 
one '"between the Arab inhabitantst and the immigrant 27, ionist population 
artif icially i=porxted" into the country,, and extended its -Urport to 
%hat it termed a "revolt against the economic and political serfdom" 
vhich Brit-, sh i=perialism had enforced. The manifesto explained that 
the Arab masses had risen against, the Zionist movement which "they 
-A, g-, htl, y regarded... as the main instrument of British imperialist 
exploitation" in the country, but warned them againct succumbing 
to imperialist intrigue and embaeking on the road of religious and 
--racial strife. 
Soon afte, "lie uprising, the EOCI held a special session to 
discuss the events and to hear Smeral's report. 
91 The meeting came to 
. &on that. the PCPF had made a mistake in its analysis of the the decis* 
events, and that the upri-sing-had to be seen in the. broad historical 
context; thus what-was. -significant. was not the pogroms,, but the 
breadth oll the rovementj and its roots in the agrarian situation. It 
P( was decided to com=micate to the' T the text of the ECCI resolution 
faulting its analysis and pointing out its mistakes. This "Resolution 
of the Political Secretariat of the ECCI on the Insurgent Yovement 
in Arabistan" dated 16 October 1929, was only made public early in 
92 
1930- 
The ECCI resolution flatly denied that the events of August 1929 
seen as a complete whole constituted a pogrom. These events were 
a national liberation and anti -imperialist movement of all Arabians.... 
93 The MCI by social Composition chiefly a peasant movement". 
admitted that the movement had began as an attempt by Arab 
-reactionaries to start a pogrom in response to Zionist provocations, 
but this was oon transformed into a revolution aimed at overthr%mring 
89. The Bloody Events in Palestine. Inpreco Fc 47.1929. p. 991. 
go. Against British Imperialism in Palestine: lilanifesto of the League 
Against Imperialism. Inrrecor N. 47.1929. pp. 991-2. 
91. Berger-Barzalai. loc. cito 
92. The resolution was published in I n-precor N. 6. F ebrua-vj 1930- 
104-6. It was also publishýd in Arabic in abridged form in 
E , 11a. Al 1. -=am,, N. 
7. May 1930- 
93- Ibid. p. 104. 
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imperializ--, and the initiation of an agrarian revolution. The 
Comintern' s emphasis was on the movement as a peasýxnt uprising, 
and it was regarded as the natural outcome of the Zionist policy 
94 
of disposing Arab peasants of their lands. The attacks on 
Jewish settlements were the response of the land-hungry peasants 
to their direct and visibe dispossessm-ts, thus the emnity of the 
ie Zionist settlers was not of a racial Arab peazwrtz to til 
character, nor was, it the result of outside instigation, but 
constituted a clear class antagoni=. It followed fr= this 
charactexi k. -4 sation that the PCP' s analysis of the events was grossly 
mistaken and. - ignored the fundc01'ental causes of the resultant Jrab 
actions in attacking and burning dow -n Jewish settlements during 
the u-pr3-sing. 
The fundamental cause of the mistaken analysis by the PCP 
05 leadership was seen to be "the predominance of Jews" in the ]Party, 
and the lack of contact with the Arab ma ses. Thus the leadership 
was accused of having been "caught unawares" by the outbreak of the 
uprising, precisely because--: Lt had ignored the repeated demands of 
the = to Arabise the Party. Had the Party taken "a bold and 
determine; A se to Arabise itself from top to bott=11, it d couir would 
not have been so totally deprived of Arab cadres, especially arong 
the peasantry. One of the cardinal mistakes it had committed was 
it had "concentrated chiefly on Jewish workers" and had not that 
exerted more serious effort to the task c., penetrating the Arab 
wc: icerrs and peasants. The leadership was further criticised for 
having adopted-a mechanical interpretation of previous demands to 
Arabise and having appointed merely a few Arab members to the CC of 
the Party, instead of striving to set up a permanent organisation 
among the Axabs. Furthe=ore, the "rightists" in the Party leader- 
ship hadd-held a pessimistic stand on the possibility of organising 
peasant and Bedouin memberrs$ thus activity in that specially 
important field was neglected L This disbelief in the possibility 
of work among the peasantry in particularl and the Arab masses in 
94.1. Shlchter. "Jerish agricultural colonisation and the Uprising 
Of 1929 in Palestine#' Agrar-Probleme Vol. 2.11.3/4 Moscow- 
1929. Translated in Dirast Arabiva N. 10.1970. p. 2. 
95- resolution. ov. cit. p. 106. 
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general, had led "to an undercstimation of the revolutionary 
porsibi3ities" in the countxT., and to the consequent unprepared 
f the Party, when the uprising did take place. This state 
oA 
Imented absence fmm the Arab scene had led to an inability to 
influence the small Arab working class in the townz, and the lack 
of any directing role as far as the *peasant movement was concerned. 
Thus the Party v; as unable to "perceive, Ithe trancformation of the 
religious-national conflict irito a general anti-imperialist peasant 
revolt", and failed to advance the appropriate slogans-of the agrarian 
revolution: the-siezure of land and the formation of peasant 
co=ittees. 
The tasks which the M"Cl resolution put forward were mainly 
concerned va'Lh. trann., forming the Jem. sh character of the Party from 
one based on Jerish. immigrantsj, to a territorial orgemisation 
representative of the indigenous Arab population. The Jewinh. 
members cf the Party and the CO. it was pointed out.. should fulfil 
the role of "aias and not of leaders" 
96 in their relation to Arab 
co=mmisits and the Arab labour- movement. Their task -hould be "to 
Arabise the Party-from-top-to-bottam"t and direct its main energies 
towardr- the brab field. The selection of Arab members for responsible 
positions zhould take place gradually and through the sharing out 
of responsibilities in "all organisations and all governing bodies" 
of the Party. At the same time) this eqphasis on Arab work, the 
creation-of peasant committee! 7 and the drawing up of an agrarian 
, =gram, should not lead to an abandonment of the Jevri-. h community. 
party activity should continue -qm ng the Jewish working class and in 
reformist organisations like the Histadrut. Hidden opposition to 
Arabisation should be exposed, especially in regard to activity among 
the Arabsj and -in the failure to accept the mle of Jewish Party 
members as helpers and not leaders in foster-Ing the grvwth of the 
communist movement in Palestine. Activity in the Arab field should 
be systematized and Pax-ty members should be appointed for different 
activities: for work among Arab workers, for work among the peasants 
and Bedouinst and for the creation of Arab cadres for trade union 
activity. The Arab youthp so long ignored. by the Partyp should be 
96. F= resolution. -OP- ci-- P- 
105- 
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organised, by the Young Communirt League, and this purely Jewish 
orgr,, 1_4sza-t,! on should also undergo Arabisation. 
It is clear that the aim of the ECCII s resolution was to change 
the direction of the Party frvm activity within the Jewish connunity.. 
increasingly perceived to be controBed by the Zionist movement, to 
the up till then ignored Arab majority in the country. The ECCI 
foresaw that resistance to this new line would be forthcoming not 
only, from the rank and file members of the Party, but also from the 
leadership and -thus called for a struggle inside the Party against 
those who persisted in their estimation of the uprising as a pogrom, 
accusing them of harbouring nationaliF-. t tendencies and preferring to 
remain within the narrow, and familiar confines of the Jewish 
colmmmity. 57 
The -emphasis - on 11ý. rsbisation., t-hough not a new feature of Comintern 
policy, - rn, 
t be seen in conjunction with the new line introduced at 
the Comintern' s Sixth Congress in 1928. In its application to 
Palestine, this policy called for a fierce struggle against the' 
national reformist Arab leaders and the-scuttling of the demand for 
a representative assembly and a democratic republic. The Comintern 
raised the slogans of 'Workers' and Peasants' Government"., and the 
"All A. -rab, Workers' and 
Peasants' "Socialist Federation of the Arab East". 
'This necessitated an active policy aimed at winning over the Arab 
-ma ses in Palestinep increased attention to agr-arian issues and a 
decreased interest in the fortunes of the Jevrish labour movement which 
it was correctly perceived could not, as a sector of the smaller of 
the two national communities in the countryv constitute the basis of 
the mass movement. The pogromist aspects of the uprising were not 
ignored, 98 but they were-attributed to the peculiar canditions of the 
coioniza revolution, and were not allowed to affect the Comintern' s 
recorpition of the overall positive character of the uprising. ý The 
immediate task set out In the October resolution was that an 
indigenous coinmunist roovement should be built which would be able 
when the next uprising cames to influence the course of events in a 
meaningful Way- 
97. ECCI Resolution. op. cit. p. 106. 
98. Report of kfanuislky to the plenary session of the Executive 
Committee of the Young Communist Internp-tional., held in Moscow 
November-December 1929. IERrecor. N 15- 1930. p. 268. 
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The MCI's evaluation of the August events as the first stage 
Of an impending agrearian revolution, and as constituting an "anti- 
imperialict peasant revolution" suffered from the fundamental wealmess 
that no corroborative evidence could be found to substantiate it. 
Not only did the participants avoid any attack on the obvious 
s of the British presence in the country, but manifestation. the 
immediate cause of the disturbances was religious in nature, and the 
whole episode was devoid of any i=ediate social or economic dimiension. 
The massacres of. long-established Jewish communities in Saf ad and 
Hebron indicated-that the outbreak. war. directed against Jews, 
irrespective of political affiliation. Moreover -the events were 
marked by a co=plete absence of any agrarian upheaval in the shape 
of attacks can the property of absentee landlords or an attempted 
distribution of 1and. 
The Partv's Re-evaluation of the Events 
The September 1929 Plen= of the PCP had already gone some way 
tow, -ds revising the Party' s -initial stand on the August uprising. 
-J tted It was then s; rlr I that the upheaval was a'national uprising, but 
its reactionary character was noted, as v. -as its diversion into the 
direction of a poggrom. 7*7 TheHaifa local committee of the Party 
which had rej. sed to admit the e)dstence of any positive aspect to fu 
the movement, and had insisted on the initial characterisation of 
the events as a pogrom., was condemned. The Plenum also criticised 
ra number of mistakes committed in relation to the the CC fa 
estimation of the rate of development of the radicalisation of the 
Arab population,, and declared that work among the Arabs must be 
accelerated to enable the Party to play an important role in the 
next revolutionary uprising of which the August outbreak was only the 
-first stage. The Party and its leadership were not prepared to go 
--ther in their evaluation of the positive aspects of the much f uxx 
uprising. Thus on receipt of the BCCI October Resolution there 
was surprise and resentment in the Party's ranks. 
100 Among the 
99. The PCP and the Arab Revolt. I recor. N CL. 1929. p. 1321. 
100. Berger-Barazalaij, ot,. cit- P- 136. 
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leadership of the Party voices were also raised against the demand 
for Arabisation 
10'1 
and the idea of the existence of a national 
peasant movement and the revolutionary characterisation of the 
August events were rejected. 
102 The Party leadership howeverp did 
not express its views on this matter to the Comintcrn, and accepted 
the msolution as a matter of revolutionary disciplinep even going 
-so far as to expel Jewish members who crpozed the new line. 
103 
Although opposition within the leadership was not openly manifested., 
-it did not cease. The Jewish 7 arty leaders who were. ordered by 
the Comintem to gradually replace themý-elves by Arabsq refused to 
accept the correctness of the decision to Arabise., and resolved to 
slow do, -m the process and obstruct its irr. plenr-ntation*104 
. The Partyl s propaganda soon adjusted itsellf to the neyr 
interpretation of events. A new pamphlet was publishedl05 which 
atterarpted to reconcile-the Party' z earlier statements and position 
with the new line. It dealt wt1th the theoretical: issues raised in 
assessing whether the revolt was an ix; ýsing or a pogrom. Vhile not 
denying the fact that atrocities were co=aitted against Jews and 
; tlements, the--pearmUet argued that "it was not the massacres Jewish set 
that determined the essence of the uprising", but the attacks carried 
out by the Arab mas!: es against the British authorities in the purely 
txab towns. 
106 It condemned the pogm=- which took place as 
reaction=7 and comter-revolutionar . y., 
but insisted that these were 
only 11=inor pog-romist manifestations"., and should not be utilised to 
belittle or detract from the potentially revolutionary situation. 
-The responsibility f or the Jewish blood which had been shed was 
placed at the doors of the Zionist movement and the Arab reactionaries, 
but it was the fomers' activities as. the spearhead of imperialism 
which were cited as the in-ain cause of the outbreak and the Party's 
101. J. Degras. The Cor=, mis' Intermational. (London 1956). Vol-3- P- 177. 
Union and the Middle East (London 1959) p. 102. 102. W. Laqueur. The Soyie 
-Barzalai,, loc. cit. 103- Berger 
104. J. Berger. The Tragedy of the Russian Revolution. (Tel Aviv. 1968) 
81 quoted in Hen-Tov (thesis) op. cit. p. 191 
105- The Arab Revolutionary Movement and the Tasks of the Proletariat. 
Hebrew Pamphlet quoted in Hen-Tov (thesis) cit. pp. 255-259. 
106. Ibid. p. 257- 
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advice to the Jews was that cmtinued support for the Zionist 
movement would necessarily lead to further pogroms and national 
strife. 
107 
As far as the %ro'omintem v; as concerned hoviever., the PCP was not 
maMmg rapid enough progress. It still refused to come out openly 
in support of the E"Ou"I Cctober resolution and clung to shreds of its 
previous interpretation. In a message on the occasion of the 25th 
ssu- off the Farty' -- Yiddish organ "Forois" in Noven-ber 1929,108 the 
Comintern reiterated that the main weakness of the Party had been due 
to its failure to penetralte the Arab masses. The Jewish members of 
the Fax-ty verze rend-nded that as the "avant-garde" of the JM-ish 
worikers in the country., Ithey were ass#ied the "historical and ccntral 
task o1h se--aring the confidence of the Arabs, and accelerating the 
process by which-the PCP will become a mass party of the local Arab 
-proletariat". 
In De--e=ber 1929, an enlarged plenum of -the CC decided that the 
rebellion was a link in a long chain of a-evolutionary outbreaks in 
the whole of the-Arab East, and-owed nothing to outside instigation. 
109 
The mots of the uprising lay in the changing social relations taking 
place in Palestine: the destruction of the peasant economy, the 
poverty and desperation of the peasants and the Bedouin3q the increased 
rentst taxes,, usury.. etc. 
110 
These were expected to lead to a new 
2, evolution both in Palestine and the Arab world, of which the August 
uprising was only the opening chapter. The Plenum criticised the 
party, s pos-; tion during t! 'he impri-sing and attributed it to a number 
of sdbjective and objective conditions: the Py i aft had been forced 
due to increased police repression to burrow deeper underground, and 
as a consequence was isolated and cut off from the masses. This 
led to the main blunder committec I in August 1929 which resulted in 
the upholding of a mistaken position: the clisbelief in1he 
redicalisat-lon of the masses., and the underestimation of the 
-possibilities open to the Party. The "pacifistic" line held during 
107. Th ,. rab Revolutionar7 111ovement and the Tasks of the Proletariat. 
Hebrew 1 Damp1aet quoted in Hen-Tov (thesiý op. cit. p. 259- 
108. 2-orois 29 November 1929. Quoted in Israeli., op. cit. pp. 67-68. 
: 109. j:, r, -, p Plenum. Forois December 1929. Reproduced 
' 
in Police Report 
on Co=uni-st -Activity 1930- m. cit. pp. 20-23 
3.10. pCp Plenum. Forois, December 1929. op. cit, p: 20. 
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August -was faulteds and the leadership was criticiced for failing 
to give a lead, by placing itself at the head of the mass movement, 
to the peasants and Bedouins who "wanted clear and concrete 
instructions on -vimt to do with -their knives, swords, rifles., 
revolvers, naboots". 
The forthcoming duties of the I-arty were listed and first and 
f ore=--t was the struggle against clef eatiz; t tendencies within the 
Party vdliich, had been unleashed as a result of the uprising and the 
Comintern"s line. - Members were questioning the validity of their 
ac. a. -I tivity in Palestine., and some v. ere advocating emmigration. The 
'Plentra e=h-sised that the Party should continue to explain to 
Jewish workers the folly-of the Zionist movement and call on the= 
to join-thle national liberation movement of the Arab masses.. but 
should also -raise'the slogan "out oil the Jewish ghetto", and intensify 
the policy of Arabising the Party. The new aim was to broaaen and 
develop the rev lutionary movement-of the Arab masses, and to 
identifýy the PCP withthe aimss-of the movement in the eyes of the 
Arab workers and peasants. A practical outcome of this new line 
was the expuls-S.. or. of Jevrish Party members who refused to accept the 
B0,1111ts characterisation of the events. , Thus the majority-of the 
T_ýzaifa brazich of the Party.. and some members off the Tel-Aviv branch 
112 
were ex elled. As a result., Jewish members were confused about 
their role in Palestine and, in disagreement výlth the Cominteral s 
perception of actual events, many left the Party or deserted Palestine 
323 
altogether. 
In-the period stretching from October 1929 to the holding of 
lay 1930., the Party claimed to have increased its -the CC plen= of 
V 
-hip. -zet up purely Arab branches, and to have Arab mmberw to have 
134 but this elected Arab members to all its leading organisations, 
-was Imdoubtedly a gross exaggeration aimed at Yrinning 
the favour of 
the Comintern. - 
3-11. PCP Plenum. Foroiss December 1929. op. cit. p. 22 (Naboot: wooden 
club). 
71 -ice Report on Co=unist Activity, op. cit. p. 15- 112. 'pol- 
113- Y. PcraLth. Revolution and Termrism in PCP., 1929-1939. Hamizrah 
Hahadash. N 34- 1968. p. 259. 
13j+. The PCO and the Arab masses. Innrecor N 16.1930- P- 325- 
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The MaY 1930 plenum of the CC met under the slogan of "Arabisation 
plus Bolshivisation". This latter term was a reference to the 
resolution passed at the Sixth Comintem Congress to establish the 
Communist Parties as professional revolutionary organisations. Its 
introduction by the Jewish leadership of the Party who aimed to slow dam 
the rrocess of Arabisation115 while'still remaining within the bounds 
of the Co=intern line. The plenum nevertheless seems to h&ve 
116 
satisfied the Comintern that Arabisation was proceeding as required. 
It reviewed Party activity since -the last enlarged CC meeting of 
1929 and concentrated its discussions on the peasant problem De embe., 
vhich it was agreed represented the main repository of the Arab 
masses, the prolet, --Aat being confined to the Jewish section of the 
population. The correct path for linking the workers' and peasants' 
movement in the country was seen to lie in Arabising the Fartj in 
movement. order to enable it to lead the growing peasant As a result 
of-this plenums the Farty adopted an agrarian program calling for the 
distribution of land to the peasants by -corifi seating it from "all 
large landoymers., religious-institutions and state domains". 
117 The 
reason-for this- eraphasis- on -the --peasants was explained as being 
necessary to enable the Party to withstand the counter-revolutionary 
lorces ranged against it. The proletariats ehould link its forces 
with those of the agrarian movement.. and work to convert the 
agrarian disturbances taking place throughout the country into an 
agrarian revolution. 
118 The Party attempted to. give concrete f(n 
to this activity and to popularise the slogan of agrarian revolution 
b ith the peasants in their struggles to stay on'the y linking up Y. 3. 
land. In lvýTadi al Har-areth,, a repeat performance of the Affula 
affair, the Party extended its support to the Arab peasants in their 
fusing to evict their land after its sale to Zionist struggle in re. 
3.19 
settlers. It called an Jewish workers to dissociate themselves 
115- Porath. op. ci p. 259. 
Bol-hivisation: -Enlarged plenum of the PCP- 3.16. Arabisation plus 
Article in Pravda 22 June 1930. 
117. police Report on Co==ist Activity. 1930P-OP- cit. p. 29. 
118. Police Report on Communist Activity, 1930- a- cit- P- 30- 
: 119. The Zionist Plunder of t7ork has Started. We Must all Stand 
Togetber to Help the Peasants of Wadi al Hawareth. Arabic 
Leaflet of CC/PCP, September 1930- 
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from -those atte=ting to rob the Arab peasants of their livelihood, 
who were creating conditions which would lead to outbreaks against 
the Jewish inhabitants. It exhorted them to stop the hands of 
those atte=ting to usurp the Wadi al Hawareth landz, and to join 
with the firab peasants in their struggle ageLm-t the "Zionist plunderers". 
The PCP had coze a long way from its first neg&tive characterization 
of the August uprising. At least on the official level 4b , 
its course 
had been re-directed towards the Arab co=mmity after a decade of 
intense involvement in the Jewish labour movement. Its aim had 
become, enlarged hl Arab members-lip, and its first step was an increase 
120 
paganda. activities among the peasants, ca 111-g for the 3np rop ý& 
s zzure of lands and the taking up of arms. The volu- the ie ne of 
Party-' s printed ,, rabic literature increased manyfold, as did the 
-ecuency oP its distributions even in the most distant villages. 
121 
z 
The whole ez, -hasis given to t1he events of 1929 underi,, ent a p:., of ound 
-mall peasants" 
122 
change; it was now characterised as "a revolt of Arab b 
and the res-Donsibility of the ma--sacres was attributed to the crimes of 
the Zionist leaders. Those Jewish members of the Party who opposed 
-ulp this reform -tion were expelled as were those merbers' who hid 123 
played an active role in the Jevash defence effort in Jerusalem. 
it was poin-ted out to the Jerish -workers that they had a choice of 
two roads: joining the national emancipation movement of the Arab 
124 
masses, or Zion3. =. Prom all outward appearances it seemed that 
the process of Arabisat tion was taking place smoothly and in 
accordance wi 'th the EOCII s instructions. Despite thisy opposition 
within the Party-remained strong and the May plenum of the CC had 
= de that abundantly clear. a 
The reaction of the PCP to the Comintern's decision to speed up 
-implementation of the long called for Arabisation,, -and its emphasis 
on the revolutionar y role of the Amb masses was a mixed one. On 
. 120. 
police Report on Ca==. Ist Activity., 1930. op. cit. pp. 23-27. 
121. Ibid. p. 28. 
122. Zionism is Banknrpt- See also., . 6. t 
Inrrecor IT 41.1930- r- 865., 
The Crossroads. Hebrew Pamphlet of Communist Youth League 1930 P-8- 
123- Police Report on Communist Activity 1930--or- ci - p. 27. 
124. The Palestine Program of British Social Imperialism. Inpreco 
N. 50- 1930- P- 1041. 
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the one hBndq -there was 
disagreement with the Comintern' S 
characterisation of the 1929 events, and the pmscribed role of the 
Jewinh com=nis-ts; on the other handl revolutionary discipline 
and loyalty to the cause of revolutionary co=zunism impelled 
unquestioning loyalty and obedience. Opposition to Arabireation 
was based on the belief that leadership of the Party would go to 
the Amb members-1, those recent converts to the cause who were not 
capable of carrying out the tasks required of leading a revolutionary 
party and. who had had no preparation to enable them to- shoulder such 
a task. They perceived that the result would be to weaken the Party, 
and the -%bole co=munizto movement at: a result. Furthennore.. to the 
Jewish leaders- of the Party., nurtured as. they had been in the 
socialist movement-in Europe, and the Jewish labour movement in 
Palestine, the proper object of a communist party was the organisation 
of the proletariat and the marshalling of its forces into battle. 
In Palestine the proletariat was overwhelmingly JeY. -1Ehj and organised 
in the left 'Zionist move=ent. To communist militants# the peasantry 
did not seem, to be a fit subject for a-commLmist party. 
The opposition of the PCPIs leadership was clearly demonstrated 
at tbe Vkv 1930 plenum. Their reluctance to hand over command of 
the Paxty to tbLe I. rab me=berz led them to link the slogan of 
Arp-bisation to that of Bolshivisation. This latter formnilation 
-completely excluded e 
Arab members of the Party as there were no 
There were only recent recruits who rArab bols-heviks" in the PG?. 
had joined the Party for a variety of reasons, and who were completely 
ignorants even if not by choice.. of the principles of Ylarxism-Leninisms 
and who were tots-Uy foreign to the struggles of the labour movement. 
In -time -no . doubt., these cadres would -develop and some would be 
capable of shouldering ýhe responsibilities of leadership,, but not 
till then-could-they be entrusted with, so important a task as the 
direction oi. a commmist organisation. The leader-ship of the PCP 
125 
never came out openly against Arabisation; indeed it was thanks 
to its efforts that the small cadre of Arab members existed at all. 
Their misgivings over the speed of the Comintern's Arabisation policy 
125- Interviews -with J. Berger-Barzalai, Tel Avivs 2 January 19741 
and Radwan al Hilou, Jericho, 12 January 1974. 
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were to prove well founded. The Party did not yet porzess a 
sufficient number of tried and mature Arab cadrez; to carry out the 
required tasks. For four years after the uprising of Augurt 1929 
the leader-chip of the Party continued to be in the htnds of the 
Jewish cadres., while the overall majority of the Party was to remain 
Je M. sh mtil the split cf 1943- 
The Long Process of Arabisation 1: The Seventh C=gress of the 
? ajestine Com=mist Party. Decenl)er 1930. 
The impatient with the vaccilations of the leadership of 
%. he ITICP and 
its see=ing inability to comprehend what was required of 
126 
t 
-; t, addres-sed itself to the Party in an open letter in October 1930- 
it -ccciplained- of the inactivity of the CC and the 1Fck of success 
- ng Arab workers and peasants. 
12-7 
"he C0 vý-as also criticised for 
4ts failure to transfo='Farty organisations like the Red Aicl Society.. 
-the Youth Leagues and the League Against I =erialism, into general 
member organisations by winning for them- a non-party membership, 
-primarily from among the A. rab workers and educated youth, and thus 
changin, g, their all Je m. sh character. Yet the Comintern was not in 
agreement with. those Ar,, b members of the Party who had previously 
-C - -ition to "Jev-Lsh domination" and the Arab and Jew. ish , voice, 2 orpos .r 
meizbers who had gone as far -as to declare that there was no ro6m for 
Jewish workers in Palestine, anE that emigration was the only alterna- 
tive open to non-Zionist Jews. The open letter threatened with 
expulsion those who demanded that 'T-alestine should remain an Arab 
country" and denounced them as "national deviationists". It 
explained t1at the EXI Is October resolution.. while calling for the 
trans-,,, Crmation of the PCP into an Arab party had not implied that 
work wmng-the Jewish working class should cease. On the contrarys 
the paxty should maintain its activity among the Jewish com=nity; 
. f=thermore-q the expulsion of Jewish workers from Palestine would 
gmatly weaken the Party itself - What was important to realise was 
126. Decisions of 7th Congress of PCP: Appendix pp. 213-22 in G. 
israeli op. cit. p. 216. 
: L27. Forqis... Ja=arY 1931. translated in Falastin, 31 January 1931- 
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, ure of the struggle in Palestine was one of national that the nat 
-41pation, and that in such a struggle,, Jewish com-mmists could emanc. 
in no way take on the role of leaders. Their aim should be to secure 
the agreement of the Arab national movement to gr, -nt the Jewish 
community in Ftlestine minority rights in the independent Palestine 
of the future. 
The practical aspect of the Comintem's intervention was to 
effect a change in the leadership of the Party. The CNIO was for the 
128 
first tim appointed directly by the Comintern, and was composed 
129 
of three Arab and two Jewish members. This was the first time 
-in t1he Party' s history that the Arabs had enjoyed a majority in the 
party' s leading body.. but this in no way reflected the real balance 
between Arab and Jewish members in the organisation. Moreover the 
Arab leadership was to have an extremely, short active life, for 
exactly three months after its appointment, the two prominentArab 
ted by the police. 
130 
members were arresto 
seventh Congress of the-Party met in Jeruzalem towarx1s the The s 
131 
end of December 1930 in-the presence of a Comintern representatives 
and was presidea--over by an Arab-member of the CO. 
132 The Congress 
s et the tone. for comnunist activity, in Palestine for the next decade 
and directed the Partyt s path firmly towards the Arab. community. 
The deliberations of the Ccngrees can be divided into three main 
areas- first, an examination and criticism of the Party's development 
and record in the last ter years; seconds ant_analysis of the role of 
theJewish community in Palertines and third, the tasks the Party 
-should -perform in the Arab national liberation movement. These three 
areas -were dealt with by way of an attempted criticism of the Party' s 
previous understanding of the national question in the country., which 
the Congress had- declared to be the- key for the for=dation of a 
133 
correct policY. 
-with J. Berger Barzalais Tel-Aviv., 2 January 1974; Po 128. Interview rath 
cm. cit. p. 259; Decisions of Seventh Congress. c? p. - cit. p. 
216. 
129. k-fal-, moud Yo& hrabi., *Naiati Sidki, an Arab printing worker, J. Berger 
and Y. Yuperman. 
130- 1fahmoud"140ghrabi andNajati Sidki were arrested on the 2nd of 
See "2 February 1931- "alastin 3 Februery 1931- 
131- The Times 10 Januar7 19,31, reported that it was composed of an 
equal number of Arab and Jewish delegates. 
Ija4ati Sidki -a- lay, 1931- 132. according to Fal stin, 15 L 
- The Iational Que -tion at the 7th Party Congress. Inrrecor 11 3- 1931- 133 
p. 64. 
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The Congress' s main criticisms of Party activity since its 
recognition by the Cominterng stemmed from the view that it had 
failed to characterise the "peculiar position of the Jewish national 
minority inPalestine"p and that this was the major source for the 
134 
mistakes and errors which it had committed. The Party was seen 
to have been successful until 1929 in its work in the Jcv. 3. sh labour 
having set up wor' r_-1 clubz and organizationt,, end having movement 
partic4pated in various events and demonstrations. 
135 It had also 
disseminated 44- its propaganda in favour of a united front of Arab and 
Jerish workers, wilely among the ranks of the Jewi 'd 'shpmletariat. 
In the Arab field ho,.,; everl the Party had co=. itted =istakez,, and 
these-1huad led directly to its-veakneess and estrangement from the Lrab 
136 
masses in 1929. It had restricted its activity among the Arabs 
to TX nted propaganda and contact with the leadership of the 
-=ent, and consequently failed to achieve the transCor7w- zational =v Z. 
tion to "a pure Arab party". Its very success among the Jewish 
ad led to a veakening of ýthe Party' s Arab work, and to an vv rke rs h 
-incorrect estimate of the 
Jewish worker z' ability to effect change 
--failed to take note of the radicalization in the coun"try. Thus it had 
of the Arab masses and of t, 11-agow he ar, nizm between the Arab national 
movement and iziperialism. The"Party also held to an incorrect 
equatlon of Jewish agricultural- colonists and Arab peasants,, and 
emphasised a false contradiction between the Zionist movement and 
imperialism in Palestine. 111-4-- policy led to the neglcct of the 
necessary build up of an Arab cadre f or the leadership of the Party, 
while as far a- Arab Party me. =ers were concemed, - the leadership did 
3.37 
-not 
take suffic-ent interest in their progress, nor in securing 
gainful 'Party work for them. The activity of the Party in the Arab 
field projected internationalist slogans,, but these were so in form 
only and not in content.. The failure to convince not only the Arab 
but even the Arab co==unizts,, that the Party stood at the head 
of the Arab national liberation movement resultec I in mistrust of its 
134- The Rational Question at the 7th Party Congress. Inpreco 
N. 3- 1931. p. 64 
135. Decisions of the 7th Congress. op. cit. p. 213- 
L p. 214. 136. Ibic 
137. Ibid. p. 215. 
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policies among the Arabs., and failure to achieve any sizeable growth. 
The Congress' s decisionr, denied that the milstakes of the Party 
leadership could be blamed on the existing objective conditions., or 
-that they v., ere the responsibility of a fevr leading membersq tho 
themselvez: deviated from the Fartys norrms. It vmc the CC itself 
vhich was declared responsible for the failure to Arabise the Farty; 
moreover it stood condemned for failing to put the Comintern in the 
picture, and for deliberaltely mizleading it about developments within 
týe Party. This rznifestly incorrect stand vis-a-vis the national 
problem resulted f ran, a "double f ailure": , 
first,, lack of understanding 
of the reasant rroblem. in Palestine; second, failure to arrive at a 
correct-Interpretation of Meninist proletarian internationali. =11., 
as far as the relationship of the Jewish communists to the Arabs 
was ccncerned. 
-0 the PCP -to the October 1929 MCI Dealing -%-Ith the response c. A 
resolution,, the Congress laid the blame on a "right opportunist 
deviation": the result off. Jewish national chauvinism in the Party. 
138 
Although theCC had struggled against these "Zionist manifestations",, 
'- imrlemented the Co=ntern's directive. On the contrarys it haE not 
it contrived to place obstacles in -the way of the realication c. & 
and the slogan of the May plenum, "Bolshivisation plus 
Arabisation" had been an atter-pt by the CC itself to block the 
process. Even after the Cominterml s direct apr-ointment of a new CC 
vtth--an Arab majority, opposition persissted in the fo= of demands 
for further "ex-planations"p and the acceptance of the Comintem' s 
directives "in principle" and as theoretical statements only. 
139 
This the Congress deblared,, flowed f mm, the absence of a proper 
understanding of the background of the national problem and "deliberately 
ignoring the tasks of the Jewish minority in Palestine" which 
itself was closely connected to the Zionist movement. It was noted, 
on the other hand, that since the Comintem' s appointr,. ent of an Arab 
dominated CC in October,, a mere two months before the Congress,, the 
Party had thrown off its lethargyp and was actively perfoming its 
138. Decisions of the 7th Congress. op. cit. r 216. 
139- lbid. p. 217. 
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tasks in the Arab field, in correct understanding of the national 
problem, and struggling against "Jewish national chauviniset. The 
Congress affirmed its determin3tion to continue along the line 
decreed by the Comintern and confirred the appointment of the Arab 
do=inated CC. 
140 
The second topic dealt with by the Congress ccncenied the 
national problem and the po-aition of tl-ie Jewish national minority in 
Palestine. The Party' s role, it was declared, vmz to riage a struggle 
not only against the Jev. -Ish bourgeoisie, but also against the Jewish 
r. inority vbich was completely under- the influence of Zionisms and 
llvlkved the role of an imperialist agency in the sup ression of the Ip 
j, -rab national emancipat-4on move=errtvj, 
l4l As far as the uprising of 
the Arabs against the presence of the Jewish mi=ity in the country m. r, 
concerned, the Congress affirmed that the Party' s duty was to make 
clear to the Jrurmsh working class that this phenomenon was a common 
feature of colonial uprisings again. -t imperialism., in so far as 
pported the continued domination of national =inorities often sup 
i=perialist rule. 
142 
ks long as the Jewish. minority in Palestine 
zaintained its support for imperialism and -continued to serve as its 
-agent, so 
long would Arab uprisings in the country con"Unue to be 
directed agairmt it. 
ng the clas s composition of the Jewish minority in the 
countryg the Congress establi--hed that "only 51"o, of the Jewish 
immigrants are vorkers., Yýhile the rest 
I 
are petty bourgeois". 
143 In 
an atte=t to counter earlier support or at least acquiescence for 
Jewish immigration.. it-was declared that Jewish immigration into 
Palestine was not a spontaneous phenomenon., but organised by the 
zionist movement with the express aim of creating a Jewish state. 
144 
Thus it was -the duty of the Farty to oppose Jewish immigration and 
The fight of the Arab Communists. In, -nreco No- 11- 1931s p. 215- 
see also Israeli, op. ci . p. 81. 
141. The National Cuestion at the 7th Congress. op. -cit. p. 
64. 
jj+2. Decisions of the Seventh Congress, or. ci p. 218. 
343- -yýorkt_mong the Peasants and the SItruggle Against Zionisd', in 
Doc=ents of the PmE-rams of the Co=mmist Parties of the East. 
Ed. Madyar., 11if , Orakhelashvili & safarov. (Published by the Marx- 
ijagels-Lenin Institute of CO/RCP. Moscow 1934). Tr. in I Spector 
"The Foyiet Union and the Moslem World 1917-5811 (Univ. of 
Ve ashington press. 1967) (pp. 111-78) p. 172. 
144. Decisions of Seventh Congress. op. cit. p. 222. 
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expose its "robber imperialist" character. Likewiseo Jewish 
colonists could not be regarded as oppressed peasants, nor be 
compared with the Arab peasants who had been evicted from their 
I w. -ith. the sole purpose of making place for these self-same 
settlers. Rather, the Jewish farmer was a member of a privileged 
class. 
145 
and his relationship to the peasants waz akin to that of 
the kulak. The Party had to strLzggle against Jewish colonisation 
as strcnEýLy as it should against Jewish i=, igration, as both would 
f6ad to the Arab workers and peasants being "evicted from their 
workplace" and dep=ved of their livelihood. 
146 
The Congress's conclusions an the position off the Jewish minority 
were -, -biguous. It clearly portrayed the Jcmi, -, h co==ity in 
Palestine as fulfilling the role of an imperialist agent, and in 
turn being aided by imperialism to realise its policies of land 
conquest and immigration. Thus the opposition of the Arab move- 
;I jus: t., but its appearance ment-was perceived to be both natural and 
as an anti-Jewish movement was seen as affcrding an opportunity to 
AmI reactionaries and to British imperialism to deflect the masses' 
dissatisfaction from ther-selves., and tum it again. -t the Jewis-b 
minority. 
14-7 The Congress insisted that "it would be erroneous 
to regard Zionism ana the Jewish pro-pulation as one organic whole", 
among whom there were no intemal contradictions. There was a 
-process of differentiation continuously taking place among the 
Jewish, minority ma it was perceived that a section of the workers 
was alrea(5Ly abandoning Zioni=, and that the privileges which Jewish 
worker-s enjoyed were fast disappearing. Thus despite the Congress's 
characterisation of the pro-imperialist role of the Jewish minority 
and despite the fact that the Arab masses continued to regard it as 
an "organic whole"p the Party persisted in holding out the prospect 
of a future united front between Arabs and Jews, Justifying not only 
its repeated calls for co-operation, but also the activity of the. 
-145. work -Among the Peasants and the Struggle Against Zionism. op. cit. 
p- 177. 
146. The National Question at the Seventh Congress. op. cit. p. 646 
3-47. work Among the Peasants and the I, -truggle Against Zionism. op. cit. 
P. 175. 
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Jewish co=munists and their continued presence in the country. 
The third area of activity dealt with by the Congress conoisted 
of the Party's work in the JArab street and the general political 
outlook. The first bazic condition for succesnful work rmong J., rab 
-end on the transformation of the Party into peasantS2 was seen to de; 
sume it. - an P. rab organization. Cnly then would it be able to an- 
"proper place in the national struggle again., -:, t imperialism and 
Zionim". 
3-1-B The main -field of activity was provided by the assumed 
atmosphere of. permanent agrarian unrest. The Paxtyl s duty was to 
take advantage of the *"e. --loitation and betrayal" of the Arab peasants 
by the Arab leadership, zn,. 31 the absence of an agrarmir-n progr&m in the 
platform of the left wing off the Arab national moverent. The Party' s 
activity should concentrate on landless peasants and tl-, e semi- 
umb lan agricultural workerss; the Congreas mapped out an er proletax 
practical =eaziwes, such as the distribution of printed matter 
ple and understaniable languagell, personal contact Inwritten in si=- 
with the villages, --md specifically contact- with the teache = in 
village schools... and-the formation of peasant committees. The 
Partyl s stand on land sales was unambiguous and -uncompmmising; it 
refused to recognize the validity of deals made between the Zionists 
ard abzentee !. rab lando-aners, and declared that the duty of Jewish 
wor-k-er-s was not only to offer sing-, port, to the peasants, but also to 
supply them with arm to -enable them to fight against the expropriation 
f-c the- 
149 
. 11-r lar-Is. At te same 
time, the Party' s propaganda among 
the Jemsh workers shoule. explain that the settlement of Jews on 
Is" would only cause the peasants to launch attacks those "robbed lanc 
ag st the Jewish settlers. The tasks of the agrarian revolution 
included the -ex; ulsion cf Jemsh settlers fr0m their recently acquired 
land,, and the return Of this lana to its previous owners, Only by 
enrolling in the -Arab national movement could the 
Jerish workers 
assure themselves of the prospect o-A" being allowed to remain on the 
land. -Their future in Palestine would depend on the extent of their 
struggle againFt Zionism, exd theyvauld be granted the rights of a 
national minority with full f reedom to develo their national culture. P 
248. Decisions of the Seventh Congress. op. Ci p. 219. 
149. jbia. p. 223. 
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The Congress affirmed that the general activity of the Party 
should not neglect work among the small Arab working class and in 
the Jerish street. The real character of Zionitt icmigration should 
be made clear to tbe workers, and the Party should raise the demand for 
its cessation. 
150 It should also pay special attention to the 
organisation of Joint demcrutt rations of Arab and Jewish workers 
against British irperialismo and by underlining the j'. rab mashes 
opposition to ir-perialis=, gain ac1herents among the Jewish labour 
movement. 
The Feventh Congress' s comprehension of Palestinian conditions 
suff ered fxvm major defect-s. In so far as it perceived a situation 
cf agrarian ==est and rebelliousness agAinst the traditional Arab 
leader-ship, thAs waz the result of dogmatic preconceptionz which 
did not, match the reality of the situation. The agrarian revolution 
was not on the agenda in Pale--tine. The ! rF-b ]-, easantE:: traditional, 
bacImard and conservative, were activated by tribal and religious 
loyUnties rather thn by social and political considerations, and 
were completely subservient to the Arab-urban religious and semi- 
feuda- leadership. The -position regarding the Yishuv revealed a 
similar lack of understanding. The belief that sections of the 
Jewish working class were increasingly becoming disenchanted with 
Zionism was unfounded: even if true, the outcome would have been an 
increase in the rate of emigration as had happened in the past when 
severe economic conditions had led to discontent and despair among 
-sections of the Yishuv- There were no grounds for the belief that 
Jewish-v; orkers had any interest in Joining the ranks of the Arab 
national movement. As Zionist immigrants they had come to Palestine 
with the express aim of building a Jerish national home; the success 
of the Arabs in securing national ind-pendence 'would necessarily 
deliver a death b1cmi to the Zionist dream. As such, the British 
-were not at this stage an enemy but rather an ally. Thus from the 
standpoint of both Arabs and Jews, any call for joint activity in 
pursuit of supposed com: mon interests was devoid of any meaningrul 
content. 
150. Decisions of the Seventh Congress. op. ci, p. 222. 
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The deliberations of the Seventh Congress nevertheless 
constituted a landmark in the development of the communist movement 
in Palestine. The Party radically re-orientated its policy and set 
its course for the next eighteen years. The implication of its new 
analysis and the policies put forward aff eoted not only the PCP1 s 
previous exist&-ice as an '1innigr=, t section",, but also the practical 
abandonment of the goal of socialist proletarian revolution and its 
replacement by the recognition of the national chF-racter of the 
struggle taking place in Palestine: the primacy of the tasks of 
national liberation over those of social emancipation. 
Hitherto the Party, in its preoccupation with the Jewish labour 
movement had acted in ac--ordance mth the precepts of classical 
European Karcismp vi- zj ith itz emphasis on the central role of the 
proletarian class struggle. It had ignored the colonialist aspects 
of the wj'e: d--h presence in FaIr. stine and worked out the doctrine oil 
'vishuvism v&ich justified its preoccupation r1th the Jewish 
co=munity and excused its lack of opposition to' Jewish immigration. 
It had atte=pted to link the struggles of the Jewish working class 
to those of the oppressed Arab masses, by-abstract appeals to 
imternaltionalism. and calls for a joint struggle against the Arab 
and Jewish bourgeoisie. It failed to comprehend that as far as the 
Arabs-were concerned) the perceived threat came from the outsider, 
4. Ithe foreigner who was depriving them of both land anawork,, and that 
the first condition of a successf ul social struggle was the realisation 
of the countr7' s independence and the evacuation of British troops. 
7he Seventh %'. -ongres-Q repudiated the Party' s previous positions, and 
came out strongly not only against Jewish immigration but also against 
the Jewish minority as a whole which was correctly seen for what it 
the result of ZionL-, t agitation and activity in the effort to was: 
build tl. -- nFitione-1 
home, and not the freak outcome of immigration in 
resporLe to national persecution or the personal desire of individuals 
to start a new life or make their personal fortunes. 
7he necessity of setting up an Arab communist party presented 
itself, once the anti-imperialist nature of the conflict in Palestine 
bad been recogni! Fed. The Seventh Congress can justly be regarded as 
the first steps taken at the Comintern's prodding, to embark on the 
roap, to prabisation. This involved the re-examination of the position 
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of the Jev., ish minox-ity,, and the re-direction of the Partyt s activity 
on the path of involvement within the Arab comcminity. It is 
evident that the Party' s position vis-a-vis the Jewish minority 
remained ambiguous, but this *ras essentially because the Party 
aspired to be an internationalirt organisation an, -' not a nationalist 
one. It could not itself put forward nationalist solutions, but 
it was p-repared to support a nttion&l independ ce struggle, 'while .e Ien 
fi=ly insisting on the riOlts of minorities. Regarding the 
nature of the Jewish cOrr=lnitY in Palestine., the Party was not vexy 
clear as to výhether it constituted a national group., or merely a 
settler society, but it in:: isted on the differentiation between the 
Zionist movement and the Jewiah com=mity as a whole. Even though 
the Jewish coz=mity was in Palestine as a result of the activities 
of the Zionist move=nt and extended its wholehearted support to 
thi- movement, the Party continued to see an objective co=unity 
of interest between the Arab and Jewish working masses,, and never 
advocated the emigration of the Jews from the country. Thus it 
hoped to arrive at a synthesis between. its support for the national 
ermncipation movement--of the -Arabs, and its oo=unist ideoloor. 
Althougýa this would initially veaken the Party in the Jewish st'-Oreet, 
it was hoped., as the Seventh ConEress demonstrated, that the Party 
would become f irmly established among the Ar-ab population, and thus 
win -recognition for the rigýats of the Jewish minority in the country, 
and as a result.. extend its influence within that minority. 
The Lon7 Process of Ambisatiorli: Tran-sformation and 
fictivit7 1929-193 
The formal decision to Arabise the PCP taken at the Seventh Congress 
did not put an end to discussion of the nature of the 1929 events or 
the correctness of Arabisation. , Confusion remained in the Party and 
a state of flux continued until the appointment in 1934 of Radwan. al 
151 
Hilou (Yusa) as the first Arab secretar7 of the Party. It took 
151- Radwan al. Hilou (1910-1975) had joined the Party in 1927- In 
1930 he travelled to 111"oscow as a delegate to the Prof intern 
Congress and remained there at the Comintern School till 1933- 
on his return to Palestine, he was appointed secretary of the 
Communist youth movement and early in 1934 after the arrest of 
the Jewish Farty secretary Zeev Berman, he was alTointed Secretary 
of the Party., a position he continued to hold till the split of 
Arab and Jewish communists in 1943. 
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the Party three years to put its house in order and arrive at an 
understanding of v6at it considered to be the correct attitude to- 
wards the Arab national mcvement. Those three years, stretching from 
the Seventh Congre:: s to 11'Utal s appointment as Secretaryp were replete 
with azzurances, that krabisation had been finally implCmented . 
152 
and, counter claim-, from within the Party itself that the line agreed 
at the Sevent'n Congress: hzai not in fact been followed. 
153 The 
el Cominte=. chose to disbelieve the claim--. of the former and conti-nuea 
delivering its exhortation= to struggle again--t "Jewizh national 
chauvinism"- end the influence of Zionism within the Party. 
As late as the S'eventh Comintern Congress held in 1935, the 
Farty wass criticised for having failed to perfo= its t&skus in the 
de-raonstrat-4 ons %-hich swept, Palestine in October 19,33., and for be-Ing 
"again, as in 1929 over. 2. ken by events"154 a failure attributed to 
i -:; not having Arabised itselfo In similar f ashion., Y .t 40 uca, the 
Party's delegate to the Congress, was even more severe in his 
criticiams of the previous Party leadership and its record. 
155 He 
stressed that the reason for the Party' s past failure had been the 
strong influence of Jewish nationalism within-the old leadershipý 
The Jewish leadens, of the Party being ex-Zionists "had ideologically 
never changed their line"150' and had continued to mage a struggle 
agairmt the line of the ConLintem &nd hirder Arabisation. It 
was only at the beginning of -1935v Muza, claimedthat "the defeat of 
the opportunist line in the leadership" had been achieved. 
The Part-j had suffered a series of set-backs soon after the 
conclusion of the Seventh Congress. Its secret prese was siezed 
by the policc: 
L57 
and its nevý, ly'eppoinlted Amb leaders vere arrested 
less than a month after the Congress. Although their arrest was a 
152. Tasks of the ConriLmists in the All Amb National Yovement: An 
ýnalysis Adopted at a Ueeting of Representatives of the PC, I 'P anc 
the Syrian Communist Party in l'931. Reproduced in The Cor=unist 
Pro, -,, 7s=j op. ci - P- 139- 
153- A Secretariat report described the Party as "a discussion club" 
end stated that it had not follmed the line laid dom by the 
Congress. See Report by M. Kupermans 1932# loc. cit. 
154. Der Yo-munistiche Internationale Vor der 7th; 'elt Yongress MateriAl 
(YOscow 1935) P. 599. 
155. Yusa spoke under the nam of Yussuf. Inpreco N 54.1935- P- 1344- 
Ibid. 156. 
157- F. O. 372/290256. Police Summary.. 7 October 1931- 
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serious blov., to the Party, the Comintern chose to regard their trial 
as a success. For the first timet Arab commmists appeared in 
public and were tried for being leaders of the movement. Their 
firm stand at the trial and their defence of their political 
convictions was seen to illustrate to the Arab population that 
conr=ism Yýaz not merely a Jewish aff"I r; it also served to 
derrionstmte to those Jeviish merabem of the Party who were doubtful 
about Arabisation that I-rab Party menbers were mature and reliable 
158 
cadres. 
For the three years that elapsed between the arrest of the Arab 
mezbers of the CC and the appointMent Of M-USa as Partty Secretary$ 
the leadership remained in the hands of Jev. -i--h co=nuni--ts, and they 
energetically applied the=-elves to the task of its transformation. 
A yea. - and a half after the Seventh Congress, the leadership itself 
was still critical of the attitude of the Jm-ish rank and file. 
Many were --een to be in the Party not because of their adherence to 
co=mxdsm, but simply as a reaction again: 7t Zionismo and appeared to 
be doubtful of tli-- usefulness of activity among the Arabs. 
159 
Yer-bers of the Tel-ýAviv bra=h denied that the Party was implementing 
the Comintern line in its Arabic leaflets or that they were calling 
on the Arabs to struggle against their ozm national leaders 
160 thus 
exhibiting a cz-1-sis of cor. "idence' between the Party and its leaders. 
In its efforts to explain the Comintern line to the Jewish members, and 
to neutralise the slogan of Bolshivisation as a weapon in the hands 
of the anti-Arabiserss, the Party explained that Bolshivisation in an 
agrarian co=try like Palestine differed from that in E%a-ope where 
the main task was to win over the proletariat. In Palestine the task 
wa. s "to win over the mass of" poor and in-iddle peasants", for it was 
on the Arab me-saes that the Party had. to rely in its revolutionary 
struggle. 
161 The answer to the endless arg=erit concerning 
Arabisation was a ban on theoretical discussions and a call for 
I, 
eý ý. 
i, 
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158. Amb-Co=xuni_-ts before the Court. Inpreco .VM 1931. P. 515. 159. Document of PCP -Secretariat, 3.6 Yzrch 1932. CZA S 25/7530- 160. Document of PCP Secretariat.. 23 April 1932. CZA S 25/7530- 
3.61*. Bolshivisation and ý, rabisation. Document of PCP Secretar-lat 
June 1932. CZA S 25/7530. 
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practical revolutionary work. 
162 The continuing climate among 
the Jewish Party members of "doubts and hesitations-11,, "everlasting 
discussions". "fear of instigation".. I'defeatim". 
163 "questioning", 
"non confidence". and, the "spread of Zionist ideas" 
164 forced the 
Party leaders to consider i=lementing a purge of Party members. 
165 
This purge and re-registration olf members., coupled with a campaiEp 
for branch ex-pansion was carried out in September 1932 in order 
to rid the Party of opposition. 
166 Party members were requested 
to fill in application forms stalting -whether they were familiar with 
167 
and accepted the resolutions of the I. S-eventh Congress on Arabisation. 
16s Every Party Member had to go through this process of re-registration 
and tbose with a previous record of opposition had to face an 
Investigation committee %rhere they v,, ere called on to explain their 
political attitudes. 
169 In the branch expansion plan -which 
accompanied the re-registration, emphasis was placed on the w: Uaiing 
of -new Arab me-bers and 
'the establishment of new branches in 
villages round the three main areas of Party activity., Haifa, 
Jerusalem, arA Jaffaý/Tel-Aviv. 
170 The instructionz of the 
Secretariat to -the Party branches were detailed and pin-pointed 
areas of activity. - The'r-arty, 
however, did not set its aims too 
high, and this was reflected in the proportion of Jewish to Arab 
members w4iich it hoped to enlist. 
171 It was implicitly aftitted 
that- the proportion of Jews to Arabs would remain highs as would the 
propor-tion of workers to peasants. Certain branches such as the 
Jaffa Tel-Aviv local co=nittee, came in for heavy critici= and were 
accused oil being "nests of defeatis&1,172 and acInonished for their 
162. Document of ir? Secretariat,, 10 MaY 1932. CZA S 25/7529. 
163-' Report by M. Kuperman. 1932. loc. cit. 
: L64- Document of PCP Secretariat., 23 April 1932. loc. cit. - 
165. Document of PCP Secretariat, 16 mar-ch 1932. loc. cit. 
166. Document of PCP Secretariat. 1932. 
167. Registration and Acceptance For=. Document of PCP Secretariat. 
1932. 
: 168. Instrac-t-ions, to Registration Committee on the Registrationlof 
Cadres. Document of PCP Secretariat. 1932. 
169. Ibid. paragraph 6. 
170. Branches Expansion Plan. Document of PCP Secretariat. 1932. 
'171. Plan of Activity for Six Months. Document of POP Secretariat. 
1932., 
172. Report by 1.1. Kuperman. Document of PCP Secretariat. 1932. 
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173 
lack of Arab rae ers while other branches such as Haifa were 
commended for their successful activity. 
The intensified activity of the Party in this period had its 
negative aspect: it led to increased arrests among the more 
experienced cadres and the Party was'thus handicapped by the "lack 
of experienced comrades with the necessary knovvledge of Party work". 
174 
In a commarnication to the Oriental Department of the Comintem, the 
Party Secretarlat actually called on the Comintem to supply it with 
experienced cadres to enable it to continue the policy of Arabisation. 
It went on to report that the majority off Parlty memberc had not yet 
175 
accepted -,: re nec line that the Party had lost nearly all its 
lead,:. ng cadres since the Seventh Congrezz, that very few experienced 
Party me=bers re=ained in the branches and that mozt of the merbers 
were nevv and had no past revolutionar7 experience. The 00 itself 
from the ab. "'cnce of was described as being verj weakc- and suffering -. 
Arab cadres. In addition,. police harrassmnt coupled with increased 
hostility from the Yishuv, virtually outlawed the Party in the 
. Jewish street in the aftermath of the AuguEt 1929 uprising. Yet 
despite all the shortcomings and despite the proclamations by the 
'Party leaders at the Seventh Comintem Congress, of the obstructionist 
-he Je-msh lep-ders off' the Partyq this pe ocl was to tact. iCs of 1. r-i 
witness an increasing militancy in Party activity and itse 
-establishment in the Arab Street. 
The uprising of. August 1929 had been regarded by the Party as 
the expression of the agrarian ferment taking place among the Arab 
peasants and Bedouins. The Party professed to see a continuation 
of the peasant movement in the form of "partisan-fights" and rural 
brigandage. 
176 In the -absence of eM meaningful Arab proletariat, $ 
the Party outlined a course of action ihereby in each village where 
contact-had been established, =all meetings of peasants should be 
held where Party members would lecture on the communist agrarian 
173. Open Letter of Reprimand t6 Jaffe/Tel-Aviv Branch. Document of 
T&TP 'EFecretariat. 1932. 
174. Letter f rom Party Secretariat to Oriental Section of the 
Comintern., 1932. CZA S25/7529. - 
175. Ibid. 
176. -ýý. raztissan Fight in Palestine. Inprecor. N 70- 1929. p. 1479. 
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program and explain the meana by -rhich it could, be res-lized. 
177 The 
subjects discuzzed should encompass the political zItuation In the 
country, bad harvests, the dangers of famine, the Zion: L--. t conquest 
of land., the siezure of land and crops, taxes and the obstructicn 
of tax collectors. It was necessary to set up revolutionary 
village committees under tl,. e slogaa of "organize and arm yourselves 
for the revolutionary uprising". The economic situation, of the 
peasants was characterised in a Party document as so desperate that 
the coming of the inevitable agrarian uprising was only a matter of, -, 
time., and it was the Party' a duty to prepare 1, 'or it. by organizing 
the most revolutionary groups =ong the peasants. The Party 
centred its activity around the landless and the unemployed vh= it estimated 
to make up to 2,1% of the Arab peasant population. 
178 Of these, 
the youth were held to con-stitute the group "least influence by 
religious f anaticise arA most open to revolutionary agitation, an: 1 
thus had to be attracted to partidýate in the revoluticnax-j- 
committees. 
The three years follaving the Seventh Congress -atnessed an 
unprecedented degree of activity geared to deliverinCgtýhe Party's 
messag -peasants.,. and encompassing the most distant villages. ge 
to the 
The Arabic press contaLned many reports of the distribution of 
cc=-un-, st leaflcts in Arab villages calling on the peasants not. to 
leave their land and to reftre to pV taxes. . Althouji thds activity 
did not achicve any startling breeakthrougýh, the Party did succeed 
in mustering some support, 
179 
and in gainin;:,; sym-Tathy for itself. 
ISO 
Yet its agitation remined abstract and although i-11.3 leaflets were 
written in siz: -ple language and concemed themselves -. -, ith concrete 
issues relating to the peasants' daily needs., the few --,, easants that 
177. Instructions to Party mEmbers. Doement of PCP Secretariat, 
10 May 1932. Circular letter N 3- CZA S' , 2-5/75e., 178. Inrtrur-ticns to Party Yezbers. Doc=ent of PCP ý3ecretariat,? 
5 May 1932. CZA S 25ý7530- 
179- F. O. 370/'1787/405. Police s--umary, 26 111fay 1933- 180. A newsraper reported the trial of a Jewizh co==ist in Tulkarem 
acctred of dietributing leaflets to Arab peasants. * -;. here the Arab peasant who had arrested him expresred regret for hwrimg 
delivered him to the police after hearing hi3 political 
defence, not having knom that "he is working for the poor and 
tr7ing to-help us". See Falastin,, 25 Ceptember 1932. 
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the Party did succeed in enlisting were themelvess divomed from their 
villages and carried out their activities in the tc)vnv,. Here again 
the Party was h=pered by its Jevash make-up. Jewish cadres were 
reaýy P-nd capable of distribul Cing leaflets in Arab villages =d 
among agricultural workers, but thit, activity could not compensate 
for the IEýck of personal contact-- and the exi-stence of Arab memberz 
who vere the=. selves living in the villages, sharing tlicir daily life 
-and struggle, and thuz capable of playing an active role and 
mustering round them other radical elements. 
in its leaflets directed at the peasant masses, the Party called 
tIA. -for the-taking over of 'state dwmins and the 1wrids of Zionizt settlers 
and Arab feudalir-ts. 
161 
called on the reaLants to rise in arrea 
rebellion and to rely solely on their "swords and rifle-, and forsake 
the Arsb trF-itorous leaders. It was explained that the cause of 
their poverty -was the existence of i=erialism and Zionism, ayiO it 
called on them not to give an inch of their land to *. e Z Zionist 182 
L its literature in this period, the Party settlers. Throughout 
emphasised that the peasants had to struggle not only against the 
imperialint goverment-and its--taxesp and the Zionist settlers who 
were exprop ating their lands., but also "the traitorous feudal 
1E3 
effendis" who sold their land to the &. icni-, t com. pp-nies and lived 
parasitically off the money they extracted from their lhbour. Also 
for the first time in the Party's literature, the issues of "lancl 
conquest" and Jewish irmigration were linked togetherI184 and the 
peasants were called upon to demonEtrate outside Government 
buildings and in the ports a-r-ainst Jewish immigration and to call 
for the return of the immigrants. Instead of bringing foreigners 
into the co=t.:, 7, the Government was called upon to provide work 
and food for the inhabitants. The Party called on the peasants to 
"prepaze for the axned agrarian national liberation revolution" and 
181. To the Masses of Oppressed Peasants: Life or Death. Arabic 
. 
leaflet of CC/PCP. January 1930. 
182. Remember Peasant. Unsigned Arabic leaflet adorned with the 
Hammer and Sickle, 1932. 
183- To the 11asses of Workers and Peasants and to the Revolutionax-j 
Youth. Arabic Leaflet of CC/FCP. April 1932. 
184. To the T; orker-- and Peasant Massess. Arabic Leaflet of CC/PCP 
April 1932. 
74 
although-this projected uprising did not materialisep and the feruent 
in--the villages continued to express itself in primitive forms more 
akin to brigandage than to revolutions the Party attez. ptcd to 
capitalise on the increased Zionist acquisition of land. As far 
back as the Affula incident of 1924, it had opposed the land 
acquisition policy of the 7ionists. After 1930 this became me of 
. 
its main plankes and was link&d to the struggle again. "t the conqueEt 
of worký ca=zjgn_ in the towns. Increasinglys Party literature 
advocated a more militant -stancej openly calling on tl. ie Arab peasants 
to use. armed force,, not only in defence of their lends, but also to 
retrieve those Nd-. 4-ch they had lost in the past. 
185 
Among the small Imb worldng claE-s and in the urban communityf 
communist propaganda was well organised and persistent. Initially 
the-aim was to popularise the Party's slogans and to advertise its 
exi-, tence. The Party embarked on the novel technique of hanging 
banners-across the main streets of large towns; 
186 it distributed 
-leaflets after 
the Friday prayers in Jerusalem and on occasion Arab 
comr=ists delivered _speeches at Moslem religious feE.. tivals. 
187 
Two occasions--%hen-communiset prisoners,, comprising both-Arabs and 
Jews., declared hunger strikes in Paleatine'6 Jails were utilised by 
the Party to win sy=athy in the Arab street. 
188 A veteran Arab 
commmist, Aref al Azouni, issued a call to "all social layers of 
the Arab pcpulation" to support -the co=umists in their strike 
--he described as "non-political". 
189 The communists' demand vinich 
was for the-setting-up of a special pr-Ison regime for political 
185. A call to All Peasants and Revolutionary Nationalists. Arabic 
leaflet of CC/PCP. February 1935. 
186. e. g. Falst 30 November., 1929 reports two Euch banners hung in 
King George street. 9 Jerusalem: "Arab workers Unite-Doxn with 
Zionist imperialism"s and Movm with the Traitorous Arab Leaders". 
ruar 167- Falastin,, 12 Feb y 1§30- 
188. The first strike took place in May 1930., see Falastin 6 and 11 
May 19130- The second strike was a much bigger affair; 55 
political prisoners at the head of which was the veteran 
communist leader Mahmoud al Moghrabi took place in July 1935- 
'See L. Links, Political Prisoners in Palestine: Their Lives ad n 
Struggle (ýalestine Labour Defence. 1939ý p. 12. 
189. Falastins 6 larch 1930. Aref al Azouni was an Arab joumalist ;", oo 
on the staff of Falastin newspaper. He was one of the ear3, y 
members of the Party having joined in 1927, and was particularly 
active in the Party's publishing activities. 
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prisoners. In this they were naturally supported by the Arab press., 
as such a regime waszeen to benefit Arab prisoners of the 1929 and 
1933 uprisings 
190 
and the com=nists won the sy--,, athy and adniration 
of many as a result of their nineteen-day hunger strike in 1925. 
The demonstrations held by the Party in Jerusalem and Jaffa to 
extend solidarity to the strikers were Joined by many Arabs 
191 
a3id 
contributed towards popularising the struggles of the Party and it3, 
involvement in Arab affairs. ý This was coupled with the cannonisation 
of the three Arabs executed by the Government for their role in the 
events of iugust 1929. They were hailed in the Party' s literature 
as martyrs, and the day of their execution - was singled out every 
year as a remembrance dayq 
192 
while the Arabs were called upon. to 
storm the country's jails to free the political prisoners held 
193 there. This increased attention paid to the Arab movement 
stimulated additional Arab involvement in the activity of'the Party, 
and was reflected in the growth of the nmber of Arab cozzunists 
1914- 
's on -arrested, as reported in the press and in police - repo-r". 
communist activity-195 
The Pax+. y called on Arab. -rorkers to struggle for a number of 
-trade -Lmion -demands p -linking these-to the wider political struggle 
against both Arab leaders ani I't-he Histadrut. 
196 According to -the 
Party the i=nediate struggle off the workers should be directed 
towards the abolizInent of child labour the ri&-h4- to organize Arab 
unions, the distribution of land. to' the peasants, the eight-hour- 
day, Goverrunent aid to the 'une=ployed, equall wages for Arab and ý 
190. Falastin. 29 May 1930 publiahed an ediltor'ai 'n atrz--ort of the 
communist pzriscners on strike. IF ee also Political Frisonerm.. in 
Palestine, o- , p. cit. p. 
14 which reported t1hat an -,:. -, e i-mortant 
Arab nevspapers care out in zym., athy with the stýzkerz. 
191. 1 bid. P. U. 
192. To All ". '. orking People in ? alestine, and Revolutionary Youth: On 
the Occasion of Ule 17t.. June, the Day o. tlhe 1-fart. -rS. Arabic 
Leaflet of CC/117ýCP, June 1932. 
193- Arabic Leaflet of CC/PC? quoted in Palezitinee., 10 j-Lay 1930- 
194. e. g. FaIxting 15 March 1930., reported arrest of 13 Arab coz=unists 
in Jeruz-alem; 28 January 1931., the arre--t of 13 1--ab co=mists; %. 0 
3 IMay 1930 the arrest of the Secretar-1 of the CC o-16' the Arab 
16orkers Congres-, X,; nmel Cdeh2 a comrmnist; 17 Ja=. L,, -y 1931,. the 
arrest of 'he Secretary of the Arab 17ork ý11 --, Taffav Da ah 01 ters Society rNi 
al Fashar a com=ziist. 
195- F-0-37V16926/1076 % 4051. Police Su=naries, 9 February-1933 
and 26 YaY 1934. 
196. To All Workers Peasants and Labourers. in Palestine: On the 
Occasion of the Fir3t Of 'May. Hebrew Leaflet of CC/'PCP. 1 May 19319 
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Jewish workers,, and a Government labour ord-inance regulating 
employment conditions. 
197 The workers were warned that the 
Histadrut was not honest in its claims to care for their interests 
and the sane applied to the traditional Arab leaders I'v. ho belong 
to-the employer and capitalist class and. inherently cannot SUPPort 
108 
-the exploited workers"* ' 
The pCpl s re&I involvement with the ArRb -workers movement 
started with 41, he efforts to convene a general Arab torkers' congress 
,:, -i Haifa. Arab 
Partýy rx=berz did =ch of the gmundwork for the J 
congress an 
. 
,L' 
199 The :1 actively participated in its proceedingse 
the congres-- in Januw-j 1930 was hailed as "the hour of holding of 
týhe birth. of the proletariat as 
.a 
distinct class". 
200 In 
retrospect however, thiz congress., although it was followed by 
increased id I Jtancy in the Arab labour movement., did not prove to 
be the breaktl-x, -uZ-h that haE been hoped for. Y., '3. thin the TIARIS, the 
strongesit- Arab workers' organisation in the country, there was open 
hostility to communist involvement in labour affair4 at the same 
. Porters and 
the oppositionistso attempted -time both -t: qe '. ',: uf t4l s st; -, 
to set up rival unions vbose aims and activities were strictly 
-partisan and political. As a consequences the Arab labour move- 
ment remained weak and divided. 
The -rarty-persisted in its efforts to work within the established 
labour organisation and -to help found others where none existed. 
speciall attention was paid to the railýay and port workers and to 
building and printing workers. 
201 The Party atteropted to 
organise-cells, in indurte-al establishments such as the Electric 
-197. To L11 Working You'll'. 1h in Palestine. Arabic Leaflet of CC/ 
Comm-mist Youth organisation. 1931- 
---298. Manuscript of Arabic pamphlet on the Labour movement 
issued by 
19,32. 
199, The Fimt Arab Woriters Con&ress, Haifa 11 Januarv 1930. Pamphlet 
Issued by the PAV. B(n. p. n. d. ) - Of the elected 11 xnan CC of the 
Congress,, 3 were ccmmunistsp as was the president of the Congresso 
and the secretary of the CO. Among the future leaders of the 
Party who took part in this congress were Raawan al Hilous 
Sadek al Jarrah. Boulous, Farahs, . 
200. The Rise of the Arab Working Class in Palestine. Inprecor. N. 5- 
1930- p- 78. 
201. Letter from Party cadre in Jerusalem to Secretariat. 23 April 1932. 
. 
Document of PCP Secretariat. 16 March 1932. CZA. S25/7530- 
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Company and the Dead Sea Zorksx and among the viorkers of the Iraqi 
P ; roleum Company in Haifa. 
202 In Jaffa it succeeded in setting up 
203 the Transport 7,, orkers' Society and the corrmunit: ts involved them- 
%. o selves in the struggle of the Jaffa Arab"' rkers' Association against 
Zionist pickets formed to enforce the policy of "Conquest of Labour". 
Its propaganda activity culminated with the itsuing of a labour 
jou--mal "Al Nur", which devoted itself to Arab labour affairs and 
204 
pu the defence cff the Arab workers rights,, and with it. blication 
of a number of panThlets dealing with topics as varied as, "The 
Chinese Revolution", "Lieblmecht Against the War" "Lenin' s Death" . 
"T'he R. -4-1-ray T. 'orkers"j, and "Class Revenge and Class Power". 
205 This 
period of proliý "ic + -riblication also saw the distribution of a number 
of legal boo, klets by an Arab mezber of the CC dealing with the 
2o6 method- of trade-union c-ganisation and other topics. 
In th e p;: 4--vailing atmosphere of heightened Histadrut activity, 
t the Pazty centred its campaign among Arab workers on the struggle 
against their evict -ion from their jobs. It emphasised the all- 
enbracing importance of a campaign to van support among them, based 
on their defence against the encroachments of the Histadzut. 
207 In 
202. Police Stramary.. 9 ? ebruary 1933- loc- cit- 
20.. 7. This was headed by Said Ylbalan,, an active con-m-unist v-bo joined 
the Pa. A rty in 1932 and participated in the activities of the Jaffa Arab Workers' AEsociation. He continued to play a 
prom=axnt role in Arab Labour affairs in the Forties. For 
activity o-1, " Transport ISociety see-Police Summaryp 26 May 1934- 
10 . cit. c 204. Al N (The Light), published by the Lawyer 11. Stein who also 
published. Haor in Hebrew. He was assisted by two Arabsp Jabra 
Nicola and Abdul Rahim-al Iraki., 
7- 205' Document of PCP Secretariats Marth 1933- CZA. S25,17530- 206. Jabra Nicola (. 1912-19751, a journalist joined the Party in 1931 and in 1935 became a, zmber of the CC. He left the Party after the 
split of 1943, and later became a Trotskyst. He was one of the few Arab members interested in theopetical issues. His works include, The St-ike 1Jovement among the Workers in Palestine 
n. Trade Union Organisation: A Study (1935 p in the 
Organisation of Workez-s and the way to Establish Trade Unions (Jaffa 1935), In th_e eh T-orld: A Concise Furve Jewi of the _ Historv of the Jews and a Detailed Analysis of Zionism and its "Farties with a Descrintion of Other Jewish Trends (Jerusalem 
1935) s pnd a translation of Palm Dut s Lenin (1935 n. p. ) 207. -Internal Docummt of PCP Secretariat: tivity Ag4nst occupation of V'ork. 23 April 1932. 
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its instructions to Jewish Party members., it underlined that 11the 
duty of the communists is to stand by the side of the Arab workers, 
and to struggle against the Histadrut,,. 
208 
This activity was 
-characterized as absolute1j, necessazy in order "to gain the confidence 
of the Arab workers". To counter hesitationz among the Jewish Party 
meubers, the Secretariat declared that particiration in activity 
against the "Conquest of 'Vork" cauTaign was obligatorj and threatened 
. _ýexpulsion. any manbdrs vaho refused to take part. 
209 
The P arty 
aimed, to actively inZtigate the Arab workers in Jaf fa, where the 
confrontation took the most extreme form., to set up. counter-pickets 
to -defend themselves agaminzt the pickets of the Hi--tadrut2lo and it 
did nct- shy e!. -sy from calling on the Arab workers -to "u-se force if 23-1 
necessary" in 1heir o-, = defence against Ahat it termed "the 
hooligan fascizt car. -paign" to oust them from their Jobs. 
In K-adi Ht--nein (Nis Ziyona) , where clashes between I. rabs taid 
Jews--were a consequence of the Histadrut' s activity,, the Party 
declared that "the duty of class conscious Jerish workers was to 
prove-to the Arab peasant that they had nothing in co=on with those 
vlao-occupied hi-- land and -his- work'. 
212 The Party presumed that tthe 
resistance of the Arab worker. was a result of. its agitation and took 
-ide in this fact; it described the Jewish workers who took part 
in tais activity as having "lost all feeling of class interest and 
collabo. ation". 
213 
the Arab It glorified the armed resistance ol 
workers again-t the Zionist pickets and declared that-11th ere is only 
the language of the stick to deal v. 1th scoundrels who attack the 
livelihood of the workers". - In. 'Jaffa itself, the Tran sport V-7orkers 
Society., the'labour organisation set up by the Party, actively 
engaged in the picketing organised by the Arab Worker. Association 
in the city. Party' s attacks on the "Hitleristic, labour 
'In-tructions of PCP ESecretariat to the MaZers. Ci Letter 208. rcular 
F. 3- VaY 1932. 
209. Document of PCP Secretariat, 3 June 1932. loc. cit. 
210. F. C. 371/17M/6778- Police S. ummary, 15 October 1934- 
211. Open Letter of reprimand to Jaffe/Tel Aviv branch. Document of 
PM Secretaxiat- 1932. in Khomer lehel 14azkirot. -op. - ci 212. Haor, 15 APril 1932. quoted in Vilner., op. ci 
213- To 11_11 the Zork-ing Masses in Palestine. Arabic Leaflet of 
CC/j: CP December 1932. 
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conquerors" serves as an example of the Party' c attitude to the 
problem and its campaigns among JeYrish workers to take the ciae of 
the Arabs. In Tel-Aviv where Ar-,., b and Jerish woriý. ers were injured 
during an attack by a Zionist Picket, the Party co=., endea the action 
of a couple of Jewish workers w1ho defenaea the Arabs and were 
injured as a result. 
214 It characterised the Zionists as, "building 
a wall of naticral hatre: 111 betwecn Arab and JeY. -Ish workers, ani 
atte= pting to exterminate the Arab labouring masses. p The Jeti-eh 
workers were-warned that the policy being inTlemented. by the 
Histedrut endangered their-future in the coLmtry rnd even their 
-veiy e2dstence. 
215 They werd called upon to desert their 
"chauvinistic leaaers" and to refu, ýe to take part in "the Zionist 
hooligan groups". Only through struggling against the policy of 
11concuest"_ and -againct jewish inznigration in the co=on front with 
the Arab workers, could imperialism be expelled fr= the country 
and -the welfare cf both Alrab and Jewish workers be -lafeguarded. 
The position taker, ty the PCP and the international commmi,,, -t 
movement on the events of August 1929,, coupled with the fi= turn 
towards Arabisation that the Party had taken after the Seventh 
Congress resulted in increased hostility from the Yiebuv and a 
decline in activity mithin the Jewish co==ity. This was 
reflected in-the Party's poor showing in the election to the 
"elected assembly" of the Yishuv in 1930 when it won a very small 
number of votes 
216 
and where its members were attacked as "pogromists". 
Vithin the Partyp'the struggle centred on the issue of whether 
ý4 it was possible for Ar. -ab workers to conduct an economic struggle,, 
and whether raising dermands for higher pay and the eight-hour-day 
-would lead to a weakening of the Arab movernnt and the facilitation 
of the Zionist-"conquesit: of work". -'The Party leadership denied 
the -velidi`ty *of these criticismý 
217 
and held that the Arab workers 
214. To All Workers inPalestine. ' Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP. October 1932. 
215. To All Arab Labourers and Revolutionary Jewish V. *orkers: Down 
with the FasciEt Conquest of Labour. Hebrew Leaflet of CC/FCP. 
WaY 1934. d 
216. The 'Troletarian L-ý;., --V' a communist f mnt organization gained only 700 votes, less than half the votes gained in the 1925 
elections. Fee Israeli., _pp. cit. P- 
83. 
217. The Strike lvbvement A=ng the Arab VForkers. CC ra . zia. 
- 
ýO June 1932. Circular N. 8. 
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had demonstrated by embarking on strikes even while suffering gretit 
economic distresss that there was room for a syndicalist jBtruggle,, 
and that-the organization of Arab workers should accompany the 
raising of economic demands and not necessarily precede it. The 
Party insisted., att the same time, that Javish members should 
continue to seek entry into the Hirtadrut to wage a struggle from 
within the Zioniet organisation.! -,. This hov,, everl brougýit strong 
opposition from Party mezbere. The condition-, of activity m. thin 
Zionist organiEationc were extre-, -&ly difficult and hostility tov, ards 
the Party was so pronounced that Jewish Party members preferrec! to 
set u-- their oy. n trsde union organisation. The Party leadership 
however, never wavered in its belief that opposition -to Zioniz. m 
should come fromwithin and to this end, -it continued to wage 
Its 
struggle inside the Zionist movement, but with little successs and 
as far as the manberE- were oonce,. "ned., v6-ith srer. t reluctance. The 
Tartzy never conceded that the Jemsh conmunity -. as -a whole was a lost 
cause, or that it was impossible to differentiate between the Zionist 
leade=aAp and the Jewish working masses in the country. 
218 
The Party's-main-drive within the Jewish con=mity remained 
aimed at winning sul: port for the Arab national independence movement. 
The Jewish ninority vas seen to have become 9 as a result of Zionist 
policy,, the "main pillar of Briti--h imperialism and used as a tool 
against the Arab national liberation movement.,, 
219 Thiss it was 
pointed out, presented a threat to the existence of the Jewish ý 
minority, and the Party warned of the danger of a repetition of the 
massacres of-10,29. Further-more., the threat which i=nigration 
presented was declared to be-not only directed against the Arab 
--workers and peasantst but also against Jewish workers, for "it served 
as a means of swelling the ranks of the unemployed-and lowering 
220 
wages". ,,. -It also 
led to the creation of "an abyss of hatred" 
between the two peoples, which was to the benefit of neither. - The- 
only way to guarantee the f ree development of the Jewish minority 
218. A: r6bic Leaflet Of CC/PCP quoted in Falastin, 10 September 1931- 
219. - 
P- stop must, be put to Zionist provocation: Long live the Arab 
National Liberation Yovement. Hebrew Leaflet of CC/FCP 1931- 
220. To the I.. 'orking and Peasant Masses. Hebrew leaflet of CC/FCP- 
April 1932. 
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in the country was to struggle against imperialism and Zionisms 
against immigration and conquest, 
221 
and to ensure that in the coming 
revolutionary uprising in the country, the Jewish workers would, 
unlike in 1929, participate in the struggle for national independence. 
In the five yesxs stretching from the Party' s Seventh Congress 
"30, to the Seventh Congress of the Corrintern in 1935, the Party in 1'. 
had succeeded in extending its roots within the Arab community. 
, A-rabisation was 
the natural outcome of the change in the Comintern' s, 
e=hasis f rom the cl ass to the national struggle. The Jemrish 
leade--, h3. p had fulfilled' its historic task of drawing a number of 
. Arab ce-res into 
the Party ana had to make way in order to facilitate 
the Pazkvl s 'idealtif ication r-ith the Arab national struggle. This 
transformation -did not take place ass a result of the rarty' s own 
0 
reading of -the situation in Falezline,, but in confonrItywith the 
, 11 iom. The Party failed in its ta--I-. of winnina %.. -cminte=l s instruc"I. 
over the. Arab peasant mazesesp but it did succeed in attracting 
sections of the Arab wozi-. ing class and intelligentsia. The 
objective conditions in Palestine favoumd the development of the 
Party. The national struggle was becoming more acute,, there was 
an increase in land sale-- and in Jewish immigration. Within the 
Arab co=wumity.. the Arab masses were becoming restive: they were 
il--_atient with their, leaders who were holding out for an arrangement 
T., Ith Britain., and they favoured more militant action., as the 
demonstrations. of 1933 and the guerTilla band of Shikh al Kassam 
showecL The small Arab working class was grov., Ing anabeginning to- 
take the of f ensive: strikes were occurring with increasing 
frequency and trade union organisation was the popular watchword. 
The educated youth were also clamoui-Ing-for organisation md to 
-wage a struggle against the British, and for the first time literar7 
works-were circulating vhich introduced new ideas of revolution and 
social justice. The struggle for the Arabisation of the Party went" 
h&Td-in-hand with the attempt to take advantage of this new climate 
in the country. 
221. To the Workers of Palestine, the Labouring inhabitants., ý and the 
Revolutionary youth. Arabic Leaflet of CC/FCF. April 1932. 
82 
,, 1, 'I 
*X -4 y %, ,, - 
A 
Vs y*w ,, 
WN T"Vo 
LAO A 
CHA2= R TBM 
PJAMY POUCY DUMFG TIM, 7MRD MUM IND UM 
MET 
. LRODUCTION CP TEM NATIONAL FRCKT 
The Left Phase of the PCP 
The PCPI s position Vis-a-vis the Arab national movement was 
formulated in conformity Nýith the decisions of the Sixth Comintern 
Congress* The new Comintern policy relating to association with 
the nattionalist movements in the colonies started ar, an attempt to 
redirect the molicies of the Prench and British cormurdst parties 
vr-; th regard to political alliances with social democratic parties and 
as a reaction to failures in China. 
1 The Ninth Plenum, of the BOCI 
meeting in February 1926 decided on the new tactic of "class-versus- 
class"; the period was characterised as one of "increasinz 
2 
capitali-st instabilit,,, " and. of betraval by the leadership of the 
social democratic-parties in the West, and the leaders of the 
nationalistýmovement in the colonial countries, of the anti- 
i=pperialisst revolutionaz-, struggle. The Sixth Clomintern Congress 
meeting in Jul_y 1928 formlly consecratecl the 'Thircl Feriod". "Mis 
was based on both internal and external considerations pertaining 
to the Soviet -Union and Stalin' s -struggle- f or power, but its strictures 
were to a; ply to all co=anist -parties., and all camtries v. -Ithout 
exception and-Irrespective of -their varying internal conditions. 
In the backrard -colonial countries the tactic of alliance with the 
national bo=. geoisie ras rejected, and the "revolutionary wing" of 
-, 
the national liberation movement was no longer to be trusted. The 
new orthodoxy declared that althou. Eýa temporary alliances with the 
revoluxtionary wing of the national bourgeoisie were permissable 
under -very specific condi tions, the aim was to establish independent 
organxisations in'preparation for the setting-up of Soviet power, by 
armed ixrrisings if necessary. 
3 - The- commmist parties of the* 
colonial countries were instructed to wage a determined struggle 
-against-the 
leaderships- cff' the various nationalist movements and 
to sever all -relatims vilith them, including what had been previouzly 
4 
characterissed as 'their revolutionary wings. 
.. --- 
1. Haithcox,, 
-op. 
ci . p. 87. 
2. Outline History of the Com: mmist International op* cit p. 270. 
3-- 'Pro=-am of the Comintern adopjecl at the 6th Congress 
*tý. Y. 1929) P-59- 
4. Tenth pleni= of ECCI July 1929, in Haithcmc. op. cit. p. 129. 
84' 
The PCP ca: 7ied out the Comintern' s instructionz to the letter 
and waged a deter=ined campaign againzt the Arab Executive ana the 
leadership of the Palestine Arab national movement -Y6-hich lasted well 
beyond 1933. The Party dated the "betrayal of the national reformil-tsit5 
from the convening of the Feventh Arab Congress in 1928, which had 
adopted a poliCy of co-operation with Britain. The Arab Executive 
was chr-ractex-ised as "having entered upon t2he road of traitorouz 
competition vdth the Zionists in bargaining for concessions from 
British ixTe-rialiem" 
6 
and the national refomists were declared to 
have turnea =re ana more to "counter-revolution and capitulation". 
The -re-evaluation b.,, - the Party of -the nature of the August 1929 
events led to an attack on the leadership of the Arab national 
movemerx'. for having diverted -the struggle of the Arab masses into 
racial attacks -on the Jewish population, and for having betrayed the 
insurrectionary movemeen-1. of the Arabs by discuzeing terms with the 
British imperialist Crover: =ent "while corpses are still lying in 
the streets of Haifa, Nablus, and Jerusalem". 
7 The Party declared 
its vehement opposition-to--the discussions which took place between 
the British Govermment-and the-leaders of the Arab national movement 
in the aftem-ath of the Aug-u-st 1929 uprising, and came out strongly 
agains-t the sending of an Ixab delegation to London. 
8 
The Arab 
leaders., it was declared, had in the past played a revolutionary 
role -and opposed British imperialism but, as became obvious during 
the 1929 uprising and its aftermath., bad become traitors. Their 
policy had changed from one of struggle against imperialism to one . K--- 
of t. xy. 4.. ng-to make a deal with the British within the terms of the 
-Mandate. The aim of the delegation to London was declared to be 
not the securing of the independence of Palestine., but the reaching 
of a compr9mise -which -would give the country the semblance of 
_parliamentary 
rulep but v which would keep it wider-the domination 
of Britain, and further 'die interests of the traitorous leaders. 
: -'. t-: 
" "". 
" 
5. Decisions of the 7th Congress of JýCp. 1930- OP- c. p. 220. 
6. Tasks of the Comm in the 1,11 Arab National Yovement. 1931. 
(M. ci t. P. 18. 
7- Ibid. p. 19. 
B. London., the I'llecca. of the Traitors of the Revolution. Ella -Al Ar=am, No. 7. MV 1930. 
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Before the delegation actually travelled to Lonaon, the I'arty 
called on the Lrabs to r-efuse to give any contribution to help 
finance the trip. 
9 It -%-as stressed that the alm of the delegation 
was to wo--, i-. out some compromise which would not bring any benefit 
to the Arab masses themselvesp and pointed out-that the struggle 
fo. Palestine' indepenience. could only take place in Palestine 
itself. This woulcl be achieved through the total rejection of not 
only the Balfour Declaration which the Arab leaders were bargaining 
over, but also the British imperialist presence in the country. 
The decisions of the Feventh Congress of the Party held In 
December 1930 were 'unequivocally hostile to the aims and practices 
cf lie A- It was stated that although t ý. rab national movement. 
n detrimental to all Eeotions of the Zionist actiNity had bee: 
10 Ar b population, -a -the landoxners constituted an exception for 
they sold their lands to the Zic%ists and btnefitted from the 
inflated prices which the latter were prepared to pay. it was 
these self-same-people v. -ho constituted the leadership of the Arab 
-national mcvement,, and 
the Party-accused -the members of the-Arab 
Executive of selling land to-the Zioni-. ts. Thus the Party saw- 
-its-task as one o. &I"'exposing, the traitorous leadership of the 
12 
and of contrasting their behaviour efTendi Majlisi ana the 'Mtetil' 
in-atte=tin- to -work: out "- deal with British imperialismp with 
-the suffering of the. b masses as symbolised by the execution of Pra 
he t -three Arab rebels in Acre by the British'for their part in the 
-u: 1929 prising. It was decided at the Congress that the Party's 
propaganda should emphasise the betrayal of -Arab feudal land -the 
-owners'- who were accorded the Comintem' s latest. label., "national 
'13 
refo=, - and should expose the "secret agreement" concocted 
in Landon'by the Arab delegation and -the British -in return for a 
sham--leg. Islative council. Likewise it conde=ed the Supreme 
9. "To comzades, wozizers; and peasants". Arabic leaflet CC/PCP 
-February 1930. 
10. The tasks of the PCP in the Countr -yside. Resolutions of the 
Seventh Congress. op. cit p. 3.74. 
Ibid. 170. 3.1. 
12. 'Ibid. P. 159. 
Decisions of the 7th Congress. cit. p. 220. 13- 
86 
Moslem Comcil itself., under the leadership of the Yuf tit for being 
"the defending body. active in the name of religion and Arab 
tradition" and for being representative of the clerics, the 
-merchants and the feudallistc who had, as one body, turned away 
fro= the Arab national liberation strugglet and joined the imperiali-st 
camp. Even the bourgeoisie elements in the country were regarded 
as being incapa1le of waging a revolutionary struggle apainst. 
15 imperialism- and, in conformity with the feudal landovýnerst were 
cberecteri5ed as moving towards -the conclusion "of a counter- 
revolutionax-y deal" in the shape 
. 
of continued imperialist dcminati'on 
of 'Faiestine disgui--ed by "pseudo-conztitutional concezzion-c"o 
16 
The Yart. y attem-ptea. to link. the national E: trur ; ain. -, t .. r-gle F_; 
-British dominstion and 7ionism, to the social struggle revolving 
round the agrarian problem in the countryside. It criticised 
the Arab national movement ffor ignoring the basic agrarian problem 
and-confining their demands to keeping the land within Arab hands. 
The Party, v; hile not minimising the importance of this struggle, 
saw the necessity of directing attention to "the landlessness of 
t he - re as ants ... peasant-- -indebtedness ... taxes... the feudal exploita- 
tion of the villages by the landozners.. -the Kh=s. " 
17 
It 
criticised t'he R. Husseini group, which it regarded as constituting 
the most advanced section of the national movementp for being 
hesitant about the agrarian problem and for not raising the slogan 
"land -to the peasants". 
18 
The. PCP saw its role as one of 
introducing the class struggle into the rural scene, and putting 
pres-sure on the H. Hus-seini group, as the most radical. national 
sectionp towards achieving a correct appraisal of-the agrarian 
problem. However., the Congres!: was careful to point out the 
great difficulties involved in working among the bacloxamd, Arab 
peasantry and warned against the dangers of provoking the Arab 
-peasants into the counter-revolutionary camp by extremist propaganda 
-vhich was too advanced or injured their religiouz sensibilities. 
III.. The National Question at the 7th Congress. Tnrreco - o-p. ci . p. 
64- 
15- Tasks of the Comrumtp o-o- cit. P. 17- 
16. Ibid. 
17- ResolUtiOnz of the 7th Congress (programs) op. cit. p. 170. 
18. Tbia. 
1' 
87 
--- 
-4 
The Party, --howing itseLf conscious of the objective limitations 
on its activity &, nong 'the rural massesp declared that care must 
be taken to consider "the living condition. - and religious factors 
-connected with the backwardness and illiteracy" 
19 
of the peasant 
masses and wax-ned that party p. -cpaganda should not take a hostile 
attitude to matter. - relating to the peasants' religious beliefs. 
20 
This however., was not to be construed to mean a cessation of the 
expossure-of 'the political role which certain clerics pcrformcds to 
the detriment of the national liberation struggle. 
#6 he PCP1 s a' ttack on the Palestine Arab national movement and 
the host.; li-Ity evinced to i t leadership, was linked to the adoption 
of -a:. new-poliJ cy pertaining to -the 4rab national- qlu-. ntion and the 
political bo=dariez dividing the Arab states. The Party 
characterised the erzeence of the Arab national question as being 
conte.! xed in the deliberate imperialist pol-'&. Cy o.. arbitrarily 
splitting the Arab world into separate parts under the domination 
of the different imperialist powers. 
21 These boundaries, which 
were. "forcibly maintained" by-, the imperialist pmvers, were seen as, 
"artificially wealening the masses- of-- the Amb people -in their 
struggle against the foreiga. domination" in their pursuit t of national 
independence and unification. -The resultant "feudal fragmentation" 
deprived each an6L every one of those countrics of "the pre-requisites 
for eccnorde independence and political development",, -and at the 
Sam time hamassed the Eervi -ces-of "the reactionary monarchical 
cliques, he feudal and se. mi-feudal landmmers 2nd sheikhs, and the 
native-bourgeois compradores-and high clergy" 
22 to maintain and 
preserve this enforced disunity and-safeguard continued imperialist 
dominances whether British, French., or Italian. The groups which 
_,. constituted 
the leadership of the 1-rab national movement in Palestine, 
and in the other Arab states, were seen to have an interest in the 
continued existence of the Arab states formed as a result of the 
post-Pirst World V. -ar imperialist carve-up, and to be hostile to the 
19. Resolutions of the 7th Congress (programs) op- cit- P- 159- 
2D. Ibid. Such as attackz on 'rRajul al din" and the 'Wakf. 
21. Tasks of the 
-cit. p. 
16. 
2Tbid. 17. 2. 
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reali--, --tion of Arab unity which would deprive the= of tlic., 'Ur 
privileges and rut an end to their sectional interests. In 
oppoziticn to this., the PCP raised the slogan of national political 
independence as a step towards. the voluntar-j union of the Arab 
. 
23 "he role of countries "on the basis of federal principles" .1 
the con=unir-t, parties in the Arab world was to struZZle for 
nationan independence and national unity,, "not only within the 
narxvw and artificial boundaries created by imperialism and despotic 
interests"S 24 but for the national unification of the v&ole Arab 
East. Thas the Party =xt work for the formation of an "all 
ArOb revolutionczy anti-i=- er-. 46alist front . 11 stretching across the 
boundaries of the v, -rious Ar&b states, and lead thc nas! ý. er, behind 
th---zl-cgen of the "all 1rab workers' and peasant----' federation of 
the lxab peoples". 
25 Thds, the Party emphasised, was imperative 
if it hoped to win the support of the urban poor and the retty 
bourgeois masses. It was necessary to link the social struggle 
of the vorkers against the Arab bourgeois&, e, and the peasant masses 
agajxL-__t the feudalists., to the v, -Ider national anti-imperialist 
struggle aimed at the national liberation of the Arab countries. 
IMAs Y. as a novel departure in -the policy of the IICP in Palcstine. 
It had in effect donned the rantle of the I., -, tikla. 1 rovement at the 
close, of 'the I First Torld War, P-ncl pmclai=ed the necessity of 
involving the Party in the national liberation movement of the 
Arab -peoples in order to vrin them over to its economic and social 
'program* The Party's literature continuedv right ur- to 1935, to 
proclaim- the slogEn of the Ir. orkers' and Peasants' all-Arab 
Federation" and to call for co-ordinated struggle in all the Arab 
countries against British and French imperialism, in the face of the 
increasingly separate national movements -which were leading the 
carTaign for political independence of their o= states. It thus 
tried to outflard: this traditional leadership by making a urider 
national appeal to the more radical sectors of the Arab population 
and the radical section of the Istiklal, and the Arab Youth Congress. 
23. Tasks of the am=istr- op. ' cit. p. 17- 
24. Ibia. p. 19. 
25. Ibid. p. 18. 
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With the coming of the era of the popular and national frontss 
ushered in by the Feventh Comintem Congress in 1935, this slogan 
was. quietly dropped, as the PCP ha!: tened to fom a clozer alliance 
with the lcaderzhip of the Arab n. itional movement in Palestine, 
and -was never to be raised again. 
Me hostility of -the PCP towards the Ar-ab national movement 
had =nifessted it--elf as esrly a-- 1928 in the f o. -. -, i of an attack on 
the Feventh Arsb Congress and it-- non-representative character. 
The new ; 'xrab Executive fomcdas a result, vias regardcd vIth 
suspicion and its treasonable intents were quickly slezea upon 
dL-r-; nC-, rnA- in the after=ath of, the 1929 uprizing-. The Party raw 
in the favourable reception accordecl by the ýr&b leaders to the 
report of the Investigation Co=ittee dealing with the events., 
confir='Ldon of its susliclons that the Arab leaders weiv reaay to 
accept a compromise base: 1 on the - set-1.1 -ing-up of P- legislative body, 
This the Party regarded as a betr. Val of the Arab national liberation 
struggle, as the. report of the Comrnission had "renewed the comm: ittment 
to the Yandate and the Balfour Declaration"., 
26 
and conn-equently any 
constitutional-set-up created would necessarily remain rdthin the 
framewDrl, of, -continued B. =tish domination and Zionist expansion. 
The Party interpreted the decisions. of the leaders of the Arab 
'Executive to cU, spense ýwith the holding of the traditional protest 
demonstrations at the Rebi Yusa festival in 1930 
27 
and on the 
anniversary of the Balfeur Declaration on the 2nd November 1931, as 
a concilliatory move towarcls the British authorities and as signaUing 
the-abane. cnment-of the mass-struggle. 
28 At the sanne time the Party 
regarded the Arab national movement, including its radical wings as 
being -afraid, of the impending revolutionary outbreak 
29 
rhile 
preparing nevertheless to dominate the outbreak should it occur, 
and ch2mel it in-the direction of racial slaughter. The Arab 
leaderss 'Kho the-Party saw as still excercising total control over 
: :-' 
26. Cn the Statement of the Investigation Commission. p. 6. 'Ell'a &I 
A==. ý- 
1% 7. MaY 1' 50- 
27- Is Peace Permanent? Ibid. p. 9. 
28. A call to the Arab Youth Congress... to the Nat. Intellectualsy 
and the extremitt revolutionary youth. CC/PCF leaflet November 1931- 
: [sraeli. or. c 86. 
290 Documents of PCP 1,3ecretariat. Letter to Party memberso 5 May 1932. 
CZA S25/7530- 
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the Arab ma s movement, attempted to channel the popular anti- 
Zionist agitation into peaceful avenues to aid them in applying 
pressure on the British Govemment, but the Party was afraid that 
in the event of any outbreak... the Arab 'Executive Y. ould "divert 
the movement into bloody racial disturbances,, 
30 to wF., rd off the 
threat of agrarl-ar. rebellion and arrest the anti-British strug&7le. 
Thus its leaflets to the Amb population vere full of attacka, - m 
the betrayals of the Imb leaders and their total indifference to 
the sufferings of the peasants at the hands of Govemment tax 
collectorz, end ' the-Ir eviction from their land by Briti-th solaiers 
to make way for I'Lionist set-ttlers. 
31 Party exposed the role of The 
the _. ýrab 
leaders ass holders, -of Govemment jobs, and called on the 
masses to a--k them. to explain what they were doing to stem the 
tide off Zionist i=igration and land acquisition32 and thy, instead 
of leading the August -upeising against the British presence in the, 
couatry, they had aborted the revolt and turned it into inter- 
33 
communal feuds. 
The demonstrations ýwhich broke out in October 1933 in a number 
of tov.; ns, in 'Palestinc,, seemed to confirm the Party's pmgnc---is of 
the continuing revolutionary. ferment in the country. Although the 
iz=nediate cause of the protest was to be found in the mounting 
tensions created by the inc-r-eased Jevvish i=dgration and land 
transfers, the 'Party swr in the "outspokenly anti-British character" 
of the events, 
34 
an affir=tion of its claim that the Augmt 1929 
-St chapter in the revolutionary outbreak uprising wp-s only the fi. 
and that, although subduea, the revolutionary movement continued 
despite the concilliatory policies of the-leaders of the Executive 
Committees, to fenrient under the surface. The Party emphasised 
30- To the T-orkers'of Palestine., the labouring inhr-bitants and the 
Revolutionary Youth. Arabic Leaflet of CC/PýM A"pril 1932 
31- Greetings to the Oppressed Masses, to all Workers, Feasanis 
Bedouins, and national revolutionaries. Arabic Leaflet of CC/PCF 
April 19,33- 
32. The Expulsions of the Arabs of 71MIEdi al Havere-L al A=am 
N. 4. Ju1Y 1933- 
33- To All Labouring People in Palestine: To the Revolutionary Youth 
on the occasion of the 17th of June, the Day of the Martyrs. 
Arabic Leaflet of CC; /PCP. June 1932. 
34- The Bloody Events in Palestine. InEreco - IT. 48- 1933. P- 1056- 
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the anti-British nature of the events to cut short any possible 
allegations of a pogromp or of the movement being organised by 
35 
"the Mufti and the effendis as in 1929". On the contrary$ the 
Arab Fxecutive Committee, under pre. -sure f"rom the radic. -. 1 section 
of the IE: t4-klal., had bew. impelled to cr-11 for a protest strike 
again--t Jewish irarigration and against land sales as early as March 
191133., hat'.., after ccn4, -*, act4, -z Y. -Ith the High Corrzvdssioner, gone back on 
its decision and called off the -trike. In October 1933,, again 
under the =Lmting pressure of Arab feeling againct increazing 
immigration., -the Arab leaders were forced to call for national 
de--onstrations, but the -Fartr pointed to the fc^t that the 
demonstrations were called for different dzýv-- in different tovLms 
az proof of the Arab lea4-erzhipls atten-rpt-- to atomise the demonstra- 
tions -and 'thwartany concentrated mass movement. The occasion of 
the demonstrationz- was siezzed upon to modify the Party' s stand 
towaxds the Istil-dal movement. AlthouF)a Ar-ni Abdul Hadi., the 
leader of the Lstildal and its most prominent representative in the 
Arab -Executive, was attacked as belonging to the same group of 
36 
reactionaries as the other Arab efffendis, the radical wing of the 
movement was commended as having become more revolutionaz7 and for 
having rnized clurint-, the demonstration--., the right political slogans 
o "no diplo-maticnegotiaticn, only mass demonstrations". 
37 The 
Party described the me=bers of the radical wing as the "true anti- 
ir-merialists, 56 and insisted that it was they who had marched at 
the head of the demonstr-alt-ions and gave the latter their anti- 
Briitislh character. Vhereas in 1929$ the traditional Arab leaders 
had retained control over the movement, and H. Hus-seinil s efforts 
to turn the dam nztrations against the British rather than the 
ish inhabitants had -failed., in '1933, the central role was played 
by 
-the radical sections ce 
the Arab national movement, represented 
by the Istilklal radi-cal ving, and the Arab Youth Congress. 
F-0.3-73/16926/1585. Palestine Police Summaries., 15 November 1933- 35- 
The report confixms that the demonstrations were directed against 
the British. 
36.1-"-, abic leaflet of CC/PCP quoted in Falastin, 8 Wovem niber 1933- 
37- Yiddish leaflet of CC/PCP October 1933 quoted in Israeli op. cit. p. 98- 
1b4 I- entioned by name were, H. Husseini; 36- 3*ýz at Darwaza; 
Zuxuaihad- Ajaj IN 
92 
The Pexty wholeheartedly Eupported the outbreak of the October 
1933 de=nstrations, and itc, --dlitants, many of whom were arrested, 
39 
played an active role, unlike during the 1929 events. The main 
slogans of Ithe demonztrations, a---ainat continued Jewish immigration) 
and for the cessation of land sales, where ones, '%hich the Party 
itself haaa been propagating ccnsistently for some time. The situation 
in Falestýne i-as charac to ter--sed by the F-Exty az one where tr4o hundrud 
40 
villages v. ýere alreacý,, in open revolt , and the country war, seen to 
be-fast appmaching the stage of a revolutibnarýy crisir.. During 
the de=nstratU ons themselves the Party's call was no-14; restricted to 
support for the two above mentioned slogans, but directed the rnazscs 
to ca'11.1 for the annulment of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration 
a-- the only way to achieve the desired stoppage of i=ý, Lgration and 
land sales. Thiz was linj. -ed, to the demand for the immediate confis- 
cat-Ion oý -I' the 11-nas of the Goven=entj the Zionistso =d the Arab 
feudalists, and for the organisation of =. -Imrs' end peasants' 
committees to boycott British end Zioni!: t Food_. 
41 Unlike in 1929 
the position of the Party di"ring the 1933 events was clear and unanimous. 
The Arabs -had spontaneously -erupted against the Zionist "land and 
work robbery" and the oppression of the i=perialist goven=ent; this 
vas a Oust struggle and deserved suLPCr4,,. The Party protest j -ed in 
its publications against the arrest of the leaders of the 
demonstrations and demanded that the accusations against them be 
dr-p-pped.. and that both they and all other political prisoners in 
42 Palestine' s jjails should be set free .A the same time an appeal 
-for funds was made, to send to the families of those výbo had lost 
their lives as a result of the suppression of the demonstrations. 
, The Party's, characterisation of-the nature of the 1933 event-. 
was not entirely correct. The e=phasis on the participation of 
Arab peasants and Bedouins was simply not true. Unlike the Aug=t 
events., the -eruption was mainly an ux-ban me and was of such short 
duration that itwaz su; pressecl before it covId have anywider 
39- F-0.372/16926/7585. Pal. police summaries. loc. cit. 
40. The beginning of the Revolutionsry Crisis in Palestine. In-prec 
No. 50.195,33- P. 1110. 
4: L. To all the labouring inhabitants. Arabic leaflet of CC/PC; P. 
October 1933- 
42. Article in ak-R., No. 18.1933. Quoted in Israeli. or.. cit. p. 103- 
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national repercussions. At the same time., the social connotations 
that the Party professed to see in the demonstrationa are difficult 
to verify. I'athough there is no denying the economic hardships of 
the ru-. a mazses, and the exactions they suffered at the hands of 
both Government tax collectorts and feudal landlords, there ic no 
evidence whatsoever of any fom of social rebellion or agrarian 
outbreak. -17he nature o. "' the 1933 events was wholly political, and 
here the Party was correct in teeing the change of direction which 
had taken place in the tkrab national movement since 1929. For the 
- timee zince the Britie. n. occupation of Paleztine, the movement f irs t 
which broke out in 1933 was directed largely against the BritiLh 
rresence itself 2 ana not agaInst the Jc-. dth co=---unity. A &. an ge 
. hr. d ocCurred in the nationaI movement, xhich after three years of 
fruz-Aration in its dealings r. 3-th the Mandatory power, and its 
1r, ability to secure conceszions even in the for. m of a power-shorn 
legislative assembly, had led to the realisation -'.; hat it was 
necessary to struggle against British policy itself, rather than 
its manifestations:. the continued grarth of the Zionist movement 
in the coi. -it-, j -and the strengthening of the Yinhuv. The denrionEtrations 
had beem orgmised not, as the Party had claimed., by the radical wing 
O-L the ýmb nat-ional movement, although there is no denying that these 
groups cont tributed to the cl-ienged climate of opinion, but by the týx-ab 
Executive itself under pressure to show. some positive results after 
a long period of inactivity. There had been a shift towards more 
zadical -policies within the Arab Executive and the 1933 demonstrations 
had consecrated the break between the mainstream of the national 
mcve-, rzrl,, v&ich was becoming increasingly hostile to Britain, and the 
Washasshilio; position viiich though it occassionally pursued an extreme 
line in -its atte=tr. to embarrass the V. ufti, 'favoured a policy of 
-moderation and continued 
dialogue in the hope of winning Britain 
away from its Zionist allies and proteges. 
43 The Party's characteri- 
sation was again correct in seeing the outbreaks of 1933 as only the 
opening chapter in the long expected national uprising. The years 
to 1936 vatnessed a continued radicalisation of the Arab national 
43. For the actiý4ties of the NashashilJL opposition see Y. Porath. The 
Ernermnce of the Paler-tinian Arab NPtional Movement 1,018-1929. 
ýLondon 19793. Chapter 5- 
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movement and increasing reference to the necessity of armed struggý. e 
-as the only possible path which would lead to freeing Palestine 
from Bel-tain and consequently from the continued growth and 
strengthening of the Yi--huv. The move=nt of al Kassam in 1935 
was a mani estatlion of the adoption of this path. 
44 
The events of 1933 are i=portant in the histox-I o. 1 7 the development 
of the --party: they signalled a change in its att. 4tude toy. ards the 
leadeers-1h. d4p of the national movement, thou&h thit, did not become 
official doctrine until after the Comintern Congress of 1935- The 
Party gradually began to abandon its call for agrari= revolution., 
and although it continued its agitatJon x-nong the small Arab working 
class in *.. he to7. ns.. its attention was more fully directe! to the 
national dimmision of E Ven in its ' the struggle in Palestine. I 
activity a=ng t 'he Arab workers, its efforts were directed at 
agitating P^r the organization of Arab labour piclmts to stmd up 
to--the '7ionist "Conquest of Work" campaign, and it directly linked 
this struggle v. -ith that against Livd-gration. This is not to imply 
that -the Party approved of the Mufti' s. leadershij; indeed he was 
attacked- as late as '1935 as an "Italian propagandist", 
45 
and so were 
the other Arab leaders for their persistent efforts to find a modus 
vivendi rith the Y! andatox7 power. But the 'Farty was begimIng to 
give primacy in itz propaganda to the national azpect of the 
struggle more than it had ever clone before. Thus attention was 
paid to any armed activity in the countxy which could be construed 
as representing ar. med opposition to BritisIh authority. Prcminence 
was given to Abu Jildeh, 
46 
and he was described as a leader of 
44. For the activitY Of Al Kazaan see Y. Taggar. The Mufti of Jerusalem 
andPalestine Arab 'Politics 1930-1237- Unpublished Ph. D. thesis 
London University 1973. PP- 355-356- 
45- To the Vasses of the People in the Comtrr. Join the Struggle of 
Ethiopia For its 'Freedom and Independence. Hebrew. Leaflet of cC/. PCP. October 1935. 
4b- A =arderer-rho evaded the authorities for a considerable period 
and becaze sorething of a folk hem He was later hangecL A 
recent Soviet publication described Abu Jildeh as ".. the popular hero v; ho used to plant terror in the hearts of the imperialists 
with his courage and bravery". See D. Foblikov (ea. ) The 1163em 
History of the Arab Countries, 19217-1970. (Moscor, 1975). Vol- 1- 
p. 223. 
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"partizan cletatchments". 
47 The Party saw in supporting this band of 
pea-zant outlazz, an extension of its support for the defiant aruled 
zpir-It in the coLmtxy., contributing to disorder, and agitating 
defiarze of Govern=nt authority. Although the Party exprest: ed 
itself opposed to the u-se of individual terror, 
48 it mounted a 
popular campaiga for Abu Jildehl s releaEe and clExcured for the 
cc=., ' ting of the der--tý-' s, 
49 
er, terice passed against him. Umilarly, 
the Pa-.. -4,, y r-aintained contact-- with the el 'Kazs= group prior -. I-z 
their discovexy in October 1935 50 and came out in open solidarity 
the . -m-ement af Iter al Kasesaml --- death in a chance mcounter v. -Ith 
the 110--itizh azmv. 
51 Yet "the 'PF-rt:, itself mno-incd ambivalent in 
-Its attitude to armed avtivity and ceticiml al ss movericnt 
f or be!. ng too eager to take the field, f or b cing conspiratorial p and 
for being Lmclea-A about the nature of the enemy facing it. 
The t-hirt, ties saw a Iýardening of the Pax-tjl , attituac toward-- the 
Zioni--t movements ana a decrease in its political activity within the 
zluv. Aa though it had " for the Vaad I Aalken part in the election-- 
Leumi in 1930s and fared badly., theParty explained its participation 
as P- -roraganaa ploy to ex- Wionist policy among the mass of r- pose 
Z 
jemssh vmrk--r--52 and to shlor: that J=3*.. -h co=rrunists were ready to 
declare the--4- support for the Arab struggle againzot Zionism from 
-wi-Lhý_ 'this "i=perialist zLzs; e=b1y1'. The big test ca-me in 1933 
-with the accessicn of Hit tler to power in Germany and the start of a 
ner wave of irLnigration to Palestine. Until then, Je ish immigraticn 
from Greinany had been virtually non-existent., and immdgration as a 
vhole had hot-been in sufl'icient numbers to constitute any real 
threat, or to enable the realisation of the Zionist alm of a Jewish 
47. The Beginning of the Crisis in Palestine. In-orecor. loc. cit. Palestine Red Aad Haor, 1 Quoted in 48- Leaflet olf 8 August 1934. 
Israeli,, loc. cit. 
49. krabic Leaflet of CC/t1, CP quoted in Falastin, 29 June 1934. 
I nterview vrith A*I raki, Al Tira, 28 1-Tay 1975. The Party toyed 
with the idea of =, Lmting a rescue operation when Abu Jildeh was 
being moved fmm jail. 
50- romth,, op. cit. p. 264. In an intervievr with Racl-man al Kilou., 
Jericho 16 January 1574,, he stated that the brother of 14. A, r rhka 
the POP delegate to the Comintern Congress was a member of 'Kassari's 
group and served a- go-between. 
jbic lcaflet of 51. A i-a -PMF quoted in Pnln-stin, 29 January 1936. 52. The Commiunic-ts and the Vaad Leumi. Ella al Amnam. N. 11. Januar7 
1931. P- 12. 
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state. With the changed circinn tances in 1933P the Fart3r was 
forced to meet the problem head on and declared itself in favour of 
the deL-. nd---- of the Arab national movement in regard to the ce. -Mation 
of im=izration. The Party realised that Hitler's ascendence in 
Germany would only serve to help the 'Zioniste in their ta, -k of 
agitating for i=nigration to Palc-stine. The Nazi pcr. -ecution 
it-Self WES a Zicniý-t argummt for im. -, gration. 
53 The Farty arVed 
against Jewish pointing out that Palestine could not 
absorb morc. tl-. zn its present population59 and linked this: to the 
Zionist ca -aigas of 
"Conquest of Tork" and "Conquest of Landllp 
arguing that i=igmtion woul--' only lead to more Arab peatsants 
being forced cff their land, and more 11, rab workerz thmrn out of 
tbeir jobs. In its propagan, 11a to the Jevlsh street, the Party 
erqýmsised that i=igraV. on would only lead to magnified Arab hatrea 
and that., in addition to increasing the d2mger to the Jewir-h 
community in the coizitrys "every new irrnigrant takes av. -ay the live- 
libood of another jew,,. 
55 It pointed out that the Nazis were not 
only orpressing Jews, but also Ger=mz and other -natioruLlities and 
-that the proper -course for Jews -to take would be to struggle 
together vvith other workers, and not to leave their countries of 
origin. 
56 
In the period before 1033., 'the Party had directed its efforts 
. por-1. of 
the JL-rdsh workers fcr the struggle towar-,; - vninning the sixv 
against izq-peelalism and Zionism, and for the joint trade union 
organisation cf Arab and Jewish workers, but the increa-zed turn 
towards -the Arab national movementO in the mid-thirties., and the 
realissation of the primacy of the national conflict led the Party 
to weaken its efforts to win support within the Yishuv. Indeed, 
its policies were directly opposea to the mainstream of the perceived 
self-interest of the Jmish cormmmity, and its struggle against 
;, Of it Cti ty ir, =: igration which became increasingly the focus sa Vi in 
the Jewish street., served to act as both the cause and the effect of 
the party tuming its back on the Jerish population. 
:!, eviev of the Inemy '%'a:: rP. H. --. or, 17 August 1933- Cuoted in 1--reelis 53- 
Or. cit. 'D. 108. 
54- I-rabic leaflet of CCACP. Falastin, 14 October 1933- 
55.1, sraeli, o-p. c: 1 - P- 107. 
56. To the Jewish worlmrs. Gerren leaflet of Tel S-viv local comt. of 
'PC; P. Ju-1Y 191136. quoted in Israeli. op. cit. p. 109. 
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The Advent of the National Prcnt 
The new line of the 'FCCP uldch startea to ennerge tovjards the 
latter half of 1933P Nýas a faithful reflection of developments 
vat-',, in the international communi-t movement. The success of Nazism 
and. Ithe rise oil F. itlcr to pcrv., er in Gerymny impelled the Cominterm to 
'ti dify its hostile oppot ýon to social der: iocratic partiet) and to 
e=baxýk on P_ ncr, line of collaboration vith them to orpoEe the common 
cnemy. As -early as IMP-rch 1933, the ECCI had i--sued an appeal to 
the workers of all count-ries proposing an anti-Parcizt alliance of 
c=-unist and social r: e_-__ratic parties. 
57 
. This was an attempt to 
work ote, an agreemcnt at. leaderzIip level between the two rartier., 
wl, den contrasted sharply vdi th the Comintern' s stand of a year earlier) 
Them it was specified thr-t agree. =nts were permistible only in 
special circ=z. tances end fcr short periods. The first Eign of 
the fruition cf this ner. tactic was the holding of the European 
anti-Fascist rorl. -er--' Congress in June 1933 in Far-Is, 
58 
výtdch was 
attendea by both commmist. and social democratic representatives. 
týfter th, -,. t the movement rsncivballed., and various European communist 
parties worked out bilateral agreements with their social democratic 
co=terpazts to form united fronts in the face of the perceived Nazi 
danger. The speech of the Bulgarian comrunil st leader Dimitrov, at 
-the Leipzig trialp stressing the "necessity of establishing a united 
front with the social democrats and other workers" 9 
59 
was a clear 
indication that the Comintern had embarked on a f=da=ntal 
transformation of policyj while the 13th plenum of the E-OCI meeting 
in November/Decenber 1933 gave the official blessing of the 
international co==i-st novement' s governing body, to this new policy 
by calling on the ccmrnmist parties to "persistently fi t for the gh 
60 
realisation of a 'united militant front" with social democracy. 
As far as the colonial countries were concerned, the first 
explicit indication of the applicability of the new "united front" 
57. Outline History of the COM=nist Intemational, 
_op. cit- P- 
332. 
56. Outline History of the Commnist International. op. cit- P- 334- 59. lb-id- P- 336. 
60. The 13th Plenum of the Theses and Resolutions. (London 1935) - 
p. 20.. 
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tactic to conditions in those areas, c=-e in the fom of an articlc 61 
in a Comintern journal prior to the holding of the ýeventh Congrestso 
The article referred to the porsibility of broad unity among the anti- 
impex-alist forcez- baLed on "drawing the bulk of the national 
bourgeoisie into the anti-imperialist struggle". At the same time 
-4= ras levelled at the "sectarianism" of the colonial crit icý 
co=nunistl ala tlb, - r'logan of "'Soviet rule in backmrd countrice" 
was rejected in f avour of the "national liberation revolution". 
"Soviet goverment" was cleclared- to have been no more than a propagand& 
slogan, and one moreover, v. hic--h ignored the specific donclitions of 
the struggle in the various colonial co=trics and the extent of 
thei- back=Lrdnesz. 
The seventh Congress of the Co=unist International meeting in 
62 JulY 1935, was atter-ded by two Arab delegates from the PCP- As 
f ar as the colonies were concerned, the Cong:, ess repudiated the 
formerly held slogans cf "workers' and peasants' revolution" and 63 
"Soviet government". Condeming this "ultra-leftism", the Congress 
outlined a theory of stages, in vduch the "national liberation 
struggle" necessitated the fomation of an anti-inrerialiFt f nt 
64 p 
ro 
wit. vi the "national reformists". The Congress rejected the view 
L that-the national bourgeoi-sie of the colonies was WhOllY Pro 
ir-perialist 
65 
ard declared that the antagonisms between the national 
bourgeoisie and impe- I alism not only continued to exi-at., but in a 
nwnber of co=tries, had been aggravated. As f ar as the Arab 
-mere ccncemedp the S-ecretariat of It. countries -he E_, CCI adopted a 
resolution in February 193 
66 
which condenmed the previous orthodoxy 
61. -,. he Co=,. -=,. ist International. N 10 1935. p- 571. ý'uoted In outline 
Eistory of the , om=, n-dst International. or. cit- PP- 368-369. 62. Radwan a- Hilou (whose name appeared as Tussuf) travelled from 
'Palestine specially to attend the Congress. F-0- 373/18957/6729. 
Palestine Police Su=aries., 30 October 1935- Xehrnoud al Ashkar (Whose 
name appeared as Hadschar) was one of a group of Palestinian 
stuaents atten#ng the Comintern , school. CZA S25/7531- 63- Outline History of the Cor-mmist International. o-P. cit- P- 388- 
64. The Anti-I=erialAzt Peoples Front in the Colonial Countries: 
Resolution Adopted at the 7th Comintern Congress. Inpreco N. 46. 
1935. P- 1161- 
65- outline 'I-'; -mtor-j of the Co=., ranist Intemational. or. -cit. P- 
389- 
66. ! bid. 429. 
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of hostility to the "national reformist organisation-. s", and 
reco=aended to the co=rmi--t parties of the area the necessity of 
ensuring "close co-operation with the national revolutionariez... 
to vm--k for collaboration with the national ref or=ist org=isationze 9 
support the demands of these organi-ations directed againct the 
-positions off im-cerialism", w1hile at the same time continuing their 
4. ` Emy compromise vrith 
1--:, cr. 1 S straggle againzt ", he concluricn o., alim. 
During the discussion of Dimitrovl-. report to the Congress,, 
Khaled Bakdash 
67 
spoke in -the name of the Arab com=nist purtiez, 
and expounded on 'the new line to 'be follcrv., ed in the Arab East. 
Central to his reaý, czing was the division of the struggle into 
stages, and hiz definition of the prevalcnt stage an being that of 
the stral-gle aFain-st imperialiýým. This was the first staCe of 
the struggle, and only after its successful conclusion could the 
com=unizt parties Icacl the ras--es in the fight for socialit; n- From 
this., it followea that the ccm=Lnists should adopt a more positive 
policy tmmrds the national reIL*Or=izts. Bakdash denied the 
validity of the thesisp upheld during the "Third Period" conceming, 
the betrayal of-the national bourgeoisie and their capitulation to 
inTerialis=. He advocated support for the "anti iraperxiaust 
de. mands which P-re raisedby the national reformi-sts"., zn: I indicated 
that the Arab c=-_-. ur_ist parties ", mue-t have in vica the possibility 
of collaboration end agreement with even the most varied parties 
of the national reformist bourgeoisie". Even if the national 
refo, -m. IS-t 
bourgeoisie were to come to pov; er on the basis of a 
" 
" "- "" 
;;!: -'V 
compromi-se agreement vith imperialism, the continued existence of 
contradictions bet-. veen the -hvo camps would persist, and the 
communists, auty-would remain one of extending support to the 
nationalists. Similarly., Bakaashp while paying lip service to the 
importance of the agrarian revolution, declared that at the present 
stage it was not necessary to raise such a slogan. The peasants, 
as a result of Zionist and i=erialist oppression, were driven to 
,, concentrate all their anger" against the domination of imperialisms 
thus their revolutionary potentialities should be gauged by their 
67. Leader of the 'Syrian COr. m=st Party; he spoke under the n=e 
of Ramsi. inrrecor. N 62.1935. p. 1541. 
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willingness to struggle againzt foreign domination and not 
necessarily by their cle--. s consciousness. 
The speech of the IF-ecretary of the PCP to the Congre-Is., did 
not depaxt from the outline given by Bakdash and emphasised the 
necessity j for the Party's success, of creating in Palestine "a 
united f_-cnt with the nat tional revolutionary and national reformist 
gm=z and organizations for the struggle againzt imperialize's 
68 
The speech was =arked by a fierce condemnation of Zionism,, and 
described the Jewish population as a whole as a "colonising society". 
I Palestine were t The -A-rabs of' Portrayed as legitimately pTozing 
the or-ists, who ! es Ib ze polica. were leadin to the evacuation of the 
Arab peasants from their lards, and to the enxpulsion of the Arab 
wcr? x-. s-Ir--m their jobs. The Party was charactericed as having 
be en . un. able 
to involve itself -In -the national liberation strurgle 
of the Arab mnsses because o--F* the "Jewish ntnt ionali='I r. hich 
continued to permeate the Party leaderz-hip even after its formal 
Arabisationz. - Vliile re-iterating the resolve of the Party to 
continue its work among the masses of --theJe m. * sh population "to 
emancipate thvm from Zi=i--t influence". 
69 
the marked emphasis 
of the Paxty secretary's speech was on the necessity of involvement 
in the A: -a: b nationcl an--' enti-Lnperialist struggle. : Indeed the 
ierceness of this -attack and the absence of any clear distinction 
I between the 44iordst movement end the masses of the Jewish population 
in the countx7p was not lost upon the praesidi= of the Congress, 
and was consequently condenned. 
70 
-T To -rectify the imbalance caused by -this speech, the I'CP 
delegation was instructed to address the Congress a second time. 
pea The second Palestinian sp -ker reiterated the need to form" the 
anti-inperialist and anti-Zionist peoples' front"71 and to Support 
the national revolutionax. forces in their struggle against 
inTex-malism. But he noted that the paLrty, s role was to lead the 
Arab national struggle "on the right roa4 against the min enemy: 
6s. 
- y. $ 
69. 
70. 
71. 
Speech of Raftan a! Hilou (Yussuf) in the Discussion of the 
Report, of the 1-ctivities of the Ex-Comt- 31 July. Inpreco 1; 54. 
1935- P- 1344- 
Speech of Ra&mn al Hilou. ! PM-rleeor N 34- 1935- p. 884. 
Interview, rdth Radwan al Hilou. Jericho., 223 February 1974- Sneech off 2-41. Ashkar (Hadschar) in the Discussion an the Report of 
Dl#trov. 10 August. 
. 
1-ppreco N 35.1935- P- 948- 
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r- 
foreign imp . 
72 
ViTdle condemning Zionism for its role as perialism" 
an agent of British imperialismp he offered "a comradely hand to 
the je%iigsh labourers for the common struggle". Fle vient further 
than the first Palestinian speaker in declaring that the P arty' s 
task was to win the participation of the Jewish workerz in the 
nationE-0 struggle of the Arab masses., and to make them a part of 
the enti-Lmpenialit-ti. pec; lez' frcnt- This second speech by the 
Palestine delegation was co=letely freep in contrast to the 
former, of any hostility to the Jerish population in Palestine, 
and While opposing Zioninm in equally strong termn, singled out 
British ir-pcx*aliz-: m as the legiti=te object of the anti- 
! =: Penialist peo--Ie--' front, ana' ex-plaasized the joint interests of 
both Arabs azd Jews in the posecuticn of thlirý struggle. 
On his ret turn -to Palestine in Cctober 1935, Radwan al Hilou 
set ou-t to i=lemtnt the nev, Comintern policy. In a speech to 
Party activists izz=ediately after his return, he called for the 
abandonment of the policy of instigation of class struggle,, 
explaining that the Party would never be able to penetrate the 
Arab me ses if it did not put itself at the head of their national 
struggle. 
73 In its activity among the Arabso the Party should 
e=phasise the stnazgle against Zionism and against British 
imperialism., and come out strongly against Jemdsh imzligration 
and Laid sales. At the same time he pointed out that the Jewish 
work 0. the Party was no' to be neglected., and that this should 
centre on the economic demands of the workers, and on the fo=ation 
! thin the jewir of opposition groups w: h trade unions. Laying special 
stress on the necessity of Party activity among the Jewish inhabitants, 
the Party Secretar7 declared that the presence of Jews in the Party 
vas indispensable, end that "it would be impossible to attain success 
74 
ement". Y. 1thout the Jewish el 
The Party's policy in the period between the Sixth and zeventh 
72. The speech of Comrade Hajjar - representative of the PCP to the 
7th Comintern Congress 1935. Hebrew translation in CZA S25/7531- 
73- j, %ssorted news of the Com=zii,, --t Movement, 22 October 1935- CZA 
S-25/7531- 
74- F. O. 372/18957/6729. Palestine Police S=nriess 
30 October, 1935. 
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Congresses of the Comintern N%w not based on any independent 
fcr=u: L, -tions.. but was completely subservient to the tactics of the 
international Com=ist Y. ovement as; developed in Yoscow. The 
Arabisation of the Party coincided with the "Third Period" and 
the CominterTi's ner, militant policy. Although the introduction 
of this policy was not rreýhcated upon conditims In PEaestinc,, 
beinZ, a , onse to dcvelopmcntz in ux-opc and - it clearly a re- 
in Ch-: na, it dia nevertheless coincide with the pursuit of moderate 
and concilliatox-i policies by the Arab national movement in Palestine. 
yet this hostility and the Eectar-iani= v. hich permeated the Party's 
outlook aia slov. down the proce--. - o-j" Arabisation rnd t1he desired 
Penetration of the -rrab populaticn. 
Thiz war, Uhe clirect result 
of an inability to conT., rehend the national dimcn--4&on of the struggle 
in Palestine,, and the continued emphasis on the Party's role in 
the Process o. U -$' social revoluticn. Tb this extent ,, 
the po" -Y cf 
the`PCP in the early thirties represented, despite the on-going 
rrocess of Arabisations a continuation of the "revolutionary" line 
of the past. There weres in. addit-; On to the Party's hostility to 
the national movementj -two important features of Party policy in 
this period. First., the beginning of the involvezent in the 
nascent , Arab labour movemcnt vhich hor?, ever, was cut short by the 
outIbreak of the 10,, '4,6 rebellion; second, on the theoretical level, 
there waz an attemp-14, to develop an all. trp_b strategy which reflected 
itself in the conaemnation of the existing division in the Arab 
East., and the demand for Arab unity. This, havvever2 was to prove 
a passing phase. 
'in 19,35, the change in the Comintem tactics,, this time in 
response to the rise of fascism in Euxope, again imposed itself 
on the strateMr of the Party., and propelled it towards greater 
. 
involvement in the Arab national struggle, Yet this oould not have 
been at all possible had it not embarked on the path of Arabization 
Fund the development o-17 an Arab cadre. in 19360 on the eve o. the 
tl, --altuous events rhich were to envelop Palestine, the Party had- 
undergcne aL ccrversion, and 'was totally committed to the Arab 
national movem-ent. Yusa's accession to the leadership of the 
Party, t'he adoption of the theory of stages by the Comintern and 
the introduction of the populsen-ational front tactic, took the 
('_" 
103 
Party fi=ly into the anti-imperialist struggle, and relegated the 
sociz-2 revolution to an unspecif ied future date. In the actual 
ccnditions of Falez: tinc,, this transforzniation, despite its foreiEn 
origins, was nmch more in tune with the realities of the situation 
but, while: enabling the Party to e-stabli-sh a firma. - base an, ong the 
J, rab popul-Etion, proceeded to further isolate it among the J ewish 
workLing class. 
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C %. OHII-'V. R FOUR 
THE PCP AND TIM ARAB MMMLION 1936-1939 
:.  
The Party's Position on tl-, e Eve of the Rebellion 
'The populF-r front policy initiated at the Comintem' s Seventh 
Congrezs gave the green li&ht to the PCP1 s attempts to win a base for 
itself vithin the Arab co==ty. - It legitinLiced the T-arty' s 
increasing involvemcnt %rath the . rab nationel movement, and 
it f elt 
f ree to 6. eciamr itz recogý. ition of the pozitive role r. layed 
by the 
Palestinian Sx-at national movement., a-beit led by feudc-a and 
clerical elements.. in pursuit of the now much enhanced national 
independence struggle. 
The Party lost no t: l---- in cleclaring. its adherence to the riew 
, pol--; cy and the concrete task; this: cntauea in the prevailing 
conditions in Palestine. In a meeting held in October 1935 in Tel 
Aviv, rýhcrtly after Rladwm al Hiloul ss return from Moscows the Party 
Secretz. *- ! et out the new line. 
1 T-Tdle not denying the importance of 
jewisl-, work and affirming that it výas i=cerative to continue the 
-ecruitmen't of Jewc- to theParty, the outstanding aspect of his 
speech lay in 11he emphasis on activity within the Arab population 
rz, d -the chazige fro. -ii class to national agitation. The F arty 
Secreta=7 ex; lainea that the popular front with the ArF-b parties was 
a vital necezsity, end stressed that the basis for this front was 
not the Party's, social but those aspects of it which 
constituted common ground with the Arab nationalists, such as the 
struggle against Zionism and British imperialism. Arab Party 
niembers who were expected to forra this liaison with the Amb 
parties were warnecl that it was not necessary to speak of communist 
a=s, and to restrict their agitation to thoce issues uhich were 
the co n property of both the Party and the nationalitts. This 
was the only way, the Party Secretary declared. 9 of ensuring the 
transformation of the PCP into a rass organisation. Activity in 
the JeYasb street was to be restricted to the economic sphere with 
the setting-up cf opposition blocs within the Higtadrat. The aim 
was to explain to the Jevrl--h workers the need to form a united f =nt 
v, ith the Arp-b national =vement, a clear indication that Whereas the 
ropular front policy was to manifest itself concretely in an alliance 
Assorted Nevis, 22 October 1935- Jevash Intelligence Report. 
CZA '-S-25/7531- 
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with the Arab national independence moverento on the Jerich sides 
there was to be no change in the perception of the 'Zionist camp us 
onc undifferentiated whole. 
In a state=nt explaining its new line to the Arab population 
and at the sa= ti= openly aeclaring its surrort for the independence 
struggle of tlie 1ý.. rabz- in Fale-e-tine and in the neirbbouring trab 
coun, tries, the Farty issued a pLr=hlet outlining its new policy End 
suggesting the fox-mation of a ropular front. 
2 In a rection der., ling 
with foreigzi affz:, --s, this pamphlet urged Palestinian Arabs to show 
their solidarity with the Ethiopians fighting agalnz-t fazci--m, whale 
calling on those Arabs urider French rule to struggae app-in--t 
continued Fremh occupation cnd in the event of en imýerialist v; -.. r, 
to str=_gle agr-inst Ithe wax-r4-ng i=reri&ljttS and tum that war into 
"a revolution of national libention,,. 
3 
Dealing -with mtters pertaining to Palestine.. the pamphlet 
declared the Party' s total opposition to both Britic-1h imperialism 
and Zionism,, and stressed that the struggle against both was., by 
A necessity a siiýgle struggle. The immediate activity of the Party 
was to be geared towards the "destruction, of Zioni= and for the 
i=medie. e cessation of im7agration ana the disarming of an 
"4 
Z-onists". 
" It e=lained that the Party was not riotivited by 
animoz!. ty towards thle Jevdsh peop ple, but professed to see in the 
large number of immigrants brought into Palestine and their axringg 
an ir=erialist plot. This was a ed at thwarting the A im, Lrab 
independence struggle both in Palestine and in the neig"ouring 
fixab co=tries., and at setting up "a reactionary f ront in this 
strategic area of the worlal agaimt the USSR". The Tarty perceived 
the Yishuv as performing a "f ascist role" in the country, and the 
Jewish-workers were dismissed as con-stituting, an "aristocracy of 
: LRbo, =". D5 k1though the 'Party bad actively tried to thwart the 
2. A Statement of the PCF: For the Alliance of All the Arabs and 
AF, ainst all Imperi-a-lists, 9 
October 1935- 
3- Ibid. pp. 9-10. The Party set up the "Friends of Ethi: piall society 
headed by Raja Hourani., a member of the Lebanese Com=nist Party 
wl-x spent a few years working in Palestine as a teacher during 
the thirties. 
4- 2ý3-d- pp- 10-11* 
5- Ibid. p. 13- 
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Z Zionist manipulation of the Jewish commmity.. the pamphlet conceded 
that the results had been meagre, and attributed this to "objective 
conclitions which drive it (the Jewish minority) to ploy this 
imperialist role". -, s a result of thiss the Tartys thile not 
actually saying so, called for a struggle againzA tho v. hole Jev; rish 
ccrz, =ity in the country as a privileged and opr,, ressinr, minority. 
The pam-phlet cLlled on the FtLle, -tinian ;, rabn to Etruggle as a 
national con=unity az=st their inferior status in their ovn 
country, and asked them to set up "committees and associations to 
struggle against the privileges granted to Zionim" In the 
allocation of Gover=acnt ýobs and in business, and to carry an a 
-L 
6 
strugZ. le against the poll-Cy of lrzid end labour conquest. The 
Party directed its ca-11 to all patriotic grot-,,. - and -. pecified that 
it was appealing. to all classes of Arabs m-bether I'merchrmts or 
artisans,, shopkeepers, or factory ovmersj, bankers or profeszlonal 
persons" to come togethe. - in a united front. 
7 It further condemned 
the dissension and bicke-r-ing bet%een the various nati=ali: -: t groups 
and warned the people to be wary of their leaders whose record was 
cne of co=promise with the British, and %Nlno had sho= themselver, in 
the past to be incapable of fulfilling their duties and serving the 
homeland. 
8 
The Party also warned of the daiýkger of provocation by 
the fascists an, ' . the agents of Italian and aern, an imperialism., vho 
wanted the A', -rzb movement to indulge in terrorist acts and who 
declared the time ripe for a general uprising. 
9 
An uprising could 
only be the last stage oft a successful struggle., to be embarked 
upon cr-ly if there were responsible and honest leaders tho were 
prepared to persevere in the struggle to the end. Otherwise the 
projected uprising would be aborted, and this would constitute a 
setback for 'the liberation struggle in the country for a long time 
to come. 
The Party took the opportmity of this cleclaration of its new 
6. A cý, tatem- , nt of the PCP: Por the Alliance of All the Arabs and their Friends Lga-inst all Imperialists. Arabic Pamphlet TCP. 
ap. cit- P-. -15- 7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. p. 17- 
9, Ibid. pp. 18-19. 
108 
line to "stretch its hand to all those who accept it" asking in 
return only that its future allies should be honest and sincere 
in their desire to struggle for the independence of the countrj. 
Aligning itself firmly within the rank--ý of the ;. rab national move- 
ment, Itt-he Party called on "the Jewish worker-- and peasants" to struggle 
against J=Jgmtion and the militariration of the Yirhuv, and againnt 
the policy of lLmd and labour conquest, 
10 
ra-4--inr in ftct, the 
slogans of the j", rab nationaili! 7-ts, end portrtýying them as "the 
cmditions for bring; Lng the tro peoples together". 
The Party pursued the same line in its Hebrew leaflets directea 
to the YiF Iriv and or the occazion of, a strike on the 13th Povember 
1935, again!: t the arrival of t. Iýe High Co=. ilc-sicner in Falestine, it 
called on 'Llie JeriEh worldng massses to join the strikes and 
demons trati ons, and explained that Zionizta had trF-nsfo=, ed the 
Jewish minority : Sji the co-,. =Ix-,, into "a persc(-uting reactionaý 
imperialist cushion", 
11 
and that the only way to enaure the rijýits 
of the Jews as a national -. -inority van through their participation 
in the "united front rhich is forming ... for the struggle against 
imperialism and Zioni=, ena for the independence of Folestine". 
Again an the eve of the 1"-, -. b strike : Ln 1936, the Party addressed 
itself' to the Y-Jsh: uv, calling on Lhe Jerish workers to "put out 
your hands in friendship to "t-he Arab workers, for a Lmitecl struggle 
against oppressicn. 11 and declared the emancipation of the Jews to 
be conditional on the liberatio: n movement of the Arabs themselves. 
12 
The discovery of a smuggle., shipment of ar=- in the port of 
JaffLa in Cetober 1935 
13 
was the occasion for the Party to make contact 
10. A Statement of the 'IFOCT: For the Alliance of All the Arabs and 
-their Friends .:, ggainst all Inperialists. Arabic Pamphlet nP. 
CYO. cit. , Pp- 17-18. 11. To the Jewish Torking Masses. Hebrew Leaflet CC/FCP. Noverrber 1935- 
12. To Jewish Intellectuals and Torkers. Hebrew Leaflet CC/PCP 
Peb. -uary 1936. The Party was of ten accused, both by Arabs and 
Jews of --mealdng different languages to the ,. rab and Jewish 
co=anitiez. This claim could argueably be made after the 
setting up of the Jerish Eection in 19379 end its drift away 
from the 7-Oart. y-, but there is no evidence for this prior to that 
date. 
13 - R. John Hadawi. The Palestine Dia 
(Beirut 1970). 
- 
Vol. 2. r. 251. 
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aI the leadership of the Arab national movement. A r-nrty delegaticn 
delivered a memox-and=s addressed to -the A. rab partics and the Supre= 
Moslem Council, to the Grand Muf ti himself 14 In it the Party 
conde=ed the acti-4ties of the 711. onirts in inT. orting arms and 
cal. lea on the Arab leademhip to a= and organise the frabE for 
the approaching struggle &, -&in.,: t iardgration, land salec. and the 
Manda te. This first contact %-Ith the official leadership of the 
Lrab mcvezieenllo was iz, 7, -Iic4-t recognition b,,., the Party of thi-- national 
leadership, 'and indicative of the new course it %as to chart as an 
autonomous group v-1thin the framework of the Srab national movement. 
141. iras born cut of the recognition, not only of the nece-, sity of the 
for. -r. t. 4-on cf the porular front & %0,, a- directed by the Comintern's 
Sevearith [3ocngrets, but also the realisation that the Party itself 
could not lead the national movemen-t., and that its role was confined 
to ruA. t: L-ig pressure on the leadership to adol: t more radical aims 
an4 met-hodz. 
Initially the Party'. -, policy remained distinct and separate. 
Although it secretly maintained contact with some terrorist groups, 915 
it ncvertheless remained opposed to terror, 
16 
and wa=cd of its 
dangers. 11. d. 4fferentiated itself on a n-umber of other issues, 
nctab'llZur the approach to the land probleml Ihereas the Arab leader- 
zhip to collect funds to buy Arab land thich was in danger of 
falling into the hands of Zionist institutionsp the Party thought 
that this policy would result in failure. Its vier. was that the 
Zionists could only be defeated by increasing the degree of national 
awareness of the Arab population to ensure-that they themselves 
would refuse to head the tempting offers of the Zionistst and hold 
3j+. The delegation was composed of , Laid Kabalan and TTajib Franjieh. Inte-r7iew v-ith Radwan al Hilou, Jericho, 16 January 1974. 
15. 
, 
Assorted News, 11 October 1935. Jewich Intelligence Report. CZA 
S25/7.53l. The Report mentions that Ehalil Shannir,, secretary of 
the Jaffa party committee maintained contact Yrith terrorizt groups 
nea-- the Tulkarem area. This is tupported by Radwan al Hilou, 
interview, Jericho, 16 January 1974. 
16. Jewish Intelligence Report, 11 October 1935., loc. cit. states that 
there was apitation within the Party for partaking in the terrorist 
ca=aign, and that this included Jev. -Ish party members. in Haifa. 
Radýan al Hilou however remained opposed to this rath and travelled 
to Haifa to point out the dpngers of such activity. 
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on to their lends. But this independent stand was soon swamped by 
the enthuziazm engendered by the long national strikes and the ever 
close-- identificetion. v., Ith the policies of the liufti'-. leadership, 
and %rith the separation of the Party into -tA,., o rections. This 
immersed the leader. -ýhip cor-T. letely in the Arab struggle end it 
became even rore distant from the YiEhuv and its internal problems. 
'"he Fae.. y --iczed on the death of al Ka-,, sam %hich cloý: cly 
followed the discovery of the smiggled Jewish arT= and created an 
atmou phere-of intense political agitations to arrange a public 
meeting to launch its new national front policy. Held in Jaffa 
in December 19,35, the meeting was attenled by a lLrge audiencel7 
and claired by L ohammad 1, imr Cdeh 
18 
a recent convert to the Farty. 
At tl-. is mectina, the Party declared its adherence to the sloganz 
which were to becorr- the official demands of the Arab strike end 
stibsequent rebellion: the cessat. -Lon. of I=Jgration and land salcs, 
and the establi-shmerr, of'a de-mocratic EQvemment in the country. 
In addition., it called on the krab national movement to &eclare civil 
disobedience by refusing to pay taxes and demanded the raising of the 
slogan of "no taxation without representation". As a further step 
17. Falastin, 10 December 1935. The meetingovahich v; a-- held in the 
A7, polo cinemas was estimated by the paper to have been attended 
by over 2,000 reople. A large picture of Al 3ýassam decorated 
the platform and the reeting was attended by H. Elusseinis I. 
Darwazas L Nvwaihed (left I stiklal leaders) =d X". Mlitri, 
leader of the jaffa Arab workers' society. In ean interview 
r. -, adran al Hilou, Jericho, 22 Janua--Y 1974, he stated that 
H. Husseini seCretly organised the meeting on behalf of the 
Party. 
18. Mohamnad, Vimr Odeh, was a young teacher who had resigned f rom 
his Govemment job as a protest against the death of al Kassam, 
and the rhipping of ty-o pupils as a punithment for their 
agitational activity. This act won him great notoriety in the 
countr . On joining the Party he v6ras irmediately appointed to the CC'Yand soon after to the 11'ecretariat. He was later held 
responsible for identifying the Party with the policies of the 
Lýazfti, especially as regards terror activitiesp and was accused 
by the Jev. -iFh Section of being a Mufti plant. He left Palestine 
in 1939 and joined thellufti in his exile in Baghdad. His 
association with the Party ended with the termination of the 
rebellion in 19,39 and his disagreement with the Party over 
the 1939 "t', hite Paper to thich he was opposed. 
3.11 
to put pressure on the Goverment, the commmist chairman of the 
meeting called for the resippntion of all Arab Govcr=tcnt o'&ficiL, 1. -,, 
a demnd, v. -hich, considering the official standing of the Iduf tip was 
clearly intended as an atte-mpt to put prent; ure on the Arab leader- 
ship to come out openly against the British a&ninistration and to 
co=letely sever its links %rith the Mandatory pcp. ver. 
'"hus on the eve of 'the ,,, rab general Lteke, and the forthoo=ing L 
protracted Arab rebellion, 
40, 
stigaa -he Party atter. pted to disrcl the 
of being a Jewish party. The turnabout in the Comintem's policy 
at the Feventh Congress could not have been better suited for the 
Party's future development. Arabisation had been initially linked 
to an ultra-left policy whidh neceszitsted ccntinuea hottility to 
the Arab national movement, and the primacy of the class aver the 
national struggle. The introduction of the popular front line 
r, e=cyvecl the last barrier separating the Party from the Arab 
national movement. Alt'nou&. numerically it continued to have a 
large Jev. lsh membership and Lrab sympathizers from among the 
intelligentsia continued to shy away fz opcn association with it, 
the P&r, -, y could no longer be accused on the grounds, of either its 
leadership or its political line, of being alien to the struggles 
of the Arab =, -, ven**-.. -. t in the country. This: itself, after a long 
-eriod of vaccilation was preparing to embark. on a long struggle 
against the British Mandatep the enemy thich the Party had long 
proclaimed was inseparable from the on-going Zionist colonisation 
I: roject, andby far the more important and dangerous adversary. 
The Farztý-, 
_ 
During the Rebellion 
a. The Reaction to the Rebellion 
The outbreak of the general strike and the ensuing rebcllion 
took the Party by surprise. Thile it had repeatedly called on the 
Arabs to forsake co-operation with the British, 
19 
and pointed to the 
path mapped out by al Kassam, the Party had simul taneously warned of 
the dangers of a -jrematx=e uprising and of provocatory attempts to 
19. Leaflet of CC/'ý? CF., quoted in Palastin, 29 January 1936. 
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abort the mss movement. However, once the general strike was 
declared and unanimously observed., the Party wholeheartedly gave 
its su pport to what it regarded as "a link in the chain of 
spontaneous outbreaLm., which have taken place from time to time during 
the eigýteen years'of the Zionist policy of conquest. "20 
The outbreak of the rebellion found the Party still dividel on 
the correct, intexýpratation and application of t1le porular front line., 
and its consequent attitude to the ZionistB and to the Arsb national 
movement. - As understood by the Party leader--hip,, 
21 the popular 
f rant irTlied sur. port f or the Arab =verent md f or the primacy of 
the independence ntruggle. lirmaltaneoutly, it meant an unchanged 
Jon cf hostility towards the posit. ZU%. niý, t movc-, _nt at: a whole. 
Yllile no+. being blind to the dif 'Lerentiaticn xhich exizted within 
the Zionist car-, 4.1 the Pazty leadernh# rejected any con-cideration of 
joint acti-vily with t1he more "moderate" Zionist group-z., denying the 
validity of any pozs-ible co-exittence with "moderation" based on 
Zion-4:: t principlea and policies. Thus the "Zionist movement was 
treated as one hostile body, and this reduced the Party's activity 
to the one : -ection of the populaticn -which offered potenti-aitiec 
for activity in the independence struggle. Party activity in the 
Jewish street was co, -Xined to dealing with ir. miedIate economic 
dezia=ls and to propagarla for the Arab movcnent with repeated calls 
to the Jewrish work-e-n, to forsake Zionism and Join the Arab independence 
struggle. 
There existed Uro olLherp as yet uncrystalised points of vievi 
wie, in the Jewish cadre of the Party. The first represented the 
Jews in -Lhe country as being "chauvinist and reactionary", while 
terding to regartl the Arnbs as "progressive and revolutionar7l'. 
22 
lFrom this it logically follovied that the role of the Party lay 
entirely within the Arab movement. Until the outbreak- of the 
rebellion, this roint of view was regarded as a deviation. Later 
however, it beemm official Party policy though thie was never 
explicitly admitted. 
20. Events in Palestine: Letter from Jaffa. Inrreco . 11.28.1936. p. 80. 21. During 1936-39., the Party Secretariat was Ma-de up of Radwan al 
Hilou., Simha Tzabari and Moharnmd Nimr Odeh. 
22. F. 0- 373/21681/5922. CID Report on Co=mmist Activity. 20 
September 1938- 
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The second point of view which crystalised among the Jevrish 
cadre, war a more orthodox. continuation of the Party's past political 
attitudes. It oppolted the methodz and tactics of the JP. rab move- 
ment and aid not see the role of the Com=ist Party as helping to 
effect "national liberation"s but rather an uniting Arabs end Jews 
to realise the aims of the "social revolution". 
23 This point of 
vi ievi was to ser; re az the ba. -is e. the rýoiicy of the Jewish section 
which Nvas set up by the Party in 1937 and v-tich later split and 
established itself as an indeperxient group 
24 
rith t1he outbreak, of the revolt, the Farty leadership put 
00 
forvvard the thenis cf "t-ro -struggle ca=ps". The _! rab cazrp vas 
portrayed as progressive., Yý! -, ile the Zionists were relegatel to the 
imerialist camp. 
25 
The ammed s-trugg , 
ae in the 1. rab !: treat was 
characterized as a masr struggle repultine from objective political 
conditions which the Arab masses found themselves in. It was thus 
perceived to be correct that the task of the Jewish mcmbcrs of the 
Party was to help the Arab =vement, including participL,, tion in the 
armd struggle. Regarding the Zionist camp as a uniform front, the 
Party did not --introduce any slogans in the Jevrish Street which were 
specific to the internal conflicts vi,, ich existed within the Zionist 
movem=,, t. The Yishuv was regarded as "a single reactionary boay 
opposed to the Areb people as a single progressive bot, ". 
26 
The 
Paz-tyl s role in the jevýrish street was reduced to propagating the 
slogans of the Ar, -. ID national movement and extending support to the 
amed rebellion. 
The Party's support for the rebellion was immediate, though 
initially it had believed that the general strike vould not last 
longs and tended to see the events as a repetition and continuation, 
thouja undoubtedly vIth a different thrusts, of the previous dis- 
23. P. O. 37ý/21863/5922. CID Report on Commmist Activity. 20 
September 1938- 
24. See pp. W-148. 
25. Memoranclun of the Jemsh "ection to the Comintein., September 1939. 
-p. 6. Kaf A. Icf F"hel Teudot shel HP. 7.! iflara HaFononistit be Fretz 1- Yisrp-el (21 documcnts of the PCP - hitherto referred to as Kaf Alef 
Documents) Type written collection compilcd by the Hagana. Tel AvIv, 
Octcber 1941. 
26. Letter of CC/IýCP to the Executive Co=, a* ttee of the Histadrut, Tel 
I. viv 29 July 1944. Repmduced in -Supplement 17. XV to Dip,, e--, t cf Tress an-; ' Events. Jer, ish Agency for Palestine. Infomation 
"'Fection. Jerusalem. (20 September., 1944). 
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turbances of 1929 and 1933.27 In an appcal calling for support for 
the strike, the Party charracterised the Lrab struggle at: one of 
"necessary self-deffence" againt. t two pov; crful enemiesp 
26 
and 
" unity rhov. n by "evex-. - catego, of th commmded the high degree o. ry c 
7opulation ... all parties, all creeds, in one united front against the 
common ener7l'. It naw the struggle in Palertine as one for the 
right of s elf- deter--imit ion an! "for national liberstion f1mr, the 11 
yoke of foreign orpressors". The Party vehemently denied the 
"false allegations" that Eitler and Muc-solini. su; ported the 
insurgents and supplied the= with money and arms 
29 
and described 
the stxvggle as one of "a rmp-ll and ý-uqppressed n&tio. -Il cxhibiting,, 
e, -p, --'#. e all the ensuing hardzlips and Euffering, "a rare excir--ple". di 
The battle %hich the Amb movement wLs seen to be waging was portrayed 
as ccnstit-ating a "crossroads" and one whose resultwould be "(Iecif, -, Jve... 
liberty or slave--j-, life or death". 
30 
The rebellion waz seen to have two obýectives: againz t -the 
British, the aim was to achieve indeperdenceg while ap ., 
ainst Zionism, 
the Part-j recognized and gave implicito support to the "endeavours to 
make the continuation off Zionist colonisation impossible by means 
of sabotage and pa--tisan attack-s". 
31 In its leaflets directed at 
the Jevvish street, the Party did not hesitate to cone out fully in 
he. upport of the rebellion, and cUled on t. Yews to join the Arabs 
in the s-traggle against Zionism and imperialism. 
32 Its message to 
the Jews vms clear and uncompromising. It waxmed th= of falling 
into the trap of becoming the means by which Britain, for its omn 
interests, Put dov. n the rebellion)33 and called on them to struggle 
against Jewish immigration, not only because it was aimed at building 
a JevIsh state and reducing the Arabs to a minority status., but also 
in terms of the economic hardships they were suffering cnd those 
27- Intervier, with M. Nimr Cdeh. Beirut., 10 Mlarch 1974. At the outbreak 
of the strike it was decided that Odeh should not go underground 
an! I that he should allcw himself to be arrested, as this was 
expected to be for a short duration. 
28. Urrising in Palestine: Appeal of CC/PCP. Inrreco -Y 30-1936. p. 805- 
2.03. To All British 'Soldiers, Members of the Navy and the Air Force in 
'Palestine and Trans-Jordan. English Leaflet of the Revolutionarl 
Organisation for the Focial and Political Liberation of Palestine. 
Haifa, August 1936. 
30. To All Jev; irh - orkers. Hebrew Leaflet PC/PCP- June 1936. 
31. Urrising in Falettine. loc. cit. 
32. Leaflet of C, '-',, /PCPs quoted in Falastin, I May 1936. 
33. To All Jewish Toekers- Hebrew, Leaflet of Tel Aviv Local Conarittee- 
PCP- August 1936. 
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which wouia befall the new i=igrants. 
34 Referring to the attacks 
.r 
on Jewish settle=&. -- by Arab bandz. the Party laid the blww fully 
at the door of the Zionist movement which was "decpcning the national 
hatred chasm between Jew-, and Arabs and driving the Jews into a 
dead end". 
35 It was the Zionists who were "toying with Jei&ish 
blood" and theirz- war, the responsibility for whatever calmaties 
befell the Jews in Palestine. The Farty called on Jcwish workers 
to refuse to support the Histadrut in its strike-breaking activities 
again, st th6 11, rabs. These activities were seen to constitute 
mprovocp-tcry deeds" vhich would "bring about the escalation of th-- 
Arab mp ses' hatred of tI-x Jev, -- in the co=try" and contribute to 
0 the ant-i-jewir. 1h terror. 
3' 
, he 3-e2llets 
OA. I" " tllc PartY directed at the Jev, -! --h street 
described the rebellion az "fully justified" and went so far as to 
see it as "a strupgle for all the oppres, -ed in the comtry... for 
your liberalion also fromm the yoke of your oppressors". 
37 The 
Ambs: h&d been so fpr eng-aging in the struggle alone.. and the duty 
of the Jews was to sup pport them and not to stand as obstacles in 
the zath cf their libera' tion. Both to save the Jcvdah coirz=ity 
in -the cci=. try from furUier bloodshed., and to shake the country 
I free the oppressive imperialist yoke, it ims neccesary for 
the ýews 'zo foxrm. a 'Lu-iite! 
41 the Arabs. Althou3h the front rit.,. 
Party did not indicate hmv this should come about, it continued to 
hold to this slogan as the only possible means of avoiding further 
inter-com=nal conflict) and of depriving the British of one of 
their mainstays, in the country. 
'he Party correctly perceived that the rebellion was directed 
prea0minantly against the British, and this in many ways Justified 
its call for support for the Arab national move=nt and its 
chaxacterisation as anti-im- , perialist. 
However., it war, not blind 
to the ter. = that acco=, -anied the rebellion and to the attacks on 
the Jewish co=--anity. The Party taw this anti-Jemsh terror as a by- 
34. To 1,11 the Refugees of Tel Aviv. Hebrew Leaflet of the Tel Aviv 
Local Committee-FCP. JulY 1936. 
35- To All, Jewish '"Workers. Hebrew Leaflet CC/PCP- August 1936. 
36. To All Jerish Workers. June 1936. loc. cit. 
37. Ibid. 
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product of the armd struggle38 and nots as in previous disturbances,, 
as the predominant feature of the Arab movement. V. hile it condemned 
the terror : L-i no uncertain ter=39 it also tried to cxplain its 
occurrer=e as a result of the predominance of pcasant_,., who had 
felt more directly the pressure of Zionist colonisation, in the 
ar=d bands. 
40 It pointed out th. -. -'%, in the to-.,. -n. -, where the urban 
population vmr, more mf_ýture politiccIly, the rtrug, -, le rez. Mainly 
conducted agaimt the Britirli. Thile not reporting anti-Jewish 
acts of terror in the Party pres. -, 
41 the Fartyl -- =zt f reqyent 
reaction to this phenomenon was to explain it as being the 
consequence off zlon. 6. ý_t rolicy, of im: _-i, ý: ration ar-i of the campaigns 
of land and work ccnque. -, t. 
The Party also blamed the Fictadrut for the fact that the trab 
strike was not a total one. It explained the lack of participation 
of scrx Amb worlxrz in the ttrika, such ass the raillvmy worlaerL., Ei. - 
being due to fear of "Jevash blacklegs". 
" 
The Arab -t-luctance 
-was seen to be the direct result of the Histadrut's call to Jev. -I--h 
workers "to force their way into undertakings were A-rabs are on 
strike". Thus the ýrab ", rkers, though in solidarity with the 
strike, felt impelled to stay at their jobs, but the Party claimed 
that -they had shorn their solida,. -ty 
by "contributing t1leir wages 
to the strike fund". 
'The illegal Party press took it upon itself to propagate the 
activities of 'the rebel bands and the hardships r. h3. ch the country 
was suffering as a conseqiaence of "British-oppression". A weekly 
organ displaye& reports of aimed activity again--t police stations 
and various other incidents,, arr: dwelt on the "militax-j atrocities" 
inflicted on the jkrabs, conde=iing the burning of houses by troops, 
the searching of villages., the "assaults on women and looting! ', 
43 
and echoed -the national mcvc=ent in its dentmciations of Jewish 
i=migration. But when t1he HAC called for the termination of the 
strike 1n October 1936, the Party refused to acquiesce in Atat it 
38. liemorandum of Jev; -Ish ! 'ection .. op. cit. P. 8. 
39. Interview vith Radwan al Hilou. Jericho, 16 February 1974. See 
also Porath,, cr. -cit. p. 
265. 
40. Palestine in Uproar. Inrrecor. 11-33.1936. pp. 884-686. 
41. Porath, loc. cit. 
42.7"Vents in Palestine: Letter from Jaffa. loc. cit. 
43. CID Report on lo==, iist Activity, 1938- loc. cit. The Party's ner, 
. Arabic organ was entitled Al Jabha Al 
Shaabiya (The popular Front). 
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perceived to be a xetreat f ran the struggle againnt the British and 
a desire on the part of the Arab leaders to arrive Pt a compromise 
v*th the =ncL-tory gove=cnt. It correctly perceived the 
intervention of the ,. rab Kings as a face-aaving device rrompted by 
the Paloztinian 1-rab leadership in order to put an end to the strike, 
and called cn the ', mbs to disregard this "chameful betroyal"44 by 
-il the demandz put the-Ir leaderz and to ca. -tinue their strike unt 
forward EA Ihe outbreak of the strike were ret. 
b. Involvement in the-. *. =ea r? trupcle 
The actuall involv=ent of the *Pzrty in the rebellion# in the 
sense of ca=y: Lng out ar--ed activities, was small and r-athe. - insig- 
nificant, and it did not constitirlte an important variable in the 
development of the rebellion itself. Howeverp the Party' c support 
for the rebellion, both politically rmd as eymbolised by the few 
acts c=, Itted by Party members, was important. At the timej, those 
fev7 acts which can be grouped together under tfic general heading of 
-mrticipation in a=ed acit-livity., assumed an i=r-ortance out of all 
prop ... 
orttion to theirreal size. The reason for thir, lay in the fact 
the Parity., dez: pite its Arabisation, continued to be regardeaby 
both frabs and Jews as a Jewish party, and indeed, Jev7-- continued 
to nake up the maibrity a.,. ' the Pextyl s cadre. 
The policies contributed to a changed image of the 
Paxty within the ýrab co==Anity: its strength among the 1-rab youth 
increased axe. it cam to be regarded as being firmly pro-Arab. 
45 
the se time the Arabs held an exaggerated view of the Farty's 
strength and capabilities. 
46 The Party had worked hard to achieve 
this transformation ani achieved some prominence due to its 
participation in a numberr of nationalist gatherings. In kpril4fay 
44. Interview vath M. Fimr Odeh. Beiruts 10 March 1974. See also 
Leaflet of C, '-', /PCP in Falastin, 14 September 1936. 
4-5. Y.. TTimr Odeh terzred this "the golden age" of the Party. 
46. During the first =nths of the strikep the Party was approached 
by a group of Arab youth at the head of whom stood a young 
lavrjer, Aziz Shihade, vho asked for arms to carr7 out 
acti7Aties in Jerusalem. Interview vdth Radwan al Hilou., 
Jer-icho., I February 1974- 
lis 
1936 'Party me ers took part in the activities of The National 
Congress of Stuýying Youth, 
47 
while in 1937 -h-to Party m=bers4e' 
were dispatched to the Bludan Congress. 
49 There they distributed 
a statement declaring the Farty' -- support for the rebellion and 
at the concl"zion of the Congress the Party issued a further 
statement conde=ning the extulsion of the Yufti from Falectine and 
Su'-p -Wd. -. 
0 porting the msolutor= F-r. d tronouncements of the longreer, in 
its demands for mational independence and the continustion of the 
'rebellion. 
ýO 
7-14thin the Yitl=vp the Party' s support for the rebellion took 
51 t-vv ofon. -z. - the f irst, consistea of oral and wri-lttcn propagancla 
aimea at c>. -' CIV ... Laining 
the situation in the country., and ---howing the 
ca=wn interests of the Yithuv and the Arabs in the struggle against 
"British imperialism and its 'Zionist servants"; the second 
consisted off armed activity and collpboratic-n with the Partisan 
L_ 52 banc . This latter ras aimed at increasing the confuzzion witkin 
the yish,, 53 an xd to demon-st. ate the F-arty' s open zu-, port for the 
Prab movement. At the same time in it-- literature,, the Farty 
incree-singly attac"----ed Jewish i=igration and thi!:, at a time of 
mounting pressure on European Jewry, inevitably gF-ined it wide 
hostility vdllhin the ranl--- of the Yishu-.,,. 
The issue rhich angered the Yishuv and sozed dissension within 
the Party arose as a result of the planting of a bomb at a Histadrut- 
47. The Role of the Party and the Co=tunist Youth in the Arab P-treet: 
Doc=nent of CC/PCP A- 
. ýril 
1942, in Y. Fran3kel (ed. ) Ha Tnua 
Hal", cnon, s- t-t Ve Fla Yiýhuv Ba Eretz Yisrael 1920-48 (The Co=mmist 
Lovement and the Yishuv in 7'alestine: A collection of Documents) (Jerusalem 1968) p. 1-65. TI. -is work is hitherto referred to as 
Frankel Collection. 
45. The'volicy of the PCP towards the Arab National Movement: 
Doc=en-41, of CC/PCP., ;, ugust 1941 in Raf 1ýlef Documents., op. cit. 
P. 83. The two members were Adullah Bandak and M. Nimr Odeh. 
Interview with. ;. Bandak. A: =manp 6 March 1974. S-ee also P. 
Yei-freij. The ! 'ýrab National ConErens in Bludan 19-37 (Dama cus 
1937). Pp- 33-34. 
49. TIxis Congress held in I, ". -; -ria, Septenber 1937 was attended by more 
than 300 delegates fmm various Arab states. '. 7ee Hurewitzq 
(M. Cit. pp. 88-89. 
50- A Living Picture of the Bludan Congress. Hebrew Leaflet CC, /PCP. 1937. 
51. The Dissolution of the Jewish Section: Resolution Circulated to 
Party Branches. Doc, =ent of CC/pCp, December 1939. Kaf Aelf 
Doc-, nents. or. cit- P- 31- 
52. Ibid. There were referred to simply as 111movm deeds". 53- Kemo of Jezish Section ... _pr. ci . p. 
6. 
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54 
rua vorhers' club in Haifa during the strike in 1936. Even then 
this act of the Party was attacked in the pages of the pro-comzmmist 
paper T&T&aor. 
55 An answer on behalf of the.. -ýarty did not deny the 
authenticity of the reporlts but argued against ks- publication on the 
grount-Is that it hardened the Yishuv against the Party by serving as 
a propaganda ploy in the hands of the Zionists. 
56 V'hile this 
seemz to have been an isolated incident the Party did however engage 
in other acts57 both on its ovm and in collaboration with the 
partisan bands, and its members-who enrolled in the bands pursued 
activities such as bloving up trains, cutting telegraph wires, and 
=, pmoting treez in Jewish plantations. 
58 TheParty leadership 
=aý-, =tained contact n,. th the leader-w of the rebellion in the 
54. Most Party =mberr. I interviewed affirmed that thi-- act took place. 
P'nina. Feinha-a-, Haifa r ., 4 'pril 1974 stated that she had knowledge of the decision to rlace Ithe bomb but was, unable to change it. 
Radwan al Hilou on 'the other hand denied that this event ever took 
-place (interview., Jericho, 9 February 1974) and claimed that the 
Par-ty issued a statement at the -time denying its responsibility. 11. Nimr Odeh (inter7iew., Beirut 10 March 1971+) who was a member 
of the Secretariat at the time also denies Party responsibility 
for this incident. He admits, however, himself placing a bomb 
on the Tel Aviv beach but claimed that this was done without the 
knowledge of the Partr. 
55. Laor, 7 December 1936. On the Role of the PCP In the Recent 
Events: A letter to the Editor. This letter condeamed the armed 
activity of the Party and mentioned the bombing of the Histadrut 
club in H aif a 
56. "L 4. A Letter to the Editor (translated from Arabic): About the letter 
ot 'Tcrker" in the previous issue. Haor f-7 January 1937. 
57. e. g. Placing bombs in the Jewish exhibition in Tel Aviv; placing 6 bombs in a. wood storage depot in Jaffa. See also Falastin, 15 
Ju1Y 1936 and F. 0- 372/20018/5551. Palestine Police Surm ss, 
3.8 Lugust 1936. Radzran al Hilou, Interview, Jericho 9 February 
1974, stated that all acts--, committed in the Jewish street were 
carried outby Jewish Party members. He also claimed that 
Jewish communists were eager to take part in the armed struggle 
Fund that rather than the CC ordering them to perform such acts., 
it was they v1io approached the CC with the demand to be allowed 
to enrol in the armed struggle. 
58. e. g. Fakl=i Yarakas know, as the Red Corporal. 9 who was active in the MaJdal area. He had joined the Party while a member of the 
Police,, and later deserted and fled to the mountains vhere he 
became the right hmd man of Shikh Hassan ! -'-. alameh me of the prominent partisan leaders. He was wounded and taken prisoner 
in 1936 and given a life sentence, but managed to escape from 
kcre jail in 1946 w. hen it was blown up by Jewish terrorists. 
Interview with Fakhri Maraka., Amman, 6 March 1974. 
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59 6o 
mountains and on a few occasions with the Mufti himself,, carx-3ang 
61 
out intelligence services , and performing some tecImical aid which 
the Jewish and A=enian cadres of the Party v6rere able to supply. 
At the same time the Party tmdertook the printing of leaflets for 
some of the partisan bands 
62 
and hoped in this way to be able to 
influence the political outlook of the rebellion. The one notable 
success was the publication by Aref Abdul Razilk, the second most 
prominent rebel leader,, at the prompting of the Party, of a leaflet 
63 
- denied any -direct. ed by the Jewish population. This leaflet 
religious or racial motivation to-the Arab struggle and denied 
accusations that the Arab movement wanted "to thmw you into the sea... 
or that we will tre;. --t you as they tre,,, t you in ----. 'urope", and pledged 
the Arabs to gaar-antee the security and the liberty of the Jews on 
condition that they did not take Britain's side in the on-going 
iLdependence ntruggle. This was what the Party characterised az 
being able "to influence the political direction of events",, and 
vindicated its suport for the rebellion. 
5 -y -'&. he time the second phase of the rebel lion started, the Party 
59. The Policy cf the PCP towards the Arab National Movement ....... 
op. cit. p. 84. Radwan, al Hilou., Intei'view, Jericho, 1 February 
1974, maintaincd that the Party was in touch with ; --rif Ab&a Razil; a gang leader in the mountains. Abdullah Bandak, 
Interview, tru-nan, 6 L:, ---ch 1974,, stated that he established 
contact with Fouad Nassar.. a future leader of the firab co=-. unists 
in the forties and of the Jordanian con=aaist Party.. Vho at the 
time led a small band in the Hebron area. Khaled Zagmouri, 
Interview Az=an 8 March . 1974, who at the time was a member of 
the CC recounted that he often travelled to the mountains with 
M. Nimr Odeh to confer with the armed band leaders. 
60. laona=med Nimr Odeh, Interview Beirut 10 March 1974, claimed that 
hiz fir-st meeting vath the Mufti was in Beirut in 1937 and that 
e. ll his contacts rdth, the Mufti were kno%---n and approved by the 
two other members of the Secretariats Musa and c. Tzabari. 
Radwan al Hilou, Interview, Jericho 9 Febru, -a7 1974, stated 
that in addition to the activity of M. Nimr Odeh, contact with 
the Mufti was maintained via one of his agents., L: oha=nad Nimr 
al Havari. 
61. W. Laqueur. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East 
(London 1961)-p. 97. Intervieýv with Radwan al Hilou-, Jericho, 
9 February 1974- 
62. Interview with Abdulla-h Bandak. Bethlehem, 23 July 1973. 
63. To the Je-tash People in the Country and Outside it. Hebmv 
leaflet signed Arif Abdul Razik-Conm=der of the Rebels. 
Septenfoer 1938. Thi-- was re-published in Kol Haam. N. 18 
Varch 1939. 
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had suffered hard blows. The period of anarchy which followed the 
general strike enabled the Farty cadre to mrface and operate in 
an atmosphere of semi-legalit3,,, but during the latter half of 
1938 the'British ar:; y went on the offensive. The Tarty cadre was 
agaln forced underground, and it suffered losses among the active 
inember. s, some of v; h= had been killed or i=risoned, ezrecially 
ainong the youth. 
64 
Others, especially anong the Jeva--h cadre had 
been separated from t2he Party and preferred,, due to dizagreements 
wath the Pirty's pro-nationalist line, to remain do=ant. Very 
early in the strike., the authorities had taken "preventive action" 
againzt t. `, e I=avvm ccmnurists and the Party' s _-ympathiters. By 
the end of the st-. *Lk. e, forty-six communists had been deported, while 
a total off two hundred end sixty-four persons had been detained 
65 
on suspicion of co=mmist activity. t, --cng those was the Party 
Secretary Radwan al Hilou and most other leading cadres. Uthough 
this greatly hampered the Party' s activity it was, unlike deporta- 
tions, a minor irritant since the tim spent in jail was usually 
no more then a few month , after which Party members could return 
to political activity. 
The Paxty's total eLdherence to the Arab movement and the 
support. it'. extended to -14. he ax-med Arab bands al.,. -, o had a negative 
eftfect: it resulted in strong disagreement ar-ong the Jemsh cadre 
of the Party. As early as MaY 1936, the secretary of the Tel Ixiv 
local party eoz=ittee had drafted a leaflet which, while supporting 
the "-rab revolt, had called on Arabs and. Jews to refrain from 
bloodshed. 
66 
The Party, holding to the view that it was necessary 
to give full backing to the revolt, and that terror was a minor 
manifestation and a by-: product of the general armed struggle, rejected 
this and in its own leaflets called on the Jews to take an active 
role in the-revolt. As a result of this dissension the Tel Aviv 
64. The Role of the Party and the Communist Youth in the Arab Street 
cm. cit. p. 166-167. 
65. F-0- 371/20018/6608. Palestine Police Summaries, 28 Septenber 
1936. 
66. The Events: CC Version. Document of CC/PCP March 1940. In 
- Frankel Collection., op. cit. p. 143. See also S. Dothan. The Beginnings of Jewish National Communism in Palestine, in 
Cz: rpi (ed. ), -op. ci . p. 
210. 
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committee was dissolved and its members were expelled fran the 
Party. Although this incident was exceptional, the majority of the 
Jewish cadre gradually found themselves in opposition to what they 
saw to be the outright "tailism" of the Party to the national move- 
inent. A nuxl)er of cadres found a way out of this impasse by 
volunteering to go and fight with the loyalists in the 'Spanish 
Civil V. ar. 
67 
'Eoýxverq by 1937 the Party had found itself forced 
to divide its work in the , ';. rab and Jewish streets, a fomulation 
which it was hoyed would preserve the Jev. -ish cadres loyalty, v-h-11-le 
at the sr. time; dlowing them to pursue their ovm political 
activities rithin the Yishuv. 
c. The Settin7-uT,, of the Jewish Section 
The establis1--i-ent by the CC of the Jewish Section ea--3ýy : Ln 
1937, to carry out activity in the Jewish street was e=plained 
simply in terms of tactical re-organisation stemming frcm the changed 
conditions in Palestine resulting from the 1936 rebellion. 
68 
A Party 
document spoke of the disturbances as preventing the "permanent and 
active connection between the Jewish and Arab street" 
69 
and pointed 
67. F. 0-373/20016/7576. Palestine Police Su=ariess 20 Kovenber : L936. 
See also C-0-733/397/75146. Undesirablm, 1939- W-hile all the 
sources agree that Jewish members of the PCP went to Spain., there 
is wide disagreement over the actual numbers involved. Falastin 
7 Noven: ber, 9 Decerbers and 25 December 1936, gave a figure of 
60, some of whom it reported were released from prison on 
condition that they left the country fbr Spain. C. Abramsky 
(Interview, London., 5 JU111Y 1973) gave -a figure nesrer 100 vhich 4s the same as that mentioned by Fadwan al Hilou, Interview, 
Jericho, 9 February 10.74. Two Arabs only went to Spain. One, 
Ali Abdul Minlik al Tm-z-ini was according to a report in Falastin, 
28 May 1938, killed there. The seconds Vajati Sidkis spent 5 
=nths there working as an intelligence officer; he returmed 
to Beirut and publi--hed a number of articles entitled, Five 
Vmths in Stein, in 1.7aft al Shaab (organ of Syrian Commmist 
Party) Juli1937. The Party, it is worth mentioning, objected 
to the dispatch of large numbers of its mezibers to Spain as this 
was seen to weaken the Party. 
68. The Dissolution of the Jewish c. ection ... or. cit. p. 28. See 
also CID Report on Co=mmist Activity 1938- 
-loc- 
c-41t. 
69. The Dissolution of the Jewish Section ... loc. cit. Inter7iews 
rith Radran al Hilou, Jericho, 16 February 1974 and Jabra 
Nicola, London., 5 January 1973. 
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to the existence of special conditions in the two streets 'Which 
de? npnded particulEr attention and different tactics. The establish- 
raent of the 'Section vaE not ineant to enshrine the rur--uit of two 
different policies, but was rather the utili. -ation of two methods 
to suit the existing national divisions and to overcome the 
difficulty cf Arab and Jev; ---*sh com=niste. getting together in the 
prevalcmt atwsphere of animosit-j and boycott . 
70 - 
In reality the decision to establish the Section was necessitated 
by inore than the fact t1riat the conditionz; created by the rebellion 
made joint activity impossible. Although the precedent of having 
separate nztional secltion.. ý. did eydst among com=nist partiesp 
71 the 
fact that the Party haE exiýted in Faleztine for over twelve years, 
v-. ithin a Lmited organizational frs=-rork, despite severe police 
repression and the hostility of both Jewish and krab co=nmitics., 
lends weight to the aszumjýtion that the decision signalled a change 
of strategy concerr2. ng the role of the Jmrish cadre in the Farty 
vis-a-vis the Arab rebellion. It perhaps signified a realissation 
by the Party leadership that the previous insistence on Jev; rish 
co=m-r-ists playing an active role in the arned rebellion was not 
realistic. 'The setting-up of the SSection aimed at directing the 
Jerish. cadre' s activrity to v,: ithin the T-anks of the Yishuv, by 
involving it -in 4.1,, -- Jernish corm-mmityl s ozz problems- and activities. 
It war, in effect, an admittance on the part-- of the Party leadership 
that the pro-rebellion path pursued by the CC was at best incompre- 
hensible and at worst unacceptable to the Jewish cadre. 
The establishment of the 'Section was carried out at a meeting 
of delegates of the local Jerrish committees in Jerusalem., Haifa, 
70. There is some disagreement among the Pa-rty members I interviewed 
concerning contact between Jews and Arabs in the Farty. Some 
Arab Party merbers seem to have had a lot of contact with 
Jewish mezlers vzhile others explained the absence of contact 
as resulting, fr= the realities of national division in the 
country. Per. places of e=ployment combined vrithin them Arab 
and Jewish workers- which led to most Party cells being made up 
of one or the other national group. In an interview with 
C. Abrams1W., London 5 July 1973P %ho was active in the FCP during 
1936-39o., he stated that in the entire period he met only one 
krab Party member,, Ra&; P-n al Hilou., the Party Secretary. 
71. e. g. In the USSR the Yevsketzia. existed till 1930. 
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72 73 C, and Tel Aviv. The CC appointed Hanoch Brozaza, as Fecretary of 
the Section. 74 He had not opposed the Party line during 1936 and 
was appointed as leader of the Fection on the strength of his lack 
of oppositional activity. As it turned out he vas Eoon to intro- 
duce chr-nges in the political orientation of the 17ection's 
activities which led it to revine and reinterpret the slogan of 
the "popular front", recopising the exietence of "progressive 
'4rcles within ZioniEm", axid enbzxking on a policy of "entrism" 
. 
75 
Y'ithin the ZicniE: t organizations- This led to a depF-rture from 
the line decreed by the CC and to widening the gulf separating the 
latter from the Section. A year after the Section' s establishment, 
its path had so diverged from that of the Party leaderzhip that the 
Orgmisational link be-!. ween the two waz severed 
76 to be renewed only 
after the ter=ination of the rebellion. Thusp vAuat started as an 
attei: pt to fit the general Une of the Party to the special 
conditions of the Arab arld Jev. -Ish streets., led to the adop-Ition of 
two separate ana. seemingly heterogeneous policies, each in tune with 
the national aspirations of that part of the porulation in vdach the 
respective section of the Party was active. 
The Remonse to Partition 
'"Me Party' s response to the 1937 partition proposal of the Peel 
72. Memo of jerdsh Section too Cominterm ... ýop. ci , p, 9, Radwan al Hilou r. as in jail at the time of the Section's establishment. 
Tbe decision vras tahen b, -, - Simha Tzabari and Farajjal al Hilou, (a leader of the Lebanese Communist Party vho was sent to 
Palestine for the duration of Raawan al Hilouls, imprisonment) 
and ag=eed to by the Party F-ecretary. Interviers. v. -Ith Radwan 
a! Hilou, Jericho, 16 February 1974 and IT. Nimr Odeh.. Beirut.. 
10 March 1974. See also Dothan$ op. ci . p. 23.1. 73. HanochBrozaza (known as Zak-en: the old man) 1910-64) emigrated 
, -o Palestine in 1926 as a menber of a left wing group, Hashomer 
Hatz-air and joined the PCIP early in the 1930's- He led a split 
fmm the Party in 1939-40 and formed the Ha Emet group. He 
joined the Party for a short spell in 1942 only to split 
again in 1943. 
74. IntervIer with Radwan al Hilou,, Jer-icho, 16 February 1974. See 
also Dothan,, loc. cit. 
75- For the policy of the Section and its disagreements with the 
Party leadership see pp. 11+2-146. 
76. The Dissolution of the Jewish ýection ... loc. cit. 
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Commission was one of immediate rejection, de. -cribing it as an 
attempt to strengthen Britain's hold over Palestine under the gui, --. e 
of "satisfying both sidez:,,. 
77 The paxtition plan was portrayed as 
providing a political ba-se for Zionism in the most i=portant parts 
of the country by transferring the Arabs from the proposed Jevrish 
state to the econorlcallv -ýecondary regions, m. -Intaining a chasm 
separating the two peoples and reducing botth to complcte dependence 
an Bx-itain. 
78 By realising partition under the "facade of a Jewish 
state and a Jewish ar=, y" the Party saw British policy as successfully 
establishing art e=ea fcrce for itself End a base for its military 
forces vLich would' serve to Eafeguard British interests in the 
whole Arab region, while at the same time (!!. recting j-'-rpb natiomlist 
hostility from Britain to the independent Jewish state. 
79 
'"he Party -raised its voice against partition in its Lrabic and 
Hebrew leaflets and in its underground press, calling for a struggle 
against partition by political means. 
80 
As far as the txabs were 
concerned, its call feli. on receptive ears since the national 
movement itself was unanimously opposea to partition,, while in the 
Ir-; shuv the Zionists were divided. The mainstream leaclers of the 
Tish: u-v were in agreerent. wit'li the principle of partition, while the 
Revisionists stood' fix=ly in oppoFition to it. The Party 
'ance of this "Jew-ish dv. mrf state" by characterized the accel!,. ', 
Weit"r-m-n and Ben Gurion, as being based on the dream of future 
expansion, výhile the Revisionists were attached for opposing 
partiIIII-don because they were desirous of a state "on both sides of 
the Jordan" 
61 
and held to a maximalist position vhich r. ould not 
accept anything less than total Jewish cont=1 of the country. 
Directing its attention to the Yizhuv., the Party attacked the 
Zionist leaders for acce. -ting partition after luring thousands of 
Jews into the country with false promises of Jewish independence and 
consequently subjecting them to economic hardships and suffering and 
77. To the Tishuv: To 'the Masses of Toilers in the Country. Hebrew 
Leaflet of CC/PCF. 7131Y 1937. 
78. The Dissoluation of the Jermlsh Section ... on- ci - P- 31- 
79. To the Yishirr. To the Masses of Toilers... Ioc. cit. 
80. The Policy of the PCP Towazez the Arab National Y-ovement ... a-cit. 
P. 83- 
81., The Dissolution oA. I the Jew-ish ,, 'ection ... O. P. ci - P. 32. 
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placing them in a situation ubere their life was in constant danger. 
it wamed the Yishuv that the concurrence of its leaders in the 
partition plan was again-st the interests of both peoples in Palestine 
and emr1asised that the ; -rabs "would not agree to the tearing-up of 
their count3: 71#82 but would struggle against partition vnith all their 
migýý,. It further sought to make them aware of itz; ovm characterisa- 
tion cf the proposed Je,, Afish stat e as a facade for British domination 4W 
which would strengthen British i=er-lalism at -the expense of the 
Jer, s themselves ancl would place the Yish: uv in permanent danger and 
exacerbate racial hatred in the region. This would only serve to 
create a favourable atmosrhere for fascist propaganda among the Arabs 
and would ensure that even =derate I-rabs would be won over to 
fascism. 
83 7jae Tax-Ity further warned the Jev. -Ish, inhabitants that the 
only way to avoid the outbreak of anti-Jewish tex-ror lay in "under- 
smanding! ' between Arabs and Jews on the basis of tl,. e rejection of 
partition. It proposed as a foundation for -Lhis "underz- tanding" 
plan the prevailing numerous clausus between Arabs and Jews in the 
countxy, the establishment of an elected democratic goven=ent and 
the securing of equal rights to the Yishuv, conditional on the 
latter' s giving 4D its occupation policy against the Arabs. 
84 
Me divergence between the CC of the Party and the Jevrish Section 
began to appear soon after the latter' s establishment and came into 
the oren in response to the partition question.. Both relied in 
their calls to the Yishuv on a predominantly class appeal and out- 
lined the eccnomic hards-birs of the immigr=ts, the unemployment, 
the bad ILiving and'vorking conditions., and the insecurity which 
acco-. ýpanied the A-mb rebellion an: 1 which was further eXT-Acerbated by 
the Zicnist suýp- n. 
85 
The CC although endeavouring ..., ort 
for partitio: 
to strengthen opposition to partition within the Yishuv, rejected 
any f o= of co-operation vath Zionists and insisted on maint II 
82. To the Yishuv: To the Masses of Toilers ... 20C. cit. 83- Article in Kol Haam, N. 4-December 1937-P repri; ted in Kol Haam., 
17-11. Yarch 1938. 
84- The Prevention of Partition is the Prevention of New Disturbances. 
Hebrew Leaflet of CC/'-r-CP 4 Septezber 1937. 
85. The Ftraggle r', gainzt Partition is a Struggle for Understanding. 
Hebrew I'Lleaflet of the Jmrish 'Fection-PCP. August 1938- 
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its policy of treating the Zionist camp as one hostile bloc. The 
Section,, on the other hzend sought to implement a popular front 
policy on the basis of opposition to partition within the Yishuv, 
end thus found itself in the sw, -e camp as the Revisionists. it 
actually defended them in its leaflets against the efforts of the 
partition z=porters to silence all opposition vvithin the Jewish 
66 
CO=, ""V and it called on F-2.1 those oppor: ed to paxtition.. 
irrespective of their political belief s to unite together in the 
struggle against partition. 
P, 7 
Si=Llarly, while the CC called on 
the Arabs to boycott the hearings of the Technical Co: 7L-. -dssion and 
put fo. -warci as conditions for co-operation: abolishing martial 
lp-w, stop-ping =7 activity in the coizntr. vside, bringing back 
political exilezj freeing all political prisoners., and the restora- 
tion of dez=ratic ri&hts and freedoms, i=luding the re-estrblish- 
raent of the MC , 
88 
the fSec-Ition called on the Jevýrs to appear before 
1 89 Again, as far as Jewish the Co=rzission and to cr ppose partition. 
ir=, gration into the country was concemed, the CC and the Section 
found -themselves following divergent policies. While the CC 
based its call for "understending" on the existing numerical ratio 
in the coimt"ry,, and echoed the call of the national movement for the 
i=ediate cessation of i=migratjon, ac ri the Fection char te red 
"unclerstanding" vdth the Arabs as ensixing agreement to enable 
further i=igraticn into Palestine., and even went so far as to 
proclaim that "understanding" would lead the Arabs "to open the 
doors of the Arab states to Jewish refugees"090 
The dropping of the partition plan in 1938 was portrayed by 
the Party as a consequence of the stmng resistance put by the Arabs 
of Palestine and of the surrounding countries, whose intervention 
it welcomed and viewed as a concession of the part of Britain- 
vihile welcoming tie invilta"bion to the London Conference.. the Party W 
called on the Arabs to insist on the right to choose their own 
representatives9l and declared that the basis for negotiations must 
86. Those Vho are Opposed to Partition Do Yot Give In to Terror. 
Hebrew Leaflet off the Jewish Section-PCP. 1938. 
87. "Zicnists, Unite with Non Zionists against Partition. Hebrew 
Leaflet of Jewish 'Slection., 1 May 1938, quoted in Dothan, op-c 
p. 252. 
88. Statement of 'ItT. Arabic Leaflet of CC/PCP., Janus. 17 1938. 
89. Those Tho are opposed to Partition do not give in to terror. loc-cit. 
90. Article in Kol Haam L- L in Israeli, N. 10 September 1938- Quotec 
_pp. ci . p. 
112. 
91. Eýtatement of PCP. Arabic Leaflet of CC/PCP, 12 "Vovember 1938- 
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be the cancellation of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate., 
and the setting-up of constitutional govemment in the country vvith 
proportUonal representation for Arabs and Jews., and the restoration 
of Falestine to its normal state of affairs through the annulment of 
Ithe emergency regulations. I 
e. The Renewal of the Rebellicn and -the 
1939 '7hite T-Lrer 
3: niti-*'-UY. - t-be PartY stood opposed to the renewed outbreak of 
a--med activity and character-ised the new disturbances taking place 
as being against the interests of the Arab liberation movement as 
well as the Yishav. 
92 
1t warned the Arabs thr-t the renewal of 
the -rebellion vould only mcceed : Ln haming their political 
struggle, against the partition.. rhile the Tris. huv was wamed of' 
fresh victims and the worsening of the economic crisis. Thuz in 
its leaflets, the Party called on the Arabs to maintain the peace 
and to turn all their energies to the political struggle and for 
"'understanding! ' with the Jews, vihile the Yishuv was called upon to 
reaffi= its policy of "Havlagga" (self-restraint) and to refraln 
from --r-venge cleed-z againzt the Ambs. 
93 
"he Parby rep i arded the renewal cf the rebellion as the Arabs' 
direct response to partition and a consequence of the krab leadership's 
desperation of reaching a compromise with the British. 
94 It 
estimated that conditions in 1"alestine were not ripe and that the 
economic situation did not all(nv the initiation of a new armed 
struggle campaign. It favoured instead a p6licy of concentrating 
on :! =roving the economic conditions of the inhabitants and organising 
them for a political struggle against partition., 
95 hoping that in 
this way it would be able to show the Jewish minority that the 
possibility of joint co-existence did exist in the country. It 
argued that the renewal cf a=ed clashesp especially between Arabs 
and Jew could cnly serve to facilitate the realisation of partition 
92. The Prevention of Partition is the Prevention... .. loc. cit. 
93- Ibid- 
94. The Dissolution of the Jewish Section ... op. cit- P, - 32, 
95. Ibid. P- 31- 
129 
and strengthen the hands of those arguing in favour of the 
impossibility of securing the peace and prosperity of the Yishuv 
in an independent Arab state. 
The Party cam out much more strongly against individual 
terror, especially after the murder of Andrews, a Gove=. ment official 
in the Gallilee and sou&-ht, throuEýi its contacts rdth the national 
movement, t, - ex-plain that 'the situation in the country waz not ripe 
for ax-med activity, that its pursuit was meaningless and suicidal 
96 
enal v. cula or. I. -y- result -Jn counter repression by the Briti--h and 
strengthen the h. --n4. z of tho! Fe : Ln favour of partition vithin the 
Yi!: huv. '-rt was, however too weak numer-ica. ly ma too deeply 
o= i an the side of the national m. veimnt to be able to exert c-* tte, 
any moderating influence and effect a cha-mge of course in the 
development of the rebellion. Finding itself battling alone 
against the t4-de,, the Party F-llo7ýed itself to be swept along and 
resi d its collaboration, %-Ith the national movement, while 
atte--pting to maintain a degree of inaependence which manifested 
itself in its condemnations of acts of-terror aýd its objection to 
attacks on the Jewish Oommunit3r. 
97 The Party reasoned that it could 
only i-nfluence the Arab mcvement fromwithin its ranks. By joining 
han the move=ent it soug1it to enable itself., if not to c ge the course 
cf, the rebellicn at least to retain the support it had won as a 
result off its backing of the rebellion in its first phase. More- 
cver this was justified by the continued characterisation of the 
rebellion az a progressive and anti-imperialist uprising. 
The'Farty did not find it possible to persevere in this policy. 
The Section had gone its own way and opposed the renewal of the 
rebellion, pointing to the "increasingly fascist direction "it 
was taking, and the contacts of the rebellions' leaders in exile 
vIth the fascist powers, t1hus drawing closer to the Jewish conmunity 
and to vihalb- it represented as the "moderate" wing of Zionism. The 
Party itself could not., after the defeat of partition in 1938, 
90.1-1he F-olicy of the IFICIF Towards the Arab National Movement ... loc. cit. 
The Farty was asked by the national movement to print leaf`3 ts 
calling for the renemal. of the rebellion, but it refused. 
97.7be Policy of the PCP Towards the Arab National Iiovement. *. loc-cit. 
See also, The Latest Developments in Palestine. In-precor N. 35- S 3-938- P- 837. 
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continue to support the rebellion and called on the Ixabs to lay 
down their arms 
98 
pointing out that the mason for which the rebellion 
had been declared in the first place no longer existed. 
The Party recognized the publication of the 'ihite Paper in 
March 1939 as an Ilachievezent of the Arab rebellion", and urged 
those element-s- in the armed bands it was in contact rith to leave 
the field. 99 Its estimate of the situation was that the rebellion 
had played itself out, and that the n. ite Paper provided the Arab 
leaders- vit-h mi escap-e from thit., impasse. It called on them to 
accept the Ehite Paper as a first step in the struggle for the 
"absolute liberation ca" -"Palestine" and while recogaising that its 
terms- did not completely fulfil Lmb national aspirations, 
100 
jointed to the tiredness of the masses and to the impossibility of 
me-Intaining the temp po of the rebellion as additional arguments in 
favour of acceptance. 
101 In it-- propagandz : Ln the Arab street, the, 
Party emphazised that the Thite Paper constituted "an imTerialist 
document cf retreat" i- the face of the Arab movement at a time 
rhen the danger of a European war was increazing 
102 
and welcomed it 
.. a compulsory 
basis by which Arabs and Jews in Palestine as providing 
would be fo.. -, red to seek co-operation, by negating the fear held by 
both of do=Lnation by the cTposing side. The lf., 'hite Paper, by 
offering the trabz, conciliatory terms, providecl a way out of the 
continuation of the rebellion vftich had reached a stage where its 
further -pur-ruit could oray be in the "interests of fasciEd'. 
onal I" ement. or.. ci 98. The Policy of the FCF toward,, - the Arab Nati . Lov 
p. 64. The Party claired to have publiEhed a number of Arabic 
Leaflets to tl,,. is eff ect immediately after the publication of the 
report cf the Technical Commission. 
90. The Party asked Fouad Nassar, one of the Armecl Band leader-s with 
who= it vas in close contact, to withax-aw. from the field. He refused 
however, and later left the country to join the I. Tufti in his exile 
terriew with Radwan al Hilou Jericho 1 Februa in Bagý. dad. Int I XY 1974- 
100. The '--ýolicy of the TCFF towards the Arab National Ivrovement. loc. cit. 
101. The Part tyl s public support for the White Paper led to open hostility 
with the national movement. Radwan al Hilou and another Arab member 
of the CC., Said Rabalan., %dre arrested by Hassan Salameh, me of 
the leaders of the armed bands. They were released however a few 
, days later after the intercession of Fakhri 111araka, rho m-as a 
senior inember of F-alamehl s Staff. Interviews with Radwan al Hilou., 
Jericho., 1 February 
., 
1974 and Fakhri Maraka, Amman 6 harch 1974. 
The Jewish Section accused the Party of succumbing to the Mufti's 
terx r and as a result issuing only one Arabic leaflet in -support 
of the 77hite Paper. See Memo of Jevrish Fection to Comintern. 
OD* Cit* po 80 
102. The Dissolution of the Jev. -Ish Section ... P-P. -c P. 
32. 
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By affinning the V-T4te Yaper as a basis for krab-Jevish 
"unders- tanding" the Far, --y again found itself in opposition to the 
Section. The lstter' -- leaflets directed to the Jewish street were 
based on the prerniLe that acceptance of the '-,, 'hite raper would 
further isolate the Paz'. -y in the Yi! ýhuv,, and it vehemently denied f 
the CC' s prognosis that a non Zionist formula could serve as a basis 
f or "under-standing". The Fection perceived that the central place 
accorded to the questions of i=-dgration and independence in the 
of t lie ,,: h-.. te Pape: F, negated any validity it might have 
in the eyes 
103 Yizhuv. ` It condemoed it as 1'rn imperialist document" leading 
to "enlarging the hatred between Jews and Arabs". Moreover, the 
c2ection chose to see in the publication of the nvite -raper and the 
resu . oppozition cf 'the Yi--huv.. beginning of the parting of ltaný 
the vvays between Britain and the Yishuv. This it hoped would provide 
a more neanLrigful basis for understanding between Jev7s and Arabs. 
Thus it directed itself to the Yir-huv hoping to establi.,. -h zin 
alliance v. -ith Zionist groups within it on 'the basis of this 
perceived hostility torax-ds Britain. 
The Consecuences of the Rebellion 
The P arty' s renetration of the Arab street was greatly facilitated 
by its support of the rebellion and by its adoption of the slogans of 
the I-xab national movement as its owm. The Party' s unhesitant 
support was a natural outcorie of the continuing drive towards 
Arabisation,, and further=re a fulfilment of the resolutions of 
the "Seventh Comintern Congress on the popular front, and support 
for the independence struggle in the colonies. 
Participation in the Arab revolt and the open identification 
with its slogans brou&. t t2he Party to the attention of the Arab 
population and enabled it, in the near anarchic ccnditions obtaining 
in the country during the first tvm years of the revolt., to emerge 
from the underground and operate in conditions of semi-legality. 
For the first timej the Party managed to vdn a measure of 
103. Yemo of Jewissh Fection of Cordntem. op. ci . p. 18. 
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respectability in A-rab eyeS104 and to shed the stigma of being 
rega-rded as a Jewish party. 
In ter=s of numerical expr-rision and the attraction the Party 
posed for members of the Arab intelligentsia, this was indeed the 
"golden age" of the Party. While previously its call had been 
answered by Arab proletarian elements., and only rarely by educated 
Arab youth, the years of the revolt witnessed a dr. -inatic transforma- 
tion zhich was to nanifest it-self even more clearly cýuring the 
latter stages of the Second 'V7orld War and the setting-up of 
separate ArOb and Jerish commwist organizations. Even in the 
early thirties there had existed in Jerusalem a group of young 
educated Arabs vho syz: pathised r. 3. th the Party but v. ho --toppea ýhort 
o 4' act 
105 
T: -: on, and Uual nezZer--bip. -ith. the outbreak of the rebell- 
the open support exhibited b-., the Party,, most of thoýýe -;. -ere drawn 
into the sphere of active -participation. It is si&-)-ificent that the, 
pole of tttx-actior, for theEc educated youth was the co=unist 
ideoloMr of the F arty,, yet they were only impelled to take part in 
its activity -. -, -hen it openly came out in support of the national and 
anti-imperialist struggle. This is also observable among those 
who came to the Farty with no previous knowledge of co==ist 
doctrine. Thile the f ev7 Arabs -who had joined 'die Party in the 
twen-Ities and even in the early thirties saw it as the vehicle of 
their day-to-day economic struggle and were not much interested in 
the national dimension of the conflict in the country, the adherents 
of the mid-t1hdrties found their my into the Party in response to 
its anti-imperialist appeal and as a result of identifying it with 
-aaical anti-irmerialist activity. 
106 
1.1though the Paz 
.= 
lost scpe 
104. In 1936 for example a gmup of Arab lawyers made a declaration to 
11 sh m be the Arab press of their readiness to defend t_rib and. Jewi em rs 
of the PCP free of c1harge. See The CC/PCP to the Active Members: 
inte=al Document 20 March 1940, in Kaf Alef Documents op. cit-p. 47. 
105. A n=nber of those were educated in Europe., like Abdullah Bandaklo 
ana. Dr. Ylisail Bucleiri, where they had come in touch vith socialist 
and co=unist ideas. This group was later Joined by two Syrian 
members of the Syrian Communist Party., Raja Hourani and, Raif Ehoury 
vhowere employed as teachers in Palestine. The latter was a rell 
knorn writer and exercised. a stmng influence on a wide circle of 
youth. 
106. lZearly a2l Arab Party members interviewed gave the anti-imperialist 
struggle as the reason for their entry into the Party. In an Inter- 
view with Ehaled Zagmouri, Amman 8 Yamh 1974., a metal worker who 
Joined. the Party in 1936 and. was later to become one of the leaders J 
of thellp-tional Liberation League, he mcounted that he decided to 
join the Party on hearing of Gallachee z (the dzmmuni-st member of 
parliament in Britain) defence of Palestine and the Arab rebellion 
and on being told that he was a communist. He further recounts that he and others used to shout the slogan "long live Gallacher" in 
demonz-trations even before he had joined the Party. 
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of it-- si; Tporter-F as a result of its initial opposition to the 
renewal of the rebellion., and later due to its acceptance of the 
White Paper, there is little doubt that the gaim- in . *. rab menbership 
ancl the contacts establishecl in the Arab street in the 1936-39 
I pe, -, j. od provided the Part:,,, - mth the cadre -vwhich later in the forties 
waz to succeed in establi-ching and leading an independent Arab 
c=. m==ist 
107 
I . knother important consequence of the rebellion was the severance 
, of relations -. -dtlh 'the Co=inteni, 
108 
and the increazingly different 
polie-*N. es pursued by the Party in Palestine frow. those advocated in 
the Comintern' s jourzaLls abroad. Other thm the difficulty of 
maintaining contact betreen Palestine and Yosccw as a result of the 
chaotic conditions in the country, it is pr6lbable that 114oscam 
itself was rm-occupied with the p=ges,, and the Ididdle Eastexm 
Sect tion of the Cor-i-xite---was unable to give a fir-- lead in the 
absence of any policy foxwulated at a higher level. 
The Comintern' zý jou-, nals however$ while reporting on the 
development of the situation in Palestine, did occasionallY Put 
forward opinions which appeared to be in no way connected with the 
actL-, -'-' -practices of the Party. Soon after the declaration of the 
Arab generall strike, an unsi&-ied article appeared which praised 
the "constructionist" efl , an "Orts of the young Jcrv-3-sh pioneers d 
ad=dreA- the "splenaid idealism! ' shown by -the immigrants in building 
the co=try and establishing a strong trade union movement. 
109 
6 
107- Of those who joined the Party during 1936-39 or came in touch 
with it and later played an important role in the cammnit 
mave=ent, E. Tuma., E. Habibi and T. Toubi beep-me leaders of the 
NIL (and are nmy leaders of the New Israeli Co=munist Party); 
"Fouad Nassar, became a leader of the NIAL and #., he Arab workers' 
Congress in the forties and -until his recent death he was secretar: y 
of t1ý Jordanian Cormunist Party; A. Bandak, 11. Imer, K. Zagmuri., 
i became leaders of the Till in the forties. and M. Nashashibi 
108. Padwar- al Hilou stated in an interview.. Jericho. 23 February 
1974, that contact, with the Comintern weakened in 1937 and was 
co=-, -Ietely severed in 1938 when the last Part3, ztudent in Moscow 
returned to Fales".. ne. The Jewish Section on the other hand 
cla--Med that L%oscor, cut its links with the PCIP as a direct 
result of the Party leadership's deviation from the Comintern 
line. See, From the Resolutions of the Party Conf erence Called 
by the Jevash Section.. August 194-0.1n Kaf Alef Docizients, 
0--. cit. p- 58- 
109. The Jewish National Home and the Arab Rebellion. InRreco . N. 27- 1936.. P- 728. 
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Ignoring the independence slogan raised by the Arah national movement 
and supported by the Party, the article výent on to recommend only a 
. pag, e 
of Jewi-sh immigmtion and the creation of a tenpoxT-r y star 
legislative asse=bly "based on proportional representation". a 
Clear recognition of what the Jewish Section was later to term the 
"legiti=ate national rights of the Yishuv". 
A year later another article called for the "x%eecognition of the 
Jews as a national minority with equal rights" 
110 
. -. hile yet another 
, demanded from the I-rabs, "a sympatheticunaerstanding of 
the 
aspirations for national statehood within the YishuV1.111 In 
Palestine,, the Party was demanaing the establishment of an independent 
Arab state and the recognitim of only the indiVidual rights of the 
Jews, and also calling on the Arabs to tisist on the right to 
nc=inate the leaders of tineir choice (meaning the hufti) to the 
London Conference. The Comintez. n. press Ix. the meantime was condem- 
ning the ! '-Ufti for maintaining ccntacts with Fascism and accusing 
the rebellion of receiving azms and financial and tech. zLical aid from 
Berli. n. and Rome. 
112 It declared that the ---tn4, - lalestine had , gle 
in ' 
ceased to be a purely Arab struggle in opposition to British 
i=perialism, and had "become complicated and influenced by the war 
aims of the fascist axis against the democracies" . 
113 The Arabs., 
characterised as "pawns in 'the game of f ascism"j, 
114 
were called 
upon to struggle againzt the Yruf ti,, 'while the JeVrish 'S'ection's 
call for a "united front of Zionists and non-Zionists" was endorsed., 
as was the necessity of actively supporting the I'moderate" leadership 
of W eitzman , ndthin the Yishuv. 
5 
By 1939 the leadership of the PCP was impelled to attempt a 
re-evaluation of its position and to note the causes of the failure 
of the Arab rebellion. Since the abandonment of the partition 
proposal it had opposed the continuation of the armed rebellion and. 9 
by endorsing the ter=s of the 1939 White Paperv had come out 
110. The Best Solution for Palestine. Inpreco 11 43- 1937. P. 971. 
111. The Present Situation in Palestine. TNAV. N 51.1938. pp. 1176-1177. 
112. Fascist Agitation in the Near East. C-1. N 6.1939. P. 476. 
113. The Present Situation in Palestine. YNAV- N 18.1939. P- 365. 
114. The Figýiting in Palestine. C. I. N 1.1939. p. 40-42. 
115. The Revisionist Menace. VMkV. N 39- - 1939- P- 864. 
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irrevocably in oppo-tition to the leadership of the Arab national 
movement. A combination of pressure from the Jewish E-7, ection and 
its newly found independence,, led the Party over the next couple 
off years to re-exa=e its previously held positions and to indulge. 
in a certain amount of intemal self-criticism. 
116 
a. Re-evalwýtion of the P,, -KLv LLne 
The Farty put, f forth a number oA. reasons which., in its axialysis, 
combined to bring about the decline of the rebellion. While 
pointing to the bad econo--4c situation vdiich had re--Ulte,, a in hard- 
ship and suffering and led to the desire for a return to more stable 
ccnd . tions., and the escalation of the Government's czmpaign againzt 
the rebels which eventuallv led to their military defeat, 
117 the 
Fal'tY perceived the =ain reasons for the rebellion. 's, declir-e as 
lYing elsewhere. The most i=portant of these . vas the lack of a 
cent-Mlized leadership and the egoism and selfishness of" the krab 
leaders who preferred to rely on military adventurers who were 
.Y 
PersOnallY loyal to them,, rather than on men c-A" sound militar 
IMOýIledge axid: clear political aims. 
118 This decentralisation in 
CO'lla'-'nd had led to t-he entrance of "gangs of criminals and hooligans" 
into the ranhas of the rebeis., who used the rebellion, especially 
in its ', stages, as a means of exacting tribute from the ,- --atter, 
peasants. The terror xhich these elements unleashed had led to 
the losss Oýo 4. sympathy for the rebellion on the part of the majority 
Of the-Arab population. The introduction of terror into the 
rebellion was blamed on the Mufti himself, rho., according to the 
rart 
-V-1 11tiIi-sed it to struggle against his political opponents and 
as a 13"ZIs of continuing the rebellion %hen popular sympatby for 
: Lt'v'a's beginning to wane. The anti-Jewish terror ýndulged in. by 
116- T"le `--artyt s cr:: tici Fms of its past policies were contained in 'n-e, -'nP-l PartY docunents and never made public. In 1944 however, 
the split of t1he Partyq the now Jewish PCP in the course 
'Correspondence vdth the Histadrut admitted certain mistakes cQtrý4 
117. T1,1, ttecx during the rebellion period. e Policy of the TFICP towards the Lrab National Kovement. op., -cit. P% 82. 
Tbj 
. P. 81. 
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the Arab bands proved counter-productive.. for it did "not decrease 
the hatred of the Yishuv to the Arab revolutionary movement".. and 
also al'lcmed the Zionist leaders to exploit the ter-ror and mobilise 
the Jemsh-workers into pla3ring a reactionary role in the service of 
the British, v-hi'le beliýeving that they were performing an important 
anti-fascist task. 
Another e1qUally ir=portant f actor seen to lead 4#. -, o the rebellion's 
decline was ", at the Party ter=ed %*he involvement of the external 
119 factor". Ihis referred to the part played in the rebellion by 
Ital. ian Fascism ara by Germany., which had a vested interest in the 
continued exi--tence of a state of chaos in Talestine. Fascist 
agents bore a direct responsibility for introducing the terror 
into the rebellion and to-vard-s the end, had succeeded in 
infiltrating into the heart of the movement. The --um effect 
of this was that democratic forces in the r. -, rld lost ry=pathy for 
the rebel. lion, and this, in combination vrith the other factors, had 
brcugýit about the -.!,. rp-b maz-sez disenchantment and the termination 
of the rebellion. 
The demise of the rebellion also led to an atte=pt by the CC to 
examine the pro-rebellion line it had formerly pursued. I'vhile 
continuing to hold to the correctness of its general line in support 
of the revolt LI .. and 
its characterisation as a progressive anti- 
imperialist struggle, 
120 it recogaised that some of the policies 
had been wrong and that some of its political evaluations had been 
faulty. As early as 1937, the Party had admitted its mistakes 
121 
concerning aim-ed activity in the Jewish street and had, by 
setting ikp the Jewish Sections seemingly recognised the impossibility 
of forcing the Jewish cadre to indulge in the same kind of activity 
as'wras taking place in the Arab street. 
122 
As regards its policy 
towards the rebellion., the CC stressed that it had op- ., 
osed its 
renewal, in 1937 in opposition to the partition scheme, 
123 
and 
119. The Policy of the PMP towards the Arab National Movement op. ci 
p. 82. 
120. The Dissolution of the Jewish Section. ap. ci - P-31- S-; ee also The Policy of the PCP Tovmrds the Arab Wational !,, -ovement. loc. cit. 
121. The Dissolution of the Jevash Fection. loc. cit. 
122. Memo of Je-. -. -Isli Section to -Lhe Comintem. op. cit. p. 6. 
123. The Policy of the FCP Towar-as the Arab National I-ovement.... 
OP- ci - P- 83. 
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had refused to collaborate with the armed bands. Haviever the CC 
admitted that this "correct policy" of the Party did not last long., 
and that the Party clue to its numerical weJacness was unable to 
influence the orientation of the national =vement. Consequently 
it had found itself isolated from the Arab mas-sez., and lost what 
little influence it had gained among them. The departure from 
tj-, iz "co=ezt polic,, r" va- explained P--- being due to the inability 
of the Farty to oppose the I,, -., ufti inside the national movement2 and by 
the absence of a cArong cadre which -xould h&ve eaviabled it to --pread 
its call for a political as oppoF: ed to a military struggle against 
partition. It ev--dently hored to be able, by rever-ing its stand 
and stqppporting the renered outbreak of armed activitoý;,, to influence 
the ra--vement and af fect a change from the inside. 
Turning to -Lhe problem of fascist influence in the rebellion, 
the C""' 4. ., výhile admitt! mg 
that it was possible for f ascic-t interests 
to e=loit the independence zrýtruggle in the colonies,, denied that 
the objective situation in those countriez: provided the political 
an. A social basis for the movement to be transfo=ed into a fascist 
one. 
124 Only in May 1939 did the CC admit the existence of contacts 
between certuain of the 11, rab leaders and the fascist coiintries. 
125 
It e=lained thi-s-, as the result of the desperation of the Arab 
leaders in the face of, the united f=nt of Zionitm rnd irperiUisms 
but later admitted that it had "not valued suff. 1ciently the fascist 
126 danger in the Arab movement" . In its subsequent evaluations., 
the CC recoV71sed that -the leadership of the revolt had, towards 
the end, fallen under fascist influence and used fascist slogans 
and fascict methods. 
127 
The %0*0, gave 1938 as the year when "the Husseinis became open 
-P' '. 
128 
agents o fascism? ana this was at a time when the Farty still 
supported the Yufti's leadership of the Arab movement, called for 
his return to Palestine amd the legalising of the MAL, and insisted 
124ý The EF. -vents: CC Vemion. loc. cit. 125. Lemo- of Je,, -, Lsh Fection to the Comintern. op. cit. P. 7- 
125. The Dissolution of the Jewish Section. OP- cit- P- 32. 
127. The Events: CC Version. loc. cit. 
128. The Role of the Party and the Comn=ist Youth in the Arab 
Street. 
-crp. ci . p. 
165. 
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on the Arabs' rioit to no, -. anate him as ti. -eir i-epresentative to the 
London Conference. In this later evalm. tion the CC _zaw the Kufti 
as facilitating the entry of faacist propaganda not only into 
Palestine, "cut over the -. hole ! 'ear East, by popularising the idea 
that the Gemzns roula help the independence struggle of the Arabs. C:, 
Dealing v. -Ith the early activity of the Jmýish section, the CC 
declp_rzed in 19391 that it had follo7;,, ed a rdztaken policy in seeL-ing 
to look for allies wit*,. in the Zionist camp. 
121 9 
The role of the 
Jewish cadre should have been co. nf ined to explnýin=g to the Jewish 
comm=ity that those responsible for the Arab revolt were "the 
Zioni--44.1 
;s and the ir-Terializts Arith their occupation policy" and 
that the terror was "a side phenomenon". 
130 By seeking to exploit 
those voices in the Jewish --treet vhich had come out againzt 
parti tion., the Party had hoped to win over the Jew-ish m3ses. 
This atte. --rt to for-a a I&mnt vdth certain gro-ups within Zionizm by 
playing or- the internal conflicts within the Yishuv was conder., med 
131 
as a zistaken policy. The CC declared that there were "no 
pmg. ressives in the Zionist movement", that Jewish democrats should 
e7ldbit their anti-imperialism by supporting the Arabs., and that 
there was no possibility(f carrying on political activity within 
the Zionist move, _ . ent. 
132 
7,7hile critici-sing its repeated calls 
for Arab-Jewish unaerstanding without putting forward any fo. -=la 
for its attainment d1arling the rebellion,, the CC declared that 4: 1 
"understanding" could cnly be achieved on a non-Zionist basis, 
133 
and characterisea the 1939 -Fhite Paper as the proper basis for 
such an. "undere-tanding". It cho-e to see the rejection by the 
Zionist movement, of the provisions of the MAte Paperp as proof 
of t-he correctness of its position in conde=ing the pursual of 
a front policy within the Yishw. 
134 
129. Memo of Jewish Fection to the Comintern. op. cit. po lle 
130- The Events: CIO Version. loc. cit. 
131- The Dissolution of the Jewish Seot -ion. loc. cit. 
132. Protocol 11.2 of a meeting of Secretariat members of the Jewish 
ec -tion vdth t-r. o members of the CC. Quoted in Memo of Jewish 
Section to the Co=inter. n. op. cit- P. 13- 
133. The Problems of lr=igratiýn and the White Paper: Document of 
CC/PCP. Frankel Collection., op. ci - p. 151'- 134. The Dissolution of the Jewish Section. op. cit. P. 33- 
139 
b. The q,, ol: it with the Jev7ish Section 
The differences between the CC of the Party and the Jewish 
Section began to appear soon after the latter's formation in 1937, 
and were manifez-ted by loss of contact betrýeen the two a year aftcr 
the Section's establishment. 
135 The two organisationn were already 
pursuing scparate raths when the Section issued a leaflet in June 
1938 conde. -n-nine the execution of a Revisionic-t acciz-, ed of terror 
activities. 
136 Miz leaflet which -signified the Section' -- belief 
that the Zionist-British alliance was not necessarily permanent, as 
evide-riced 1: ýy the willingness of the Briti-ch to execute a Zicnir-A, 
brought into the open tl-. -e wide Culf which separated the Section 
fro= the CC. The differences centred on three r,. --in iý-sues: the 
characterisation of the Arab rebellion, the recognition of the 
"national rights" of the Yishuv, and the policy of the por. ul, -r 
front vi-thin the Yishuv. After the tenalar-, tion oL ' the rebellion, 
contact be, xeen the tvzo wass re-established. 9 but no agreement was 
reached and the C', formally dizt-! ýolved the Fection in December 1939- 
137 
The leadership of the Section refused to abide by the CCIr, decision 
and, althou; h the majoeity of the Jewish cadre remained loyal to 
the CC 138 -n the leader-hip of the Section succeeded in holding a 
,,, con, =, e- 
tt=. arty zs" in August 1940 in xhich -Lheir sececsion. from the 
Party was declared. They subsequently came to be knom as the 
1 
139 
Emet" graLT. 
The Section' s evaluation ol 4- ' the Arab nationall movement was 
basically hostile. It characterised the second phase of the 
rebellion as "a revolt organisea by fascist agents"140 and 
condemned the slogans of independence and the-banning of Jewish 
A-M'gration as contributing to the fascist domination of the 
=ovemen'.. 
14-1 The Section saw the slogan of independence, raised 
135. The Dissolution of the Jemsh S-ection. op. cit'i P* 28. 
136. Hebre-Ar L'eaflet of Jewish Sectiong June 1938., quoted in Dothanp 
it Me c'. 
,. 
P. 219. 
137. The Dissolution of the Jev; a*. --h Section. loc. cite 133- The Reaz=s for the Split in the PCP: Report by a member of 
the CC of Emet. December 194.0. Kaf Alef Documentsf op-ci -p-77. 139. From the Resolutions of the Party Conference Called by the 
Jeva* sh Section. cp cit- P- 59- Emet (the truth) was the name 
of the organ of the group. 
10. Ibid. P. 57. 
141.1emo of Jev7ish Section to the Comintern. 
-op. ci p. 
8. 
140 
"I 
in vhat it termed the "Ifascist period" as cnly playing into the 
hands off fasci= in its ztruggle againct the democracies. it 
perceived the i=igraticn slogan as being even mom damaging 
because it was wrongly posed as a central que--tIon,, in. -tead of 
being left open to be decided by the future Covernment of the 
co-, mtx-j. 
The was conde=ed for co., =* tting a munber of mistakes: 
failing to evaluate the fascist danger, supporting the independence 
slogan, and refraining from open struggle again3t anti-Jmrish and 
inter-Arab terror. It was criticised for ignoring the rtruggle 
for "und-er2: tandIng" in 'the Jeaish street and confining itself to 
mouthir. 7 well intentioned --loganz 
142 
as well a: for failing to 
struggle a-gain-st the -Te*, -ash boycott declared by the armd bands., 
an' fina-ly for engaging in ax-ned activity against the Yi--huv. The 
Party' s =istaker, were at -tributed to an incorrect evaluation of the 
international scene143 and for not having grasped the contradictions 
v; hich existed between the fazciE: t states and the democraciezz, -; -. hich 
encouraged the fo=er to exploit the independence slogan in the 
hoppe oi. gaining a foothold in Palestine. As a result of its 
failure to condemn the re-opening of the rebellion and having 
-Z J. pj. cred the &ties of the rebellion' s leaders to fascism, the CC 
was accused of weakeninz the Party both in the Ar-ab and Jewish 
streets. 
144 In the latter this had resulted in the Yishuv'. -, loss 
of confidence in the Partyl s call for "understanding" . and for the 
Jewish cadres' mistrust of their leaders. In the Arab streets 
the CC IDY identifying the Party completely with the Arab national 
movement., had lost its 1-mb cadres to the nationalists,, and was 
unable to concentrate the "progressive Arab forcer. " around itself. 
The Section Suggested an alternative set of policies to those 
pursued by the 00. in its eyes the Party should have concentrated 
on Y. -Irlening 1he democratic rijhts of the inhabitants and struggled 
against te-y=r and against the danger of fascism in Palestine. 
145 
142. Frcr- the Resolutions of the Party Ccnference called by the 
Jevash Section. loc. cit. 
143- Ibid. 
144. Kemo of Jermish Section to the Comintem. op. cit. P. 7- 
145. Ibid. p. 9. 
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SUCh a policy would have provided the basis for a. "formula for 
underste-nding" which could have won support in the Jetri-ch street. 
The Section itself had atte, -Tted to implemnt thic policy in so 
far as the struggle againtt terror ", aa concemed, by condng out 
againz-t it in its leaflets, and calling for the Jeý--dsh inhabitants' 
right to defe, -d themselves. 
146 
The Fection saw the P-nti-Jev; ish 
terror as ftelpinf. farc-*A. -, n in the ! rab strect- to a'ivcrt the struCgle 
fro= being directed againzt the Briti--h onto the v-i. -, huv, and thus 
deepening the cha-m between the two peopless. It rej ected the CC Is 
view, that the terror was a by-produc-81; of the rebellion and proposed 
t- againzt it 4. o cone ou-14. - i: n its leaflets and call on Jev. -Ish youth to 
defend 1,12,, e=selveý again:: t the A.. -ab--. However, the CO ttood 
opposed to any appearance against the terror even as a matter of 
self-defence, seeing thit as acquiescence to the Zionists' practice 
of llar=ed occupation", in addit-. Iun to their "peaceful occupation" 
of the country-147 Dissolving the Section and expelling a number 
of the leaders, vhom it held to be revponzible for its divergent 
policiez, the CC rejected its arguments regarding the character of 
the revolt - and dezied the exi-tence of a social and political basis 
for -41asci:;: = in the colonial countries. It ascribed this belief 
to the < ection' s 'al I -lu--e to comprehend the "objective progressive 
nathi-re of a colonial anti-i: T. erialist rebellion" reEarelless of the 
fact that it was led by "feudal and clerical elements.,, 
148 11. bile 
it admitted that it had =ini, -nised the danger of the fascist influence 
in the revolt, it rejected the charge of having failed to stand up 
to the ter-ror, and held to the cor-rectne. -s of the independence 
clogar. accusing the : -'ecticnl-- leadership of having -fallen under 
"nationalist Zjion-Jet influences". 149 
7he central contradiction between -the CC and the Section 
revolved aroimd the dete=ination of the nature of the Yishuv. 
The navel and positive evaluation by the'Section in rejecting the 
"Party's traclitional hostility to the Yi!:. huv as a whole, brought 
146. Kem of Jewash .- 46- T) Section to the Comintem. o- ci - p. 147. The E'vents: CC Ver-sicn. loc. cit. 148. Ibid. 
3-49. The CC/PCP to the Active 11mbers. op. ci p. 48. 
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about the c3i vergent path-s f ollowed by the two groups and the 
resultant split. Tl-., e 'Section claimed that the CC had failed to 
grazp the changes and developments which had taken place within 
the Y-6--huv as a recult of the influx of nevi immigrants and the 
entx7 of le--ge scale Je---drli capital -which had led to increased 
social differentiation in the Jm,! --h street. 
150 
While the Yishuv 
had arreared seemingly L-mited in the "prorrocrity period" of 2933-350 
and had succeeded in "--mear: Uig its inten,, al conflictr, "i 
151 the out- 
break of tI-e economic cri--iz- a. the end of 
197 5 and the influence 
of the t-rab strike early in 1936 had led to the beginnings of 
disin-'tegrat: `_cn in the -ionist front and to intensified inter-nal 
conflict. The C1. accu. %, ed of having ignored these clianges and 
maintainei its outlook of a uniform Zionist front encompazzing both 
"the fascist Revisionists and the Zionist sccialist left". The 
-C had continued to regez-d Lhe -%hole of the Yirhuv as "a ; =T tc 
group" 
152 
and to iaent: LPy it mrith Zionist and imreriali--t policies. 
Thus it did not introduce any specific slogans, in the Jewish --treet 
based on the real and exi-sting conflicts r. 11thin it, and its propaganda- 
v, a, s confined to support for the Arab i-ebellion. This was an added 
=izIwake in that it di, -'L not take into account the level of political 
-Fturity of 4, *he Je7dzh inhabitants. The S-ection rejected the CC' 
posit. ion cf negating, "the exi. -tence of progrez: sive elements wity4n, 
5 
Zionism! ', 
1.13 
and declaxed that the Party's activity should have been 
based on the intemal d-: -Iferentiation within Zionism and should have 
adapted its methods to Id-ic level of the YisbuvI s maturity. 
-ed by Me Section interpreted the slogan of "understanding" raiý 
the Party in 1937., as siE; iifying implicit acceptance of the 
11-progressive national interest--" of the Yishuv and the solution of 
the problem in the coLmti7y by agreement between the two peoples. 
154 
17 On thds bassis it rejecteE the provisions of the 1939 vihite Paper 
as being incompatible Y. -Ith the struggle for "understanding"., and as 
unacceptab"Ie to the left forces within the Yishuv. 
155 The Section 
150. The reasons for the Split in the PCP- op. ci - P. 78- 151. Yemo of jewish Section to the Conintem. a. cit. p. 7- 
152. The reasons for the -, plit in the PCP. loý- cit. 
153. Memo of Jewish Section to the Comintern. loc. cit. 
154. 
. 
1-bid. P. 17. 
155. Ibid. p. 18. 
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Wass emphatic that the Jews in Palestine constituted a "nation" vrith 
progressive national de-mands thich did not however conflict with the 
interests of the -"rabvl56 and relied on a number of articles appearing 
in the Co=inteml-- pre--s to attest to the correctness of its position. 
157 
The C-C took the 7 ection 'to task on t1ais querntion of the Yishuv' s 
develcp=nt into a "nation", declaring it "absolutely incorrect,, 
158 
and ridicul! -rig it by elainirig that the only way 
to deduce "national 
de=&nds" for t; qe jews in 'Palestine, was by "accepting the Zionist 
-thesis t-hr-t the Y-J--huv : L-i Palestine is the actual Jmich nation". 
The CC relied on Stalin' --- authority to deny that the Jev,, s constituted 
a nation, roin-Iting to the absence of "territorit-LI titty" the "pe-no: 5. ple 
ccnA L -: tior, " for the form-etion of a nation. The CC d. 1d not deny that 
the jewish people had naV,. onal de=nci. -- for thich tk,, ey fought wherever 
they hapre-ned to be, but, e. -.: plmsised that the Jewish pmblcm could 
only be solve-c' by "social re-volution". It reiterated itz traditional 
conde=ation of the Yizhuv by affi=dng that in Palestine it was 
"an instrument of B-.,:. t4---h imperialism contrary to the interests of 
the jewish na ses and for the national oppression of the Arab people". 
159 
It declared that recognising the national demands of the "Jevash 
nation" on the territorica basis of Palestine meant supporting 
-7, 
Zionism whiclh r-as enraged in a policy of occupation rnd "the removal 
of the Arabs from their aim country". 
16o On this basis the CC 
supported the Gcve==enýt Is policy aga3. n--t illegaa im. -. -agration and 
condemned the FectionIn leaflets whiah attacked the brutality of 
the Governrmsntl -- treatment of the irmigrants in refusing to permit 
1 161 4.17em to dise=ba-. k once they had reached the shores of Palestine* 
Unt till 1937, the ordy activity of the Party in the Jewish street 
had been confinecl to the Histadrut and the "Antif all. 
162 The pursuit 
156. verno of Jewish Section to the Comintern. loc. cit. p. 13- 
1'57- Ibid. p. 14.. .d 158. Is There a Neces-sity for National Paght5 for the Yishuv: 
Doc-ument of CQ/PCP. Frankel Collection., or. ci - p. 153- 
159. lblidf- P. 154. 
16o. Tbi& 
161. ge-mo of Jer; -:. sh ýection to the Comintern. or. ci - p. 14- 
162. "1-. nti Fascist Organisation". A grouping of the Farty and some 
nmall left -7ionist groups on the basis of the struggle 
against fasci= in Pales-tine. 
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of anti-Z--*oni, -t policies within the Yishuv was regarded by the 
S and Section as the reason for the Party's lack of grov; thp its 
isolation from the "progressive elements vdthin Zionisel. 
163 These 
policies le--' a large part of the Jewich cadre to de. -, pair of ever 
making hea(! N-F-y in the Y-4, chuv and consequently to being bound to 
inactivity. They were al-o responsible for the rite of the theor7 
that "--,,,, lie v7c-xish in '. r-slcztinc are reactionary", for the 
blind belief in the po--. ibility of E? ucce. -. s in the '. rab street, ami 
for the desire to lcave the country: a liqijidationex-y trend in so 
fa-- as the presence of the Party within the Yi-, hL-, v v; r-z concerned. 
164 
.e est3blizrMent o. '"1- -1 ' the Section hýnd led to altem4t-.. icn-- in the 
orientations of the Farty., begiiming -.. -Ith the recoL-=ition cf the 
eýdstence of "progressive forces 'writhir. Zionisd' * 
165 The Section 
divided the Zionist movement into tuo parts, one progressive., the 
other reactionazy2 and tried to organise the progressives into a 
. Cb front ffor the economic struggle N-, --Lthin the Yizhuv. Its main 
slogans were the strL; ggýe for the videning of democratic "under- 
stand. ing" - The FS, ection relied on Dimitrov' s directives on the 
pc--ula-- front in the Seventh Cor. antem Congress., to put foruard a X 
Tol-; CY -parallel to that being pursued in the Arab streets and to 
A le-mnt tais in t1he Yishuv. Lncv., n as the "trojan horse" methods I --T- 
the Section sought to infiltrate the "progressive forces vithin 
Z. -iori and instructed its cadres to "u-se Zionist reasons and 
language", to aspire to reach important leading positions within 
these organizations., and "to transfer the essence of Party activity" 
to the lega- organi---atio, -Ir,, in the hope of affecting a change of 
it, clicY fr0m'rlthin 7rhe Yishuv. In addition to this., it gave its 
slr, 'PO'--t to t1c "moderates" in the struggle between the e.. -azting 
leadership. of the Yishuv and the Revisionists. 
166 Mile admitting 
that its advocacy of a npopular f =nt', within the Yishuv was 
"see=in&ly not aimed against Zionisd'., the Section nevertheless 
insisted that it was anti-Zionist "by its very nature" in that it 
: L63- Yemo of the Jewish FRectim to the Comintern. cp. cit. p. 9. 
164. Ibid. p. 10. 
165- Lb--icL- P- 11 - 166.1bia. p. 16. 
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4 
"increased conflicts within the Zionist Czp,,. 
167 The only 
reservations that the Section had on the line it had pursued within 
the Yishuv up to the end of 1939 were in the form of a self-criticiem 
of its aim "sectailan attitude"s which had not allowed it to exploit 
the conflicts in the Zionist camp more fully and for having blurred 
the differerces between left and rightinits attacks on a "united 
front of ! he right"* 
16s 
For its part the CC opposed the "trojan horse" method, and 
-stressed the impossibility of carrying out a popular front policy in 
the Jeri--h street. 
169 It reftsed to allow the publication of 
articles advocating the establisbme&. of a popular front in the 
Party's organs: 
L70 
and recognised the existence of only a small number 
of progressives 'in the Yishuv. These were determined by the degree 
of an-U- or non-Zlonism they displayed. The Section's call for a 
front was condemned for being based on a false -anders-tanding of 
D -4 rovl s tactics, and as an attempt "to imitate what other parties 
under different conditions had done in other countries". 
171 This 
policy was viewed as a method of "creeping through t1ae back door" 
of ZicniEm and as having led the Section to the abandonment of an 
"independent and revolutionary policy, " in the Jewish street# and 
to the acceptame c. " the Zionist thesis of a "Jewireh nation and 
Jewish national demands in Palestine". The Section's for=lation 
for "understanding" was also rejected on the gmunds that the so- 
caUed "pmgmssive forces within Zionism" were in favour of 
"understending" only in so far as it allowed them "to realise Zionist 
colonisation in peace". Their abjection to the White Paper had 
shown the true nature ce their "p=gressiveness". The CC was 
unequivocall, v, clear: there could be no alliance of any fo= with 
any group in the Yishuv on anything other then a non-zicnist basis. 
Even the-Section's attempts to differentiate between "moderates" 
and "extremists" and. the support it extended to the formr was 
declared to have been wrong. 
3.67. Memo of the -Jewish Section to the Coraintem. 22. cit. p. 10. 
3.68. : rbid. p. : L6. 
169. Ibid. p. 18. 
170. The reasons for the split in the PCP. op. cit. p. 77* 
171. The problems of immigration and the' Paper. op. cit. P- 150. 
-J 
16 
The split of the Party in 1939 was a dress rehearsal for the 
final break between Arab and Jevvish comml Pts which was to take 
place four years later., While in 1939 the break was only 
temporary 172 the issues which led to the split of 1943 were the 
same as those which had led to the dissolution of the Section and 
its defection. Arabization bad rested uneasily on the shoulders 
of the Jewish cadres; it had severely restricted their role 
within the Yishuv by denying =Y revolutionary role to the Jewish 
co=nmity and directed the Partyf . fUll attention to the Arabs as 
that section of the population capable of caxT-ying out the tasks of 
the anti-colonial revolution. 
The in-'lux of Jewiah i=igmtion., especially after the rise of 
Nazism, and the spreadir danger of fasci=, brought about changes 
Iýoth in the makeup of the Yishuvj, and in the direction of the Arab 
zvbellion. To an increa-singly large section of the Jewish ca3x*s, 
the policy pursued by the Party during the rebellion appeared to be 
one of tailing behind the nationalists and signified a "liquidation" 
of the Party's independent role. At the same time,, their close 
involvement with the Tishuvw broug)2t them to realiEe the falseness 
o-. O&'the orthodox view of the Jewish co=mmity as one undifferentiated 
whole. Again the old question posed itself: what should be the 
role of the 
Yizhu-re MLUe in the early twentieFs the question was 
arguatly false in that the Jewish immigrants constituted an 
insigaificant minority of the population,, the change in both the 
nizabers and the composition of the Yisl= which had takenplace in 
the twenty years which had elapsed., made the question more relevant 
and indeed more pressing. The Jewish cadre could not fail to be 
affected by the nationalist atmosphere which existed within the 
Yishuv just as the Arab cadres were influenoed by the nationalist 
atmospbere of their ova comamity. The fact that-the Party 
followed apro-Arab nationalist line during the rebellion solved 
the problem for the Arab cadres, and indeed contributed to the 
expansion of the Party's strength in the Arab street. The problem 
172. The Emet group returned to the Party in mid 1942,, only to split 
again in 1943. 
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was resol"d by the temporary expedient of setting-up the Jewish 
Section, but this only served to confirm the distame between the 
two national components of the Party.. and led to the pursuit or 
=Aval. ly irreconcilable policies. While in the past the couminal 
disturbances bad resulted in small desertions from its ranksj, In 
1939 this, was repeated on a much larger scale. The rupture was 
again temporarily healed,, but the Party was to prove unable to 
survive the increasing divisions in the country. A novel 
contribution was added to the existing internal tensions by the 
increasingly aggressive role which the new group of Arab ==bers, 
the fruition cf the Party's pro-Arab policies of 1936-39., were to 
play, Thus the crisis of 1939 proved to be a larger repetition 
of past ruptures and a telling foretaste of things still to come. 
ý, ý. -2ýý -- --- 
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CHA= FIVE 
T13E PARTY D=iG M WAR 
The Position Towards The War 
Prior to August 1939 the PCP had pursued a consistently anti- 
fascist line in conjunction with the resolutions of the Comintern 
and. the dictates cC I. Roviet foreign policy. It had repeatedly 
attacked fas-cism earld pointed to the threatwhich Germzxq and Italy 
posed to the Soviet Union and the independence struggle In the 
colonies, calling for the formation of an international popular f ront 
of com=inists and democrats to bloc the path of fascist expansion. 
The signing of the Nazi Soviet Pact in August 1939 T&ich came as an 
unexpected shock to com=uniet parties everyv. here, placed the PCP in 
a particularly difficult position. Not cnly were the majority of 
the Party' s cadres Jews., but part cf its political activity was 
carried out amon& the Jewish population of the couatrys ubose 
ur. cocrpromising hostility to the Nazis was sr. issue cominanding the 
unified consensus of the whole Yisbuv. Yet the Party showed no 
hesitation in explaining and justifying the Soviet Union's decisionj, 
a5splaying to a much morv unified degree than on any other previous 
occasions, a lack of independent Line and complete subservience to the 
twists and turns of Moscow's foreign policy. 
Almost immediately after the conclusion of the Soviet German 
agreementl the Party attempted to perform an acrobatic feat by 
explairAng that this pact was aimed at furthering the cause of peacep 
and that the nature of the Nari regime itself had undergone a 
transformation as a result of its "detacbment from the British-French 
Imperialist camp" and its association with Moscovi. The Party's 
literature portrayed Germany as having been "forced to go to Moscow" 
and paradoxically., the result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement 
vas characterised as baving "put the Hitlerite gang in a situation 
of total isolation". 
1 
At the same timeq it was argued that the 
pact was the result of Germany's Tear of the strength of the Red 
A=: Y"s 
2 
and Was hailed as a work of genius an the part of Stalin 
who by concluding this agreement with the Nazis had foiled the 
capitalist states' plans to direct Hitler' a aggression against the 
1. Article In Kol Ham., Augmt 1939- Quotea inI smeli.. op. 
P. 155. 
2. To the Workers ana Masses cf the People. Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP 
September 1939. 
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Soviet Unionj. and "refused to pull Chanberlain' a chestnuts out of 
the fire,,. 3 The move of the Red Ar: W into Poland later in 1939,9 
was =claimed by the Party as a further step towards averting the 
danger of war in the Eastp and as "guaranteeing the safety of 
Romania.... and stopping Hitler's advances against H=garY". 
4 
Miraculously,, Hitler was now a changed man; he had ceased to be 
"the gendaxme of Chamberlain and De3adier and has to do what 
Moscow tells him"; 5 thus he could no longer conduct a campaiga against 
the Soviet'Union. and no longer constituted a threat to the ocmmunist 
Inovewnt. 
Yet the opening of the war in September 1939 found the Party 
-unsure of the po. -A-tion it should adopt and its natural inclination 
was -to support the war against fascism. In a leaflet issued Just 
after the outbreak of hoStilities, it characterisea the wax as the 
result of "fascist aggression" and attributed it to the arpeasement 
policy of Chamberlain which had previously sacrificed "Ethiopia, 
Austria, Spain and Czechoslovakia" and %betted Hitler's appetite 
for more easy conquests. Although the-war was seen to have been 
forced on Chamberlain and Daladier by the Polish resistance to the 
German invasion,, md not due to any desire on the part of Britain 
or Fra e to stand up to Hitlers the P&rkv nevertheless offered the 
conditional support of "all progressive forces in the world" to the 
war as long as Chamberlain and Daladier would "consistently carry 
out the war against Hitler". 
6 
The Party declared that the masses 
had taken "to the battlefiela to extendmate, fascism in the vorld" 
and that the comm=ists placed themselves in the front ran]cs of the 
battle. However,, the Party quickly rey rsed its position vhea it 
became clear that support for the war was not consistent with the 
terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. It embarked on a propaganda 
campaign against what was re-temed "the Imperialist war" and against 
British policy inPalestine, a campaign which was to last until after 
3. To the Workers, and YAsses of the People. Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP 
September 1939. See also., In the Commist Camp: July 1941-March 
1942. Jewish Intelligence Report. p. 1. CZA S25/48. 
4. Hebrew Leaflet cf CC/PCP quoted in Israeli.. loc. cit. 
5- Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP quoted in N. . Weinstock. Le Sionisme Contre Israwl. (Paris 1969). p. 218. 
6. To the Workers and Masses of the People. loc. cit. 
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the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. 
The Party' s attitude to World War Two passed throuEýI two clearly 
distinct phases. The firstp stretching from 1939 to 1941 was one of 
outright hostility and opposition; the second, starting in June 1941 
on the heels of the Germn attack on the Soviet Union was quickly 
transfoxmed from support for the Soviet Union alone, and continuing 
condemnation of "British imperial. -IIst aim".. to enthusiastic support 
for the "deweratic allies" in the struggle against fascism,, and 
for the British war effort in Palestine. 
In the first period, the Party characterised the struggle 
between Britain and France on the one hand again. st Germany and Italy 
on the other, as an "imperialist war" aimed at "dividing the world 
7 
between the capitalist powers". As far as the inhabitants of 
Palestine were concexned, this war which had been "declared in the 
name of 
8 
the colonial people without their opinion and against their 
wishes" was aimed at securing "British world domination and establish- 
ing its colonial terroristic govemment in Palestine". 
9 It was "a 
colonizatory war" which Britain wanted to force Palestine- into 
against its Willi but the Party was confident that "the Jewish people 
and the Arabs are not interested in this war" 
10 
which they realised 
was, not theirs an6. widch was moreover directed against their aims of 
liberation and independence, The Party attempted to adopt a position 
similar to that of Lenin's vis-a-vis the first World War# which was 
seen as a struggle for the retention of the colonies and the re- 
d. 41-vision of the world# Thus it rejected the slogan raised by the 
Zionists for "defence of the fatherland" and counterposed this with 
its slogan of "peace and bread". 
3.1 In its propaganda the Party 
sought to show that there was no difference between the two opposing 
cenps as far as the inhabitants of Palestize were concemed. Thus 
it was emphasi-sed that there was no struggle over principles between 
7. Com=nist Affairs,, January-J une, 194.1. Jewish Intelligence Report. 
P. 5. CZA S 25/48. 
8. To all Workers in the Country: On the f all of Frame. Hebrew 
leaflet of CQ/PCP June 1940. 
9. Let us Beware of Colonial Conspiracies. Hebrew Leaflet of 
M" 5 May 1941. 
10. To all Workers in the Country: on the fall..... loc. cit. 
11. Article in Kol Haam., May. 1941. Quoted in Israeli., op. cit. p. 168. 
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the two camps and that "English and French imperialists bad long 
supported fascism in Germany and tried to direct it against the 
Soviet Union". 12 The British regime in Palestine was described 
as being "identical to that of Hitler or Mussolini" and the strugge 
was portrayed as being solely concemed with the "monopoly of the 
exploitation of the capitalist countries and of the oppressed 
nations of the colonies713 The Party countered the wa=ings of 
the Zionists that the country was under imr4nent danger from the 
advancing tascist armies which were approaching the Suez Canal# 
by explaining that while "it is true that Hitler's and Mussolinil s 
sk=Jes are at the gate .... that Churchill's armies axv in Palestine, 
it is our first auty to struggle against the enemy within". 
14 
This demagogic attempt to direct the attention of Palestine' s 
inhabitants against Britain was paralleled by the false inter- 
13r, etation the Party gave to Arab opposition to the war effort and 
the struggle against recruitment. Thus the Party attacked Britain's 
Arab policy and conjux-ecl up the "long record of oppression and 
dest, ruction" since Britain's arrival in Palestine 
15 
and paid special 
attention to the British ar=71s activity during the 1936 rebellion. 
, he Party proudly proclaimed that the Arabs in Palestine were 
"opposed to the imperialist war" and that this could be clearly 
seen in the small number of "Lrab recruits to the a=yt and the 
small financial contributions made by them to the war effort., Yet 
the-Pa2! 1. y chose to forget that this OPPOsiticnwaB due to OUPPort 
and Tzpathy for the Axis powerst and not a result of any realisation 
of the '"imperialist natlMe" of the . war. 
Even the, small n=ber of 
Arab volunteers for the azzy,, were acoounted. for by the Party by 
pointing to the Goven=entl s economic policy of "delibemte 
pauperisation" which ccupelled the Arabsp unable to secure any for 
of employment,, to join the aruy. 
16 It was thus explained that the 
reason, wbich compelled those few Arabs to join the army and take up 
12. To all Workers in the Country: on the fall... loc. cit. 
13- Hebrew Leaflet of CC/13C-P., July 1940. Quoted in Weinstock.. loc. cit. 
14. Article in Kol Haam., May 1941. Quoted in Israeli., op. ci . p. 169. 
3.5. Sawt al Shaabt October 1940. Quoted in Jewish Intelligence Report. 
CZA S 25/7532. 
3.6. ! bid'. 
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arm against fascism was "not iaealism,, but their material 
cirm=stances". 
At the same time, the Party increasingly sought to undemine the 
Arab' a support and sympathy for the Axis powers by pointing out the 
falseness of Arab hopes that they might achieve their deliveranoe at 
the hand of the advancing German a=iies. Thus the Party combatted 
the frequent calls made by the Mufti to the Arabs to resume the 
rebellion. Not on3, y did it proclaim that "the time is not ripe" 
but chose to see in these calls an "Italian plot to enslave the 
Ambs" ax)d harness them to the service of aims external to their 
ovm interests. 
17 The Germans and Italluas, despite the fact that 
they were engagecl in a war against England,. were "also the enemies 
cf the Arab liberation struggle", and the Party blamed the 
"treacherous Arab leaclers" 
18 
who conspired with the fascists to 
raise a premature uprising in the coxmtry,, for endangering the 
national movement and wa-Pned the Arab masses not to place any trust 
in them. Thus,, when the Rashid Ali uprising took place in Iraq, 
the Party called an both the Gemms and the British "not to intefere". 
it explained that the Gazxans had succeeded In "paving the way for 
German colonisatiarl'in that country and warned that the fascist states 
had colonialist aims and aspired to control ff1raq1 oil.. the potash In 
Palestine. -the Suez Canal and the cotton in Egypt.. "19 and were 
trying "to deceive the Arabs as Britain had dcme in the First World 
War". Yet paradoxica3.3, - when the British intervened in Iraq and 
toppled the Rashid Ali Government., the Party came out against their 
intervention and condemned it. 
20 1 
Soon after the outbreak of war in 1939 the Party unleashed a 
campaign against recruitment to the British armq7 in Palestine. This 
lasted until well after the German attack on the Soviet Unions and 
oontinued to engage the Party' is attention until the final split in 
1943- This campaign was directed both against the Jewish Agency 
and the British Government. The former were attacked for their 
17. Sawt al Shaab., August 1940. Quoted in Jewir., h Intelligence Report. 
CZA, S 2377532. 
18. Let. us Beware cC Colonial Conspiracies ... loc. cit. 19. aid. 
20. Arabic Leaflet of CC/PCP, June 1941- 
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policy of enoouraging the recruitment of Jewish youth into the arvy 
and thus "sending them to the Maginot line as cannon fodder". 
21 The 
Party argued that although the Jewish Agency claimed that its support 
for recruitment was based an the wish to defend the country against 
fascism.. conscription to the army could be nothing mom than "a tool 
of imperialism and Zionism" 
22 
and thus had to be opposed. it 
attacked the Zionist leaders as "warmongers" ard called on the Jews 
in Palestine to demonstrate their "opposition to the war effort" 
and "not to give imperialism a single soldier ... a single farthing" 
23 
pointing out that it was against the interests of the Jewish masses 
themselves to have "a Jewish a-, mT under the comiumd of the traitorous 
Zionist gangs and British imperialism. " 
In the Arab street the Party' s task was facilitated by the 
fact that U3, ere was little support for the war and recruitment was 
insignificant. In its campaign in the Jewish street it point--od out 
that recruitment would increase the "denger of turning Palestine into 
a battle -field"24 and continued to argue till as late as the mi&Ue 
of : L941 that the reason Palestine had not been engulfed by the war, 
was due to its "opposition to the war and to both Britain and 
Germany" '25 It continuously called on both Arabs snd Jews to put 
pressure on the Government "to remove its military bases from 
Palestine". 
26 Condemning the savagery of the Italian bombings on 
Ha: Lfa in August 1940, it explained them as being "retaliation for 
'British attacks against civilian targets in Libya". 
27 It, also held 
Britain respcmsible for endangering the lives and prvperty of the 
inhabitants of Palestine by "turning Palestine's villages and tovmz 
into military camps" and called for the removal of the British arvy 
-V the country 
28 
A. rom and the declaring of Palestine a non-combatant 
zone. This explenation which certainly fell on weloome cars in the 
21. Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP,, February 1940. Quoted in Israelis 
op. -ci . p. 
162. 
22. The CC/1Y. T to the Active Yeabers.,.. op. ci . p. 50. The Party also 
condemned the Jewish Agency's call for the establishment of a 
Jewish Arw. See Kidal al Shaabs October 3.940. loc. cit. 
23- Hebrew Leaflet of CC/Fýs July 1940. Quoted in Israeli., crp. ci p. 164. 
24- An Oýxtline of Communist Activitys 8 ', October-8 Noverber 1940. 
Jewish Intelligence Report. CZA S 25/7532. 
25. Let us Beware of Colonial Conspiracies ... loc. cit. 
26. To All Workers in the C(=try: On the Fall... loc. ci 
27- The Commmist Movement jr, Jaffa. Jewish Intelligence Reports 
10 September 1940. CZA S 25/7532. 
28. Statement After 3rd Italian Air Raid on Haifa. Hebrew Leaflet 
Of CC"- August 1940. 
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Arab street, was auaethma to the Yishuv, - but the Party did not 
allow tbis to influence its complete opposition to the "imperialist 
war" and its persistent attempts to use any and all argiraents to 
tu= the Yishuv against the war in faithful pursuit of Moscow's line. 
The news of the Geyrmn attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 
caught the Party unawares. This unexpected events as far as the 
Party itself was concerned, resulted in confusion and an attempt to 
explain the Nazi attack in terms of a capitalist conspiracy abetted 
by Britain. to bring down the socialist regime in the Foviet Union. 
On the =rrow of the attack the Pa-rty called on Palestine's 
-inhabitants to 
defend the Soviet Union and to show their solidarity 
by decl&ring stx'., kes and organizing demonstrations throughout the 
country, 
29 
while continuing to struggle against recruitments and 
tran-Efonti. ng 'the on-going "imperialist war" into a war of liberation, 
and for the f reedom and independence of Palestine. Unable to 
explain the war between Germany and the Soviet Union within the 
framework of its past stetements and analysis, the Party reverted 
to the old line of blandw "the reactionary bourgeoisie in the 
United States and Britain" for instigating the N&Zjs. 
30 It was 
explained in the Party's Arabic leaflets that Hitler's attack on 
the Soviet Union was "backed by German capitalists and their friends 
in Britain" ard that Hitler "could not have started the war vithout, 
the agreement of the capitalists of Britadn and the United States". 
31 
The Party attacked Churchill's offer of help to the Soviet 
Union and characterized this as "aimed to lull the masses and to 
benefit from their support-for the Soviet Union". 
32 In Palestine 
the Party saw this strategy as ailued at enlieting the support of 
the inhabitants for Britain's om interests and "to increase 
recruitment and forced labour for small wages in the army cams" 
but this recruitment it was declaxeds "did not aid the Soviet Union-**(it) 
aimed e. strengthening British oocupation and the realiraticm Of 
29. To the gasses on the Occasion of the German Attack oil the USSR. 
Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP.. 26 June 3.941. 
30. Long Live the 'Wide Popular Front for the Defence of the USSR. 
Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP. 29 June 1941. 
31- kmbic Leaflet of CC/PCP,, quoted in Cc==izt Affairs: JanUarY- 
June 1941. Jewish Intelligence Report. p. 6. CZA S 25/48- 
32. Ung Live the Wide Popular Front ... loc. cit. 6 
156 
Zionist occupation against the Arab liberation movement". 
33 The 
Party called for direct recruitment to the Red Aroly as the best 
way to help the Soviet Union and for a short period actually 
advocated the formation of intemational brigades to go and fight 
, on ihe Russian frcnt. 
34 This was deerned to be preferable to 
co=lying with the Zionists call for recruitment which "had a 
Zionist and anti-Amb nature" and hindered the fostex-ing of friendly 
relationz between Arabs and Jews. 
The war between Britain aad Genmny had been opposed by the 
Party for nearly two yeers; it was and continued to be, condemned 
as an "imperialist war" where the prospect of a victory for England 
meant a world "in -which a race of masters sucked the colonial 
people' s blood in a capitalist world of crisis and unaploym=t. 
35 
While Mmxrchill had "abstained" from declaring his war aim, Stalin 
in contrast had armounced that the Soviet Uný. on had no ambitions 
of conquest and aimed at nothing more than "the destruction of 
fascism once and for all". Thuss even after June 1941, the Party 
continued to differentiate the fbroes engaged in Ihe war against 
Germany. as "imperialist" and-"socialist" and it continued to regard 
the United States and Britain-as "the secret allies of Hitler". 
36 
Its reading of the international situation led it to arrive at the 
conclusion, Just prior to thg construction of the Anglo-Soviet 
alliance$, that the weakening o-11! inter%4uperialist contracUctions 
would result In #creased danger of a general w of intemention 
against the Soviet Union. 
'The Soviet Unionts entry into the war did not initially cause 
the Party to abandon its old line. 14%- persisted in its propaganda 
against recruitment and denied that "the British robber gangs, 
exploiters of the people... r-re partners of the Red A2-, V"37 and 
declared that the enezy of the Party remained the British presence 
ijý Palestine. It called on the inhabitants to struggle against 
33- Long Live the Wide Popular Front ... loc. ci t. 
ewigh intelligence 34. In the Commnist Carap: July 1941ýMaxch 1942. J 
Report. p. 1. CZA S 25/48. 
35. Leaflet of CC/PCP j, quoted in InfoMati0n m the Commi sit Move- 
ment. Jewish Intelligence Report, 12 July 1941. CZA S 25/48. 
36. Theses of the Secretariat. - Documeat of I? W. April 1942. Frankel 
Collection$ 21ý* cit. p. 161. 
37. Leaflet of CC/'ICP,, 8 Ju3, v 1941. 
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the policies of imperialism and Zionisms to call for the establish- 
sent of wide democratic rights, for legalising the Communist Partys 
as proof of Britain's good faith in its claims of willingness to 
co-operate with all anti-fascistss and for increasing the tempo 
of the class struggle against "the exploitation of the bourgeoisie 
and the leaders of the Histadrut". 
38 The Arabs in particular were 
caMed upon to struggle for the liberation of the prisoners of the 
rebellion and for the expulsion of British Imperialism from the 
country and the establishment o, 4, ' "a popular government". 
39 Britain 
was called upon to show the sincerity of its often asserted desire 
to help the Soviet Union "by ending its rule in the colonies" arxl 
granting freedom and independence to the people of Palestine. 
The Party took more than four months to overcome its adherence 
to the old line and produce a new policy suited to the circumstances 
created as a resxiit of the I. L 'r, viet involvement in the war. It was 
hampered by having lost nearly all its top leadership in July 1941 
shortly after the Nazi attack, and waz still reeling from this 
-unexpected shock and unsure of the correct position to adopt. 
40 
it was some time before the new leadership, seeing the close co- 
croeration developing between Britain and the Soviýt Union, eventually 
came out in unequivocal support for all the participants in the war 
again, st fascism and declared itself in favour of the British war 
effort in Palestine. it relegated to second place the internal 
conflicts and the struggle against Zioniamp main sining that it was 
necessary to subordiuate everything to the task of defeating fascism. 
Anncouncing the formation of an anti-fascist front comprising 
Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States4l, the Party cam 
out in favour of the recruitment of Arabs and Jews into the arz7 . 
42 
and exhorted them to enter the ranks of the British army "the 
brothers -in arms of the heroic Rea Anoy". 
38. Long Live the Wide Popular Front.... loc. cit. 
39- Arabic Leaflet of CC/PCP, quoted in Communist Affairss January- 
June 1941. loc. cit. 
40. Musa and his two Jewish lieutenantss S. Tzabari and S. Mimiss 
'were arrested a week after the German attack on the E. -oviet Union. 
They were all released towards the end of the year. During 
their imprisonments the Party was led by Pneina. Feinhaus# 
Khalil Shamir, and Hassan Yehia abu Aysha. 
4.1. Long Live the Anti-Fascist Front f rom Leningrad to Torbruk. 
Hebrev; Leaflet of CC/PCPs October 194: 1. 
42. W. O. 169/8310. Communist Activity in Palestines 30 May 1943- 
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The Party Ia vost profound, change of attitude concerned the 
British Government itself. The Governmen had been perceived as 
being the immediate enezy which Palestine's inhabitants had been 
exhorted to struggle against and whose "brutal oppression" of the 
1936 rebellion was frequently called to saincl as reflecting the true 
nature of Britain's motives in the ongoing "imperJslist war". 
Eowever, towards the end of 1941 the Party recognised that it was 
inconceivable to maintain ' this attitude towards Britain TdAle at 
tbe same time calling for a wide popular f=nt for the prosecution 4. 
of the anti-fascist war and when the Soviet Union itself was in 
very close co-operation with Britain. Thus the Party soon declared 
that the Soviet Union's entrance in the war had "changed its 
character and influenced Britain" in'the struggle against f&scism; 
43 
it -*as no longer posssible to make a distinction between a "Soviet 
liberation war" and a "British imperialist war". Britain it was 
emnhasiseds hs-Ld declared its willingness "to make great sacrifices 
for the ant-i-fascist war headed by the Soviet Union". 
44 
The Party's new attitude implied an enthusiastic and persistent 
call for recruitment., but more important,, in its agitation for all- 
out sunpo. -t for the war effort, it stood for a period in 
45 
opposition to industrial actiono conde=ing it as a "sabotaging 
of the wax e'Lfcrt". The Party sought to exact a price from the 
Government for its support, and persistently called on it to 
46 
legalise the Party and allow it to pursue its activities openly. 
This can was frequently repeated in the public meetings which the 
Party was holding openly for the first time with the ostensible aim 
-of generating support for the w and which the Govern ntp 47 
starting in 1942., allow cl the Party to convene. The Government's 
43- Theses of Secretariat. ' 
loc. cit. 
44. Long Live the Anti Fascist Front. loc. ' cit* 
45- In the Com=unist Camp: July 1941-March 1942. loc. cit. 
46. Statement to the Eigýi Co=issioner and every Honest Citizen of the 
Country-. A call to abolish all limitations on the Party in pursuit 
af the Joint Anti Fascist Struggle. Leaflet of CC/PCP reproduced in 
Assorted News.. Jewish Intelligerce Report 21+ April 1942- CZA S25/48. 
47. The Party held its first ever public neetings. during the r ears4p 
e. g. in Haifa, 16 May 194.2 (attended by 150-Tews, and 50 
A:: 
bsT- See 
Commmist Affairs. Jewish intelligence Report 29 May 1942. The 22nd 
of June 1942 was designated Day of Mass Recruitment and. Party 
members were instructed to join the arzq on that day. The Party 
also took the opportunity of the relative freedom it enjoyed to hold 
meetings on "socialist occasions". e. g. the Anniversary of the Red 
Armiy, meetings held in Jerusalem 20 February 1943, in Haifas 23 
February and in Jaffa 26 February. See Nidal al Shaab N-4- Maxch 
1943. pp. 6-7; The Anniversary of the October Revolutions meetings 
in Haifa 6 November 1942 (attended by 600 people), and in Jerusalem 
(attended by 1,000 people). See Nidal al Shaabs N-5 November 1942. 
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adherence to "the wide popular front" did not however extend to 
grafting legality to the commmists but Govemment reports indicate 
that it was not cblivious of the 
Zuýle 
role they were performing 
in drumaing-up support for the war effort. As early as 1941,9 the 
Gover=ent had noted the "considerable modifications" which Party 
policy had umdergone and its call on Jewish workers "to fulfil their 
sacred duty... in the great anti-fascist front of the Anglo-Soviet 
allia=e". 
48 After two years of such activity, the Gove=ment 
recognised. that as far as the war effort was concerned "the general 
49 
attitude of tbe PCP and its members is irr-eproacbably pro-British",, 
and that its -; ropaganda "maintained a spir-It conducive to the 
efficient prosecution cf the war". 
50 Although this did not earn 
the Party the right to legality it was allowed a measure of freedom, 
which reflected itself in a strengthening of its ranks and in the 
extension of its activities. 
A natural ccrrmlary of the Party's advocacy of a joint war 
effort against fascism was the toning down of the struggle against 
Zionism. The Party declared its readiness to reoognise some of the 
"national organisations" of the yishuv5l and atte=pted to extend 
its popular front policy to include those Zionist parties willing 
to co-operate with it and prepared to subordinate their differences 
to the insin aim of the struggle against fascism. The "Victory 
"agw"52 Le was born out of an atte=t to affect such a oollaborationp 
but the Party's influence within it remained relatively small. 
The Party also reversed its stand on the mobilisation of Jewish 
youth into the British ar=V, While previously it had opposed the 
Jewish Agenc7s advocacy of recraitment,, it now criticised. its own 
corrLizued adherence to this line after the Soviet Union was under 
I attack. 
It reoognised its continued opposition to what it had 
4B. C. O. 733/457/75162. Annual Reports 1941. p. 45. 
49. r. o.: L69/8310PICIM Paper X-7. Ccm=ism in Palestines. 1 July 1943- 
50- - Commtmist Activity in Palestinet 30 May 1943- 2-00- cit- 51- Spe; ch of Musa: political and Organisational Tasks of the PCP 
in the Present Time., delivered at Enlarged Plenum held on the 
8th January 1943. See In the Conm%unist Camps 1943. Jewish 
Intelligence Report. CZA S 25/7532. 
52. "The Council to Aid the USSR in the War Against. Fascism! l was set 
up early in 1942; later its name was changed to Victory League. 
see T.. o. 167/15702 FICHE N. 64. Russian Influence in the Levant. 
31 August 1943. 
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termed the "imperialist Zionist mobilisation. 
53 
while it itself had 
called for anti-fascist mobilisation., as a mistake. This bad 
constituted a double error in that it served as "a weapon against 
anti-fascist mbilisation",, and also left the initiative.. and thus 
the control of the Yishuv, to the Zionists. Rectifying its policy* 
the Paxty's new line was to call on "all those who can carry arms to 
54 
join-the arn7" & 
Increasingly the propaganda of the Party centred, on ihe demand 
for the opening of a second front in Europe. Among the numerous 
arguments used to advance this demand.. the most radical., and the one 
vhich was to prove to have far ranging consequencesp was the appeal 
to the "national consciousness" of the Yishuv, to its feelings of 
anger and hor. -or at the fate engulfing the Jewish co=mm-ities in 
occupied Europe.. and the desire for revenge. 
55 This, was repeatedly 
used to appeal to the Tishuv in language vftiah did not imich differ 
from that used by the Zionistsp harping on the theme of "national 
interests"., and cal 34 ng on the Jews "to organise -metings and 
demonstrations to press the Government through mass action"56 for 
an imexediate opening of the second front. The war was variously 
desce. bed as "the war of the Jewish people" and "the gmat national 
war of all the Jewish people", 
57 
and the necessity of joining the 
army was hi#ilightecl by emphasising tha, 4%. at "this moment our fate 
as worimers and as Jews is being decidecl,,. 
56 The Party' s leaflets 
talked about "revenging the spillecl blood of thousands of Jews in 
EU-0pe59 and called on the Tishuv to heed the "national interests 
53. Theses of Secretariat. op. c. p. 162. 
54. Assorted News. Jewish Intelligence Report.. 21, April 1942. CZA S25/48* 
55. Speech oft David Fry, World Jewx7 in the Struggle Against Fascism, 
in Hebrew Pamphle t.. Speeches at Anti-Fascist Farewell Party-for 
Mob, *lised Cadres held by the Party in Tel Aviyj 30 Ilay-1242 
6. Long Live the 7th of November., the 25th Anniversary of the Soviet 
Union, Land of Socialism and Freedom of All Peoples. Hebrew 
Leaflet of CC/PCP, November 1942. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Long Live the Anti Fascist Front. 
. 
10c. Cit. 
59. To the Citizens of Jerusalaw Let us Revenge the Blood of our 
Brethren in 'Elurope. Hebrew Leaflet of Jerusalem Committee of 
PCP. December 1942. 
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of the Jewish people" and prevent the "total extermination of our 
brethren" by the inmediate opening of the second front to achieve 
the speedy ending of the war. The motive of revenge repeatedly 
appeared in the Party's Hebrew literatures and Jewish youth were 
called upon to "unconditionally join the ranks ... to revenge the 
blood of their brothers and sisters being killed in Europe". 
60 
Despite the adoption of this new line, the Party continued to 
sense that the Zionist parties "did not accept (its) declared 
sincerity ... in the struggle against fasci=7.61 The opposition to 
the Zionist leadership of the Yishuv which had manifested itself in 
the period perceived as the "imperialist war" continued well after 
the German attack on the Soviet Union. Even during the Ge=jqn advance 
in the Western desert and when Palestine itself was threatened., the 
Zionist leaders bad been attacked for "sawing panic.. (and) desperation 
propaganda", 
62 
and the Party had continued to ojApese the reermiLtment 
of Jewish youth for a number of months after June 1941.63 The truce 
which the Party declared in 1941 raeant a rectification of this 
policy.. and it went so far as to declare in its Arabic propaganda that 
"Zionism is not -the main enenLv at this stage". 
64 
-However., even 
. 
during this short lived truce the Party continued to oppose certain 
policies of the Zionists. In particulars it severely criticised the 
persistent efforts of the Jewish Agency to organise illegal im: migra- 
tion in defiance of the ter= of the 1939 White Paper. 
65 
Likewisep 
it stood opposed to the call for the formation of a Jewish armys 
66 
and saw this-as preparation for "the conquest of the country" after 
the ending of the war. Special attention was accorded to the Hagana 
which was attacked for "persecuting anti-fascist fighters" and 
67 
pursuing "police activities" vis-a-vis the Party and its cadres. 
60. Long Live the 7th ofNovember... Ioc. cit. 
61. Musa, s Speech at Enla d Plenum, 8 January 1943. op. cit. p. 2. 
62. Kol Hqam, April 194-1. Quoted in Israeli, cm. cit* 
f Secretariat. loc. cit. 63- Ueses ol. 
64. Kidal al Shaab, N. 4v March 1943. Speech of Musa at meeting held 
in Jaffap 26 February 1943 on the anniversary of the Red Army. 
65. On the Stru: ma Incident. Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP. March 1941. 
Quoted in Assorted News. Jewish Intelligence Report. 18 March 
1942. CZA S25/7532. The Jewish immigrants on board the ship 
were characterised. as the "victims of Gestapo agents and Zionist 
contrabandists". 
66. Con=znism in Palestines 1943. FICIE. N-7. loc. cit- 
67. Kol HAAm, Febrwiry 1942. Quoted in Assorted News. Jewish 
Intelligence Reports 27 March 1942. CZA S 25/7532. 
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At the besdnning of 1943 howevers this one-sided truce was 
a1lowed to lapse. Although theParty did not succeed in winning 
the desired respectability within the Yishuv.. thic period was 
nevertheless one of increased activity and witnessed an expansion 
in -the Party' a membersUp. It had assumed in the Yishuv the 
posture of the most. wili advocate of the anti-fascist struggle, 
a fact which both allowed it to pursue its activities for the first 
tiz)e openly, and endeared it to certain sections of the Yishuv who 
were favourably predisposed towards the Soviet Union and judged the 
Party by its attemptE to pxx>mote the anti-fascist struggles remaining 
oblivious to the rest of its policies. The disocntinuation of the 
truce was largely the result of the growing "naticnal" struggle 
within the ranks of the Party itself., vhich was soon to lead to 
its final break-up. 
The new F&rty line of support for the war proved =ch more 
difficult to apply výdthin the Arab street.. With the British arvWls 
suppression of the-rebellion still fresh in their memoriess the 
Party initially baulked at calling an the Arabs to enrol'in the arur, 
but called for support of the war effort in all other possible ways. 
In its propaganda it tried to maintain a distinction between Britain 
and 'the colonial ad=inistration in Palestine, calling on the Arabs 
to struggle against the latter while "supporting the struggle of 
the British people against fascism". 
68 
Realizing that it was 
"s-odmuing agains-IC, the currem" the Party nevertheless saw its task 
as fonmdating the Arabs' consciousness "about the place of the 
national liberation movement in the anti-fascist war".. 
69 
and to 
explain to the Arab imhabitants that "this was their warin the 
first place". 
70 
In this period of relatively free activity 'the Party held 
numercus meetings at which Party leaders spoke of the necessity of 
supporting the war. To this was invariably added more general 
demands for the release of the prisoners eff the rebellions for the 
widening of democratic freedoms.. and for the legalising of the 
66. In the Co=mmi-t Ca=p: July 1941-March 1942. -op. ci . p. 
2. 
69. The Role of the Party and the Communist Youth. -op. cit. p. 
166. 
70. Theses of Secretariat. loc. cit. 
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Party. 
71 
The demands for the organisation of the Amb labour force, 
and the day-to-day economic struggle were never absent from the 
Party's literature or its public meetings. Mese were persistently 
linked to the ongoing war against fascism and the importance of 
paitaking in this struggle. 
72 
Throughout; the war years, the Party remained conscious of the 
pro-A. -de sympatbies of a large section of the Arab population.. and 
of its inability to waster "a sizgle Arab demonstration in support 
of the second front". 
73 Recognising that there was in the Arab 
street no "wide volunteeeing movement to the amy and no confidence 
74 
towards Britain"s and acco=ting for the little emlistment that did 
take place by referring it to the hard ecoro--ic conditions and 
d to educate denying it any anti-famciEt nature, the Party attempteý 
the Arab public about the i=plications of the war for their own 
independence struggle. For this reason it set up the "League For 
. 
75 
-t opening Struggle Against Nazism end Fascism in Palestine" In I wS 
statement the League called on the Arabs not to be deceived by the 
promises of the Rome-Berlin axis whose victory would. not bring forth 
the desired independence of Palestine., but would lead to its 
ensl&vement. 
76 The condition for Independence was support for the 
"united nations" whose victory was "the only guarantee for the 
success of our national struggle". The Party tried to win the 
Arabs" support for the w by explaining that "the destruction of 
fascism is the inevitable end of Zionise. 
77 It reasoned that the 
12. e. g. Meeting held in Jerusalem, 20 Februaxy 1943. The hall was &domed 
with red flags and pictures of Lenin and Stalin. At such meetings Arab 
leaders of the Party such as Musa,, Abdullah Bandak.. and Emil Habibi 
spoke. Less frequently Jewish cominunists also appeared on the platr=n- 
72. Let the Government Guarantee Bread to the People. Arabic Leaflet of 
CC/PCP, November 1942. The 'Party warned the Goverrmient that "a 
hungry people cannot pull its weight in the war effort. -- (and) 
cannot be depended upon to support the Government". 
73- Interview with Radran al, Hilou,, Jericho 23 February 1974. He further 
stated that pro-fascist elements were openly preparing lists of 
People to be liquidated in ihe expected event of a fascist victory, 
and that he himself was stabbed soon after his release from Jail 
early in 1942. 
74. The Role of the Party and the Communist Youth. loc. cit. 
75. "Usbat Mukafahat al, Nazi-ya wa al Fashiya. fi Faiastin". It brought 
out its first statement on the 12th of Novenber 1942, and held its 
first meeting in Jerusalem, 3-5th November 1942. It was headed by 
a fellow traveller, 9 the lawyer Jaafar Hashem, and its meetings 
were attended by educated Arab youth.. who though not members of the 
Party, 9 felt admiration for the prowess of the Soviet Union,, axxl 
were disenchanted with the Arab leadership. 
76. Statement to the Noble Arab People 12 November 1942. Al Tarik. 
N. 19.1942. 
77. Speech of Musa at Jaffa meeting., 26 February 1943. loc. cit. 
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Soviet Union's leadership of the anti-fascipt bloc established 
beyond all possible doubt that "the war to destroy fascism is a just 
war" and that "all reactionary movements including Zionism will be 
destroyed". 78 Addressing itself to those Arabs who doubted the 
nature of the warp the Party deduced the need for unconditional 
support for the war effort and the relegating of the struggle 
against Zicnism to the background,, by puxTorting to show the link 
between the rise of Nazism in Europe and the persecution of the Jews, 
with the intensification of Zionist immigration into Falestine29 
Consequently the destruction of fascism would automs ally lead to 
a drying-up of the sources of Jewish immigrationj and "without 
Igration there is no Zionismr. Thus in an appeal to the 
"nation. -I interests" of the Arabs which closely paxmIleled similar 
appeals x2ade to the Jewish population,. the surest way to defeat 
Zionism was declaxed to lie in steadfast support of the war "in co- 
operation with all anti-fascists". 
Yet the Party could not resolve the problem of how to deal with 
the recruitment issue amom the Arabs. Prom initial hostilityp the 
Party at a later period. criticised the absence of a positive stand 
on this problem. 
80 
The Party had been mistaken both in having 
opposed recruitment in the Jewish street as a big danger to the 
Party among the Arab co=nity., and for leaving the initiative in 
the bands of "the Washashibi agents of the regime" Vbich resulted 
only in "postponing the development of an anti-fascist consciousness 
am=g the Arabs". The decision to support recruitment had been 
taken -vihile the Pzrty' s leader-, " were in jail and without their views 
being taken into account. 
81 
On their release the Pax-ty was unable 
to come to a unanimous decission 
82 
on how to deal with the problems 
and it was left to the 00 to decide on the raost suitable course to 
follow. This pmblem eventually played its part in causiug the 
78. Sýpeech of Musa at meeting in Jerusalem attended by one thousand 
people on 6th November 1942. Nidal al Shaab N. 5/1. November 1942. 
79. 'Speech of Musa at Jaffa 26 February 1942. Ibid. 
80. Theses of Secretariat. loc. cit. 
81. Interview ". '. th Radwan al Hilous Jerichop 1 February 1974. 
82* In the Com=mist Camp 1943. op. cit. p. 2. Interviews vith 
Radwart al Hilou conceming enlarged plenum held January 1943. 
Jericho., 1 and 26 February 1974- 
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final Pe-rty split,. but in the short term, it led the Party to pursue 
an ambiguous policy of supporting recruitment in the Jewish street, * 
'while refraining from any similar calls in the Arab streetp 
restricting itself to combating fascist propaganda,, calling for 
support for the Allied effort and for the stepping-up of efforts 
in the It"ield of war production. 
The sum total of the Party's activity during the war years 
proved to be largely beneficial despite the confusions and faltexings 
exhibited at the beginning. For the first two years of the warq the 
Party found itself forced to pursue a political line which did not 
in any way follow from its previously held convictions.. and which 
isolated it within the Yishuv. It neverthelezs relig4ousely 
adhered to the Co=intem line and subordinated its poLicies to 
the immediate demands of Soviet diplomacy. Needless- to say., the 
policy of "abstentionism" pursued by the Party during this period 
did not conform with. its character and it eagerly siezed on the 
outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union to continue 
where it had left off in August 1939., the pursuit of a V.. = struggle 
against fascism. Yet as the Party's consequent self-criticism 
showed, 183 it was unable in the first few months of the German attack 
to completely ditch, its old policy of opposition to Britain and the 
Zionists, and had to wait and see how relations between Britain and 
the Soviet Union would develop. Once the Party had decided to come out in 
total support for the war and all those engaged in the struggle against 
fascisms it faithfully stuck to this policy and subordinated all other 
conflicts- to it. Thus the struggle against both Britain and the 
Zionists was suspended, although early in 1943 and shortly before 
the Party split, the policy towards the Zionists. was reversed. But 
as far as Britain was concerned and the "Democratic aims" of the war, 
there was no backtracking. The Party went so far as to criticise 
"leftist elements" within the Tishuv., who called for the establish- 
=nt of a "socialist charter" to replace the Atlantic Charter and who 
argued for the transfamation of the war into a revolutionary struggle 
to achieve the "final goals" of socialim8l+ The Party opposed 
83. Theses of Secretariat. o52. c. pp. 161-2. 
84. Ibid* p. 162. 
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this as being aimed at "splitting the United front" and declared 
that the "main goal" during the "anti-fascist war" was to unite all 
the forces willing to struggle against the Axis powers. The 
sincerity and enthusiasm of its propaganda in favour of the 
unhindered prosecution of the war did not pass the Palestine 
a&, alnistrat. ion unnoticed, and the Party was allowed to come out 
into the open and pursue its activities publicly. This in its 
turn facilitated its progress., and even in the Arab street,, where 
it was swimming against the current., enabled it to appear publicly 
for the first time and to dispel the lingering myths, both by its 
pro-Arab policies and by the presence of its Arab cadre, that the 
ccx=mi sts were just "another Jewish party". Its success among 
the Arabs was to prove to be a mixed blessing,, as it was to 
contribute largely-to the ensuing split. 
Activitv in the A----b Labour Movement 
Me T-ICP had played an important role in the fbzrmation o-IL' the 
Arab labour movement in the late 19201 s and early 19301 s. As ear2y 
as 1925 it had published "Haifall a weekly journal of labour affairs 
and agitation., while in 1926 it had succeeded in setting up the 
Ichud Move=entp the only successf ul instance of a joint Arab-, Tewish 
labour organisation thrvagýiout the years of the Mandate. In 1930 
the Party was instrumental in the holding of the First Arab Workers' 
Congress in Haifa, and itas Arab cadres played a prominent role in its 
proceedings. It remained active in the following years until the 
General Strike and the rebellion of 1936 brought all trade union 
activity to an ends, and the class struggle, by necessity gave WkY to 
the uational struggle for independence. The Arab trade union move- 
zent as a whole.. which was centred on Haifa and had slowly started 
to spread all over Palestine., was faced with an i=aenselY difficult 
task. In the Arab street there was no working class as such and 
the majority of the population was rooted in a peasant economv 
vhere wage earning in the cities was more often than not regarded 
as subsidiary to agricultare. With the prolongation of the 
rebellion, the labour movement which had alreaay succeeded in making 
some heaAway and had esta: blished itself in'the-oountry's few urban 
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centres., began to contract and was eventually reduced to the original 
stronghold of the movement in Haifa. Even there, however,, the 
movement was dormant and eocisted in nxim, only. 
The outbreak of. the Second World War and -the severance of 
Palestine from the metropolis and from the other parts of the Empire 
had an immediate effect on the country. It boosted industrial 
development and created new places of emp ployment in the a-x-j7 viork 
camps vhich were set up to meet the needs of the British army, cut-.. 
off from its base in England# in addition to meeting the needs of 
Palestine's civilian population. In the Arab street, the effects 
of this were easily observable in the swelling ranks of Arab labour. 
By the middle of 1941, the Crovermaent and the British army had become 
the largest employers of Arab labo= in the country. 
85 
Previous 
to this, the opportunities had been very limited. Jewish employers 
refused to emplpy Arab labour on political grounds86 and there were 
no industrialundertakings, in the Arab sector capable of employing 
large numbers of workers. The F-mall, Arab working class was 
distributed among a number of occupations., the most important of 
which were the railw ays the port s of J aff a and Haifa., the building 
industry%- the Government public works department, the international 
oil companies and, until the outbreak of the war,, they bad also 
found seasonal anployment in the citrus industry. Arab wages were 
extremely law, and oompared unfavourably with Jewish labour, 
87 
and 
in the complete absence of trade union organisation 
88 
Arab workers 
were at the mercy of their employers. 
89 
85. C. 0.733/443/75430/2. Survey of Labour in Palestine: Report by 
R- M- Gravest Jim 194-1. P. 3- 
86. There were a few exceptions; to this such as the Palestine Electric 
Corporation and the Palestine Potash Company. 
67- The ratio between Arab and Jewish vorkers wagew was in Pmportion 
of 5: 3- An unskilled Arab labourer received from 60-160 mills a 
day., while a skilled Arab labourer received a maximum of 350 mills 
a day. See SurveY of Labour in Palestine., 1941. OP- Cit- P- 7- 
88. 
ýIbid. 
p. 9. The PAWS claimed in June 1940 a membership of 700 
workers., but not all of those were fully paid-up members. 
89- F. 0-373/39988/2768. Hankey in a memo dated 29 Rovenber 1941+, 
commenting on a draft paper on Arab nationalism by Professor Gibb 
had this to say an the conditions of-vyorkers in the Middle East. 
"... the untrammelled and outrageous exploitation of the workers 
by the capitalists throughout the Middle East area makes anyone 
from Europe astonished that the v6hole worldng class is not 
commmist, or at least actively revolutionary.. " 
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The initiative to reactivate the labour movement carue from the 
PC?. At the same time the Palestine Govemment adopted a policy of 
foster-ing the development of "responsible traAe unionism" among the 
Arabs. In September 1940 a labour adviser to the Government was 
appointed. 
90 
and in July 1942 a Department of Labour officially came 
into existence.. 
91 
composed of a director and three labour inspectors 
to oover Jerusalem., the northem region and the southern region 
respectively. The mere. existence of the labour department was 
seen as a go-ahead sign by the elements in the Arab street who were 
in favour of" creating a strong labour movement, and undoubtedly, by 
seezing to afford Government sanction for such an enter7wise, helped 
make it more acceptable to those ele nts vho rere hesitant. 
Mv%_ Ty"'O I 
The RIE s attempts to breathe life into the existing franzwork 
of the 2abour movement were assisted by a number of factors. The 
war itself had led to the creation of favourable oonditions. 
Coinciding with the Soviet entry into the -vvax -the Party., for the 
f irst time, enjoyed increasing Gover=ent toleration., while the 
the milita-ry camps led to the creation of a new kind setting-up off 
of Arab worker dependent an wages for his family's livelihoodo 
92 
and 
t Uo the concentration of large numbers of workers in a single 
establishment- To this must be added the support extended by the 
labour departmen"41; for the setting-up of new trade unions, and the 
ever present exa=Ie of the organised Jewish workers and the success 
of the Histadrut. The setting-up of cultural clubs in the Arab 
street., giving expression to the political and cultural fermentation 
among Amb youth during the war and the rebellion against their 
traAitional leaders., was to contr-lbute directly to the increasing 
enthusiasm f or organisation aunong the Arab workers, and a number of 
future leadere of the Arab labour movement were to come from within 
the ranks ce. these societies. 
The ner interest shown by the Party in the Arab labour mOvemeAt 
signified an imporr-tant shift from its previous trade union policy. 
go. C. O. 73YI+23/75)+30. R. Graves vho was previously Director of the 
Labour Office in Egypt. 
91. Graves became the Director of the Department which began its 
regular work in October 191+2. See Department of Labour Annual 
Report, 1942. P. 5. 
92. Ibid. The report estimated the number of Arab workers in 1942 
as between 85.. 000-100#000. 
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It had until then, concentrated on c&rrying out its activity within 
the Histadrut,, although with demonstrably no measure of success. 
Despite-its expulsion fr= the organisation early in the twentiess, 
it persisted in fielding front organisations within the Histadrut, 
and continued to call for its transformation into a truly professional 
body uniting within its ranks both Jewish and Arab workers. The 
obvious failure of this tactic and the growth of the Party Is Arab 
cadre as a result of its pro-Arab nationalist line during the 
rebellion, 2ed it to re-orientate its policy and work for the 
formation of purely Arab trade unions, an enterprise made that =wh 
more realistic by -Lhe large increase in Arab workers as a result 
of the war conditions. 
The Party's attitude to Labour organisation within the Arab 
street was similar to its previous policy towards the Histadrut. 
It did not aim to create separate comm=ist labour organisationsI, 
but preferred to penetrate the existing Arab trade union structures 
and work within them-93 In 1942 three labour societies were set up 
in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Nazareth, the leading positions in all of 
which were held by Party members. 
94- 
The Government noted that the 
Arab labour novement exhibited a "steady progress" during that 
ye -5 and estimated the number of organised Arab workers to be 
in the region of nine thousand. 
96 
While the Party was pursuing its policy of working within the 
framework of thePalestine Arab Workers' Society., a group within 
the Party was arguing for carrying out an independent line. It 
opposed co-operation with the Haifa-based trade union and advocated 
the setting up of a separate trade union organisation. The 
dif"ferences of tl, -is Haifa-based opposition group went -well beyond 
the question of independent trade union organisation. Its moving 
93- W. 0.169/83n. Communi= in Palestine: January-June 1943. PICNE 
24 August 1943. Interviews with Said Kabalan.. Jer: Lcbo.. 2nd 
YArch 1974, and Fahmi 06-alfiti,, Aman 26 March 1974. 
50 Surve, 4. j of Arab Commmic-ts. Jewish Intelligence Reportj* 15 MaY 
1946. CZA, S25/48- The Arab workers Society in Jaffa was 
estabUshed 2 October 1942; in Jerusalem, October 1942, and 
in Nazareth November 1942. 
95. A SurvSy of Palestinee (Jerusalem, 1946) Vol. 2. p. 764. 
96. Departiw-nt of Labour., Annual Report 1942. op. cit. pp. 27-28. 
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97 
-1 the CC who.. with a number arpirit was Boulous Farbh an ex-member o. 
of ad rents set up a cultural club called the "Rays of Hope" in 
October 1942.98 As a result of discussions which took place in 
the club's "co=nittee for labour affair-s", it was resolved to 
establish a trade union movement affiliated to the club. The 
ostensible reason for this was dissatisfaction with what was termed 
the "emservative policy" of the PAVZ and its preoccupation with 
the setting-up of co-opemtive societies and modelling itself an 
the Histadrut, vh-4le neglecting the organization of Arab workers in 
99 the new industrial undertakings. Thus,, in November 1942 the 
"Federation of Arva-b Trade Unions and Lebour Societies" carae into 
existeme,, 
100 
comprising in addition to individual members, the Arab 
Workers' &ý Society in Nazareth., the Arab workers' trade unions of the 
Conwlidated Re', OUeries, the Iraqi Petroleum Companyt Shell Company, 
the Public Works DepartLvnt arxl the Naval worksbops in Haifa. 
101 
This activity was met with hostile resentment fx the Party,, which 
continued to call on Arab workers to enrol in the Hai a based PAWS 
102 
97- Boulo-as Farah, an ex-railway worlaer-vho had taken part in the First 
Arab Woelcers' Congress in 1930. In 1934 he travelled to Moscow 
to the Comintern school where he stayed ti3-1 1938. On his 
return he was appointed to the CC of the Party but came into 
conflict with Musa. In 1940 he was accused of attempting to lead 
the police to the Party' s secret printing press whereupon he was 
expelled and Party members were forbidden to associate with him. 
Nevertheless.. he gethered round him a group of educated youth in 
Haifa who continued to identify him with the Party. He played 
an i=ortant role in bringing about the Party split in 1943 and 
was instrumental in creating the NM. During the forties he 
played a prominent role in the Arab labour movement. In 1948 
he opposed partition and was expelled frcm the NIL. 
98. Survey of Arab Conamni. F-ts., 1946. op. cit. p. 2. Nadi Shlea al Amal 
described itself as "anti-fascist" and called for greater demcracy 
in the country and the organisation of Amb workem. Among its 
members were two future leaders of the]NML, Emil Tuma and Toufic 
Tcrabi. It ceased to exiet soon after the formation of the FALT. 
109. Notes cn the Federation of Arab Trade Unions., by Y. Chudleigh 
(Inspector of Labour), q 15 -Tu1Y 1943. ISA- 33/42-258- 100. Ittihad Nakabatwa Jamiyat al Umal al, Arabiya. (FALT). 
101. Memo submitted 1w the Federation to the Wapes Corclittee in 
Je--usalem. (Haifa., 1942ý-. p. 2-3. (Arabic pamphle-t7-. 
102. Interview with E. Tuma, (a leader of the FALT at the time) Haifa, 
3 April 1974- See also,, Survey of Arab Cocnunists.. 1946. loc-cit. 
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and condenned what it termed the "splitting activity" of the Haifa 
group. Yet this seeming division of efforts by the Party and 
its supporters introduced an element of healthy competition into 
-the labour movement, in the shape of a drive for increased membership 
and a detex=Ination to appear as the more sincere representative of 
the Arab workers' interests. 
103 
Ear2y in 1943s after a gap of twelve years. 9 the isecond General 
Conference of Arab Workers was held. Forty delegates met, In Jaffa 
an the 22nd. of January., representing three main labour societies 
in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem and a host of smaller groups. 
104 
Among 
the mnin speakers a large number were Party members, some of -%hom had 
been active in the labour movement as far back- as the time of the 
First Amb Workers' Congress. It was due to their efforts that 
the conference took place at all and it was their speecbes -which 
set the tone to thzt resolutierts -which were later adopted by the 
delegates. Also present was the secretary of the "Peoples Club" 
in Haifa 
105 
a front organisation of the Party,, who-attended. as an 
observer, while the rival Federation was conspicuous by its absence. 
The discussions of the conference centred on the demands for 
equalising the wages of Arab and Jewish vorkersq the necessity of 
establishing Government ezployment exchanges., the organisation of 
Arab labour, and the demarg-I for the ins"Utution of a Goverment social 
insarance scheme. At the same time a resolution was passed condemning 
the separatist movement of the Federation, calling on it to Join the 
society and protesting against the recommendations it had forwarded 
to the Wages Ccumaittee regarding the establisbment of a fixed wage 
103- The Histadrut also fielded an Arab labour organisationi. The 
Palestine Labour League. A Labour Depaitment report credited 
it with 1,500 members. See Department of Labour Annual Report 
1942.22; 
- cit. p. 
27. 
104- 16--mo by A. Yassin (Labour Department) 25 January 1943# on First 
PAWS Conference held in Jaffaj 22 January. ISA 1440. A report 
by ChuMeigh, Progress of the Palestine Arab Trade Union Move- 
ment,, during 1943j, dated 13 September 1943 gave the following 
menbership figures: Haifa., 4., 000; Jaffa., 1,, 700; Jerusalem 
19234. 
105. Nadi al Siaab was organised by Said Kabalan and Emil Habibi., 
two of Musal s supporters in the struggle against the Haifa 
group of B. Farahj, in October 191+2. It was taken over by 
the latter's group in ilay 1943 when the Party wasundergoing 
a process of dissolution. 
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for unskilled labour. 
106 Soon. afters a Third Arab Workers' 
Conference was held. Thies a,. rnnob larger affairs, was beld In July 
1943- Three hundred delegates attended the meeting in Haifa 
claiming to represent thirty thousand workers. 
107 Againg the main 
speeches were delivered by Party nembers, 
108 
and resolutions were 
passed calling for a periodic fixing of a minimum wage, for the 
equalising of the wages of Arab and Jewish workers- in the military 
camps and calling on the Govenument to grant the ROS a permit to 
publish a labour Journal. 
109 
This sam period saw the convening of a third labour meeting 
which was to be of much greater iniport. The First Congress of Arab 
Workers !m the Military C=ps was held on the 4th April 191+3 and was 
attended kv over & himdred participants. Thn- Iforty-four delegates 
who took part in the meeting claimed to represent toventy-eight 
thousand oi: e. of a total of forty-five thousand Arab workers employed 
in the campse 
3.10 
fimong the main speakers at the congress., seven 
were Paxty me=bers. A. Banclak delivered. the key speech which was 
met by unanimous approval and his demands were reiterated by nearly 
every other speaker. The conummist speakers emphesised that the 
Amb workers in the camps were the "backbone of the war effort which 
win destroy fascisW'lll and declared the Arab vorkers' complete 
_wupport 
for the war against fascim They-attacked the Histadrut 
and described. its attempts to organise Arab workers as divisive 
3.12 
-while at the-same time declaring-themselves in favour of joint activity 
106. In its memo sul=itted to the Wages Committee in November 1942, 
the FAM had asked for the fixing of a mini: mnn wage for unskilled 
Arab labour of 250 mills a day. See Memo of Federation. op. ci 
P. 10-110 
107. Falastin,, 26 July 1943. 
108. The most active members were Abdullah Bandak, Khalil Shenlair., 
and Rhaled Zaagmouri. Barxis ,a Party mmber since 1933 was 
active in the student movement during the War years and in 
pablisb. ing- He was later to play an important role in the 
FM and in the LAI. The other two, both workers, were active 
in the Party since the mid-thirties. 
3.09. Al Dif , 26 july 1943. 
3-10. Conference oil Arab Workers 
-in 
the Milita3Zy Camps.. Jaffa, 4 April 
1943. (Arabic p _* let) P. 15- 
111. N-4dal al Shaab, N. 5/26. April 1943. Special issue on the First 
Conference of Civilian Arab Workers in the Militaxy Camps. 
Speech of D. Turajman. P. 3- 
112. Ibid. p. 4. Speech of Emil Habibi. 
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with "honest Jewish woricers" -and the settlngý-up of joint 000mittees 
of Arab and Jewish workers In the camps in the pursual, of the 
workers' comnon interests. The conference's resolutions med the 
,y call 
for the equalisation of wages in the camps and a customar 
host of other economic demands. More importantlyq the conference 
ca, lled on the Government, to grant permission for the re-publication 
n3 
of Al Ghad as an organ of the labour movemento vwtAle in a direct 
rebuff to the activities of the Haifa-based F11T and the 11, stradrut, 
urged a3_1 Arab workers to join the ranl--, -. of the PATtS,, and declared 
that the latter waz "the only one entitled to represent the workers 
in the camps and to negotiate on their behalf". 
114 Events were 
soon to show that this claim was well f ounde(L A strike declared 
by the Histadrut in the =11itary camps in May 1943 was opposed 
by the PAWS 115 and in the event,, the Arab workers obeyed the PAWS's 
116 
cF,. l end stkyed at work. 
Si=iltaneou--Iy,, the Federation was also enjoying rapid success 
in its efforts to organise Arab workers. Its membership figures saw 
a constant e. sepll7 ard t succeeded in getting trade union 
reoognition, where other trade unions had previously failed. 
118 The 
Federation claimed that it was only interested in non-unionised Arab 
labour and declared.. in a move to placate the rival PAVVS# that it 
would not interfere in areas already covered by the latter organisationn9 
113- Al Ghad (The Morrvw) was first brought out in 1938 as the organ 
of the Arab 'Students' League, by Abdullah Bandak; and ceased 
publication in 1941. It was open to all shades of opinion and 
many of the future leaders of the NLL served their apprenticeship 
on its pages. lhben it was repifolished in 1945,, itwas as the 
organ of the League of Arab Intellectuals. 
3-14. Minutes of Decisions of Congress held in Jaffa. 9 4 April 1943 by Civilian Arab Workers in the Military Camps. Memo in English 
submitted by the PAWS to the Labour Department, 20 April 1943. 
115- Leaflet of CC of Arab Workers in the Camps. 9 and of Jaffa AWS 
quoted in memo of A. Yassin,, 9 May 1943,, "The ATwS ard non- 
participation in the Strike declared by the Histadrut". ISA 11+40. 
116. F--0-372/35030/'1922. War Office Report,, Mky 1943. 
117. A Government source gave the figure of 1,600 paid-up members in 
1942. See Department of Labour Annual Report, 1942. op. cit. 
p. 28. In 1943, the YALT claimed a membership of 2v300. See 
Progress of Palestine Arab Trade Union Movement during 1943. - 
op. ci . p. 2. A Government labour inspector estimated that it 
spoke for 4POOO-5,9000, workers. See Notes on the Federation of 
Arab Trade Unions, by Y. Chudleigýap 15 JulY 1943- ISA I/31/42-258-p. 2. 
118. Notes on the Federation. loc. cit. 
119. Ibid. 
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Despite the fact that the two org&nisations reached an agreement not 
to poach on each other's territory, 
120 the agreement pxvved to be 
shortlived and broke down as a result of the PAMS's attempts to win 
over some of the Federation's mmbers. 
121 The PAWS continued to 
resent the activity of the Federation and aimed at absorbing the 
latter's members within its own ranks., while the Federation's 
decla. red aim continued to be that of confederation between the two 
bodiess a scheme which remained unacceptable to the FAVZ. 
122 
While sharing with the PAWS, the general economic demands put 
forward, such as trade union. recognition, the setting-up of Government 
sponsored 1; ýbozx exchanges, the equalising of Arab and Jewish wages, 
the impmvement of wages and working conditions in the campst and 
public support for the war effort including the discouragement of 
122 
strikes.. J the Federation went further in directing its attention 
to uphleres vh=h it deemed to be of fundamental importance 'to the life 
of the Arab workers. It thus called on the Government to revoke the' 
"s forbidding strikes., to institute a social Insurance scheme for 
the workers., to institute collective bargaining between workers and 
employers,, to set up construction projects to absorb the workers who 
would become unemployed as a result of the termination of the war and 
the closure cf the zilitar7 camps., ancl to help Arab workers to ret. == 
to agr#u3. t=e by subsidising small fa rs. 
124 The Federation 
combined within itself the functions of trade union and political 
movement, a political dimension ahich was totally absent from the 
It nr_ 
activity of the PAWS. '"*ý Although described by a sympathetic official 
120. Progress of Palesltine Arab Trade Union. -ýep. cit- P- 3- 
121. Ibid. The PAWS succeeded in winning over the Nazareth AWS ear: ýy 
in " 943. 
122. 'Notes an the Federation. loc. cit. 
123. Ibid. and Memo of Federation. op. ci . p. 20. 
124. Memo of the Federation of Arab Trade Unions to the Chief Secretary 
September 1943. ISA 65/1574- 
125. Although the PAWS did not engage in political activitiesp Party 
members who were active in the labour movement siezed every 
suit-able occasion to call for support for the war effort. e. g. 
Odeh al Ashab (a Party member) addressing a First of May meeting 
in Jaffa, 1943 admonished thevorkers that "the first duty of 
la-ab workers is to struggle against Nazism". His speech was 
full of pro-Soviet propagandas but there was no mention of 
Independence for Palestine.. while socialism was prescribed as 
the cure-all for every existing problem in an indefinite 
future. See Speeches of Odeh al Ashahb,, ISA 65/3048. 
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i.. I 
26 
of the labour department as "Politically swialifst"Ol the 
Federation chose to identify itself with the demands of the Arab 
national wvement as put forward at the outbreak of the 1936 
General Strike, and called for self-determination as "a basic 
right of all peoples... as guaranteed by all democratic countries".. 
127 
1140 blamed the British Goven for allowing Zionist immigration 
into the country and called for the imposition of an effective ban 
on immigration and on land sales., linking the Govermment's struggle 
against fascism with the necessity of combating the danger of the 
possible establisbment of "a Zionist majority in an Arab country". 
While declaring its support for the 15'39 White Paper,, the Federation 
demanded the institution of more far-reaching steps. It warned the 
Government that only by implementing the demands of the Are-b national 
movement during 'the war itself.. would support for the anti-fascist 
struggle wd the democra ies be preserved. 
128 Irt further called 
for the immediate removal of political censorship, for provisions 
guaranteeing freedom cC thought, publication and orgaa isation, for 
with vithdrawal o. f police supervision of the Arab labour movement.. 
for the institution of compulsory education.. for raising-the level 
of the health services# and for the establishment off a truly 
democratic regime in the cowntry by "enabling the public to 
partake in solving all problems affecting its irnediate life". 
129 
The Party's efforts to re-activate the Arab labour movement 
proved a resounding success. Helped by the conditions prevailing 
at that time in Palestine, condi- -',, ions which had not existed in the 
1930's when the first s=h attempt had been made, the Arab labour 
movement grew to sizeable proportions and came to command a wide 
following in the years preceeding the texmination of the Maudate- 
The involvement in the Arab labour movement was to absorb all the 
Party's energies in the Arab sector in the years following the 
terTdnation of the rebellion and signifiedl parallel to its Involve- 
nent in the rebellion., a further shift towards identifying itself 
126. Rotes on the Federation. loc. cit. 
127. Ifew of Federation of Arab Trade Unions to Mr. Boya (an official 
of the Middle East Section of the CO vho was on a visit to 
Palestine) 9 July 1943. p. 1. ISA 65/348- 
128. Ibid. 
129. Ibid. P. 2. 
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with the problems of the Arab population and support for' its 
aspirations. It further strengthened the Party in the Arab 
street., and attracted to its ranks a new kind of membership from 
witi. in the ranks of the Krab intelligentsia. These were 
disillusioned with the traditional leaders and. were dravvn,, not 
so ==h by the Party' s advocacy of commmism,, but by its support 
for the Amb indeperdence strugglep its modemity and methods o.. 
organisation, and not least, az a result or an ill-defined 
identification of the Party with the Soviet Union whose growing 
prowess in the war was attracting a number oll. enthusiastic admirers 
a ng the educated youth. This increasing strength in the Arab 
street was to give rise to two intemal problems, the first vis-a-vis 
the Jewish members of the Party,, and the second conceming a 
growing "national opposition" to the policies of the leadership 
from a=ngst the new Arab memberridp, and even from some of the old 
cad. res, which tended to appear as a conflict based on an intellectual 
versus worker basis. Both these problems were to prove important 
factors in the break 4 of the Pafty which was to soon take place. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TME NATICNAL =T IN M C01=ST MMIM 
The dissolution of the. multi-national PCP in 1943 foreshadowed 
the coming partition of the country. Already, with the turning of 
the tide and the ascending fortunes of the Alliesj, the future of 
Palestine following the te=ination of the war was becoming a matter 
of continuous and consuming discussion within the Yishuv. The ]Party 
could not escape from the national divisions obtaining in the countryp 
and its inability to satisfactorily resolve the national conflict 
reflected itself in the resurgence of national antagonian within 
the confines of the Paxty itself,, witness to the reality that the 
resolution of the issues first raised by the Jewish Section auring 
the Arab rebellion had not been adequately resolved. Simultaneously 
the Party soon bece aware that, in addition to the existence of 
opposition from a section of the Jewish cadre to the pol. 4&cies 
pursued. by the leadershipp there had arisen a parallel but conflicting 
ppositionwhich attempted to steer the Party in the framework Arab q- 
the Arab national movement. The split which took place in the 
zu=er of 1943 was to prove the only workable outcome of the sole 
experizuent of Arab-Jewish co-operation in Mandate Palestinep and 
signified the failure of the co=mnist movenxmts despite its 
&&erence to an "internationalist ideology" to cope with and surmount 
the national antagonism of Arabs ena -Tews. 
Dissension Within the Party 
The Parity' s role in the Arab rebellion, and its positive evaluation 
of the Arab national movement., continued to rankle with the Jewish 
cadres of the Party, , Aho persisted in their demands for a full and 
critical review of its policies during that period. The Party's 
atte=ts to escape contamine ion by the national conflict through 
the setting-up of the Jewish. Section during the rebellion itselfj, 
had proved counter-productive. Even as a short-term solution aimed 
at zaintain'='g the -unity of the Party, it proved a charade. The 
pursuit of two different political lines resulted in L closer 
identification of the Jewish "Section with the struggles and 
aspirations of the Jmi--h community., and its inability to reconcile 
itself to the pro-Amb nationalist policies of the Party leadership 
when the two sections came togetber again at the end cf the rebellion. 
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The end result was the dissolution of the Jewish Section and the 
expulsion of its leaders from the Party. The Emet faction set up 
by the ex-members of the Section had pursued a policy based on the 
recognition of differences within the Zionist camp and attempted to 
form a working alliance with what was termed "the progressive element-S 
witinin Zionism". The zignific&=e of this development cannot be 
minimised. For ihe f,, r. st time since the admission of the PCP to 
the ranks of the Comintern,, and the move towards involvemn-'40 with 
the Amb national movement in the 1930's in recognition of its 
paramount role in the anti-Brit-lbsh struggle in the country, a group 
of Jewish com=a!. --ts cam to recogni-: e that the Jews as well as 
the Arabs, had "legitimate national interests" in Palestine. 
In June 1942j. the Emet group dissolved itself and returned to 
the ranks of the Party. 
1 This reunification however did not imply 
any retraction af the previously held political line of the group. 
Rather.. it was the result of t: he recognition of a common aim: the 
struggle for victory in the anti-fascist war in support of the 
Soviet Union. This did not imply agreement with the Party's izxte=. al 
policies regarding the national conflict or acceptance of the group's 
criticims by the Party leadership. It brought with it the seeds 
of the future split and innumerable disagreementso and introduced 
into theParty new members who did not subscribe to the previously 
held positions of the Party, but iiho had entered the ranks of the 
Fmet group when it was functioning as an independent organisation, 
and who were soon to find themselves strangers in the Party's ranks. 
-The political attitudes of the ex-Section's members and their 
demand for the pursuit of "Yishuv-orientated" policies were soon to 
become generalised among the Jewish membership of the Party. The 
leadership was criticised for the past support it-had extended to 
the Mufti and for blindly accepting the leadership of the Arab 
nationalists In the anti-British struggle. At the same time,, the 
1. In the Communi--t Camp, 1943. Jewish Intelligence Report. p. 1. 
CZA S 25/7533. 
* 
Musa, the Party Secretary was not very enthu-dastic 
about the Munification of the Party,,. fear-ing rightly as events 
were to demonstrate,, that the Emet members political line would 
"infect" other Jewish members of the Party. He was however# 
unable to stand in opposition to the demand for reunification. 
Interview vrith Radwan al Hilou. Jericho, 1 February 1971+- See 
also., Y. Porath. The National Liberation League 191+3-48. Asi 
and African Studies. Volume 4.1968. P- 3- 
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demand was raised for the revision of the Party's attitude towards 
the Tishuv. There was talk of the need to recognise that the 
concentratiim of Jews in Palestine had created the beginnings of a 
distinctly "Jewish nationality" in the country, and that the Party 
should reoogniEe the Yirhuv as a "national group". The Party 
should no longer view the Jews in Palestine as an "undifferentiated 
inass" and press for their democratic, religiouz and social rights 
as individualsq but should regard them as constituting a "nation in 
being" and -consequently approach the conflict of Arab and Jew in an 
altogether different. inanner. 
2 The implications of this new 
departure fro the or-thodox line held by the Party since 1924., were 
far-rreaching,, Emd reflected themselves in the call for the 
continuation of the popular front policy within the Yishuv,, and with 
the drapping of the slogan of "Arab independence" in Palestine. 
3 
The Jemlshý opposition exgued that the Party' 6 slogans had to adapt 
themselves to the realities of the situation in the country. 
Palestine was no longer a purely Arab country: the size of the 
Jewish mdnority had greatly increased since the Party's Arabisation 
!n 1930 vinen it had embarked on the path of support for the Areb 
national navement's struggle for independence. The existence of a 
laxge and differentiated Jewish idnority in -the country thus made it 
im-nerative to recogniee 'that the old slogan of an "independent Arab 
Palestine" was no longer correct. Even the alternative slogan of a 
"democratic Palestine" was deemed to be insufficient as it denied 
any national recogaiticm to the Jewish masses in the oountry. 
The Party leaaemhip stooa t-ot&Uy opposea to v&at it regardea as 
2. It was only after the split that these demands were reflected in 
the written materials of the Jewish PCP. According to Fahmi. 
Se-Ifiti (Interview., Amman., 26 March 1974) they were prvviously 
debated between. the Arab and Jewish members of the CC. 
3- This was not reflected in the party's literaturep but remained 
confirked to internal discussions. According to 'Emil T=a 
(Intervierg Haifas, 3 April 1974) Mikuniz was in the forefront of 
the opposition to Musal s leadership and was in favour of the 
slogan of "democratic Palestine" and insisting that areas of 
Jewish concentration should be able to excerrise self-government- 
"See also, Assorted News. Jewish Intelligence Report, 24 February 
1100142. CZA S 25/48. 
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a "Jewish national deviation" within the ranks of the Jewish 
commmists. 
4 Yet the appearance of this "deviation" was itself 
a necessary consequence of the leadership's policies in the period 
following the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union. In its attempts 
to invoke-support for the war within the Jewish communityp the 
]Party had resorted to appeals to "Jewish national consciousness". 
Ta)dmg its cue from the formation of the "Jewish anti-fascist 
Committee" in the Soviet Union,, the Partys departing from its 
prýviously held policy vis-a-vis the Zionist organisations within 
the Yishuv., c alled for the formation of a popular front to pursue 
the common aim of struggle against Nazism. To this effect, the 
opposition prcfessed to perceive a distinct differentiation within 
the Zionist camps and echoing the Jewish Section's analy. -Az which 
had contributed to the latter's expulsion fr= the ranks of the 
'Purty a short period before, opined to see "progressive-and 
reactionary wings" within Zionisr. It was now not only possible, 
but necessary to fo= a front with the "progressive groups within 
Zionise in support of the war. 05 To this end, the Party showed 
itself ready to drop the dem-qnd for "independence" declaring that 
6 
the immediate task was to achieve victory, after miiich the world 
would necessarily be remodelled in a new and democratic fashion. 
The Party for the first time,, formulated a theory of "stages" 
and refused to pose final goalss as the aims of the immediate struggle. 
The -only slogan that it was reaky to raise was "all efforts for 
victorv in the war". 
7 Implicitly this was seen as sufficient 
guarantee to solve Palestine's problems,, but the Party remained 
deliberately vague on how the problem was to be resolved in practice. 
The-4pportance the Party set on the establishment of a popular front 
4. 'In the period preceding the split the Secretariat was made up Of 
four Jewish members, S. Mikunis., S. Tzabarip M. Slonismp P- 
Feinhaus2 and one Arab., Radwan al Hiloup the Party Secretary. 
The CC had a larger proportion of Arabs. Decision-m-king. 9 
however, was in the hands of Musa himself. Thus opposition U) 
the leadership implied opposition to Musa and his supporters 
(both Jews and Arabs) and not to the Party leadership as a whole. 
5- Theses of Secretariat. loc. cit. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. p. 162. 
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within the v&4-sl=v can be deduced from the fact that it rejected any 
repetition of the "two path" strategy adopted during the rebellion. 
It was seen to be necessary to carry out the se struggle in both 
Arab and Jewish streets irrespective of their particular conditions. 
Yet when this policy was translated into practice, especially as 
regar&s the problem of recruitment to the army and the stand the 
Party should adopt to this in both the Jewish and Arab streets,, it 
found it imr>ossible to maintain the line laid doym in its own 
fonmalations Rather it pursued a contradictory policy which, 
thmigh it was more in accordance with the realities of the situation., 
provided the Jewish me=bers of the Party with added grievance against 
tlx leadership. 
Prior to the attack an the Soviet Union, the Party had opposed 
recruitment to the British army among both Jews and Arabs. The 
atUzk on the Soviet Union had altered the picture. The Party now 
wholeheartedly came out in favour of recruitment and declared that 
it was no longer possible to call for recruitment while at the same 
time struggling agednst Zionist calls for m6bilisation, as the Party 
had continuedl to do for a few months after June 1941. Under the 
conditions of the anti-fascist war, mobilisation it was declared.. 
had a positive aspect irrespective Of the political differences 
separating, the co=rnmists from the Zionist parties. 
8 
Likewise 
the Party relfuted charges that its support for recruitment would 
make its position in the Arab street untenable. 
9 Yet it was aware 
that the majority of the Arab public sympathised vith the Axis and 
that it was not possible to carry out open propaganda in favour of. 
the war or of recruitment and still ho-De to maintain support within 
the Arab street. The problem was resolved by deciding to transfer 
t1je centre of Parlty activity skmong the Arabs to reviving the dorwant 
labour organisations, and to present the question of recruitment from 
within them, through the influence of the commmist cadres on the 
rest of the members. 
10 
8. Theses of Secretariat. loc. cit. p. 3.61. 
9. In ar. Interview with Radivan al Hilout Jericho, 16 February 1974" 
he stated that the decision to support recruitment in the Amb 
": treet, was taken while he was in jail and that he was not 
consulted. The leadership of the Party was then in the hands 
of P. Feinhaus and K. Shannir. 
3.0. The Role of the Party and the Communist Youth. op. cit- P- 51- 
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This political line was not to be pursued by the Party for long. 
In an enlarged plenum held in January 1943., Musa the Party Secretary, 
cam out for a revision of the previous tactics of the Party. 
11 
He argued that it was necessary to change the Party's line both 
vis-a-vis the British Government and the Zionist movement. The 
truce which the Party had declared had not led to any positive 
response fr= either, and it was necessar7, - to renew the struggle 
against the British administration on the one handq and to teminate 
the attempted collaboration with the Zionists on the other. He 
put forward two proposals for the practical implementation of this 
line, first, to drop the propaganda in favour of recruitment in the 
Arab streets and second., to disband the Proletarian Faction, the 
Party's trade union group withim the Jewish labour movement. This 
led to a storm, of opposition fram the majority of the Jewish cadres 
especially from among the members of the Faction and a-rnV recruits, 
and even some of the Arab members. 
12 The Jewish members had hopped 
for a fu: -ther strengthening of the popular front within the Yishuv 
and had a-rgued in the plenum in favour of arming the inhabitants 
of Pa2estine in preparation for & possible Nazi occupation. 
13 At 
the same time voices were raised in favour of the Jewish Brigadel s 
demand to have its ovwn flag,, and for dropping the Party's propaganda 
against I=Jgration, arguing that the firstwould increase enthusias: m 
for the war, v. =le the issue of immigration had become outdated.. 
holding, falsely as events vere to Ehow, that i=igmtion would dry 
up after the end of the war and the creation of the hoped-for new 
world order. 
14 Musa insisted in his response that the propaganda 
for recruitment in the Arab street should be halted and pointed out 
that Arab me ries were still fresh with British axmy activity in 
suppressing the rebellion, that the most the Party could call for in 
the ciromstair-es was general support for the war effort. It could 
11. Musa's speech,, PoUtical and Organisational Tasks of the Party in 
the Present Time. Reproduced in The Communist Canp 1943. citp. 2-3- 2R =- t 
12. The opposition of the Arab members was more in the nature of a 
personal opposition to Musa himself and an effort to weaken his 
position rather than a principled disagreement with his political 
line, as will become clear when discussing the Arab opposition. 
13- Interview with Radwan al Hilou. Jericho, 16 February 1974. 
14- Interviews with Mufid Nashashibi, Beirut,, 11 March 1974; Said 
Kabalan., Jericho, 2 March 1974; Radwan al Hilou,, Jericho,, 16 
February 1974, all of whom attended the January Plenum. 
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not hope to augment its position among the Arabs by calling on them 
to join the sa ax3; y v&ich until recently they had been up in arm 
against. He also rejected the demand for supporting the 
distribution of arms as playing into the hands of the Zionists who 
alone had an organisationp the Haganaj, oapable of utilising these 
arms. The end result would be the arming of the Zionistsq while 
the Party's policy was aimed at avoiding any future. bloodshed and 
the disarming of the population to ensure that such an eventuality 
would not arise. Muna, further attacked both the Histradrut and 
the Zionist leadership for their attempts "to isolate the Yishuv 
from the anti-fascist movementllv15 denounced the Biltmore Progr-am.. 
end called for the abolition of ' the porular front in -Lhe Jewish 
Street. S 
The division of opinion in the Plenum was such, however., that 
it was not possible to reach a decision end, to avoid a splitj, the 
participants decided to refer the matter to the CC and allow it to 
act as it saw fit. ' This decision suited Rusaj, and his 
recomwndations soon became the Party's new political line. 
16 The 
Proletax-ian Faction was dissolved., 
17 the recruitment c"paign in the 
Arab Street was toned downp and the Party resumed its attacks an the 
Zionist movement and the leadership of the Yishu7. As far as the 
Jewish nembers of the Party were concemed, the issue had not been 
satisfactorily resolved and they objected to this imposition of the 
Party Isecretar y1s political line. There were further objections 
that this new line had been decided upon without a general congress., 
vhile some country branches lamented the absence of democratic 
proceaures and refused to abide by a political line which they 
15. In the Commmist Ca=, 1943. a- cit- P. 8- 
: L6. In an Interview vithýRadwan al Hilou,, Jericho., 16 February 1974, 
he stated taat refe-tring the matter to the CC was exactly what he 
had hoped for as this meant that the decision rested with the 
Secretar-lat. As an interesting illustration of how the Party 
was intemally run,, he explained that decisions were never taken 
by majority vote. It was the Party Secretary himself who had 
the final word irrespective of the wishes of either the CC or 
the 'Secretariat. As was stated earlier, the S-ecretariat was made 
up of four Jewish me ers in addition to Musa himself. S. Mikunis 
and P. Feinhaus led the opposition to Musa, while U. Slonim and 
S. Tzabari, generally considered to be in Musa's camrremained 
neutral. 
17. In the Commmist Camp, 1943. op. cit- P- 5- 
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claizeed had been "imposed upon them from. above" e 
18 
Soon# old 
wounds were to be re-opened by bringing back the issue of the 
rebellion and the Party's support for the Arab national mavement 
at a time when, it had become clear that the Mufti was in contact 
with the Axis powers. While attempts bad been made during the 
Plenu: m to initiate a discussion on the subjectv Musa had succeeded 
in refusing to allor such a discussion. The issue however was 
brought to life again by the new policy adopted by the Party in 
the Arab street. V, 12ile in the Jewish street the emphasis was now 
laid on the demand for the opening of a seoond front in Europe, in 
the Arab street,, the Party raised the slogan of releasing the 
political prisoners of the rebellion, 
19 
and this was persistently 
upheld in the Party's Arabic press and in its public meetings. 
20 
This brought charges of "national deviation" against the Party 
F ecretary and further disrupted the fragile Party framework which 
had eydsted since the January Plenum. A number of factors jointly 
contributed towards the crystalisation of a climate of opinion among 
the Jewish cadre which was hostile to Musa and the unwelcome 
political line he had i=osed on the Party. There was -the Jewish 
members proximity to the Yishuv,. -%-hich resulted from the pursuit of 
the popular front policy., coupled with a stronger reception for the 
ideas of the members of the ex-Se--tion,, now active within the Party. 
This provided the ideological framework within the Party vhich, 
compoundea with the hostility of a section of the Arab membership 
to Musa's leadership., was to result in the forthcoming split. 
The =settled mood vhich existed among the Jewish cadres and 
the resentment felt against the political line imposed by Musa was 
closely mirrored among the Arab cadres. In the sm way as the 
Jewish members were moving towards recogaition. of the ongoing 
transformation of the Yishuv as a national group and wanted to play 
18. In the Com=nist Camp., 1943. loc. cit. 
19. Ibid. P. 3. 
20. See articles and references to public meetings in Nidal al Shaab 
the Party's Arabic organ., during 1942-3- It is sigiif icant that 
vhUe a call was made for "self determination for the Arabs of 
Palestine" after the wa , there was no mention of the Yishuv. (Nidal al Shaabs, March 1943, p. 6. ) In a public meeting in 
Jaffa., Musa deliýrered a speech which called on the Arabs to 
support the war in order to defeat the Zionistsp but he was 
silent as regards the British presence itself. (Nidal -al 
Shaabs 
op. c- Pp- 4-5). 
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a more active role v6lthin it, the Arab cadres were likewiEe moving 
towards closer identification with the Arab national Movement. 
Their main grievance revolved round the issue of the fixal4lJewir-h 
f the Party. They resented the presence of Jewish composition o. 
members, believing that this was a factor leading to the retarded 
growth of the Party among the Arabs. They saw their association 
with Jews-, of whatever political persuasion,, as inviting accusations 
against -them from u-ithin the Arab national movement and firmly 
believed that their task within the Prab street would be greatly 
facilitated by an assertion of" political independence and the setting- 
up 010' a strictly Arab commmist organi. -ation. 
The -policies pursued by the Paxty during the war years 
' this "national contributed in nosmall. measure to the rise of. 
deviation" a ng tlv-- Arab members. It had followed a parallel 
policy within bc+. h the Jewish and the Arab comumnities, appealing 
to their national consciousness in its efforts to manufacture Support 
-, *or the war. In the Arab street the Party's task was particularly L 
difficult as it had to face an essentially hostile publicýthe 
majority of whose sympathies. lay firmly with the Axis powers. At 
th.. _ time 
it bad to counter Geman and Italian pmpaganda which 
harped on the Ambs' desire for independence and attempted to keep 
alive the zx=ories of the rebellion and the activities of the British 
GnW in suppressing it. Thus, the Party tried to win the Arabs' 
13, upport for the Allies by purporting to show that the struggle against 
.0 
, ascism i=; lied at the same time a weakening of Zionism., and that a 
"just solution" to Palestine's problems (and to the Arabs there could 
ionly be one just solution: 'that of an Arab independent state) would 
necessarily-follow frcm the "just war" and the new age which they were 
promised was going to follow its conclusion* The, -toning dovm of 
the struggle against Britain in the Party' s wri tten and oral 
pmpaganda after the Germn attack on the Soviet Union led to the 
struggle against Zionism assuming a mom central placet and to this 
the Party added insistent agitation on behalf of the prisoners of 
the rebellion. This led to a state of affairsq alreacly observed 
in the case of the Jewish street,, where the Party was talking to 
each community in its owr political language and appealing to it 
in terms of its national sentiments. 
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The political opposition to the Party leadership was compounded 
by personaI differences and ambitions. Boulous Farahs v&o had been 
expelled from the Party as far back as 1940, did not resigia himself 
to political inactivityp but set about gathering round him a group 
of educated youths a few of whom were already in the Partys but most 
of whom rerp-ined outside it. While considering themselves part of 
the co=alni st movement in the camtryj and. indeed being seen as such 
by outsiders, these activists did not accept Musa's authority. 
Farah' s opposition to Musa was motivated by personal ambition though 
inevitably combined with political disagreements. He had dissented 
vzith Musal s policy vis-a-vis the Arab rebellion and had accu!. -ed him 
of leading the Parky into a "national deviation" through support 
for the Mufti' s leadership 
21 
whereby the Party had lost its 
independent identity and political line. 
22 At the same time he 
held Musa guilty of indecision, over the "national deviation" of the- 
Jewish Section, and had demanded as early as 1938., the expulsion of 
its secretary Brozazaj from the Party. He also disagreed with the 
Party's policy vis-a-vis the Arab labour movement during the war. 
While Itusal s policy rested on -the attempt to breathe life into the 
existing labour organisations and to collaborate with the Haifa 
based ? AWS., Farah saw the need fc. & the formation of independent 
labour unions and rejected the Faifa society's leadership as 
conservative and politically mbservient -to the traditional Amb 
leadership. On the personal level,, Farah aspired to the Party 
leadership him--e2f and resented Musawhom he deemed to be "illiterate". 
his intellectual inferior., incapable of leading a communist party 
and more specifically of not appealing to the Arab educated, youth 
in the country. The Party under Musa's leadership had failed to 
win support outside the narrow confines of the Arab vorking classp 
and the quality of its membership failed to measure up to Farah's 
conception of the kind of members it should have and its oonsequent 
nlace in the Arab natiorml movement. jr, --- 
21. Interview with Boulous Farah, Haifaj* 4 April 1974- 
22. This he ascribed to the presence of lbhammad Nimr Odeh in the 
leadership of the Party which he opposedq and whom he regarded 
as the Mietil s agent. This belief he sharvd 'with other members 
among the Jewish cadres of the Party. 
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The group-which gathered round Farah in Haifa* started initially 
as a gathering of intellectuals who were not ready to take the 
plunge and organisationally identify themselves with the Party, but 
hesitated on its fringes* Most of its members were educated youth 
f rom well-to-do families, a not inconsiderable part of %hom were 
Christian--. They were both disenchanted with the policies of the 
tradi-Ii. ional leadership of the Arab national movement and owing., to 
the family set-up which characterised Palestinian Arab politics and 
the absence of modern political party structuresp were unable to 
play an active political role. The activity of these youths 
initially centred round the journal "Al -Ghad" 
23 
and the Yovemerit to 
Reform the Arab Village-24 In 1942 a more fomial organisationg the 
Rays of Hope society was set up.. later to be followed up by the 
YALT. Having secured & base among the young and among theworkerss, 
Farah was able to overshadow Musa who by now was no longer !. n control 
-of the Jewish Section of the Party and whose Arab supporters were 
reduced to a group of workers centred on Jaffa. Farah made use of 
Musa's difficulties to extend his contacts with. the Jewish members 
c-I&P the Party 
25 
and appeared -to share with them a number of common 
gzlevances against the General Secretary which featured disagreement 
over the Party' s role during the rebellions the issue of recruitment 
in the A-r-ab street.. and tie question of support for the Histadrut 
26 
strike. Indeed,, to =mY Jewish members, Farah appeared to adhere 
more closely -to an "internati=10 I st position" and seemed free from 
Musals'hational deviation". 
27 It became clear soon after the split 
hcwever, that this was no more then an opportunistic tactic. Farah's 
group set out to establish an exclusively Arab party,,, which at the 
outset appeered indistinguishable from other Arab national groups and 
23- Al Ghad (The Morr-cm), was published by A. Bandak on behalf of 
the "Arab students League", from MaY 1938 till October 1941. 
22" Also c&lled the "Village Welfare Service", this movement was 
beg= in April 1940 and aimed at "the inlightenment of the fellah". 
25. Survey of Arab co=nmists,, 1946. op. cit. p. 1. Both Mikunis 
and Feinhaus had opposed his expulsion from the Party and 
maintained contact with him despite a CC ban. 
26. For Histadrut strike see supra. P- 191-193- 
27. Interview with P. Feinhaus. Haifa# 3 April 1974. 
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which persisted right up to pa. rtition., in trying to win formal 
recognition from the traditional leadership of the Arab movement. 
It is,, howeverq more constructive to see the opposition of Farah's 
group, as opposed to the strictly personal ambitions of Farah 
himself 9 as representing a much more fundamental divergence in the 
r; ank. s of the Arab com: mmists along a worker/intellectual dichotocy- 
The older generation of Arabs who had Joined the Party in the late 
twenties and early thirties were mainly vvorkers with no formial 
education, v&o were attracted to the Party in the first place as 
a result of the class struggle and in a self-conscious attempt to 
improve the standing of their class. A nutCber of tha4 including 
Musa, h&d received their training in Moscow and on their return 
tried to apply in Palestine whe-t they had learat in the Comintern 
school, but they had few pretensions to theoretical sophistication. 
They were caatent to follow the arectives of the Comintern, and while- 
giving support to the Arab mvement in its anti-British and anti- 
Zionist strugglej, remained grounded in the day-to-day struggles of 
the Arab wox! k: ing classp and perceived their first duV as being 
directed Trimsr: Jly at organIsing- and vinning adherents from vithin 
that class, This became increasingly easier to acco=plish during 
the war- years vhen condition-- facilitated the development of an Arab 
labour =vement. More irrportantly., they did not view their 
association with Jewish communists as a handicap which they needed 
to overcome in their approach to Arab society,, but accepted it as 
one of the fundamental tenets of "internationalism" which, as class 
ccnscious workers subscribing to com=ist doctrine., they accepted* 
The younger generatim of Arab comminists who were cluEterea 
round the Fax-ah groupj, had been attracted to the Party as a result 
of the 1936 rebellion and the vacuum created by the absence of the 
traditional leadership from the country and its visible failure to 
accommodate them within the national movement. On the whole they 
possessed better educational qualifications then the first group; 
all of them bad finished high school, while a few had been to 
university. They possessed an anti-c-olonial and basically nationalist 
outlook.. vhich was what had attracted them to the Party in the first 
place. They were also acquainted,, through their familiarity with 
a fore-1hga language, with socialist ideas, and admired the national 
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5 
achievements of the Soviet Union. Their adherence to socialism, 
v&ich revolved round its anti-imperialist content, was a reaction 
against the economic order they associated with British imperialism. 
Not only did the class composition of this group differ from that 
of the early generation cf commmists but, possessing an "intellectual" 
self-image, their interest in trade union organisation merely aimed 
at pnnid. -. ng themselves with a power base and was not the sole 
ambition of their activ-; V- They hoped to appeal to a =ich wider 
sec-t. jon of the populations the educated youth in particular and all 
those opposed to the Mandate and desirous of independence. Thus 
they saw the necessity of fo--mLng an alliance with the leadership 
of the national movemevit., and of making the Party attractive to the 
broades-41. possible section of Arab opinion. This in its tum 
necessitatednot only a diluting of the Party' s class approach, but 
also getting rid ce, the Jewish connection. 
The and " The Formati6n Of The National Liberation League 
The spark which brought matters to a head and provided the 
immediate cause of the split, was the result of disagreement over the 
propriety of Party surport for a strike called by the Histadrut in 
the ar, -v-. -ja labour camps in May 1943- 
28 The issue was not 
manifestly an important onep and the decision tD support the strike 
and call an both Arab and Jewish worlmrs to participate in it., was 
taken by the'Farty Secretariat in YaLs-al s absence. The latter 
however did not agree xvith this decision,, and subsequently overtumed 
it. 29 He reasoned that the Party could not co-operate with the 
Histadrut as the latter bad not consulted the Ara 
30 bs about the strike, 
and regarded the vmy the Eistadrut had condmted the strike as 
showing that it we"s, not merely a istruggle for economic demanisp but 
28. The strike,, in favour of, higher wages was called for the 10th May 
by the Histad-rut alone without consulting the Arab labour 
organisations. The majority of workers in the camps were Arabs. 
29. The four Jewish mmbers of the Secretariat had taken their 
decision during Musa' s absence. He imediately cancelled it 
and forbade the distribution of a leaflet which had been 
prepared and called an Arab workers to support the strike. 
ir. terview with Radwan al Hilou.. Jericho, 1 February 1974- 
30- Survey of Arab Co=mnists, 1946. loc. cit. 
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was aJmed at as5erting the Histadrut' s leadership over the Arab 
labour move nt. Success of the strike would not only lead the 
Histadrut to claim that it possessed the cmfidence of the Arab 
workers in the camps, 
31 but would aliso necessarily lead it to 
exploit this success by enrolling Arab workers within its ranks . 
32 
The Jewish menbers on the other hand,, saw this as one more move on 
the part of the General Secretary to limit their capacity for 
4- 33 manoeuvre within the Jewish stree... They insisted on the 
necessity of. taking part in the strike and approached the issue as 
one involving merely %orkers' economic rights which the Party could 
not afford to ignore. 
34 Furthermore., they argued that their absence 
would isolate them further within the Jewish labour movement. They 
added that just as the Party should not confuse the Jewish inhabitants 
of the country with Zionism., it should not confuz--e the rank. and file 
Je, wi--h workers with the Histadrut leadership. In this they were 
joined by Farah' s Haifa group v&ich also supported participation in 
the strike and accused Musa of wanting to further split the Arab and 
Jewish workers' movement' and prevent their coming together. 
35 The 
strength of oppowition to Musa' s line was such that he was forced to 
back down; he offered instead a compromise whereby the Arabs were 
instructed not to particpate in the strike, while the Jewish members 
of the Party were allowed to make their own choice. 
36 This did not 
31- In the Cozmmmist Camp, 191, ý. 3. OP- Ci - P- 3- 32. Histadrut member-ship was restricted to Jewish workers, but it 
possessed a frmt organisation,, the Palestine Labour League, which 
tried to organise Arab workers. 
33. Previous to the strike issuet Musa had reportedly opposed 
participation in the May Day activities organised by the Histadrut. 
This had resulted in the eýTulsion of members off the Haifa and the 
Tel Aviv local committees who bad ignored the Party' s instructions. 
See Porath., op. cit- P- 3- 
34. 'Survey of Arab Com=mistss, 191+6. loc. cit. 
35. Ibid. This was a blatantly opportunistic tactic, genemted by 
opposition to Musa mthez- than any concern for the unity of Amb 
and Jewish workers. Not only did this group object to the formation 
of joint Arab Jewish demonstrations to press for a second front in 
Europe on the grounds that this would damage the Party's image in 
the Arab street,, but after the formation of the NIL, there is no 
record (with one notable exception) of any such support for joint 
activity. 
36. The Arab labour organisations came out against the strike and 
Government reports indicate that communirt members of these 
organisations were in the foreftont of agitation for non-participa- 
tion. In the event the Arab workers did not support the strike. 
S-ee memo by A. Yassin., Arab Workers and Non Participation in the 
Strike declax-ed by the Histadrut. Labour Department Report., 9 May 
1943. ISA File 1440. See also F-0-373/35030/1922. War office 
Situation Report,, 26 may 1943. 
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prove to be a workable compromise and amounted to the pursuit of 
two separate lines to accommodate the two feildin sections of the 
population. The immediate result of this disagreement was the 
refusal of the ove-. whelming majority of the Jewish members and some 
menbers cf the Secretariat, to abide by the directives of the General 
Secreta-ty and the c=sequent disintegration of the Party. This 
process was hastened along and facilitated by an unforseen develop- 
ment U ,, 
Moscow's decision to diEnant e the Comintern. 
The decision to dissolve the Communist International came as a 
surprise shock to the leadership of the PCP. Although it was 
regarded as a mere formality37 it led to a weakening of Musa's 
already precarious positiong and added to the considerable confusion 
and disunity prevailing within itz- ranks. While the Party had not had 
any direct contact vrith the Comintern for a number of yearst3s its 
Abolition deprived the General ISecretary of any claim to being 'the 
final depository of orthodoxy and from playing the role of mediator 
between the Comintern Executive and the rank and file izx=bers of the 
part. y. Musa' s strength had IAin in the Comintern' a sanction of his 
position.. and -the control of the party apparatuswhich he enjoyed as 
a result. Up to the time of the Comintern's dissolution Musa held 
a virtual veto on all important decisions., and more than once 
exercised this rig#. by overriding the decisions of the other members 
of the Secretariat. The Comintem's dissolution deprived. him of his t 
authority and generally veakenecl his position. 
39 It opened the door 
to challenges to his leadership, both from those vho disagreed with 
37. Interview with Radwan al Hilou, Jericho,, 1 February 1974. 
38- In the Communist Camp., 1943. O)P-. cit- p- 3. In an Interviews 
Radwan al Hilou, Jerichop 9 and 16 February 1974,, stated that 
amtact with the Comintern had been non-existent since 1936-37. 
The CC established a committee whose sole purpose was to monitor 
Moscow radio and report on Soviet news and views to the CC. 
39- It is interesting to note that Radwan al Hilou himself dated the 
beginning of the erosion of his authority from the time of his 
am-rest in June 194.1. This he claimed brought to the surface a 
lot of internal discussion -which he would not have allowed had 
he been in control of the Party. After his release he was 
unable to put a stop to this discussion., and his position was 
fuither weakened by the disappearance of the Comintern. Interview 
with Radwan al Hiloup Jericho, 16 Februm7 1974. 
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his politics and saw in them a departure from the "correct" comn, nist 
path, as was the case with the Jewish opposition.. and from those like 
Farah, whose opposition was of a more personal nature. 
The abolition of Moscow's central control was to result in a 
number of communist parties coming out with added emphasis on their 
national colours, claiming to advocate a national communism free from 
any outside control. This was reflected in the behaviour of both. 
Arab and Jewish c=munists. The former favoured greater involvement 
with the Arab national movement and the shedding of their Jewish 
handicap in order to appear more appealing to their national 
co=m=ity., while the latter, recognising that it was dLIficUlt; to 
ignore the "national consciousness" of nearly half a million Jews. 
in -the country; wante%, '& to effect a revision in the basic tenets of 
the Party. These had been established at a time vdien the Jewish 
presence in the country was still insignificant and the Arab 
I waging a determined anti- movement had seemed to hold promise 
oA 
British struggle. 
This news of the dissolution of the Cominternp following hard on 
the heels of the conflict over the Histadrut strike, afforded the 
Farah group the oprortunity needed to deprive Musa of his remaining 
' the Amb co=mmict movement. Arab baze and to assume the leadership o& 
By klay 1943 Musa had already lost the allegiance of the Jewish 
meirbersUp of the Party. The aftermath of the strike had heralded 
a period of complete anarchy and confusion. At this juncture the 
Arab opposition group embarked on a step %tich finalised the split and 
f any future reunion of Arab and Jewish made tbepossibility oA 
communists extremely unlikely. Imed iately after a CC meeting held 
in the last week of May to try and heal the rift in the Party, 
40 
an 
Arabic leaflet appeared under the name of the CC which was quickly 
seized upon by the Jewish opposition to formmlise the already 
existing split. '" Although the leaflet was the work of individual 
40. In the Communist Camp. 1943. loc. cit. 
41. lb-id. P. 4. Mikunis and Feinhaus circulated a Hebrvw translation 
of the leaflet. 
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Arab members, not all of whom were members of the CC 
42 
and although 
it was repudiated by Musa who denied CC authorisation for its 
publication, 
43 the damage had nevertheless already been done. The 
leaflet proclaimed the PCP as "a national Arab party in 'whose ranks 
there are Jews *ho accept its national program". 
44 It welcomed the 
abolition of the Cor-intem as opening the path for the entrance of 
national elanents into its ranks, and declared that the CC had purged 
"Zionist deviationizte" from the Party and rroceeded to erpel the 
members of the Tel Aviv and Hadar (Haifa) branches. Abat followed 
can only be described as near anamhy, vtrith the expulsions by Musa 
of menibexx-z of the Jevrlsh oppositicn45 and counte r-expuls ions of 
46 Arabs by a Jemsh oppozition group under the leadership of S. Mikunis. 
42. This leaflet, dated 29 Mayp was signeaby A. Bandak, Y. Amanij. 
and E. Habýb--5 (the latter was not a mem! -. er of the CC) , on beha-If of the CC. T. Toubi., a Party member and one of Parah's group 
also had a hand in its fonmaation. Interviews with E. Habibi and 
T. Toubi, Haifa, 3 and 5 April 1974,, and A. Bandaki, Amman, 6 March 
lc.. 74. See also., Suz-vey of Arab Communists, 1946. op. cit. p. 2. 
43. Survey of Arab Com=mizts,, 1946. loc. cit.; Porath., 
-op. cit. P. 4. Interview with Raclwan al Hilou.. Jericho, 9 February 1974. 
44- A translation of the leaflet is reproduced in, In the Communist 
Ca:: rpt 1943- op-- ci - P- 4. Also in,, Survey of Arab CommLmists.. IGL6, loc. cit. In the Frankel Collectionp-2p. cit. p. 1719 two 
items from Kol Hawn, 10 June 1943 labelled CC communique's 
Nos. 1 and 2 arpear. The first is the 29th May leaflet while 
the secondo signed by a "Temporary CC" declaxes the previous 
statement "a total fýbrication of the principles of the PCP"j and 
affirms the Partyl s internatimialism. 
45. In the Communist Camp., 1943. 
_2R. Ci - P- 
3- 
46. Ibid. Pp. 5-6- Musa was accused of being an "Arab nationalist" 
and of deception conceming the existence of an Arab communist 
cadre uhich the Jewish co=mmists now denied had ever existed. 
A number of Arab ex-members of the Party stated that Mikunis 
himself had expelled all Arabs from the CC. Interviews with 
F. Salfiti, Amman, 26 March 1974# Y. Nashashibi., Beirut.. 11 March 
1974 and A. Bandak, Bethlehem,, 23 JulY 1973. A War Office 
document reported that Jewish members of the CC met towards the 
end of May 1943 and "decided to set up a Jewish communist pax-ty 
purged of all Arabs". W. 0.169/8310- PICME Report N-5. Political 
and General Intelligence Summary, 13 July 1943- 
Shmuel Mikun. -1s, an engineer, had joined the Party during the 
3ears of the rebellion. He ro. -se to prominence as a supporter of the Party leadership in its attempts to discipline the Jewish 
Section. After the split of 1943 he played a prominent mle 
in the Jewish PCP- and in the Israeli. Communist Party till the 
split in 1965P when he again led a wholly Jewish gmup out of 
the Party. 
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The zoonths following were characterised by utter confusion with the 
appearance of a number of self-appointed CCs each claiming to 
represent the Party; contacts between the contending groups were 
mq'Intained for some time in the hope of finding an agreeable frame- 
work for co-operation, but a proposed plenum to be attended by Jews 
and Arabs of all the groups was continuously postponed, and eventua. 11y 
never took place. 
47 The gulf separating the groupswhich now 
a unted to two on the Arab side, and three on the Jewishy and the 
inter-group differc-noes between them.. proved too large to surmount. 
Although Musa himself and his small group of Arab supporters werv 
opposed to the split and in favour of the continued existence of a 
, united com: mnist party., they were not able to hold the Party together, 
and it subsequently ceased to exizt as a centralissed and disciplined 
organisation. 
48 
The distinte&mtion of the Party brought the Farah group into 
prominence as the only disciplined and coherent group among the 
Arab com=mlsts. Simultaneously, some of Musa's supporters began 
to desert him and attach themselves to the opposition. 
49 Musa 
himself, though supported by a number of leading Jewish conmunists5o 
was not able to =--ter sufficient support to maintain a meaningful 
Arab-Jewish party, and realising his wea3mess, chose to retire from 
political activity# resigaing in Povember from the 'by now fictitious 
position of General Secretary. The summer of 1%. 3 was spent in a 
series of meetings organised by the Haifa gmup, to set up a national 
47. In the Co==ist Ca=: Review of 1944. Jewish Intelligence 
Report, p. 1. CZA S 25/7533. 
48- Owing to the fact that the split did not come about as the 
result of a "legal divorce" but took the fo= of gradual 
'icult to give a specific date as to disintegration, it is difl 
when the Paxty actually ceased to exist. Them is general 
agreement however that May 1943 is the most apprvpriate date. 
This is subscribed to by the Jewish FCP in, Statement of PCP., 
March 1944. Quoted in, In the Communist'Camp: Review of 1944. 
loc. cit. 
49- Of those who were with Musap sore refused to join the NM on 
its formation but Joined up latert while others restricted 
their activity to the Labour movement. 
50. Y. Slonim and S. Tzabari. Soon after the split however., both 
were to adopt very manifestly pro-Zionist stands. See the 
Communist Movement: Review of 1946. Jewish Intelligence Report. 
29 December 1946. CZA S 25/7533- Alsop W. 0.169/15703- PICME 
Report X. 7, dated 8 September 1944. 
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co=uni at movement in the country. In the absence of any contact 
with Moscow, both Arab and Jewish comminists looked to the Syrian 
C==mist Party, and to its leader, K. Bakdash,, 
51 for guidance. 
Cwing to the state of affairs in the now non-existent Party,, those 
members -who went to consult Bakdash did so necessarily on their own 
group's initiative and not as representatives of the Party as a 
52 Bakiash seems to have condoned the wdsting split,, and 
advised the Amb communists to set themselves up as an Independent 
national comr-mmist organisation without giving it an explicitly 
commmist title, 
53 
and a meriber of the CC of the Syrian party was 
dispatched to'Palestine to investigate the affairs of the Party. 
54 
His recommendations were in line with those of Bakdash, based on 
the view cf the irmossibili-tty of maintaining a joint Arab-Jewish 
organ-4sation in the charged national atmosphere prevailing in the 
comtry. 
The confusion in the ranks of the Arab com=mists on to an 
end with the setting-up of the NLL. In September 1943, a meeting 
51- Khaled Bakaash, a member of the '-Syrian Commmist Party since 1931., 
received his training in Moscor, and participated in the 7th 
Comi-n-Itern Cong; ress as the representative of the Arab countries. 
He achieved prominence as a result of the legality conferred on 
the Syrian party during the popular f ront government in France. 
In the forties he emerged as the "official spokesman" of the 
Arab communist parties. 
52. A. Bandak, E. Habibi,, I. Arm=i,, and K. Shannirs travelled to 
Darns cus to meet Bakdash (Interviews with A. Bandak,, Amman 6 
Yza-ch 1974; E. HabJlbi and T. Toubi, Haifa, 3 and 5 April 1974). 
Two Jewish communists, 0. Preminger and H. Gesis also travelled 
separately to Damascus. (Interview with Radwan al Hilou., Jericho 
22 Feb==7 1974). E. Habibi mentions another Jewish communistp 
Eleazer Langer, later a member of the Slonim-Tzabari group, as 
having also travelled to meet Bakdash. 
53- In an Interv"Iew with A. Bandak,, Jerusalem 23 July 1973, he claimed 
that while this was t the opinion of BakUsh p Faraj allah al Hilou, 
the second man in the Party was opposed to the split. 
54- Meer Uas' ad,, a brother-in-law of A. Bandak. Interviews with F. 
Salfiti# Amman 26 Yarch 1974, A. Bandak,, Jerusalem 23 July 1973,9 
and E. Habibi, Haifas 3 April 1974- 
55. In the light of the abovel it is interesting that the organ of 
the Syrian comniunists., S-awt al Shaab, did not make any reference 
to the establishýment of the NLL and its activities till 8 August 
19469 when a prominent front page article introduced the NLL and 
reproduced one of its statements. Up to that date there had only 
been three mentions of the NIZ, in the paper, -the first on 2 April 
1945, a full year after its eatablisbment. 
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was held in Haifa which was attended by Farah' is group and a number 
of Arab members of the Partyl which decided on the establishment of 
an Arab commm, ni Et party. 
56 Following this meeting all efforts were 
ooncentrated on convincing the Arab cadre of the Party, Musa includeds 
of the necessity of joining this new organisation, 
57 
and the idea of 
separate Arab and Jewish arganisations was now formally accepted and 
propagated. 
58 For some time., the Arab co=, nists continued to 
appear xmder thle narae of the pCp, 
59 but early in 1944 the title 
National Liber-ation League (Usbat al-Taharrur al-Watani,, hitherto 
referred to as NLL) 9 indicating the non-com=mist image the Arab 
communists wanted to project, waz adopted. The first bulletin 
y 19 containing the IMM's program was issueed on lst Februax- . 44.60 
The fo. -mation of 'the NU was not., at the outset, regarded by its 
56. Al Jamal-dr (The Masses) Organ of Ithe Jortlanian Commmist party. 
Year 28. K. 9. ESepte=ber : 076. Interylews with B. Tumas E. Habibis 
and T. Toubis Haifa, 4s 3,5 April 1974. 
57- In an Interview with E. Tuouas he stated that as late as January 
1944, atte=pts were still being made to convince Musa. and his 
supporters to join the VIL and a meeting attended by twenty-five 
people was held in Haifa to this effect. 
58- A typewritten docuz&ent entitled, Intemal Document of the Arab 
Preparatory CC olf PCPs and dated November 1943 (in the possession 
of T. Toubi, one of the founders of the LrLL) is the earliest I 
have found where the suggestion for the setting-up of independent 
Arab and Jewish con=unist parties is made. Toubi himself is of 
the opinion that this document was the first step taken towards 
the establishment of the X1L. It is important to note that B. 
Farah.. 9dw had maintained cmtacts with the Jewish opposition to 
Musa previous to the split, ncrw refused suggestions made by Jewish 
oommLmistss to establish a joint Arab-Jewish organisation. Sees 
Survey of Arab Communists, 1946. loc. cit. 
59. As late as 17th January 1944 an Arabic Leaflet entitled "Statement 
to the Noble Arab Nation" was issued under the name of CC/11CP- 
The "nationalist" line of this leaflet clearly indi ates that 
it was the work of the N'LL grvup. 
60. The issue of the first internal bulletin of the NM s containing 
its program and a call to Arabs to enrol in its ranks is taken 
by most sources as its foundation date. The callwas signed by 
E. Tums. its Secretanj and most well known members and by B. Faraho 
Sami Habibi, and Muss. Dajani. In it the NU described itself 
as a rsocialist democratic party" whose main aim was "the 
national inde-penclence of Palestine". See Survey of Ar*ab 
Commmists, 1946... op. cit- P- 3- and also, The League of 
National Liberation., 1944. Jewish Intelligence Reports Ist 
Vaxch 1944. loc. cit. 
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founders as a continuation of the PCP., nor was it so regarded, by its 
friends or enemies. Its program did not include any reference to 
the principles of socialism or revolutionv but confined itself to 
the Arab movement's struggle for national independence. Indeed the 
name chosen for the group was self-explanatory; it indicated the 
"national" composition and orientation of the group and confined 
its ai=z to those of "liberation" from foreign domination. The MI 
further defined its early outlook in two ways: by its demand to the 
traditional Arab leaders to grant recogaition to the League as 
part of the Arab national movement 
61 
and its deliberate choice of 
a Moslem as president of an organisation whose leadership was 
predowinantly Christian. 
62 
The Communist Movement in the Jewish Street 
The situation among the ranks of the Jewish co=mists was more 
confused and chaotic than on the Arab side, due to the existence of 
numerous small groups who, while being united in their enmity to 
Musa, managed to agree an little else. 
63 
The rest of the year 1943 
was spent in little activity., most o: " the groups' energies being 
absorbed by their attempts to find common ground on which to resume 
their political unity. A chief 1=eccupa: '. ion was the combating of 
certain defeatist trends which were circulating among the Jewish 
menbers. - that -there was no place for an organised com=ist party 
in the country as the failure aff the united PCP had shomp anathat 
the Jewish communists should content themselves with the establishment 
of a wider and more loosely based anti-fascist movement. 
64' 
The 
61.2nd Internal Bulle"Un of NLL 9 14 Februar7 1944. Quoted in League for National Liberation,. 1944. loc. cit. 
62. Iftxsa Dajani was named president. He was a teacher who had been a 
omber of Farah's Rays of Hope society, but never a member of the 
Party. He did not remain in this office for long and was 
replaced later in 3.944 by another Moslem, Khaled Zagmouri, a 
railway worker and a member of the PCP since 1936. 
63. In the Comm: nist Ca=p, 1943. op. cit. p. 4. 
64.. Report on Comnmist Activity. Jevrish Intelligence Report. 3 
December 1943. CZA S 25/48. 
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beginning of 1944 saw the sqpearance of some semblance of unity and 
the crystalisation of three distinct groups. The amallest of thesep 
which vas nat destined to have any lasting presence on the political 
scene, was made up of part. of the old membership of the Section and 
the Eimet group, who refused to co-operate with other Jewish communist 
groups and established themselves as a separate organization. 
65 
The second group was composed of a number of important Party leaders 
who had remained loyal to Musa and were sympathetic to neither the 
Arab opposition nor the Jewish opposition led by Miklinis, and some 
sections of the Party' s youth movement. Discussions were initiated 
with the MiInmis group tc ressurect the Party after it had become 
clear that the -plit was final and Musa had retired from active 
^e, and the political materials to be submitted to a political lil 
66 
congress to take place in 10.44 were agreed upon. Only part of 
this groups however,, finally merged vrith the Mil=is group to 
establish a new coirc=ist party in the country. 
67 
The remnant 
formed themselves into the "Communist Educational Union" 
68 
and were 
to continue a separate existence until after the establishment of 
the state in 1948. The tbird group was the largest and most 
important. Led by S. Mikunis and P. Feinhaus both of Whom had 
figured prominently in the opposition to Muza's leader. -Idp before 
amr-I duxring -the split 3 it succeeded in draring to its rmkz part of 
the ex-Emet group and a section of the group round Slonim and 
Tzebard. - In Ifi=h 1944 a framework for union was achieved and the 
group, held its first congress$ termed the Eighth Paxty Congress, in 
May 19-L42 
69 
laying claim to being the legitimate continuation of the 
65. This g-. oup was knovc as Socialists opposed to National Policy and 
was led by H. Brozaza. See,, in the Communist Camp: Review of 
1944. O-P. ci . P. 80 66. In the 'coommunist Carý, 1943. qp. - c. p. 
11. 
67- In the Communist Ca=: Review of 1944. loc. cit. The report states 
that members of this group withdrew during the congress in May 
1944 az a result of cUsagreements over organisational matters. 
68. This was led by S. Tzabari, and M. Slonim,, both ex-merbers of the 
S, Secretariat., who bad received their tr-aining in Moscow in the 
ear1v thirties. 
69. in the Co=nunist Canp: Review of 1944. crr). cit. P. 2. The leaders 
o-e this group were to continue to lead : Me- Party till well after 
the establishment of the', '-Itate of Israel. Goshanski was killed 
in a plane crash in 1948; Vilner is currently General SecretarY 
of the predominantly Arab Israeli Commmist Party (Rakah); Feinhaus 
is still active in the ranks of Rakah; Mikunis became the Secretary 
o Jý f the Israeli Commmi-st, Party in 1948 and in 3.965 led a split 
which established a new -Tevrish comm=ist party; Vilenska. was a 
member of the CC of the Israeli Communist Party till 1965 and then 
,; oined 
the Milunis faction; W. Erlich is currently a member of the 
Central Control Commission of Rakah. 
pre-split FICT-70 
The Com=nist Educational Union held its foimd-ing congress in 
April 1945; on this occasion it came out firmly in support of the 
"Jewish national home" and declared its acceptance of the goal of 
political independence for the Yizhuv,, calling for its further 
economic and politica]. development. 
71 The group held to the view 
that Palestine was not in need of a co=mmi-, t party, and saw its 
role as one cf "spreading co==ist ideoloey among workers in the 
yi_huv,,. 72_ It thus structured itself accordingly. Its organisational 
framework was extremely loose, and it Proclaimed its doors open to all 
those who accepted its educational and propagandist aims, v6hile 
emphasising that members did not have to abide by the decisions of 
the leaderships and that the constitution of the group could be 
changed by a si=le Majority vote. 
73 
While continuing to attack 
the leadershi; of the HiEtadrut and the Zionist movement for their 
"mistaken" policies, and paying lip service to the need for co- 
operation with the Arabs to ensure the equal rights of both 
communities in the count-. 7., it adopted the slogans of the Zionist 
movement as its own -to the extent that it became indistinguiahable 
from the latter. Thus it echoed the demand for the innediate 
entry into Palestine of one hmdred thousand Jewish refugees from 
the displaced persons camps in Europes and proclaimed the right of 
the Yishuv to self-defence. 
74 
The culmination of this stand was 
the consequent laudatory attitude to the Haganah and the call on 
Jewish youth to enter its ranks. 
75 
Although the group was denied 
recognition"by the intemational communist movement76 it perceived 
70. The new party kept the old name, PCP and continued to date its 
congresses and journal as if no split had taken place. 
71. In the Comm: unist Camp. Jewish Intelligence Report, 29 December 
1946- CZA S 25/7533- 
72. Infbrmation on the Communist Party. Jewish Intelligence Report, 
4 MaY 194-5. CZA S 25/7532. 
73- aid. p. 2. 
74. In the Communist Camp, December 1946. loc. cit. 
75- Hebrew Leaflet of Jerusalem Committee of the Communist Union of 
Eretz Yisraels 21 April 1947. The group had adopted this name 
sometime in 1946. 
76. Jewish Clarion (published by the Jewish Committee of the 
Commumist Party of Great Britain). N. 6. March 1974. The group 
was refused participation in the Congress of the Communist 
Parties of the British Bmpire, held in London in 1947, on the 
grounds that "its program and rules showed that it is not a 
communist movement". 
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its role as one of "destroying the wallE of auspicion and estrange- 
ment between the Yirhuv" and the communists abroad, 
77 
and made the 
claim as early as 1946 that the Soviet Union was in support of a 
solution of the Palestine problem based on "the right to self- 
determination of both nations in the country". 
78 A conference held 
in October 1947, saw the transformation of the group into the "Hebrew 
Communist Party" whose aim was now described as "fusing the theory 
of commmism with the national and social liberation of the Hebrew 
nation in Palestine" and which "aspired to be a driving force in the 
Yi--huv for national independence". 
79 This group, uncharacteristically 
for a self-procla. 1ined co=lni at party.. developed the thesis of 
the Jews in Palestine cor. --t,;,. tuting an "oppressed colonial people" 
anE proclaimed their fi&. t as one of "national liberation of the 
Yishuv'!. 
60 
But partition was rejected as a solution to the problem 
and the group put forward a scheine of "territorial federalism" 
enOo=pp_ssjng cc=plicated divisions and safeguardsp designed to allay 
the fears of both commimities of being dominated by the other sides, 
WIhile at the same tinte preserving the framework of an "independent 
democrat-11c united state". Needless to say, the grxmp supported the 
establishment of the Israeli state when partition was decreed, 
maintaining contact with one of the most extreme Jewish terrorist 
grouýps., 
81 
but soon after amalgamated with the Israeli Communist Party. 
82 
. 
The Mikunis grcup held its first congrese in May 1944,, an event 
which was procliki d to heal the split %hich had taken place in the 
Party the summer before. 
83 It was now explained that the reason 
77. On the Founding Conference of the Hebrew Communist Party., Tel Aviv., 
3-6 October 1947. Hebrew Leaflet of the Centre of the Communist 
Union of Eretz Yisrael. 
78. Pravda Supports Natione-1 Independence of the Yishuv. Editorial 
in Achdut (Unity), the organ of the group, October 1946. 
79- On the Founding Corif erence of the Hebrew Communists. loc. cit. 
80. Statement of the Communist Union to UNSCOP., May 1947. Frankel 
Collection op. cit. p. 224. 
81. Laqueur, op. ci -- P- 302. See also Porathp-op- ci . p. 6. 
82. The Full Unity of the Communist Camp has Been Established. 
Hebrew Leaflet of CCs of Israeli Communist Party and the Hebrew 
Communistss Achdu .9 December 190. 
83. Decisions of 8th Congress of PCPq Tel Aviv, 26-28 May 1944. 
Jewish Intelligence Report. CZA S 25/7533. 
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for the split was the unapecified "existence of differences in 
political views",, and the blame was put on Musa for the absence of 
denx>cracy in the Party which would have enabled the resolution of 
these problems within the united Party frarework. 
84 
The new Party's 
policies as formulated by the decisions of the Congress, were based 
on opposition to the White Paper and the Land Transfer Regulations 
which were seen as prvviding the conditions for the partitioning of 
the country. 
65 
At the same time the Party declared itself in 
support of the entry of Jewish refugees from the displaced persons 
camps in E'. arope to Palestine, if they so wished, but refused to 
concur in the demands for unlimited immigration. The Party 
affirmed its belief in the cozrxv. -.. iity of interests between the 
Jewish settlers and the Arabs in the country and c&. lled for the 
establiEawient of an "independent democratic state" which would 
guar-antee "complete equality of rights to the Jewish national 
minor-Ity". A special provision was called for.. to ensure the 
establishment of extensive autonomy to local authorities to enable 
the Jewish community to develop its national cultures 
86 
The party -which -emerged from the "Eighth Congress" was in no 
way a ccntinuation of the old PCP though it tried hard to appear 
as such. The new leadership had simply glossed over and ignored 
the division of the Party on national lines; yet it was noticeable 
that not a single greeting to the congress was received from any 
fraternal communist party in the neighbour-Ing Arab states. 
87 
The 
Arab-Jewish national conflict was -not diis=ssed at this Congressj, 
nor was it to be discussed at any of the future gatherings; it 
was isimply ignored and the Party, vhich for the first time obtained 
legal permission to publish its journal "Kol Haam" in December 19449 
88 
produced 11-ts literature in mmmy European languages but not a single 
leaflet was brought out in Arabic. The new Party took a further 
step simy from the pre-split PCP: in its endeavour to gain entry 
into the Histadrut., it attempted the first evez- public self -criticism 
84. in the Conmmnist Camp: Review of 1944. op. ci . p. 2. 85. Decisions of 8th Congress. op. cit- P- 15- 
86. 'Ibid. p. 16. 
87. In the Commmist Ca=: Review of 1944. op. ci . p. 4. 88. : rbia. 
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89 
of the past mistakes of the old leadership of the Party. In a 
self-proclaimed spirit of "bolshevic self-criticism".. it tried to 
dissociate itself from the policies adopted during the 1936 
rebellion by claiming that Party members had not been consulted at 
the time by the leadership, and that the consequent struggle waged 
by the Party's Jewish cadres had succeeded in ejecting this old 
leadership. It went on to explain that the Party's policy in 
that period had been mistaken in its support for the rebellion and 
in its failure to struggle against the leadership of the Mufti who 
had been in contact with the Fascists and had, "become their agent". 
It had also held to a mistaken view of the Jewish conmnriity "as a 
single reactionary body opposed to the Arab people as a Lingle 
progressive body" and consequently failed to draw up a program for 
the future of the Jewish commurity. 
90 
The new Party differed also as a result of the general atmosphere- 
of legality in which it was nov; allowed to operate. For the first 
time com=mists openly called for attendance of Party meetings and 
advertised them. publicly. The first attempt to enter the political 
4.4 . eld came with the Histadrut elections held in August 1944. While 
the Jewish opposition in the party had objected to y lusa! s attempt to 
dissolve the proletarian Faction in 1943, this group was not 
reorganised now that Musa was no longer in con-'Crol., but the Party 
continued to implement his policy by pressing for individual member- 
ship of its me=bers in the Histadrut. However,, despite meetings 
with representatives of the Jewish workers' leaders and the self- 
criticism which the Party undertook, it was unable to meet the demands 
placed on it by the. Histad. -ut, namely open and complete support for 
Jewish j=idgration., and tbe development of the "national home" in all 
its facets, and it thus failed to win admittance. 
91 In the following 
89. The Interchange of Correspondence Between the Executive Co=ittee 
of the Histadrut arki the PCP as Regards the Fubmission of a 
Commmnist List for the Elections to the Six1th Convention of the 
Histadrut. Supp plement N. XV to Digest of Press and Events, 
20 1, zeptenber 1944. Issued by the Jewish Agency for Palestine. 
Information '%Service. Jerusalem. 
90. Ibid. Letter from C,.,,, /PCP to Executive Comnittee of Histadrut. 
29 July 1944. 
91. Ibid. Letter from D. Remez on Bebalf of Executive Cormaittee of 
Histadrut to CC/PCP- 4 August 1944. 
204. 
years the Party continued its attempts to press the executive 
cnm--ittee of the Histadrut to meet to discuss the problem of its 
cadres' admission and regarded the matter as one of "top priority" 
92 
but only managed to win entry early in 1947.93 More successfully 
the Partys appear-Ing under the name of the "Popular Democratic List" 
won 3s948 votes in the elections to the Yishuv1s Elected Assembly 
and gained three seats. 
94 Its program was based on a call for 
increazed participation = ' the Yishw in the war effort and for 
guaranteeing the national rights of the Yishuv,. claiming to stand 
in the ne of numerous groups within the Jewish com=mity 
encompassing "workers, clerks, artisans, shopkeepers, intellectuals, 
small farmerst and small traders". 
95 In its first legal appearance 
in the councils of the'yishuv, the Party declared itself in favour 
of abolishing the White Paper of 1939,, but was vague on the issue 
of -! ='gration- 
96 It vehemently rejected the setting-up of a 
Jewish state, which it characterised as being merely a prelude to 
partition. In its place it put forward the demand of independence 
for a wtinited Palestine" with vague provisions of "equality of 
rights for the Jewish settlers". 
97 This successful entry into 
%, he politics of the Yishuv signified the Party' s self-imposed 
restriction of its activity to the Jewish section of the population, 9 
and differentiated it further frcm. the pre-split PCP. 
98 
The Party's position on the nature of the Yishuv- and its rights 
evolved gradually and was not clearly forimAated at the founding 
congress of May 1944. To a large extent this was due to the absence 
of strong contacts with Moscow and to the lack of any lead emanating 
from the latter as to what the "orthodox communist" position should 
be and how the intezmational commxaist movement regarded the Jewlsh 
question, -with particular reference to the establishment of the 
92. Infornation on the Ccvm=ist Party. Jewish Intelligence Report, 
I June 1945. p. 2. CZA s 25/7532. 
93- SUrriement to Sturvev of Palesting. Report Prepared by the British 
Government for the -benefit of-Me Anglo-M Investigation Committee. (Jerusalem. June 1947) P. 150. . 94. C-0-7351459,175519. Elections to the Assiphat Hanivharim, I August 
1944. The three commLmist members were llikunis,. E. Novak and 
Go-shanski. They were also entitled to have one seat in the General Council (Vaad Leumi) which was occupied ýy Mikunis. 
95. w. o. 169/15702. PICIM Report N-7 (revised) 8 September 1944. 
96. In the Communist Ca=: Review of 1944,, o cit p. 2. 
97. Ibid. P-3- Political Program submitted PCP 
io the Second meeting 
oF-the ýlected Assenblys December 1944. 
98. The Jewish Clarion., which gave prominence to the activity and 
political statements of the PCP., always referred to itp correctlYs 
as "the Jewish Communist party in Palestine". 
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", national home". 
99 Yet as early as -the 8th Congress., the new Party 
f had indicated the importamce of the issue o. the Yishuvls position 
in Palestine.. by proclaiming that the "ma k of progressive forces 
in Palestine is the attitude taken towards the equality of rights 
for the Jewish population". 
100 An indication of the line adopted 
by the international communist movement cane on the occasion of 
the Inte-mational *Vorkem' Congrresý- in London in 1945 when a 
resolution.. pro-Zioni-st in tone., and indicating support for the 
ýnational home"j, was supported by the Soviet Union. This was 
understood by the Party to signal Moscow's approval for closer 
f the Yishuv. 
101 
identi-fication vith the straggles and aspirations oll 
The Party accordingly adapted its activity and propaganda to this 
new position, proclaiming that the "progressiVe forces in the world" 
were in support off the "free development of the national home" and. 
the Yishuv's "just war against the White Paper". 
102 
Already in May 
1945, the Party waz raising the slogan "let us struggle for the 
develorment of the national home". 
103 In June 1946., when the 
British authoilties held the Yishuv "under violent military siege" 
arresting near2y three thousand people., among them leaders of the 
Zionist movement and the Histadrut, in an attempt to curb Jewish 
104 
ter'rorlsmp the Party came out for the first time in its history 
in open support of the Zionist leadership. Declaring the Br. 4.. tish 
action to be an "outrage" and a "new expression of colonial oppression"ýý 
99. The Ccn=unist Party in Eretz Yisrael. Jewish Intelligence Reporto 
1 February 1948. CZA S- 255/7533. It is probable the. there was some 
contact with the Soviet Union such as took place during the visit 
of Sultanov., the Soviet Counsellor in Egypt to Palestine during 
May 3.94LI.. Both Arab and Jewish communists held meetings with him. 
See F-0-373/41049/4496. Visit of Sultanov to Palestine. It seems 
however that the British Communist Party was the main chamel of 
contacts as far as both Arab and Jewish comminists were concerned. 
100. Decisions of 8-th Congress. loc. cit. 
101. Information on the Communist Party., June 1945. O*D. c. p. 1. The 
report states that. the British co=mmists contacted the PCP after 
the congress and instructed it to modify its an-'.. i-Zionist line in 
accordance with the support shovm by the "progressive forces" for 
this resolution and suggested that the Party should "support the 
national home". 
102. Ibid. 
103- Information on the Communist Party,, May 1945. op. ci * p* L, 
104- Huivwitz., OD- cit. p. 254. 
105- S-tatement of CC ? submitted to the Executive Co=nittee of the 7k 
Histadrut. Y-He 2 July 1946. Reproduced in Jewish Clarion, 
- ruly 1946. 
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it described those arrested as "the sons and daughters of the Yishuv" 
and their apprehension as a serious attack "upon the elementary rights 
of all the inhabitants of Palestine". Calling for the irnediate 
release of all those arrested, it proposed lodging a complaint in 
the name of the Yi. -huv at the UN. 
106 
After this the Party's litera- 
ture 6bounded with calls for the "recognition of the existing Jewish 
community and its rights to free national development"i 
107 
ad it 
called for acknowledgement of the fact that the "national home" was 
now a "reality" and that the exietence of "two peoples in Palestine 
could no longer be denied7. The Party's delegates abroad were now 
e=lairdng Jewish terrorism by ascribing it to "the justified 
bitterness of the masses of the Yishuv against colonial rulell 
108 
and professed to see the aul'ewiai resis-Lp-nce to the British &s 
"objectively viewed, something in the nature of a protest against 
colonial rule" the Tishuv being increasingly posed in the role 
ýP " 
log 
of an "oppressed national group in a colonial country 
The problem of "understanding" v-Ith the Arabs and the need to 
find common gromd with those whom the Party declared "we shall have 
to live together forever" 110 f igt4red prominently in the Jewish 
commurLists' deliberations and propaganda., yet the practical outcome 
off thds consider-able vertal activity was practically nil. The 
Party's congresses reiterated the need xPor unity with the "progressive 
forces" in the Arab commmity, stressing that this was the only way 
to c=vince Jews and Arabs that oo-<Temtion in the countr 
13-1 
y was 
possible. Yet, with the exception of a few joint leaflets an 
106. statement of CC/PCIP submitted to the Executive Committee of the 
Histadrut. LH. 2 July 1946. Reproduced in Jemush Clarion 
July 1946. 
107. Speech of M. Vilner at the Tenth Congress of PCP: The Political 
Situation in Palestine. November 194-6. L. 
-H. 
5 December 1946. 
108. Speech of Mikunis at Congress of Communist Parties of the British 
Empire held in London February-Yarch 1947. We Speak of Freedom 
(London 1947) p. 66. 
109. S. Mlkunisp Set Palestine Free. Jewish Clarion.. December 1946. 
110. E. Vilenska (Editor of Kol Haam)7-ho Are Our Friendsq. Jewish 
Clarion, February 1946. 
111. , "tatement of CC of Israeli Communist Party, 
6 October 1948. Al 
Ittihsa, N. l. 18 October 1948. The statement reproduces state- 
meiýts made at the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Congress of the JewiEh 
T-CP e=phasising the 131TOrtance end the desirability of unity. 
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the occasion of industrial action,, no other formi of co-operation 
between the Arab and Jewish co=mmists was established prior to the 
termination of the Mandate. Despite the pressure exerted on the 
Jewish commmists from abroad 
112 the desired co-operation simply 
did not materialise. In public, the Jewish commmiEts claimed that 
both Arab and Jewish commmists shared the same opinions on all 
major issues affecting Palestine, and that the split was "a question 
. 
113 
tyl s spokepin-an, Mikuni8) of internal organization" Yet the Part 
efused to commit himself on Y-hether there was a "difference in 
principle" between the two groups as regards the form of government 
114 
each advocated for the future independent Palestine state. In 
private however, the Jerish co=nunists blamed the lack of co-operation 
on the Arab coarminists' "opportunistic position" of refusing to 
co-operate on the grounds that this would "isolate them from the 
Amb national movement" and their desire to appeer as a "purely Arab. 
". 0115 The truth of the matter was that the gap between the group 
two groups was too wide to bridge and was becoming increasingly wider 
with each step taken by the Jewish comrminists in support of the 
"national home". The Aral? communists did not at any time recognise 
the "equal national rights" of the Yishuv and persisted in their 
support for the White Parer and in opposing Jewish imr. igration and 
even the entry of Jewish refugees. In calling for an independent 
Arab state in Palestiney where Jews would enjoy civil but not 
national minority rights, they were further away from the Jewish 
comm=ists than they had been even at the time of the split in 1943. 
Prior to the split of May 1943-the communist movement in 
Palestine had declaxýed its support for the demands of the Arab 
national mvementq its only proviso being the necessity of 
guaranteeing full equalily and civil rights to the Jewish inhabitants. 
The new Jewish parby cam out in its first oongress in May 1944ý; 
6 
in 
3.12. Information on the Communist Partys June 1945. loc. cit. In 
194-6 the British Commmiists came out publicly vith a Te-mand for 
the unity of the communist movement in Palestine. See., Palme 
Dutt, For a Democratic Palestine. World News and Views. 5 
January 1946. N. I. p. 6. 
113- Statement of S. lUkunis to TJNSCOPq May 1947. Frankel Collections 
op. cit. p. 216. 
114. Ibid. p. 221. 
3-15. M. Vilners The Road to Liberationp Octcber 1946. See Poraths 
op. cit. pp. 18-19. 
3.16. In the Communist Camp: Review of 1944. op. cit. p. 10. 
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support of an independent democratic state., which was not described 
as Arab or Jewish but deliberately left ambiguous. This unsatisfactory 
position was soon left behind, and at its Tenth Congress the Party, 
while condemning "any form of partition or federation" put forward 
the slogan of a "united Arab Jewish state ... democratic and inderendent 
(with) full equality of rights". 
117 
At the same time it raised the 
slogan of the necessity of taking the Palestine problem to the 
Securily Council of the M. where it was hoped the influence of the 
democratic. an(i progressive forces would be brought to bear to 
achieve a just settlement of the problem. 
13.8 The Partyl*s main aim 
wa-- to remave the rroblem of Palestine's future "from the hands of 
Anglo-US imperialism" and on this basis, it objected to the visit of 
the Anglo-US investigation committee to Palestine in N: arrh 1946, 
and described it as an attempt to keep the Soviet Union out of the 
area and as `illegal" 0 
119 
By 1947 the Party had moved even further along the road to 
recogpising "two separate national groups" in the country, and was 
arguing for the rights of both peoples to "independence in a single, 
free and democratic Palestine... on the principle of ftll equality 
of civil and national political rights". 
120 DerV-ing that immigration 
was in any way a seriouz problem, and maintaining its distinction 
between the Palestine problem and that of the Jewish refugees in 
Europe., the Party -put forward its proposal for a "unitarian bi- 
national solution", 
12-1 
and even went as far as accepting the "federal 
solution" which it had previously rejected if this proved to be the 
desire of the cemntry's inhabitants. Rejecting both an Arab and a 
Jewish state as implying 'the domination of one people by anotherq 
117. Speech of Vilner at Tenth Party Congresso November 1946. loc. cit. 
118. V. Unmis- Set Palestine Free. loc. cit. 
119. Statement of 14. Vilner to the Gglo-TJS Investigation Committee. 
Y. H. 27 March 1946. 
120. Statement of M. Vilner to UNSCOP. Frankel Collection. pp. ci 
p. 213- 
121. In an Interview with C. Abrmskyp London 5 July 1973, he stated 
that Milimis had put forward the idea of a bi-national state 
or partition at the time of the London Congress of the Communist 
parties in 1047. The Congress's resolutions howeverq expressed 
support for a united independent democratic state guaranteeing 
equal rights to Arabs and Jews and specifically rejected 
partition. See Declaration on Palestine. World News and Views 
15 March 1947. ý. 9. pp. 101-102. 
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the Partyts proposed state was based on proportional representation; 
condemning the "aritbmetical approach" and denying the need for 
parity,, it claimed that once the foreign element was removed from 
Palestine, the two peoples would settle doN%n and solve their problems 
amicably. This was the Jewish comunists' decision at a time when 
the 'Scniet Union itself had just decided to clarify its own po-sition 
on the problem and throw its weight behind the, until now,, totally 
unacceptable idea of partition. I 
The Soviet Union' s public attitude on the Palestine problem 
began to talo-- shape only dz"--ing the April-May 1947 discussions at 
the W. The coviet representative's speech contained implicit 
support for partition. For the first time ever, a communist 
rtition Bolution d spokesman admitted -the possibilit; S- of a pa an 
endorsed "the aspirations of the Jews to establish their cmm state". 
122 
This however, was declared a second choice to be implemented only in 
the case of fa-ilure to realise the establishment of "an independent,, 
dual, democratic, homogeneous Arab-Jewish state". ' The ambiguity in 
this new Soviet aprroach allowed the Party to maintain its original 
-position, and its political propaganda continued to demand the 
creation c4f a bi-national state and to condemn partition. Thus in 
September 1947 the Party condemned the majority report of the UNSCOP 
which was in favour o-f partition, and criticised it for awarding the 
projected Jewish state a size "beyond the dreams" of the Zionist 
leaders, declaring it to be "Unworicable arxl impossible to implement". 
123 
came out in , L'avou. - of the mino-. Lty report calling for the creation 
of a "federal state". A month later,, when the Soviet representative 
declared his country's support for the minority report "in principle" 
but called for 'the implementation of the majority proposal vohich he 
described as a "bad solution" but the only possible one in the 
prevailing circumstances of deteriorating relations between Jews and 
Arabs, the PartY reproduced his speech in its Journal but refrained 
from indicating its ow, position. 
124 The change was,, haweverq not 
122. Speech of Groqyko.. 14 MaY 1947. Quoted in Hurewitz,, op. ci t. - p. 
288. 
123- Statement of '., rCP on the Recomendations of UNSCop. y,. H. 1., 3 and 
8, September 1947. Frankel Collectionp op. cit. p. 228. 
124. Istatement of PC; P on Speech o' Tsa-rapkin.. 13 October 1947. LH. 
14 October 1947. 
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long in coming., and a few days later it caze out in support of 
partition and the two-state plan. 
125 
17ithout waiting for the 
resolution of the problem at the W nor ascertaining which side the 
Coviet, Union vvould eventually support, 
126 the Party revised its 
previous opposition to partition in its political propaganda and 
declared itself Kboleheartedly in favour of a struggle "for the 
establis-Iment of two independent democratic states" in the country. 
127 
"'he Jem. sh co=mmists' support for the setting-up of the Jewish 
State and the war which followed.. was total. Finding themselves 
for the first time in their history in courplete unity of purpose with 
the rest of the Yishuv, they strove to form a united front with the 
"progressive wing" of the Zioniý; t movement. 
128 In calling for this., 
the Party di, d not omit to mention that the success of the Yishuv's 
struggle against the Mandate was partly due to the help of the Soviet 
Union and "all pro, -bressive forces" in tie world. 
129 With the 
rroclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948 the Jewish com=mists 
hailed the onset e. this "great day" and called for the total 
mobilisation of the Yishuv to partake in "the fight for our freedom",, 
in which the Jewish statel. s only allies were "the whole Jewish people" 
and the 'Soviet Union. Members of the Party took en active part in 
the ongoing war against the invading Arab armies., v&ile certain of 
its leaders were dispatched abroad to solicit aid for the newly 
establislied state. 
130 
During the military operations themselvesp 
the Party adopted a hard line, calling for the lifting of the ams 
125. Statement of PCP on Independence. F. H. 17 October 1947. 
126. Tsarapkin had decla-red in a speech delivered in mid-November the 
Soviet Union's intention of voting in favour of partition. The 
actual vote took place on the 25th November. The whole of the 
Soviet bloc with the exception of Yugoslavia voted in favour. 
127. Workers., Youth, Sons of the Yishuv. Hebrew Leaflet of CC/PCP 
November 16-947. 
128. S. Mikunis. The Peoples of Palestine Struggle for National 
Indemendence. Por j1j' Lasting Pea e, For A Peoples' Democracy (Organ of the Cominfo=) N-8- 5 April 1948. 
129. Statement of CC of Israeli Comm: unist Party on the Proclamation 
of the State of Israel.. May 1948. Quoted in 11. Ebbon. Communist 
Tact'!. Cs in Palestine. Middle East Journal. N-3- July 1948- p. 259- 
130. Both -. 3. Goshann1d (the Party Secretary) and Mikunis travelled 
to Eastern Europe to negotiate aid. The former was killed in 
a plane crash on a return trip fromPoland, 21 January 1948. 
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embargo, criticising the Provisional Government for agreeing to a 
ceasefire with the Arab states, and justifying the occ=ati6n of 
Arab areas outside the boundaries of the proposed Jewish state by 
referring to reasons of "strategic nece3sity"0131 
With the Party' s signing of the Israeli Declaration of 
Independence., and its General Secretary becoming one of the thirty- 
one members of the Provisional Council of Gcrver=--nt, the Jewish 
conmrtmists had travelled full circle and finally retux-ned to the 
position vinich they had held in 1919 before the pazlting of the ways 
betireen them and the rest of the Zionist movement. ? or nearly a 
quarter of a centur7 they had waged a fierce struggle aa-, -a4. =st 
establishing the "national home" and the partitioning of Palestine. 
In the end,, considerations of Soviet foreeign policy p--cved to be the 
deciding factor in their political decisions and it was this rather 
then any internal ideological revisionwhich had caused thlem to turn 
their backs on their years of hostility to Zionism, and to finally 
accept the "national solution" to the Jewish problem. 
131- S. Mikunis. We Shall Continue to Fi6ght =t4-l no Foz--iga Soldier 
Treads our Fair Land. Jewish Clarion. N-33. August 1948. 
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CHAPTER MEN 
TIM AURAB ITATI(ITTAL C010MMIST MOMM 
The Arab Workers' Congress 
The Comn=ists and the Arab Labour Movement 
Prior to the split of the PCP in 19432 the Arab corauunists were 
active in the two competing Arab I&bour organisations, the FAM and 
the various branches of the PAWS. 
1 The establishment of the NIL 
early in 19" was a triumph for the Haifa opposition group Which had 
itself launched the P. PLT during its struggle with the Party leadership. 
However, with the establishment of the INTILs a new organisational 
framework was created which rendered the FALT unnecessary. 
the united PCP had weakened. Si=ultaneously, the disappearance o. 
musal s sx: ppoefers in the labour movements vh1o were active in the 
ranks of the PAWS, and reconciled them to their Haifa enemies, now 
in control o. f the only organised Arab commmist group. This 
convergence reflected itself in a change of policy in the RALT. 
Although it continued to exist for some time., its leaders, who were 
T now also the leaders of the IML, favoured activity within the frame 
wo rk- o -A the PAWS - This helped further to heal the breach between 
the Haifa group and Musa's old supporters in Jaffa and Jerusalem. 
This new line reflected itself in the halting of attempts to win 
over new members- and in a more positive attitude towards the PAWS. 
Few applicants were now turned dowx and advised to join. the existing 
PAWS branches, 
2 
while Al Ittihad, the organ of the FATZ, continuously 
called for collaboration between all sections of the Arab labour 
movement, and the creation of a new framework which would bring 
together the FALT and the PAWS. 
The FALT remained numerically weaker than its rival and did not 
succeed in winning its acceptance as a legitimate partner in the 
labour mairement. Fevertheless.. it scored a major success by 
3 bringing out a weekly journal "Al Ittihad". An editorial in the 
first issue emplmsised the contribution of the Arab working class 
1. see Chapter 5. pp. 167-177. 
2. Suarvey of Palestine, Vol. 2. op. Cit- P- 765- 
3- Al Ittihad (UnitY) s subtitled, Voice of the Arab Workers in 
Palestines was edited by Emil Tuma on behalf of the FALT. The 
first issue appeared on the 14th May 1944.. (Heraafter referred. 
to as IT). 
214 
and the Arab people in Palestine to the struggle to defeat Nazism. 
It declared, as one of its aims,, the familiarisation of its 
readers with workers' struggles throughout the world, to enable 
Arab workers to benefit from the experiences of others in the comm= 
struggle for the creation of "a free and happy world". 
4 Its second 
major aim was to pursue the daily economic struggle of Arab workers 
to improve their economic.. social and cultural conditions and to 
unite their efforts in one strong movement. The editorial went 
on to explain that by defending the rights *of "the toiling masses 
of the people" it was sexv='g the interests of Arab Palestine as a 
whole and showing the world the progressive face of the Arab 
national movement. 
From the start., Al Ittihad received the support of the left 
branches of the -PAYM. 
In response to a letter sent by the editor 
of the paper to all Arab labol-Ir Organisations- calling on them "to 
participate in editing the workers' paper" by sending representatives 
to take part in periodic meetings to decide its general policY5 
four orgarmisations v-dAch belonged to the PAWS responded favourably. 
The Areb vorikers' societies in Jerusalem., Ramalla,, Bethlehem# and 
Beitiala, agreed to send their representatives and proposed the 
formation of a central ad-4nistrative councilt calling on all other 
Arab. labour organisations to support Al Ittihad as the legitimate 
voice of the Arab vorking class in Palestine. 
6 
For the first two years of its existences Al Ittihad devoted 
considerable attention to labour affairs and to the activity of 
Arab labour organisations. It is important to see the views expounded 
by the paper not as solely representative of the opinions of a number 
of trade unionists., but as being an important ideological component 
of the armoury of the Arab comimmists. Al Ittihad served as the 
organ of both the Arab laboux movement and of the NIL., and its 
editors and most frequent writers were the political leaders of the 
NM. Most cf the articles relating to the affairs of the labour 
4. our Paper. IT 14 MaY 1944. 
5. For Workers Unity. IT 14 May 1944. 
6. lbid. Meeting of Arab Workers Societiess 7 MaY 1944- 
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movement were wrilUten by Farah, himself one of the founders of the 
NIL. 7 
The Arab communists saw their mle within the labour movement 
as cmsisting of defending and protecting the interests of the Arab 
workers by demanding sr. end to the "wage discrizrination" policy of 
the Gove=ment, and decrying the existing differentiation in wages 
and conditions of Arab and Jewish -wotrk&rs. 
8 
The Government was 
called upon to grant offlic. -I al recognition to the Amb labour 
organizations9 and cx-r-iticised for "not creating the conditions 
necessp--y" for the progress of trade unionirin,, 
10 
with collective 
bargaining instituted by the introduction of the relcvant labour 
legislation. 11 Company unions were denounced as an atterrpt by the 
fo. re-. &n companies to thwart independent labour organization,, as were 
private labour exclianges, v. hicb charged the workers fees for securing 
them employment, and the Goverrxent was called upon to establish 
public labour exchanges and to outlp-w private ones. 
13 
The attitude 
to the Labour Department was ambivalent. Initially., it was welcomed 
as providing the impetus for trade union organization.. and for 
conferring legality on the spontaneous organizational activity of 
the wcrkers. 
14 
This defence of the Department's activity can be 
understood in term of the support and co-operation výhich the FALT 
had received frcm the Labour Department on its fo=ation and especially 
from one of the labour insp ectors. H. Chudleigh. 
15 
The Department' s 
failings, were referred to "the opposition of reactionary elements 
in the admirdstration" to its activities. 
16 
But after continuously 
7. B. Farah had organised the opposition to Musa within the TCP. Iie 
was a founder menber of the NU and member of the CC/FALT and its 
Secretary. After the split of the PAZZ, he become a menber of the 
Executive Committee of the AWC. 
8. B. Farah. The Arab Viorker and the necessity of protecting him. 
IT 21 May 1944. 
9. T. - Toubi. 'We Demand Official Recognition of the Trade Unions. IT 
30 JA; 1Y 1944- 
10. B. Farm. For the introduction of labour legislation. IT 7 
wovember 1945. 
n. B. Farah. What Arab Workers Demand from the Labour Department. 
IT 25 June 1944. 
12. B. Fanih. Company Unions. IT 4 June 1941+. 
3-3- Labour Exchanges. IT. 28 May 1944. 
14. What Arab Worlear, -- Demand from the Labour Department. loc. cit. 
15. For relations between Chudleigh and the FALT see,, Su ey of the 
Amb c==Lmists2 1946. a. cit. p. 2. 
3.6. The Labour Department. IT 15 April 1945- 
i 
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insisting that the DeparLnent's role was . "not only to register the 
conditions of the vvorkers but to change them", Al Ittihad dismissed 
the Department for having become "an obedient tool in the hands of 
. 
17 lie Arab labour movement was the Government" The duty of t! 
decla. red to consist of putting pressure on the Goverrment to comply 
with a nt=: Der of demands: the introduction of social inswrance and 
pezission schemes, the fixing of minimun was-. ,, es and minimu-n working 
hours., equaLising the wageE of Arab workers- with those of non-Arabs,, 
the setting-up of supervisory cou=ils with workers' Participation.. 
revising the laws forbidding strikes, implementing f ree compulsory 
primary education,, and embarking on constnmtion --cbemes for scbools, 
hospitals and road-- to absorb workerrs threatened by impending 
unemployment at the end of the -war. 
19 
A series of articles explaining the importance of organisation 
"P. s the baris of success" in the struggle between workers and erployerss 
also pointed to the necessity of a strong labour movement to attract 
the attention of the traditional leadership of the national movement, 
and to perfo= its role "in the national struggle and in 'the creation 
of a new society with no exploitation". 
20 To be able to shov the 
prcgressive face of the labour movement abroad,, to give the lie to 
the HiEtadrut' s assertions that its opponents in Palestine were 
"reactionary feud'al effendis" and to have a voice in the national 
councils and in dec-Iding policy rdlating to Palestine's future and to 
the workers affairs, it was necessary to mite all Amb labour 
organisations in one "higher Arab labour council". 
21 While rejecting 
the PAIWSI s claim to leadership of the labour movement,, the Amb 
communists indicated that they were willing to collaborate with the 
PAWS leaders. The new leadership they proposed., would draw on the 
experience of the older organisations like the PAWS,, and on the 
22 
awareness and progressive outlook of new organisations like the FALT. 
17. The Road of the Laboix Department,, IT 17 November 1946. 
18. B. Farah. The Higher Arab Labour Council. IT 23 July 1944- 
19. Memo of 'YALT to the Chief ', ýecretary, 21 May 1944. 
20. B. Farah. Organization is the Basis, of Success of the Arab Labour 
Movement. IT 13 August 1944. 
21. B. Farah. The Higher Arab Labour Council. 
. 
1oc. cit. 
22. B. Farah. The Higher Arab Labour Council. IT 1 June 1944. 
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al 
Hot long after its establishment,, Al Ittihad was forced to 
defend itself against accusations, made in the guise of "the national 
interest" that it was dividing national unity with its calls for an 
independent labour organisation and an economic struggle against the 
employers. F. Nassar 
23 
replied to theee attacks by affirming the 
political role of the labour movement in showing "the progressive 
face of our struggle to the popular democratic forces in the world" 
and denied that the HAC yf ormed as it was at the behest of the Arab 
League, was representative of Palestine's Arab inhabitants. 
24 
Despite this',, the labour movement was prepared to co-operate with 
other classes in Palestine, "the peasants and the small capitalists 
and lando*mers"., -on the basis of a "common interest against 
inMerialise. 
25 Nevertl., eless it did this,, conscious that its duty 
lay in drawing the other two classes away-from concentrating their 
efforts on the struggle against Zionism., and directing them against 
the "main enerry' of the Axab national movement, British imperialism. 
The Arab cormunists were careful to explain that their primary 
Mreoccupation was with the national struggle for indepeadence and 
that the labour movement's duty was "to support the national econonV 
1z the present stage of the national liberation struggle". 
26 Amb 
employers were to be treated differently f rom foreign ones; - v6hereas 
the latter were 116bstacles in the way of independence,, , 
27 the Arab 
workers were conscious of the need to strengthen national unity and 
did "not want to embaxTass the national ecmorq". 
28 Co-operation 
and mutual sacrifice on both sides were called for in order that the 
23- F. Wassar returned to Palestine f rom, exile in Iraq in January 1943. 
He becarn secretary of the workers' society in Nazareth end was 
active in bringing about the split of the PAWS in August 1945. He 
then becaire. leader of the newly formed AM, but later left it to 
join the leadership of the IRM. 
24. F. 11assar. Our Labour Movement and the RAO. IT 25 Wovember 1945. 
25- F. Wassar. Our plan was and remains strong and correct. IT 2 
December 1945. 
26. B. Farah. The national economy and the Arab workers. IT 10 
Septenber 1944. 
27- K. Shannir. The labour movement's stand towards the employers. 
IT 30 December 1945. 
28. In Septemberý 1944, a strike broke out at an Arab-owned mill near 
T; ablus. Al Ittihad took the side of the workers and called on the 
employers to concede to their demands. At the same timej, it 
explained that this did not imply enmity to the Arab national 
economW, support for which however could not mean concurring in 
the outrageous exploitation of Arab workers and not giving them 
P_ fair wage. , -, ee IT 24 Septenber 1944. 
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workers should not be exploited under the pretext of "nationalist 
slogans" and the argument was put to the employers thet the granting 
of higher wages was in their own best interests as it vould lead to 
higher productivity and to higher salee of their goods as a result 
of the improved purchasing power of a large Fection of the population. 
29 
Farah rejected "patriotic" attacks on the Arab labour movement as 
being based on the identification of "national interest" with a 
small section of the population who stood at the head of the national 
movement and Who were "afraid of losing some of their profits" , and 
emphasised that the workers stniggle, was a fundamental part of the 
national : movement. 
30 The working class was declared to constitute 
"one third of the Arab population" and to be the only class which 
was "grawing daily as a result of the development of industry". Thus 
it was cnly rigýat that the labour =vwient should participate in the 
struggle according to its own interests, particularly as the national 
struggle was "not a monopoly of any one class". 
31 Going even further, 
he declared that the -, -. orking class was "the most important class in. 
society" and the one with the biggest stake in "liberating humanity 
from the existing regime of exploitation and national slaver7". 
32 
In the specific case of Palestine,, the Arab workers were directly 
threatened by the influx of Jewish immigration and land transfers 
to Jewish companies, which necessarily led 11 -o increased unemployment 
and the migration ef large numbers. of peasants to the tcmns in search 
of scarce eirployment. The working class had a direct interest in 
engaging in the political struggle to defend its own threatened 
rights, and to influence events in such a way as to ensure that 
the existing economic and political regime in the country was a 
democr-atic one, to enable it to realise its aims. 
33 
The differences between the left branches of the PAWS and the 
central leadership of the organisation in Haifa manifested themselves 
more clearly wit-h the grvwth of the influence of the NIL,, which 
29. The natioxnal economy and the Arab worker. loc. cit. 
30- B. Farah. The Arab labour movement and thý national econoqr in 
the national struggle. IT 22 October 1944. 
31- B. Farah. Arab workers Taid the struggle for national liberation. 
IT 18 June 1944. 
32. Ibid. 
33- B. Farah. Arab workers and politics. * IT 9 July 1944. 
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thmugh the wide distribution of its organ Al Ittihad, was able to 
reach the rank and file members of the PAVVS. 
34 The communists now 
controlled the labour organisations of Jerusalem, Jaff a and Gaza,. in 
addition to a number of smaller branches., which left the FAWS 
I eademhip in control of only Haifa, and humerous rural branches with 
insignificant member-ship. The rift between the two sections of the 
move-ment made itself fell, on a number of izsues. Most importantly 
the PAWS leadership was cpposed to worker participation in political 
affairs, while the left took the opportunity of evezy labour 
gathering to press its political demnis on the Government and on 
the national leadershi-n. 
35 
At the same time, the left branches 
openly declaxed their association with -Uie coaamist movement. A 
nu=berOfAk-----xainen. t leaders of tlie labour organizations in Jerusalem, 
Jaffa and 'lazareth regularly wrote for Al Ittihad, while some 
officers of PAWS branches held official positions in the 14"M. 
36 
The gatherings of the left branches increasingly issued political 
resolutions demanding the widening of democratic liberties in the 
countrys and came out openly in support of the Red Axwj and the 
US-SR. 37 In Haifa, on the other hand, celebrations held on the 
occasion of May Day were characterised by attacks on the Arab 
com=2nists for "misleading the workers",, and on the Foviet Union. 
38 
Another difference centred on the attitude towards Jewish vorkers 
in Pales' tine. V. -hile all were unanimouz in condemning the Histadruts, 
especially its attempts to recruit Arab worlmrs, the left affirmd 
that Arab workers were ready to collaborate with Jewish woricers., and 
34- "The AP. rab labour movements Decenber 1945". Survey of Palestine. 
loc. cit. 
35- e. g. In a meeting held in the Arab workers' society in Jerusalem, 
to celebrate the First of May 1941+t a resolution was passed 
condemning the decision of the executive committee of the Labour 
Party in favour of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
IT. 14 May "3L944. On the occasion of the May celebrations in 1945j. 
telegram were dispatched to the Chief Secretary calling for the 
release of Arab political prisoners. Telegram fx R. Habbab on 
behalf of the AWS 'in Jaffa to Chief Secretary, 2 May 1945, and 
Telegram from F. Nassar on behalf of the AWS in Nazareth to Chief 
Secretary, 11 th May 1945. ISA File 260 lAab/2/45. 
36. e. g. As'ad Yakki, deputy secretary of the AWS in Gaza was also a 
me=ber of the 111L local committee in the town. 
37. Report of Kay Day celebrations in Jerusalem, Jaffa APS. IT, 6 
December 1945- 
38. Report of Regional Labour inspector on May Day celebrations in 
Had a PAWS., 19 May 1945. ISA File 258. I/Lab/3/42. 
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the differences that existed were characterised as due to "surface 
contradictions" which could be satisfactorily resolved. 
39 Members 
of the left branches took the initiative in arranging for meetings 
of Arab and Jewish workers to establish joint action committeea at 
the places of work, whILle emphasising that such organisations should 
remain free fromliistadrut interference. 
40 
The grov. -Ing strength of the left within the PAWS was now however 
reflected in its decision-making bodies. Despite the fact that the 
left controlled the most important labour organisations in the country 
with the e=eption of the Haifa centre, Sami Taha, the leader of the 
PA'vS rem, *Lned in control of the rural branches, which always gave him 
a majoe-ty viaenever an important issue was put to the vote. The 
left dire&. ed their energies to two fronts. The first was to put 
pressure on the leadership to co-operate with the Ffi. LT,, and the 
-hin the labour movement. They second related to democracy wit 
called for changes in the ort-ýanisational rules which allowed the sane 
voting power to both large and small organisations, and for elections 
to the executive committee of the PAWS. Yet despite the evident 
strength of the left branches, Taha continued to igaore them. His 
control of the central organisation and his in-built majority 
threatened the com=mist leaders of the left branches with liquidation. 
This fear, couppled vith Taha's high-handed policy, coincided 'Aith the 
ITIZI s despair of affecting any change within the PP. '%'X, leaderehip., 
and i=elled them to actively work for splitting the organisation. 
41 
The Split of the Labour Movement ana the Foxnation of the 
Arab Workers'- Congress 
The imediate origins of the split which took place in August 
3.945 camm be traced back to differences between the left bra=hes of 
the PAWS and its leadership., over the oomposition of the Arab labour 
39- Speech of Odeh al-Ashhabi one of the leaders of the Jerusalem 
AWS in the May Day celebrations in Jerusalem 1944. IsA 65/304B- 
40. e. &Conference of Postal and Telegraph workers in Palestine. IT 7 
June 1945. 
4l. Survey off Arab Commmi-sts. 1946. op. cit. pp. 54. Interviews 
with EZ.. Tumal Haifa 4 April 1974; F. Salfitis Amman 26 march 1974; 
and M. Kuwaider, fim=., 7 March, 1974.. 
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delegation to the London. Conference of the World Trade Union Yovement 
held in Pebnmxy 1945. The left pressed to make the delegation 
representative of the varIouz shades of opinion within the labour 
movememt., and to use this international platform to show that the 
Arab %arkers "differentiated between Jews and Zionists" and that the 
ai= of the Arab national movement was "to liberate the Arab and 
Jewish masses from exploitation and from Zionism". 
42 In the event 
Taha was able to defeat the left' s, attempts to block the candidacy 
of his ov. n nomineep the lavqer Hana, Asfour,. by agreeing to a 
comprordse vdhereby a repre-, kentative of the FALT was also included 
in the delegation. 43 The affair however was not to be resolved to 
-1 -, -he setizfaction of the left. The B---Itish Government vtilc granting #1 
visas to '. "LahaL and Asef our, withheld it f mm the FALTI s delegate Farah, 
44 
245 -1 and when it did eventually allow him to travel to London he ar. ved 
late at the Conference and was granted observer status only. 
46 
The failure of the Ixab delegation at the London Conference to 
block the passage of a resolution supporting the establishment of 
"the national home"47 led to further disagreements between the left 
and the PATS leadership. Whereas the latter ce-ticised the USSR 
for its support of the pm-ZicniE-t resolution, the left defended the 
Soviet stsnd and explained it in term o.. ft the necessity of maintaining 
the unity off the intemational labour niovement in the face of 
"atte=ts by reactionary forces" to !! Plit it. 
48 In addition,. the 
le4L`t attributed the Arabs' failure to the intermal structure of the 
PAT. S and to its inability to appeal to the "progressive forces" in 
the intemational labour movement. 
49 
The spark for the split in the PAWS was the decision of a labour 
conference50 to nominate Taha and Asfour yet again as delegates to 
42.1T 9 14 Januar7 1945. 
43- Ibid. 
41+.. I-T, 21 January 1945. 
45. IT, ) 4 February 3.945. 
46. Survey of Arab Conr=i. -,: ts,, 1946. -op. ci - p. 
4. 
47- Report of the World Trade Union Conference. (London 1945) p. 181. 
48. f-T, 6 and 13 MaY 1945. 
49.1-T, 16 14ovember 1945. 
50. The conference toolk. place in Nablust 5th August 1945. Seventeen 
labour organisations claiming to repr6sent l5xOOO Arab workers 
took part. ', -ee,, Survey of Palestine. on. cit- p- 764- 
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the World Iýrade Union Conference due to be held in Paris. During 
the meeting Taha had overridden the objections of the lef t branches 
to the nomination of Asfour and reportedly threatened "to dissolve 
any organisation" which objected to his decisions. 
51 
The 
representatives of the Jerusalem, Jaff a, and Gaza branches withdMi 
f roz: the meeting in protest, and a few days later issued a statement 
declaring their withdrawal from the Pgh7-,, and their intention to 
hold a labour ccngress to elect a labour delegation to Paris# and 
to formulate "a constitutional and organisational f ramework for the 
labour mavement". 
52 
The left brand., hes justif ied their v. -ithdrawal from the PAWS by 
pointing to a number of abuses v&ich in their opinion had resulted 
in "stagnation" in the development of the Imb labour =vement wid 
in its isolation on the international scene. They emphasised the 
absence of dezr---, rL-. cy vdthin the PATS in vhir-h "no election-, had been 
held for a period of over ten years".. and the dictatorial met7hods 
o-L Taha in forcing hils opinions on the branches of the mvement . 
53 
They further pointed out that the financial affairs of the movement 
had been kept a secret even from leading members,. that the majority 
of rural branches "exi-, ted on paper only",, and that the main thrust 
of tj-x mcvement had been directed at establishing co-operatives 
rather -U-, an at trade union cre-, anisation. 
54 
Turning to H. Asfour's 
nomination as a delegate to international conferences, the breakaway 
branches explained that Taha, had "forced him on the labour movement" 
at the time of the London Conference, despite the opposition of the 
largest branches.. and that he had attempted to do so again. Their 
opposition to Asfmr was based on the fact that he was "a landowner 
-who does not represent the interests of the workers", and that his 
presence at international ccnferences was exploited by the Zionists 
to clsln that the Arab labour movement was "led by effendis". 
55 A 
report by an official of the Labour Department substantiated most 
51- Statement of AITS in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Gaza, 10 August 1945. 
. 
IT 12 August 1945. 
52. Md. 
53- Aid. 
54- IT 21 August 1945. 
55- Aid. 
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of the claims roade by the left branches conceming the absence of 
democracy and the non-representative 'nature of the delegations 
chosen by the PAWS leadershi1j, and concluded by stating that "this 
Department thinks that the actions of the dissidents was justified". 
56 
The congress called for by the left branches of the PATS, was 
hele. on the 19th tugust, 10745 and was attended by represent Ptiv es 
of the three big brancheE w1hich had initiated the split, and eight 
smaller ones. In addition them viere relresentatives of the FALT, 
the Trade Union of IPC "(arkere, the Trade Union of V. orkers in the 
Consolidated Refineries, and various small unions most of which had 
remained outside the framework of the tmo co=peting organizations. 
57 
, tlthougýa an 
invitation ha:! been extended to the FAM'S leadership to 
pa:, -.. c--4pp-te in the nneetwing58 thi. - was rejected. Inctead, a smll 
r, --b attacked the meeting, and later sirAlar attacks were made on, 
the FILT offices in Haifa, and efforts were made to clo. se dov. m some 
cf the seceding organisations. 
59 
The Congmss elected an executive committee made up of the heads 
cf the ATSS in Jerusalem, jaffa and Gaza, as well a-- F. -nrah,, v6ho was 
the Secretaxy of the PALT, 11. Amer, a member of the central committee 
c. 41 the ITM, and F. Nassar the head of the ATS in Nazamth. 
60 
it 
proceeded tc elect the two leaders of the ULL, Farah and Amer as its 
delegates to the Paris Conference. 
61 
The Congress alEo passed a 
nu::: a:. er of resolutions dealing with both economic and political 
matters. In the economic sphere, the resolutions called for 
Govemment labour legislation to protect the worla-. rs,, construction 
schemes to deal with unenployment., the establiL_-hment of f ree industrial 
V training centres and agricultural schools and issued a host of state- 
ments of support for various other trade union issues. 
62 
The 
56. "Report from the regional inspector of Labour-Northem District, 
30 September 194511 ISIN File 1440. 
57. The First Amb Workers' Congress-Jaffa 1.00 August 1945. ITj 21 
August 1945. 
58- "Letter from secretaxy of AWS-Jaffa to District Commissioner Lydda) 
Tc 10 Serter: ber 1945" SAL File 1440 Jb/l. 
59- Ibid. 
60. The AWS; -; Nazareth had --evered its contacts with the PAWS, as early 
as August 1944, but had remaixied outside the PALT. IT, 13 August 1944. 
61. The First Arab Workers' Congress-Jaffa 19 August 1ý4-5- loc- cit- 
62. Ibid. Economic resolutionz of the congress. 
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political resolutions called for the establishment of an independent 
democratic govenurbený in the countrys guaranteeing the econozrdcl 
social and political rights of all its Wisbitants and, while 
declaring fi= opposition to Zionism and to Jew-Ish immigrations 
pointed to the necessity of "explaining to the Jewlth, people that 
support for Z.; cn: Lm was contrary to their own intere--ts". The 
Goverment was called upon to remove political censorzl-dp and 
institute democratic freedo., r--, to purge Government Departments 
of "reactionary elements", to release Arab political prisoners, 
to hold democratic elections for imm4cipal and local councils and 
to change the contents of school curriculi endovdng them with a 
"naticnal democratic content". 
63 
The establisbment of the Arab Workers' Congress (AVIC) was a 
vindication of those me: rbers of the ML who had argued that the 
left was strong enough to establish its mn independent labour 
organisation, and that the left branches in the PAWS had "the 
support of eighty per cent of the Arab labour movement". 
64 
The 
split left the Haifa PAWS bentre "in a shaky position" and the new 
committees established in the tmms where the split was effective, 
had "no rank and file". 
65 
The arguments put forward by Nassar and 
other KILT leaders who were in favour of the split., had centred round 
the them that Taha himself was making it impossible for the left 
to remain in the PATS and at the saw time pursue an active policy. 
If that was the casep then it was probable that Taha was just as 
happy to rid himself of the left. However., what the split had 
revealed was that the left within the PAWS enjoyed the support of 
an overwhelming majority of the active membership,, which itself 
-raises doubts about the fears of "liquidatim" cited by the communists 
as one of the reasons for the necessity of the split. In the event 
however, the communists succeeded in establishing a strong labour 
organisation independent of the Haifa-based PAZZ, but the latter did 
not disappear. It soon managed to recoup its strength and went on to 
63. The First Arab Workers' Congress-Jaffa 19 August 1945. loc. cit. 
Political resolutions of the congress. 
64. F. Nassar. The Arab laýbour Ytoverent. IT, 2 September 1945. 
65. Report of Regional Inspector of Labo: Zp 30 September 1945- 102-cit- 
225 
become perhaps numerically larger than the AWC itself. The 
coc=unists had long campaigned againLt Taha, for his refusal to 
co-operate with the FALT, and the resultant duplication of efforts, 
and accu-sea him of "splitting" the Arab labour movement. Neverthe- 
less9 socn after the split, the PAWS' recovery caused them to renew 
tl,. eir calls to Taha for unity. This however was continually 
rejected by the PAVZ, and at the time of partition in 1948 the 
Arab labour movement waz still divided into two competing sections, 
a situation which obtained largely thanks to the communists' success 
in splitting the PAWS'- in August 1945. 
, t-ctivitv of the ; rab 
"Workers' Congress 
Desrite the fact tliat the new labour organisation was bo= as 
a result of a split, it achieved almost instant success. Besides 
attracting to its ranks a majority of the active membership of the 
PAYS., the FAIT, whose leaders had taken part in the establishment 
of the A-V-Z, soon announced its own dissolution and amalgamted with 
the newly established organisation. 
66 
Within the Arab commity,, 
the new trade union.. despite its avowedly co==ist leadership, 
was received favourably by a group of young pmfessionals, as well 
as by ele=nts opposed to the 11, uftil s hegemony over the national 
movement who saw in its fomation a challenge to the monopoly of 
authoe, ty wielded by him. 
67 
An additional boost was the decision 
taken by the leaders of the FAM and the editors of Al Ittihad to 
transfer the ownership of the joumal to the Executive Committee of 
the A. M. , which assumed responsibility for its publication in September 
1945.68 The greatest a&. ievement of the AV, -C however, carm with the 
66. statement of the Administrative Comitmittee of YALT in answer to 
the call of the aecutive Committee of AK; to dissolve itself, 
10 October 1945. IT 14- October 1945. 
67- A list of contributors to the ATC included, R. Nashashibis the 
leader of the opposition to the Iluftis Karaman Dick and Salti 
(Cigarette manufacturers), The National Bus Company, and a group 
of Doctors end Lawyers. At a meeting organized in Jerusalem to 
welcome the returning Yaris delegation of the gv', '. C, attended by 
a number of notables, contributions amounted to. EP 215- See 
1T 9 December 1945. 
68. Yh-e decision to invite the AWC to take, responsibility for Al Ittihad 
was taken on 7 September 1945. IT 16 September 1945. F. Nassars 
the Secretary of the Executive Committee of Rý-C was delegated to 
edit the papers and the first issue bearing the name of the AIM 
appeared on the 30 September 1945. 
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success of its delegation to the Paris Trade Union Conference in 
being accredited as representatives of the Arub labcur movement in 
Palestine. 
69 
The international recoPition implied by the AWT r, participation 
in an intexnational labour gathering., strengthened its standing 
intex-nally. Amer's speech at the Conference cri-l-wicized the 
decision of the London Conference in support of the "national home", 
conde=ed Zionism as a tool of international capitalism, and declared 
that Arab 'and Jewish workers had common interests., and should 
struggle jointly against Zior-im and for Palestine' s independence. 
70 
In the events the AWC delegation scored a double tritunph; together 
with other Arab delegates it st: 7ported and secured the nomination 
of the Lebanese cc=unist delegate 1. Al Ariss, to the position of Hear 
V 
East rep=ese--' tative on the eXecutive of the Intemational Federation, 
in opposition to the candidacy of a Histadrut delegate from Palest0ine. 
It also succeeded in blocking the passage- of a pro-Zionist resolution 
similar to the one takm et, the London Conference. 
71 On its return 
to Palestine, metings were held in various tawns to celebrate the 
retux-,. off the delegation., and the ATC took this opportunity boIl. -h to 
publicise its local political and economic demands. and also to 
ex-clain that Palestine's struggle for independence was similar to 
-tIhat waged by other colonial peoples, and that it was necessary to 
make contact with outside democratic forces to secure their support. 
72 
E . ight months alfter its establishment., the ATC held a Becond, 
Congress w, hich was devated mainly to a discussion of its prospective 
const-iticn. 
73 The Constitution which was approved after some minor 
amendments contained the usual pledges to struggle for the unity of 
the labour movement, for labour legislation,, for recognition of Arab 
trade unions. % for the introduction of pensions and social insurance 
69. -"1meYPfBQ%iiie. op- ci - P. 765 70. EL-eech of M. Amer at Paris Conference. IT 28 October 1945. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Celebrations for returning Paris delegation in Jerusalem. IT 
9 December 1945. 
73- Mae constitution was prepared by 0. al Ashhab, K. Shannir and H. 
Abu Aysha. Al Ghad N. 20. P. 22. All had been members of the PCP 
before 1943- Abu fivsha had received his training at the 
Comintern school in Moscow in the early thirties. 
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schemes and for "the protection of the workers vis-a-vis the 
employers" ti-xrough the introduction of various measures regulating 
hours, wages and holiday pay. 
74 
Two of the articles in the 
Constitution were of striking significance. First, despite the 
fact that it defined the aims of the AMIC as "the Organisation and 
unity of Arab workers in Palestine"., it also declared its intention 
of "wor; d-ng for the co-operation and Solidarity Of all Palestinian 
workers irrespective off nationality., colour, religion or political 
belieA The second alffirzed the non-sectarian character of the 
AIM and declared its readiness to "co-operate with all parties and 
associations working for Palestine' s freedom and independence,, for 
the establishment of a democratic government . ýbere all its citizens 
. 
75 
would enjoy equal xights and responsibilities" This Second 
Congress -which approved the ATV s Constitution was also significant 
in tha-t a number of women workerF attended as delegates, and the 
new CC elected by '12he Congress included two vomen members. 
76 Mraking 
great play of the dernocralvic proceedings o A. I the gathering, the 
Congress' resolutions called on the PAWS to join with the 9, C on 
U4- 
. he basis of the latter's "democratically adopted constit tion 
and called on the leadership of the national movezent to establish 
national unity on the basis ol "free and popular elections" . 
77 
The policy pursued by the ATC was char-acterised by support for 
militant political and economic action,, and attempts to establish 
joint Arab-Jewish action committees to pursue commn economic demands 
on the shop floor. Even when it criticised the activity of Jewish 
workers Im- the army camps., where the majority of workers were Arabs., 
it argued that "there xre no differences between Arab and Jewish 
workers" and that its objection to the activity of certain Jewish 
overseers was "not because they are Jewish but because of their 
political bias". 
78 
Joint strikes by Arabs and Jews were defended 
and the ATWO , warned that Arab opposition to such activity,, which was 
of a non-political nature, was playing into the hands of company 
74-- The constitution off the ATC. IT 21 April 1946. 
75. Ibid. Article 2. Sections l(bT-arxl 1( J) . 76. The 2nd Congress of AVjCs 14 April 1946. IT 21 April 1946. 
77. Ibid. Resolutions of the Congress. 
78. Memo of Jaffa and Lydda AWS to Labour Departments 29 January 1946. 
ISA File 1440. 
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oi,, ners, vvho stoked racial divisions in order to forestall labour 
unity. 
79 Mezzbers cf AWC branches were in. 3trumental in organising 
joint meetings of Arab and Jewish workers and loudly publicised 
them as proof of the ability of Arabs and Jews to work together in 
pursuit of their common interests. 
80 
When a strike by the e=loyees 
cf the Department of Posts and Telegraphs b=ke out in 1946,, .W 
lasting 
for two weeks., and "virtually paralysing the ad=inistration, including 
railways and postal co==ications"., 
81 
the A: jT, ' called It a "historic 
strike... th-- first time in Palestine that Arab and -JrNish workers 
have united to show that there are no differences between them and 
that they have a co==n enemy". 
82 
A join'. statement waz issýiad by 
the NLL and the PCP supporting the strike83 and the '61.7 disnatched a 
delegation to show solidarity with the strikers and called on all 
Government er. Tloyees to come out in solidarity strikes. Nassar, 
the Secretary of the M, Cl actively intervened in the stn-ke, ur-ging 
the strike leaderso without success, not to acce-pt any ccri-rOmise andl. 
to continue the strike until the denands of all 'the strikezrz, both 
civil servants and workers were met. 
84 
The RNC was particularly active a ng Arab ca . workers, 
hollding 
a special congress for them attended by one h,,: ndreed, and twenty 
delegates which put their demands to the milita--, authori ties. 
85 
Failing to elicit any positive response., it called for a one-day 
86 
national strike which. was met with unanimu: 3 rez3onse when 
79. The strike in the oil refinery in Haifa. IL 2 '" --7ebr-, -. iry 3-947- 
80. e. g. A successful attempt was -iia-de in the 0-1- *I refineries J--i 
Haifa on the initiative of, a leading me=b--r of the -, 
Sadek 
Jarrah to set up a joint loca"]. orgaLization. IT 223 j-ume 1947. 
81. C-0-733/457/75156. Strike of e=., loyees in the Dmam: m! nt of 
Posts and Telegraphs, 9 April 1946. 
82. Statement of -rbcecutive (Dommittee oil IT 221 and 25 April 1946. 
83- CC. /PCP and CC/tLL Arabic leaflet on Civil zervants -strike. 
. April 1946. 84. IT 28 April 1946. 
85. The Congrre3Z of camp workers in Gaza, 10 -, -'ebnxavj. IT 23 ? 6bruary 
1947. 
86. S"tatement of CC of Arab camp vvor'z, -ers affiliated to to ca: zp 
workers for one day strike. Fa"ast: Ln '. 'I 4%fay 19i+7. 
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thousand Arab and Jewish workers came out on strike. 
87 
-Eventually 
it gained recogaition -. F%== the camp authorities as the uole 
88 
representative of Arab workers in the camps throughout the country, 
Attempts were also made to organise village workers, and an AWC 
committee was established to deal with village affairs. 
89 
The 
Government was called upon to pay f azmiers for land taken awV from 
ie e ployment of them for use by the ar:, -Vr, to give priority to tIV 
those whose lands had been requisitioned, to build water towers, 
clinics and 
. 
schools in villages, to carry out irrigation projects, 
to supply famners, with seeds and free interest loans,, to reduce 
taxes to their pre-war level.. and to establi,.. h democratically 
elected local cou-ncils in all villages and entruzzt them with 
responsible tasks. 
90 A conference to discuý. s the problem of 
Me=p1o5ment wws also held, attended by a nwnber of employers and 
representatives of political parties., and it placed the onus on the 
Govemment to provide a solution to the problem. The speELI-xrs of 
the Am; put f orward practical pmposals for the alleviation of 
une-mployment suck as raising custonf. tariffs, banning overtime$ 
banning the use of prisoner-of-war labour, decontrolling building 
materials, stopping immigration, and the initiation of construction 
sc. 1hemes such as schools, hospitals and roads to absorb the unemployed 
woexers. 
91 
In the political field the ANT, held -Lhe customary celebrations 
an the oc--&"-on of the 11irst. of MV and adopted resolutions calling 
for the release of political prisoners, for the beiming of immigration, 
and for the establishmeni.: of an independent democratic government. 
92 
67. ! T- 25 MaY 1947- 
68. IT 24 August 194.7. 
P-9. Yn- a meeting held in Jaffa, 11 January 1947 attended by 20 delegates. 
IT 12 January 1947. 
90. Resolutions of 3rd Congress of AWC. IT 21 . 1-eptember 1947. 
91. "Report off T. Toubi Inspector of Labour on National Conference 
on Unem, -loyment., 15 October 1945". ISA File 260 I/Lab/2/45. The 
conference was attended by 65 delegates of whom 10 rerresented 
! ndustry and 8j, political parties. 
92. e. g. MaZv Day celebration in Jerusalem AWS. IT 11 May 1947. The 
paper re-ported that 1., 000 people attended the meeting. Similar 
meetings took place in Jaffa, Nazareth and Gaza which were 
addressed by local labour leaders q and those of the AM. and WIL. 
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On the occasion of national strikes such as the anniversary of the 
Balfour Declaration,, the AWO complied Yrith the national leadership' s ' 93 
call for strike action and used the event to hold public meetings 
to press the national leaders to establish a "democratically 
representative HAC" including vý-Ithin it " representatives of the 
worke--- and peasants". 
94 
The political role which some cf the K. 71, leaders wanted the 
organisation to play 
95 
was f or some time to give it the arTmearancc 
of a political party. Then Jamil liardam the Areb League delegate 
came to Palestine to try and establish a new. HAC, Nassar led a 
delegation of the -P-ý-C' to confer vdti., Mm, and impretsed upon him 
the necessity of including a representative of the labour movement 
C'6 in the prospective comzaittee. " In February 1946 a statement was 
brough, t out calling on tl,. e Arab people to boycott the Anglo American 
Investigation Connittee97 v-tile J. Hu,. sseini -jvho had declared the 
readiness of the national leaders to co-operate with the Committee 
was criticised for his "divisive action"., and the HAC's claim to 
represent Amb opinion wax- called into question. 
98 
Yben the report 
of the Committee was made public, the AWC; pointed -to its findings as 
proof cf the mictaken policy of the HAC and called for the Palestine 
problem to be t6, en to the M. 
99 
Yassar's numerous articles in 
Al Ittiha. Q., and the various meetings off the AWC branches continued 
to tackle political problemz., starting with calls for the terntination 
93- statement of CC/AVIC on Balfour Day anniverzaz7y. Palastin, 30 
October 1946. The paper reported that the PAV, 'S refused to 
c=ply and called on its supporters to strike for half-an-hour only. 
94. Yeeting of AWS Jerusalem on Balfour Day anniversary. IT 4 November 
1945. 
9 
. 05. 
F. Nassar the leader of the AWC wanted to establish a political 
ccamittee, and was in favour of a political role for the AM. 
This was resented by the NIL leaders who wanted the AM to pursue 
a purely economic role: eventually Nassar was co-o*d, not 
v. -i-thout some opposition, into the NLL leadership,, whereupon the 
AM, reverted to a more traditional trade union rolc. Interviews 
r1th F. Falfiti, Amman 26 11arch 1974; M. Ruwaider, Amman 7 March 
1974; -'-- Habibis Haifa, 3 April 1974. 
96. IT 25 November 1945. 
97. Executive Committee of A?, 'C: Statement to the working class and 
the Arab people., 24 February 1946. Al Ghad. N. 16. p. 2. 
98. Statement of Executive Committee of AAIC. IT 30 March., 1946. 
99. statement of Executive Committee of AWC flaý 1946. IT 12 May 1946. 
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of Zionist immigr, -ýtion and criticim of Arab League policy on 
Palestine, leading on to the castigation of the Iraqi and Egyptian 
Goverrments for their repressive internal policies. In the meantime 
the ATC found itself under attack from the national leadership 
concerning alleged co-operation with Zionist organizations. 
Defending itself againzt all such accusationL and pointing to its 
record of soliciting the support of "piogressive forces" on the 
inter7-a. tional scene for the caire of Arab national liberation 
100 
the 
AIT nevertheless adopted a conciliatory tone. It explained its 
position as being based on "separating the Jewish people from 
Zionism" and as calling for "understanding with the Jerish people! ' 
not in te-. -=s oll' i=: Igration and the slogan of a Jewish state, but on 
the basiss of its calls to the Jewish people" to support our struggle 
for Falestine's independence and freedom". 
101 
Yet it reminded the 
), JAC that, vLhile it had called for struggle against imperialism "in 
zthe first place",, the Imb leaders, by directing the struggle 
against Zicnisms were diverting the national movement from facing 
the main enery. 
The attitude of the ATC to the PAWS and especially to its leader, 
Taha, was characterised ky hostility coupled with repeated calls for 
unitrand co-operation. Taha. himself was criticised on four main 
issues: for acting as the "agent of the British Government"., f or 
ignoring ca" ls fcr unity between the two crganizations, for carx7ing 
out splitting activities wit-hin the labour Movement., and for 
t i6hwarting a nunber of strikes directed against foreign companies. 
As early as December 1946 the AM had contacted the PATS in order 
to start negotiations to mite the two wings of the labour movement, 
and had enlisted Y. al Ariss, the Lebanese trade union leader and 
the Bear East representative of the IFTU to act as mediator,, 
102 
Taha however was not interested and al Ari"-. ' efforts foundered as 
a result. Undaunted, the NML continued to declare the unity of 
the labour movement as "the problem. of the hour" and to pivss for 
100. Statement of Executive Co=: ittee of AM. IT 16 June 1946. 
101. F. Nazsar. "J. Husseini disfigures the aG; of the AWC11. IT 
9 june 1946. 
102. Interview vath M. al Arisss Beiruts 15 March 1974. See also IT 2Q. December 1946. 
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the unity of the FAM'S and the AWC , appealing to the rank and file of 
103 the mcnrement to destroy "separatism and its proponents". Taha 
was condemned f or attempting to f urther split the labour movement 
by employing "terrorist methods" against his opponents, 
104 by sending 
his supporters to take the place of striking workers, 
105 
and by 
setting up "Paper unions" 'where rival =ions were already in existence, 
thereby giving a pretext to employers to ignore the workers' dezancls 
and benefit by their divisions. 
106 
His record as a "strike breaker" 
was continuously conjured up. During the civil servants' strike he 
was accused of putting -pressure on workers in the oil industry and in 
the ca=s not to declare solicL--rity strikes. 
107 In the case of the 
strike of the IPC workers in Haifa he was accused of taking the side 
of the oil co=anies by declaring his "neutrality" 
108 
and trying to 
create despair among the ranks of the strikers by stating that the 
, te. ke had been "too has, ty" 
109 
nnd forbidding other workers from 
collecting donations for the strikers. 
110 
. 
In yet another instance 
he was criticised for calling for a general strike in the Public 
Works Department.. most of v., hose members were organised in the AMIC,, 
without co-ordinating beforehand with the latter, or even informing 
them of his prcposed course of action. 
ill 
lnccreasinEýy3, the communists's criticism of Taha cane to centre 
on his -political activity, and his declared intention of transfcrming 
the PAWS into a political party. This was denounced as "a retreat 
from the trade union struggle".. as evidence of his belief that "the 
workers did not possess sufficient consciousness" and of his lack 
of faith in the Arab labour movezr-nt. 
112 
His participation in the 
-103- Statement of ITUL: A general call to all Arab workers in Palestine 14 August 1947. IT 17 August 1947- 
104- A number of viorkc7-s- in the IPC who had deserted Taha and joined 
the rival All-10 had been physically attacked by PAWS members. IT 
18 k"ay 1947- 
105- 1T 23 February 1947. 
106. IT 9 February 1947. 
107- 
-Y; 
T- 5 May 1946. A Jewish Intelligence Report stated that Taha 
was under pressure from the Arab leaders to subvert the strike. 
See Survey of Arab communists, 1946. op. ci - P. 5. 108. IT 30 Ma=h 1947. 
109. IT 
-. 
ý13 and 23 111'arch 1947. 
110. IT 16 harch 1947. 
111. Y-T 10 August 1947. 
112. YT 8 September 1946. 
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London Conference held late in 194ý was declared to have been 
inposed on the HAC by the British Govemirent and he was dubbed 
"the xvpresentative of the British Govermment". 
113 His claims to 
speak in the name of the Arab working class were r-ldiculed; it was 
pointed out that within his own organization the PAWS9 elections 
had never been held, and his- claim to represent his omm membership 
was called into question. 
114 His contacts with the Br-itirh Labour 
Party "the friends of Zionism""' and his "suspect connections with 
imperialist circles" 
116 
rendered him, in Al Ittihad's view as acting 
in accordance with British lians for the partitioning of the country. 
His suggestion for the formation of an "armed Lrab guard for the 
protection of Arab villages" and his call "not for British evacuation 
but for the reduction of British forces in Palestine" were seen as 
3.17 
aind, ng to create "favourable conditions" for the coming partition* 
pite all the vitr-iolic attacks on Taha himself, the ARIC never Yet des- 
tired of calling for unit-j with the PAWS, and later condemned his 
assassination as a "heinous crime" directed at the whole at' the Arab 
labour movemen . 
118 
The last public act of the Arm was the convening of its Third I 
Congress in Septenber 1947. This represented the zenith of its 
p(r,; er. Ninety-four delegates took part in the Congress which lasted 
for three days. 
119 
Messages of congratulations were received from 
thirteen fomigr. labour o. -ganisations including the IFTU in whose 
activities the AWC had played an active part ever since the Paris 
Conference. 
120 The Congress' opening statement rejected partitions 
3-13- Statement of Executive Commit-tee of" AM on S. Taha statements in 
London. 1" 2 Februar7 1947. 
114. IT 8 September 194L. 
115. ! -T 2 March 1947. 
116. IT 9 March 1947. 
117- This man helps partition Palestine. IT 6 September 1947. 
118. IT 21 September 1947. Taha was murdered during the 3rd, Congress ý; F the AT-C. Attempts were made to put the blame for his death 
on the communists, but the most likely candidate remains the 
Mufti T! ho was resentful of Tahal s attempts to launch a new 
political party. 
119. The 3rd %', ong=esz af the = 12-14 September 1947. IT 21 September 
1947. 
120. TheExecutive Committee of the AWC had sent one of its own members 
as a delegate to the Prague meeting of the IFTU. IT 13 April 1947. 
Delegations were also sent to the Intemational YJu: ih Congress in 
Fraguet and to take :,., a--t in a road building project in Yugoslavia. 
IT 21 Septe-r-ber 1947. 
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and declared that the labour movement, could not be a political party 
but should open its ranks to workers from all political persuasions. 
'While stressing its support for all national parties worUng for the 
indeperdence of the country, it called on the UIT to grant the people 
of Palestine the right to self-determination, and on the IPTUq as 
representative of the international worldng class, to intercede on 
n of Palestine to enable it to secure it, - independence. 
121 
behalE 
The actual resolutions of the Congress:, startý*, ng with the preanble 
that the U. ýC was "a trade union organisation v. hich does not interest 
itself in party matters" covered every conceivable economic and 
political de=and., from calling on the Govermmen-11.1 to "eallarge the 
paved road system by extending t1-4m to all tov. ms and villages" to 
extending greetings to "the heroic Indonesian people in their 
strugg, le againf--. t in-rerialism". 
122 
The Congress can& to an end 
with the election, by secret ballot, of the ner executive =. -Tnittee. 
Democratic proced, -, -e did not however save * 
the G"u from the forthcoming 
disintegration thich took place a few months later as a result of the 
paxt' tion decision, and the newly elected leadership vms soon to 
find itself vathout any following. 
The creation oil the 9M, had come about as a result of the growing 
s4-ren W gth of the co=anists within the le-bour movement and their desire 
to unite its various parts. Despite the fact that its creation had 
led to the opposite of what had been intended, na=ly widening the 
divisions within the labour movement, its establishment proved 
beneficial both to the commmists and to the labour movement as a 
whole. As far as the ITM was concemed,, the AV,, r%, served as its labour 
base. Through its control of the leadership., the MrC invariably 
followed the political line laid down by the Arab comranists. 
Althougýl the overwhelming majority of the rank and file of the 
member-ship were not com-mmists., the existence of the K"r, enabled the 
com=1ists to contact the widest possible sections of the Arab 
working class. In the trade union field,, the AVOC was most active 
121. Opening statements Of 3rd Congress of AV: C 9 12 September. IT 
13 September 1947. 
122. Resolutions of 3rd Congress of AV,, C, 14 IT 21 
September 1947. 
September. 
- 
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in its support of Aorkers' demands and their strike actionz. A 
hostile source com-nenting on its role concluded "that it was without 
doubt more faithful to the interests of the workers than the p. Aj, , S,,. 
123 
The st. -n. -ngth of the AWC in terms of actual n=bers is difficult 
to determine. Its uv. z claims exceeded the twenty thousand figure, 
which seems to be an exaggemtion in so far as duly regic-tered and 
fully p-Lid-up members were concerned. There is little doubt ho%ever 
t, hat it conmanded the support ef a much larger number of workerz. 
124 
Its in-ternal democratic organization, the periodic holding of 
elections for local branches, and the convening of yearly congresses 
vdriere issues were openly debated and elections to the highest bodies 
of the organi-sation took place, were unparalleled b-,., any other 
1--re-Ob association in the cotmtry. It was indeed the firt-t Arab trade 
union assocclation organized and run on modex-n Vestern lines. 
. An evaluation of 
the su-, cess or failure of the AV-. C cannot 
however be sera-rated fro= the collapse of the Arab social fabric 
which rapidly followed the partition decision of November 1947. The 
Aj-C itself disintegrated, in part at least as a re6ult of the Arab 
com=mists? acceptance of partition and the confusion this led to 
within the leadership of the AIM, not all of whose members concurred 
with the deci-sion. Yet the main reason remained largely outside 
its control. The whole structure of Arab society disintegrated as 
a res ý- & s".. t of the outbreak of armd hostilities,, the shattering of the 
Arab ecmo=Zr ard the largee scale migration which took place. The 
collapse of the AV, "v, was the outcome Of a malaise %%hich alones it could 
neither cure nor withstana. 
123- Survey of Arab Com=ists 1946.2R- ci - P. 5. 
124. A Government report gives the strength of the ATC in the (qouthern 
re; r , ion of 
'Palestine as being 6,820 of which OnlY 3j, 410 were fee- 
paying members. Jaffa alone was credited with 5,000 members. 
See "Report of N. Antoun,, assistant ins-pector of Labour, 1947", SS ISA File l"O. 
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The League of Amb Intellectuals JLAI) 
a. The Origins and Activity of the League 
The origins cf. the LAI go back to the summer of 1937 when a 
group of students in association with A. Bandak, a journaUst and 
member of the PCP., met in Bethlehem and decided to setupanArab 
students' orga-ni-sation. 
125 The aims of this 'Small group, of 
educated youth centred round a cazpaign to eradicate illiteracýy 
am=g the country's Arab inhabitants and to improve the conditions 
of the Arab village in general. 
126 While emphasising that the 
Arab Students' Society was not "attached" to any political party 
or associationp the influence of the PCFF can be discerned in the 
inclusion among the society's basic principles, of the promotion 
of the "struggle against reactionaries and confessionalism! '. Its 
nationalirt political leanlaigr nanif ested themselves in the 
insistence that co-o-rdination between Arab, students throughout the 
Arab coimtries, was necessary "in the service of the principles of 
*4. " Arab unity wnd the spre&d of "correct nationalist spirit" a ng 
the students' ranks. 
127 
The students were keen to issue their own publication but were 
unable to do so, and had to ccntent thenselves with a monthly 
supplement to the daily newspk-, er llslawt al Qhaab". 
128 
V. ith the 
growth of the organisation, it was soon decided to change its nam 
to the League of Arab Students 
129 
and in May 1938 it was able to 
produce the first issue of its ovn journal "Al Ghad" (The Morrow) 
The journall s contributors were predominantly students, although 
a few teachers did also participate, and it treated a wide variety 
of subjects. Its tone was both "nationalistic" and "progressivelf 
and it devoted considerable attention to criticisms of the Palestine 
partment of Education and its staff,, Yhom it Government's Der 
125. Al Ghad (hereafter referred to as AG) N. 4.. JulY 1939- p. 201. 
120. Cur Basic Aims: Statemen't, of Arab Stulents' Society. AG H-1. 
1 1%y 1938. PP. 1-2. 
127. Ibid. Article 2. 
128. c,, awt al , ", haab 
(Voice of the People), s was a -weel%r newspaper 
issued in Bethiehem by I ssa Bandakj, Mayor of the town and a 
cousin of, A. Bandak. 
1291, AG 11.3 TU-IY 1938. P. le 
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characterised as reactionary and hostile to the national aspirations 
of Arab youth. 
130 The Joumal was suppressed by the Government 
during the war, but immediately before this enforced closure, the 
leaders of the League had announced that a decision had been taken 
to widen the framer-ork of the organisation to include both students 
and non-students from among the ranks- of the educated youth. 
131 
V,, Iith the closure of the jour. -. -l the activities of the Students' League 
ceased and the principal activists in the organisation graduated 
to mo. re ser-! =ý political work in the rankr, of the Rays of Hope 
Society, the PCIP and the newly revived Labour movement. However, 
the de-alsion to transf the League into a broader intellectual 
association was not. put into practice iritil the clo,: ing stages 
of the war, -when the Govemmentl. -;. relaxation of the ban on Arab 
political acti'vity, and the invigorated stimulus of the Arab 
dommxiists opeivting as an indeperdent group, led to the revival 
of the LAI-132 
Until -the publication of the new "Al Ghad" in July 1945, the 
activity of t-he ILPI was largely concentrated on the organisation 
of new branches. The general activity of the branches consisted 
of holding regular meetings open to the public', at v&ich members 
off the LAI delivered lectures on various political and social topics; 
some branches started night schools to combat illiteracy, while 
others organised public meetings vInich provided a form for local 
notabless activists in the labour movement and leaders of the NIL. 
The League atte=ted to present itself on a strictly non-sectarian 
130- A statem--nt by the editors of the Jou=al claimed that the 
Director of the Education Department had advised stu'lents and 
teachers not to join the Organisation and to shun its journal. 
IS'ee., 11 , quiet 'word to the Director of the Department of Education. AG N. 10 February 1939. Later, it was ciaimea that 
clorure off the Journal was -the work of the Education Department. LP 
131- AG N. 4- Cctober 194l. r, 8. 
132. ýýg seven members o, & the CC/Arab ýtudentsl Leaguemmed in 
. Augu-t 
19 -as five reappeared later as menbers of the NIL. Of 
these., E. Tuma became the acImowledged leader of the NLL; T. 
Toubi a meember of its CC; I. Shaker, the national secretary of 
the WJ and Me=ber of the local committee of the NM in 
Jerusale=; A. Bandah, vho was termed as "adviser" to the 
StuderrIts' League in 11,4141 was the chief editor of the new 
"Al Ghad7 when it resumed publication'. 
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basis, and in this aim it -was largely succes-, ful. Altliough. it 
, publicly associated itself %ith the I'LL as part of the "progressive 
frcnt struggling for the liberation of Palestine", 
133 it was able 
-raditional political leaders to its meetings and even to attract 1I 
relig, ious figures. 
134 The LAI's radical outlook did not blind it 
to the inýpportance of Islam as a factor in Arab political life. Thus 
an the occasicn of the visit of Sultanov, a Fonvriet official based 
in Cairo, to Jerusalem, it orgardsed a social gathering after which 
, -ultar. ov waS accompanied 
by members of the League cn a visit to the Q 
Dome of the Rock and -the offices of the Moslem Council. 
135 
In a 
similar vein, the LAI branch in Haifa organised a public meeting to 
celebrate the Moslem prophet'-- birthday., %%hich was addressed by E-0 
Tuxa,, -Ithe leader of the 11,1, T, 
136 
Yet there was no atte=. I: t to hide 
the political ideoloMr v; h4-ch lay at the basis of the League's thinking. 
Axticles written by its members called on Arab youth to "struggle 
against reaction in the Amb national movement", 
137 
and advanced a 
marxist intex-pretation of history, er; ýhasising that "history is not 
made by heroes but by the masses" and explaining the development of 
society as passing -through fixed stages following the Yarxist model, 
in an "inevitable rrocess" vinich would lead to socialism. 
138 
The rapýd growth of the LAI indicates that it fulfilled a growing 
need among educated Arab youthp who were attrected by its radical 
national-ism and irm. -ressed by the ncvt ideas it was propagating. By 
the nic-'dle of 1946, the League had nine branches encom7assing all 
133- Speech of Arafat al Taher (Secretary of Haifa branch of LAI) at 
LAU meeting. IT 24 December 1944. 
134- e. g. A reception held by the LAI in Jerusalem for an ex-Iraqi 
Triniater was attended by local dignitaries and staff of the 
Iraqi ccnsulate. (LIT 25 '-Februar7 1945). At a meeting of LAI 
in Haifa concemed with problenn of the Department of Education, 
there were among the speakersp a Christian priest and a Moslem 
shiklh- (1Z 10 June 1945). In Hebron, the opening of the LAI 
branch was held under the auspices of Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, a 
nationally prominent traditional political figure. (AG- N- 13. 
januax7 1946. p. 2. ) 
135- IT 14 May 1944. 
136. IT 4 Yanch 1945 
137. A. al Taber. You; h: break- those bonds. IT 3.4 January 1945. 
138- fi-rticle by anonymous member of Haifa. LAI. IT 25 January 1945- 
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the main tovins in the country. 
139 
Vhile the national leaders of 
the League and a good n=ber of those uho wrote in its journal were 
140 
simxiltaneously members of the h7L,, this was not the case with the 
members of the various local committees and the overwhelming number 
of rank and file me=bers. A certain number did progress towards 
membex-ship of the ITM, and in as im, h as that was the case., the LAI 
acted as a transmi: Fsion belt attracting members from Mong the 
educated youth to the ranks of the Arab commmists. Yet the League 
remained a heterogeneous association,, with the majority of members, 
Pathoug; h friendly to the political line of the VM, remaining firmly 
outside its organisational framework. 
The political line of the W1 underwent gradual changes. In 
-; ts early -chase it w"- concerned with the more general and educational 
"I 
aim of spreading liberal culture', through the foundation of study 
circles and ci: ltural publications. It campaigned for the eradication 
of illiterac. -yr and the "setting-up of a project for the revival of 
the Arab village", for the establishment of agricultural co-operatives 
and experimental stations, and for the reduction of taxation and the 
implementation of compulsory education, pointing out the necessity of 
ifsupporting the national (Arab) econony". 
141 This activity evolved 
i -o increasing involvement in the political aspect of the national n4. 
con-1flict in -Uhe countz-y. Initial interest focused on activity such 
as the cacpaign to "refore' the Education Department, calling on the 
142 Government to set up an investigation committee into its affairs I 
139- N. 19 April 1946. reported a meeting of the CC/LAI in Nablu. - ; Kich was attended by representatives f rom the follo%%-Ing tcmms: 
Jerusalem, Jaffa,, Haifa., Nablus, Hebron,, Nazareth, Jenin,, 
Bethlehem and Beitjalla. Later branches were opened in Gazat 
Acre ana Ranallah. A report on the activity of the IJJ in 110145 
cr-ed. -: ts it with having 423 menbers. See Survey of Arab comnmnistst 
1946. ov. cit. p. 6. 
140. The secretariat of the LAI elected in a congress held in Jerusalem 
in November 194-5 was made up of Y. Amer,, I. Shaker and A. Hashem. 
If. tmer was a member of the PCP since the mid 19301 s and was a 
member of the CCs of the KIL and the AVC. 1. Shaker was a 
mex: ber of the CC of the League of Arab F Ftudents in 1941,, he later 
joined the PCP and was on the UTL local com: mittee in Jerusalem; 
A. Hashem, joined the PCP in the late 1930's and was a member of 
the ML - 
141. Ar, r. 6. September 1945. p. 12. 
142. Conference of LAI in Jaffa, 21 October 1945. IT 28 October 1945. 
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and general demands for the spread of education and the foun&irig of 
an Arab university in Palestine, 
143 the removal of political censor- 
ship, and for the spread of "free thought". In some instances,, the 
League's bra=hes took a keer. interest in local isEues, such as 
municipal electicnzp using them to put forward a program of local 
reforms- based on the day-to-day interests of the Arab inhabitantc, 
144 
and to make the more general ca. 32 for electoral reform and the spread 
of "reppresentative democracy" 614-5 
Yith the exacerbation of the national conflict and the sprep-d 
of the influence of the "left" among the Arab inhabitants, the LAI 
adopted an increasingly radical political stance, in closer 
association with both the FIL and the AIM3. Asz early an Yarch 194.6, 
prominence was given in "Al Ghad" to a visit by a delegstion of the 
146 
LAI to Arab political prisoners in Acre jail P and a few months 
later, on the occasion of a h=ger strike bý-j the prisoners, the L: 1 
sent a memrandum to the High Coamissioner calling for their release. 
147 
The League's attitude tarards the Arab national movement cloEely 
paralleled that of the NIL in its insistence on the urgency of 
national unity and the call for the establishment of a "national 
front" or. a representative basis. 
148 
. Addressing 
itself to the problem of Palestine's future and the 
best mclicy for achieving its independence, the LET crine out against 
the establishment off the Anglo-US Investigation Committee, which it 
ternea an "imperialist committee" aimed at a solution of the 
Palestine problem to coincide with the interests of British and 
American imper-lalism. 
149 It adopted a critical stand towards the 
143. General Congress of L. 'a in Jenisalem, 21 Novezber 1945. AG N. 8 
Nrovenber 1945. P. 24. 
144. e. g. Statement of Nablus-IZ branch on Municipal elections. The 
statement put a piogr= of six-teen points encompassing such 
tasks as the paving of roads, the establishment of rest homes 
fo-r the aged, and beautifying the city. Sees IT 28 April 1946. 
3-45- Ibid. 
146. Ar, Na6 march 1946. p. 17. 
3.47. Statement of IPJ on hunger strike of Arab prisoners in Acre jail. 
. A. G y,. 
26 August 1946. p. 24. 
148- Fditorial. AG N. 4 August 1945. 
149. : -; aitorial: AG N. 12 Januaz7 1946. p. 2. 
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HAOCI s deciF-ion to testif)r before the COmmitteel5O and insistently 
called for its bcycott. Y. 'hen the decisions of the Investigation 
Committee were made knownp the League pointed to them as proof of 
the correctness of its stand and called for the transference of the 
Palestine problem to the Security Council of the M1,. 
151 This call 
was =unted vath increasing urgency throughout the activity of the 
League, and ; a-zphasis was added by pointing to the expected 
assistance from the Eoviet Union in the international forum, which 
was lauded for its past hostility to Zionicm, its anti-imperialist 
tradition, 
. 
and for its help to movements of national independence. 
152 
I-, Iostility to the Arab League and its activity on "behalf" of the 
Palestine grabs soon beea= one of the hallrarks of "Al Ghad' s" 
editorials. -It wp_s cn,, -racterised as being under the influence of 
British irmerialism 
153 
and consequently both unwilling and unable 
to engag, -- in a stnkggle against it in Palestine, advising instead 
0154 the con"tinuation. off negotiations with the "inmerialist powers" 
The Leezme's attitude towards the HAC underwent a gradual 
change. From pmferring advise and insisting on the necessity of 
widening the Committee to include representatives of the labour 
move=nt and the left in Palestine,, it became hostile to the HACI s 
continuing assent for maintaining relations with the British in 
the hope off finding a satis"Lactory common sol-ation. 
155 
This 
ce, tic-., I. sm -was also applied to the methods and aims of the traditional 
leadership cf the national movement. The LAI., while maint-aining 
its opposition to Jewish i=dgration and to lana sales., and 
pr, opounding the need to struggle against bot. h., admonished the Arab 
3. eaders for refusing to recognise that the main struggle should be 
directed against the British occupiers of the country. The boycott 
of the Yishuv and the Plans to fiEýIt against illegal Jewish 
150. Editorial: Ar- N-13 January 1946. 
151. Statement of U1. The decisiont of the Investigation Conmission 
are a continuation of imperialist policy. IT 12 Lay 1946. 
152. 'Editorial: AG F. 20 11-lay 1946. p. 21. 
153- 74ditcrial: 7,11-30 August 1946. p. 4. Articles criticising 
tine -,,. rab 
League appeared in the journal as early as February 1946. 
154. Open letter of Al Ghad editorial board to Arab communist parties 
in ý gypt, Syria .L ebanon and I raq. AG N. 23. June 1946. p. 11. 
155. 'Editorial: AG N-35- Januarv 1947. P- 4. 
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immigration were declared to be diversionary; once the struggle for 
the evacuation of British troops from the country and the establish- 
ment of an independent state was accomplished., the Zionist movernent 
would automatically suffer defeat. 
156 The LAI dif fered vrith the 
traditional Arab leadership on another more fundamental issue. It 
rejected the latter's call for the establishment. of an Arab state 
in Palestine and described this as facilitating the task of those 
vho were worldng for the partition of the country. it proposed 
instead, the establishment off' an "independent democratic Palestine 
state" guaranteeing equa3. r1gýlts to all its iraiabitants,, vc1th 
the provision or claltural and local autonomy to the JeNn. already 
in the countrý,. 
1537 In contrast to the Arab leaders' insistence 
that they Nvould not accept Jews rho arrived in the country after 
1917, the LAI maintained its disagreement with this condition, 
8., ja declared '. -%at citizenship in the future Palestine state shouLl. 
be accorded to r2i Jew-s- vho were already resident in it. 
A cou. ple of years after its foundation., the LAI had moved a 
long way fr= -its original platfo= and had adopted political 
positions indi stingui-sh able from those of the NIL., Vhich more openly 
reflected its association witb. the latter and the political ideology 
of its leaders1hip. In a statement. 9 redefining the League's aimz, 
the association descriýed itself as composed of young intellectuals 
"eager to shoulder their national and social responsibilities" and 
airning at tine diffusion off "correct national consciousness and 
democratic -Principles". 
158 
The means to accomplish this were 
declared to lie in "O-8simi-18-ting the mthods off westem civilisetion 
and the spirit oil the age",, exactly Ahat the = itself had set 
out to arcomplish. 
156. 7ditcrial: Arý N-18. April 194,6. p. 4. 
3.57. -:, ditOrial: -AC- 
N-43- MAY 1947. p. 24. 
158. cStatezent of LAI in'Nazareth. 
-IT 
30 December 1946. 
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b. The Journal "AI'Ghaa" 
The IML possessed two publications., "Al Ittihad".. a newspaper 
dealin§ with current political event r, and labour af f air3 
159 
and "Al 
Ghad" 
100 
v6tich served as the theoretical organ of the movement 
despite its publication by the TJJ . which remained outwardly a 
separate and an independent body. "Al Ghad" fulfiled t-%, o functions. 
Firstlys it served to attract Arab educated youth and to provide them 
with a forum for debating their views and interests. This was 
accomplishe. cl by covering a wide range ot' subjects closely related 
to the everyday life and interests of radical nationalist youth,, 
enco=passing social problems, education, student affairs, conditions 
of the peasants., Arab culture and tradition, vorld literature, the 
Arab nat. Lcnal economy.. and not least by painting an acute picture 
o-A the economic d-eprivattiOn and misery of the ovezwhc-lming majority 
cf. the Arab inhabitants of the country. Secondlys it atte=pted to 
introduce ;, arxist thought and to popularise it by giving simplified 
accounts of its =14n. ideological conT. onents, not iriftequently wi thout 
explicitly --specifying 
the 1&rxist origins of the theories it was 
, 
fox-v, -. a-%L This was by no means confined to the political putting 
realmý but encompassed literature, history and even art. Another 
closely related aim was the introduction of the Soviet Union and the 
: E, aste--n Bloc countries to Arab readers in a sympathetic vein. This 
was done mpinly through. translations f rom Soviet or co==ist 
publications, descr-lbing in glowing terms the conditions of life 
under communismp in addition to popularising Soviet views on 
inte=ational events. "Al Ghad" also took it uppon itself to defend 
soviet interpretations- of world problems, and to portray the Saiets 
159- -Al Ittihad" was first issued in Illay 1944 and was directed 
=inly at the labour movement. It later widened its interests, 
and the labour movement ca= to occupy an increasingly smaller 
part ef its attention. 
160. Subt-itled "Message of enlig)atened nationalism and progressive 
culture", it was izsued between July 1945 and May 1947; 43 
issues were pifolished. its first editor A. Bandak was a 
veteran comm: unist and member of hTM. He was replaced by 
Y.. Amer, also a veteran communist and one of the leaders of 
the NM and the ATC, with the publication of the 4th ii-sue in 
August 1945. The other two names which appeared as part of 
the editorial board, A. G. Khatib and 1. Shak: er were both 
former members of the PCP and current members of the NIZ. 
2LL 
Iý 
as playing a most important role as the champions of national 
independence movements throughout the world. 
The majority of the wril, -ers on political topics in the joumal 
were members of, the Arab co-m=mist movement in Palestine. 
161 A 
number o-. 4,. ' articles were penned by Lrab communists from outside 
Palestine, either writing directly for "Al Ghad", or their articles 
were reproduced f-Cm Irab co. =: L,. nist publicationz appearing in Egypt) 
I rao and Lebanon. 
162 
These were supplemented by the translation 
of articles by various Vestern comrm=dzts,, mainly British,, and by 
reviews of books by British com=unist authorc. Vilich were available 
in JA rabic translations. 
163 
To a large extent the Journal was 
sulacessnil in gaining the participation of non-co=. -, =. ist vnriterm. 
This was largely confinedp however., to non-political subjects, mostly- 
poetrys literature and cultural studies. 
164 A nu: -rbcr of these 
contr-lbutors were nationa. 11y renzo-med and undoubtedly contr:. buted 
to the journall s standing by their willingness to write for it. 
165 
Yet it iz interesting to note, in contrast to this, that many of 
the articles appeared under pseudanymsq a clear indication of the 
sizeable n=rbe. - of authors who, despite being friendly to the LAI 
161. An exa=iration of the various issues of the journal shows that 
Y. Amer was the main contributor on matters of 1, u=ist theory. 
In addition Ito frequently writirg the editorials, nearly every 
issue of Al Ghad contains one or more articles by him. Anoiher 
important contributor on theoretical problems, was M. Fiad a 
young engineer. Frequent contributors were F. Nassar, E. TUM, 
E. Habibi, R. Shaheen, M leaders of the NLL. 
3.62. e. g. Articles by K. Bak-dash., leader of the Syrian CP; Raif 
E-houry and. -ý'arajallah al Hilou, prominent Lebanese commmists; 
Kassem Hassan, Nazim Z ahavd . Hussein Jamil., Iraqi communists 
and fellow travellers; and numerous articles reproduced from 
"Al Fajr al Jaddid" and "Um Durman".. Egyptian communist 
journals. 
163- e. g. authors -. uch as H. Politt, 'I'. Burns$ J. Strachey, 1. Rennap. 
164. One notable exception was Dr. K. Budeiri, who was already 
closely identified with the PCP as far back as the mid-thirties 
an: 1 who vas for a short period in 1946., a member of the HAC. 
His contribution-s$ which were numerous., dealt exclusively with 
political matters, and were indistinguishable from the political 
viewpoint of the NU. 
3.65. e. g. Kadzýj Toukans a member of one of the leading f=ilies in 
Nablus, a reputed educationalist and writer on scientific topics, 
and Abu Salma, (Abdul Karim al Earmi) Palestine's foremost Arab 
poet. 
2M; 
r., 
were reluctant to have their naiws publicly aseociated with an 
avowedly leftist publication. In the light of thiz, an. analysis 
of contributions to the journal reveals that articles by members of 
the MI and its affiliated boaics . by Arab communists . and articles 
translated from the international communirt press were moit numerous. 
The second largest nuýer of contributionir, came from non-communist 
Arab vriter-- and were almost entirely devoted to poetry, short 
stories, and studies dealing with Arab literature and the wider 
aspects of. Yzsl= cultural heritage and tradition. 
It --; -- possible to discern a number of themes in "Al Ghad"t an 
examination cf which provides a =re coherent picture of the 
ideology vdnich the Arab coirm., nists were trying to impart to their 
i-rab rea(lers. Thc., ýe themes cwi be grouped under six major headings: 
introduction to Maxxis-t theory,. the Palestine problem and the role 
off the Arab national movement an-I the Arab I eague,, literature 
studies and culture and tradition,, Zionism and the Jewish problem, 
propagar4a for the Soviet Union,, and social problems. 
intmcluction to Varxiet Theo 
"Al Ghad! ' published a series of studies introducing its readers 
to history$ philosopbys politics and soci&liýýt eeory from a Yjaxist 
perspective. Most of these studies were written by local Amb 
: L66 
CO 
Amer,, ed., tor of the journal and the foremost Ilarxist 
theoretician among the Arab COM=ists, wrote a series of articles 
on philosophy explaining "idealismr and wmaterialism-, and. the 
workings of tlý-e rules of logic and dialectics and relating them to 
Ya='s e=Phasir- on rm's social and econo=ic situation as 
dete=dning his consciousness. 
167 
Another series of articles outlined a "scientific" interpretation 
166. It also provided a list of communist texts available in Arabic. 
cee, The Iffarxist L! Ibrary, AG N. 26. Of 43 books includeds 26 were 
+ranslations- v&ile the ýýInder were by non-Falestinian Arab 
authors. 
167. Amer rz te numerous articles on this topic., e. g. 1,16dem elcience 
and Modem logic: Dialectics, AG N. 9.; Idealist and Mater-lali! -t 
philosophy AG N. 6. 
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of history and described man's evolution from a state of primitive 
16B 
corm-minism to capitalism and the inevitable realisation of socialirm. 
The history of the world a-- a continuous claEs struggle was described 
from the civilisations of Athens and Pharonic Egypt right through 
to the outbreak- of the Russian'Revolution and the war of intervention. 
Ija=ism- was accounted for as the direct outcome cf the advent or 
industrial soc-Lety and it was credited with "explaining the secrets 
of capitalist expIcitation. of the working class". 
The intezzmational capitalist order was described as suffering 
from three main contradictions: the class struggle v. -ithin industrial 
societies, the national struggle of the colonial peoples., and the 
Zle between the ruling classes of the various capitalist strur 
countries. A series of articles sought, to illustrate this by 
sketching the history of Europe from the outbreal: of "the first 
intenmtional capitalist war to x-. divide the world" to the establish- 
ment of a new world order at the termination of World War Two. 
169 
Addressing itself to problems of socialist theory it reproduced 
the works of --ocialists svch as IStrachey and Cole170 and devoted 
considerable space to an examination ar the ideas of early socialists 
such as R. Owen, Babeuf end the Luddites. The life and -works of 
May= were treated at con-siderable length and his main ideas were 
Tresented in a sim-p-lified -&c-rm. Va. = the political activist was 
not ignored; his role in the First Intemational was emphasised 
as -providing an exmnple of the unity of theory and practice which 
was demanaed by his doctrine-171 
Only a couple of articles vt. ich appeared in "Al. Ghad" attempted 
to link- the journal's advocacy of socialist principles vith the call 
for a struggle to establish socialism in Palestine. This can best 
g)e understood in the context of the Arab communists' adherence to I 
a "theory of stages" whereby the Arab countries were seen to be 
pazsing through the stage of "national liberation". Only after 
this was concluded would it be possible to speak of socialism. 
168. F-istorical Events. AG Nos. 7,8,9'., 10., 11. 
169. Modern War and Peace. AG Nos. 5., 6s798. 
170. Why You 1. 'hould Be a Socialist. AG Nos. 7,8,, 10,11. 
171. Socialis= Utopian and ScientJF3. c. AG Nos. 16,17,, 21,43. 
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Meanwhiles the duty of Arab workers and peasants was "to Join the 
bourgeois class and even the capitalists against the foreign 
imperialists". 
172 
The triumph of socialism worldAricle was not to 
come through revolution., but through the "gradual wresting of 
economic powers frcm the big capitalists". 
173 
To this endp "Al 
Ghad" pointed to the necessity of irziplerrenting variou., nationelisation 
measures in the induý-trial countries as a step towards transformIng 
their economies. As far as Palestine waz conceinedo lZarxism entailed 
the implementation of social reformt., the --pread of education, the 
terudnation cf poverty, unemployment,. iEporance and disease and not., 
as the enemies of co. =mmi= maintained, t1he arousal of anarchy and 
disorder. 
174 
The Arab rational 11overr4rt and the Palestine Problem 
In its first issue, "Al Ghad" declared its adherence to a 
"c=structive np-tionalism" v. Anich entailed a struggle for "the 
ha; piness of. peoples- on the basis of universal human progress,, 0175 
To join the "caravan of progress" it was hoviever necessary to 
rep-liFe'Palestine's political independence. Here "Al Ghad" came 
into conflict v. -: th the traditional Arab leadership of Whom it had 
always been critical. It denied the claim of theHAC to repre-sent 
tt, e A. ---ab inhabitants and called for the establish-anent of a national 
front. 
: 176 1 41. criticised the Arab leaders for their preoccupation 
with. schemes to combat Zionism and for forgetting the main obstacle 
to Palestine's independence: the existence of the Mandate itself. 
177 
"Al Ghad" pu ', . forward proposals for a democratically elected 
national congress which would assume the leadership of the independence 
struggle 
178 
and rejected the HAC as "the appointee of the Arab 
League". 
179 The Arab League itself was criticised for its continued 
172. Yoderm r7ar and Peace. AG K-5- P- 15. 
173- world Peace. AG IN. B. p. 10. 
17 ", The Marxist Library. AG F. 26. p. 17. 
175.1 'Dal i ghtened Vationalism and Liber-al Culture. AG 11.1. p. 2. 
176. 'We Will Hold you to account for your Deedso A-G N. 15- 
177. Our Political problems and our plans. AG N-5- p. 23- 
178. Complicated solutibns which suit imperialist aims. AG Y. 25- 
179. A big national ccng. -ess to map the path. AG N-31- P- 4- 
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faith in negotiations with the Briti0hp and its leaders were 
characterised as "agents of British imperiali=11.180 
in rejecting all forms of negoti8tion with Britainx "Al Ghad" 
clamoured for transferring the Palestine problem to the international 
arena, in the belief that the 1-rabs struggle for independence was not 
an isolated case but similar to those waged in India, Indo-China, and 
Indonesia. 
181 It thus called for taldng the problem to the UN and 
when the Genex-al Assembly decided on the establishmcnt of UNSCOFq 
much to the. anger of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, "Al Ghad" 
blamed the "racist and -reactionary" speeches of the HAC delegate 
for alienating international pifolic opinion. 
182 Ilevertheless, it 
supported the establishment of the Committee. 
"Al Ghad! ' rejected the . -logr-n of an Arab Palestine and called 
for the establislunent of a demcratic state. It accused the Arab 
-unleasUng a campaign of terrorwhich could only je&d leaders of 
to the partitioning o-. F' the countx7,163 and declared that the only 
way to keep Palestine united, lay through showing that the Arabs 
were -wrilling and ready to live with the Jews in peace. It wa=ed, 
propheticalLy, that refusal would lead not only to partition, but 
also to the establishment of a Jewish state on an area 1ýrach larger 
A. , 
than is 
7 
. p. resently occupied 
by the Jev a", while the remining Arab 
territory "wculd be amexed by a neighbouring state". 
184 
Socialist Realism in Literature 
Litera. ry studies, poems and short stories occupied a major share 
of ', Al Ghads" pages. The poetr7 publishedwaB of a "nationalist 
progressive" varietys and the jouinal also provided a for= for 
famous and well-known Arab Poets. 
185 In addition it opened its 
-pages to the young and the unknown, attracting a large readership 
180. This refferred to Nur-I al Said and Abdullah. Ar, Nos. 14 and 16. 
181. OurNational Struggle and the World. AG N-ST- 
182. Our position in the ccming important phase. AG N-43. p. 4. - 
183- For maintaining the peace in Palestine. AG N-7. 
184. Our position in the coming.... loc. cit. - 
185. e. g. Abu 7 habka (AG N-7. ); Al S afi al Najaf i (EG N- 31) - Abu 
Saima, 'Palestine's fore-naost Arab poet frequently published in 
Al Ghad. 
02) n C-47 
n.. 
as a result. Fiction was moAly by Arab or S)oviet authorsp although 
there was a fair ntriber of internationally fe us names. 
186 Russian 
stories were mostly propaganda pieces extolling the Foviet people 
and their sacrifices in "the great patriotic war". 
187 The Arabic 
stories were- statements of. protest about poverty and oppression 
ana their predominant feature was their lnatjLonajj,, t humanistic" 
4.1 ou 4. -001:. 
in its firzt issue, "Al Ghad" defined -ffic poet's role as being 
that of "the prophet of tortured hu=. anity" 
189 
and condemned those 
poets who secluded themselves in ivor y towers. It called on Arab 
poets "to irmerse themselves in life" and to spread "hope,, national 
st glory ... to co=fort the weak and be a smrord in the face -e , pa 
=0 the strong, and the oppressor". In another art-1-cle., literature 
was defined as "a material force for change"190 and as performing 
a manifestly ideological role stressing "the humanitj of man, his 
love of freedom and truth,, hate of slavery and injustice". 
191 In 
a series of studies dealing v, -Ith the work of several famous Arab 
102 
poets"' one feature of their poetry which was deliberately enlarged 
upon and e=rlmasised was the nationalist strain. This was used as 
an illustration of the role of poetry in the struggle for independence 
social Justice. 
A series of articles by Amer introduced "socialist realism" to 
,, Al Ghad' s" readere., combined with an outline of materialist 
-Di. lilosophy relating to quest-4 ons of being and consciousness and the 
evolution of human societyp t-hought and literature. 
193 
These 
articles incorporated an exposition of the "dialectical materialist" 
interpretation of history, politics and science. Va-dle it is not 
166. Tolstoy (AG 
( 
N. 10) , Goldsmith (, LG N. 9) , Maupassant (AG N. 20). 
187- e. g. Batiý AG 11-30).. The Old Man (A2 N-33-) 
188. e. g. Abu Mahmoucl ( L-G 45 - N. 18). 
189. The Foet's didactic =ission. AG N. l. p. 9. 
. 190. fhe Literature cC Life. AG N. 11. 11 
l9l. Books are of two sorts. AG N04.11, 
192. Toukan (A G N. 5) . Shawki"TLG N. 
J, 
Al J awahiri (, LG N. 23) v 
A' Rasafi TLG N. 19) - 
193. e. g. Literature and Class (AG Nos. 12 and 13),, Literature 
between subjectivism and objectivity (AG N. 16) 9 Literature 
between content and style (AG Nos- 30 and 33) 1 The origins of 
Literature (LG IT - 4. 
)- 
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possible to clairn that Amer himelf contributed anything originals 
the service he performed was undoubtedly of a pioneeriný nature. 
For the Arabic reading public, faced with a near total absence of 
Arabic trp--islations of Marxist texts, this was its first introduction 
to Ma--=*st ideas. Moreover,, Amer's articles were not presented in 
an abstract fom., but were replete vilth illustrations from past and 
conte--poravy Ar--bi%-. literature, relating to the cultural background 
cf the --eaders, and serving to remind the= that these self-saw ideas 
were present,, although in a diluted form.. in -the Arabs' own cultural 
heritage. 
_Zionism 
and the Jewish Inhabitants Z 
"A! Ghad" set itself the task of acquainting its readers with 
the developments of Jewish history from the time of the dispcrzion 
until the rise of the Zionist movement. 
194 III; presented a simplified 
Ma--, ist account, stressing that the Jews had perfomed an "economically 
necezs&x7? ' --ole during the change from slavery to feudalism and 
later 
with the arrival of the new bourgeois order. 
195 
Persecution and the 
x-ise, of anti-seniitisms with the concomitant mass movement of Jews 
across Eurroo-pe, were disposed of with similar economic explanations. 
7he rise of ZE'Lonism. was traced through the ideas of thinkers such 
as Herzl,, Pinsker.. and Bo. rocliovy and the Zionist movement was 
c=de=ed as a "capitalist movement",, and its identity of interests 
with British i=_ erialism was continuously stressed. The numerous 
waves cf Jewish i=, igration into Palestine were explained as not 
wholly the result of Ziomist endeavours,, but also as being a reaction 
-to persecution in Europe which extended f rom T sarist times to the 
nrlse of the Nazis. 
", A. 1 Ghad's" articles maintained a cireful distinction between 
zionism and the Jewish inhabitants in Palestine. While the former 
were seen to present a threat to the Arab people,, the interests of 
the Jewish inhabitants did not conflict with those of the Arabs* 
196 
194. jhe Jews in Palestine: 'From the Destruction of the Temple to the 
Jewish State (1). AG N-15. 
195. The Jews in FalestJ3ýe: (2). AG N. 18. 
190. Judaism and 'Zionis=. Vlat is the viewpoint of Arab NationalisuP. 
. A-G iiz. 
6. 
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They were seen to be natural allies in the struggle to establish "a 
just economic order" Which itself would result in the destruction 
0.16' Zionis=. Rejecting those "bourgeois nationalists" v. ho called 
for the ! xpulsion of the Jews f rom Palestine,, "Al Ghad" pointed to 
the past history of Arab tolerance. It called on the Arab national 
movement to show the Jews that the Arabs did not bear them any 
racial emnity., by striving for the establishment of a democratic 
regime vaiich would provide the framework- for "peace'and co-operation 
between the. two peo-ples". 
197 
To this end, "Al Ghad" put forward its 
ovin pnr,, osal5 for the establishment of a democratic Palestine state 
guz. ranteeing the Jewish inhabitants "co=lcte cultural and 
arim; nist-. ative autonozq". 
198 
Frorazaxela for the Foviet Union 
Articles relating to the Soviet Union were mostly direct 
translations from Soviet jourm-als., or the publications of other 
C=rzmist Parties. They were of t-mo kinds., cither descriptive, 
inevitably laudatory., of life in the Soviet Union and other Eastern 
B-. Loc co=4., --"&. es,, 
199 
or expositions of the Soviet view of international 
affairs viith e=phasis on news of the independence movements in the 
colcnies. 
200 However., re; orts on the Soviet view of the Palestine 
problem itself were completely absent from "Al Ghad' s" pages. 
Islamic Tradition 
Little attention was paid to Islam on the pages of "Al Ghad" but 
the absence cf any ser-lous exa=1matim of its role in Arab society 
should not imply that it was viewed in a hostile inumer. The few 
3.97. Editorial- AG N. 2. 
198. Our Stand in the Important ISZituation we are now facing. LG N-43. 
p. 24. 
10019F. e. g. No Conflicting Classes, No Exploitation,, No Unemployment 
in the USSR. Q N-15.; The Life of Tito. Ar, K. 26.; 
Yxa-riage ancl 17'otherhood in the UIISR. AG 11.2l.; Memoirs of 
Travel in the USSR. AG N. 23- 
2DO. These were mostly repmductions of T6, ss Agency reports. 
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articles which did treat this subject show the joumal as being very 
careful to present itself as part of the continuous cultural 
tradition of Islam. A regular feature in every issue war, devoted 
to short anecdotes about the wisdom, bravery and generozity of the 
early Moslems. In additicn, a lukewarm atte=t vms mde to focts- 
on a =rber of historical figures and show the existence of an early 
tradition of socialism and social jir-tice in It-lam 
201 
and of str-uggle 
again--tt foreign oppression and for national independence. 
202 
The 
Prophet Yoha=ad was portrayed as a man coming from the ranks of the 
poor and tthe dispossessed, his life as being a continuous st gl rug e 
and rebellion againA inju-tice and oppre-S4on, and whoýe con-suning 
activity war. devoted to organising and leading the oprressed againzt 
the rich Pmd the privileged. 
203 Its atte. -,,, ts to apIcal to 
religiouzz sentiments wen'&. as far as to use quotationz fxvm the Yoran 
to emphasise, the recessity of intensifying the struggle for 
Palestine' s independence. 
20,1+ 
Despite the fact that religious appeal was not a regular feature 
of "Ll Ghad' =" ideological P-xmo, =7, the few and far between articles 
which did deal with the subject show an interesting development. 
The Arab cc=-r-, -. nists, in contrast to the PCP., had moved a step 
further towards coming to tems with the prevailing mligious. beliefs 
WILich constitulted a large and important part cl. the Arab national 
and culturral heritage. While the PCP had maintained a stance of 
neutrality on the sxý ject and refrainea from committing any act 
which, =ight injure the religious sensibilities of the fimb 
inhabitantsl the IML had rcved to a position of re-affi=ing 
mroslem -16, raditicn as a positive component of the nationF. 1 movement and 
atteopted to find Justification -for its own ideology in Islamic 
religious principles. 
6 
., 
er, ion cf the Prophet Abu Zhur and the spi to 201. The Com-, ri f 
socialism. AG 1% 6. 
202. Jaral al Din al Afghand. AG N. 43. 
203- The Ho3, y Anniversary of tlýe-Prophetl s birthday. AG N. 36. 
204. Ans-wers from the Holy Yoran to the Decisions of the Anslo-US 
, nves tigation Committee. AG N. - 20. - 
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social Problems 
In an attempt to appeal to the widest poc-sible readership, "Al 
Ghad" treated an extensive variety of topics. 
205 A rezular fcature 
dealt with student affair--, discusskg their problems at universities 
abroad and calling for an increase in the number of --chool., - 
especLally in rural areas and for Bn irriprovement in the quality of 
both teachertý and curriculi. Linked to 4,. hiE- war, the dcmand for 
increasing tte rrcvisions for girlr! schooling. 
206 
Medical 
conditions in the country were declared to be tuisatiOactory 
especially in the countrytide where there was tan absence of adequate 
meaical fF-cilities. 
207 In the eccno: -dc sphere, "Al Ghad" criticised 
on joint ventures vith British concerns, as being f-rabs who ezýDarkea 
accessories to the establishment of "British economic imperialimilo 
20B 
T-ne problem of women's place in society and their struggle for 
equa-vity was bravely tackled by the journal. Arab men were held 
responsible for the subjugation of women and for preventing them 
from performing a socially useful role. '. 
209 
Early marriage was 
decried az a "conuercial undertaking" preventing women from 
-p=suing their educat--on, and economic independence through employ- 
ment was i-. ointed to as the only path for women' s emancipation. 
210 
A sezies of articless dealt with the social and economic conditions 
of the Arab village. 
211 "Al Ghad! ' outlined the tmfavourable 
s-,;. tup-ticn of the peazant and apportioned most of the blame for his 
poverty and the baclwardness of the villages to the deliberate 
policies of the Gove=, ment '%hich, Y. tile collecting large taxes,, 
gave little or no services in retum. 
212 
205- Including such topics as, The Splitting of the At= (L2 N-4. ) 
and, Arab Arcl,. itecture. Between Wro Styles (LG N. 21) . 
206. The People of Palestine insist on educating their daughters. 
AGN. 2'ýoý a 
2.07. T-*,,. e Health Situation in the Villages. Ar, 11-17. 
208. Our National '"Econo=7 and the Interests Tf the People. AG N. l. 
209. To the Vcmen of nT Sex. AG N. 19. 
210. 'Subjectivism and Objecti4ý in Judgment. AG N. 6. 
23-1. soc.: A. F-l and Economic Life in Arab Villages. AG Nos- 20.9 30.9 31- 
212. The Government is Fac-hiausting the Peasant. AG, N-15- 
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: 
It is perhaps more accurate to designate "Al Ghad" as reforrdst 
rather than revolutionary in its outlook,, and anti-imperialist 
rather than commmist in its content. In the main, its articles 
had an educational and a literary appeal, and its tone was 
decidedly emotional. Its major shortcoming lay in the absence 
of any attempt to apply Marxist analysis to the curre&. political 
situation in Palestine or to the internal structures of Arab society. 
It satisfied itself with merely translating Marxist ideas into the 
Arabic language, and shied away f rom translating them into the Arab 
social and political context. Thus., a number of important topics 
such as the class nature of Arab society, the role of religions, an& 
the national problem, were absent fro= its pages. Others,, such as 
the Jewish problem and the task of explaining to the Arabs the 
necessity of Ar--b - Jewish co-operation, arA the composition of the 
traditional Arab leadership and the reasons for its policies, were 
not treated in sufficient depth. Even those studies introducing 
history and philosophy from a Marxist perspective appear, in 
retrospects to suffer f=m an exaggerated mechanical presentation 
of Marxist fundamentals. They were devoted to tracing the stages 
of development of European society, but co=letely ignored the 
question of whether the history of non-Eurapean societ-'Ae3 had 
developed on similar or different lines. 
All this however, does not detract from the fact that "Al Ghad" 
played a pioneering role in introducing Marxism to the Arabic 
reading publics and that this was done in a hij#ily literate and 
co=prehensible fashion., There is no dcdtbt that the vilide range of 
topics covered by the journal contributed to the securing of a- 
large readership among the Arab educated public. 
213 
The journal 
brought to its readers new ideas with which they had had no previzus, 
acquaintance beyond vague notions about the "ana=hy", the "atheise 
213- At least initially.. Al Ghad's attraction lay in its literary 
content. A competition held in its seventh mcnth of publication 
invited articles on one of three topics: a short staryp a 
study of a social problem., and a political es. -ýay based on a 
quote fmm a communist leader,, on the Arab League and westem 
military blocs (AG N. 12). Of the 60 entries received., the 
journal reported that the majority were stories, and "only 
few had dealt with the other two topics". (AG N. 16. ) 
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and the "immorality" of com=istal, which was the staple diet of 
the Arab nationalist press. To this extent "Al Chad" perfo=ed 
successfully in not only introducing communist ideology.. but also 
in removing to some degree, the stigma attached to comnunists and 
communism. The success of the commmist movement among the Arabs 
in the forties., in contrast to its relative failure during the 
thirties, can be traced both to its acquired "nationalimý and to 
its newfound ability to acquaint the Arabs with its ideology, largely 
exhibited and fulfilled by "Al Ghad". 
The National Liberation Leag! ý2 
a. Political IcIeoloSX 
The National Charter of the NM did not give any indication of 
the communist orientation of the new party. The political.. social 
and economic aims which were set out in detail were, broad3, y speakings, 
the common property of all the Arab political parties. Evacuation 
of British troops anZ Pa1estine's independence headed the list,, 
although the NLL unlike other Arab political groupsv did not can 
for the establishment of an "Arab Palestine state", but raised the 
slogan of a "democratic govemment guaranteeing the rights of All 
214 
inhabitants vrithout distinction". There followed calls for 
resisting Zionist imnigration, land transfers, and the establishment 
of a Jewish state 
215 
and demands for co-operation with the Arab 
216 
peoples in the neighbouring states and for the preservation of 
democratic and individual liberties. 
217 
T. 1he economic aim of the 
party stipulated the importance of strengthening "national indu3trys 
agriculture and commerce", 
218 
a fair distribution of taxes.. 
219 
--raising the economic and social standard of the Arab workers and 
peasantso and reforming the Arab village. 
220 The social aims 
214. The National Charter (n. p. n. d. ) Political Ai=: Article 1. P- 3- 
215- Ibid. article 2. 
216. Ibid. article 3- 
217- Ibid. article 5- 
218. Ibid. Economic Aims: article S. pp. 4-5- 
219. Ibid. article 9. 
220. Ibid. articles 6 and 7- 
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emphasised the "preservation of Arab cultural tradition" and the 
raising of the starAard of Arab women and "caring for the health of 
the Arab mother and her child". 
221 
The Charter did include three articles thich differentiated the 
ITIL from the rest of the national m ovement. The first declared the 
existence of a "distinction between Zionism and the Jevish 
inhabitants" p 
222 the second ccalled for llco-<meration with all colonial 
peoples and those struggling against i--,, eriali:: -zi", 
223 
while the third 
declared that "the party is bui'Lt on the basis of de=oc--atic 
centralism". 
224 It is interesting that the IMIL. ' s cý-ixtter included 
an article specifically stating that its membersh. Lip was "open to 
every Arab citizen", 
225 
a stipulation -. ihich,, by exclLuding Jews fmm 
its ranks, automatically deprived it of any claim to ccnstitute a 
territorial co=vnist party. By upholding the Lenin-4--tt, principle 
of party organisation ho-7, rever,, the link with the -cast was tenuously 
retained. 
The 11-TIM's Own self-i--zge was variously express A. ed as " Ithe 
conscious vanguard of A. the national movement" an' as "the organisa- 
227 tion of the Arab wor-king class and progressivt A. forces". 
dif ferentiated itself f rom the traditional Arab parties by it: s 
possession of a definite I'sociall program whicth cannol. - '-o-e separated 
from the stru&gle for independence" 
228 
and its deferc-- of the ' 
economic and soc-ial interests of workerýs and ,e , asant3. t. 5 
atte=. ts to "introduce new popular forces in the Lrideppende=e struggle" 
229 
. s. perc --p4%. jon of also set it apart from the other partiesy as dicl it. 
the struggle in Palestine as being part of t-he dhai-11 of the 
"intemational liberation --ovezent in the co"Lonjes t. he worýdng 
class in Europe"., and its efforts to align the -*, -ra7a nat. -A., onal, movement 
221. The "Tational. Coharter (n. -p. n. d. ) Focial Aizms: a: -t--les 14 & 15 PP-5-6 
222. Ibid. Political Aims: article 2. r-3. 
223- Ibid. article 4. 
221+.. Ibid. Internal Organisation. article 1j.. p. 6. 
225- Lbid. article 2. 
226. Statement of PolitbureWNTL: Answer to J, 3.:, Ai ý'Tus. -. einl, 
6 Jtme 
1946. IT 16 June 1946. 
227- StatenJ-t- of E. Tuma to foreign Jou-nnalists, Jerasalem 5 J=e 
1947. IT 13 July 1947. 
228. IT 10 February 1946. 
229. Ttatement of F. Tum.. to journali: ts. loc. cit. 
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with the "forces of freedom in the world"., a, the head of which stood 
"the Soviet Union and the new democracies". 
230 
Follov. Ing, the orthodox communizt theory of "stages, of development" 
the !, TIT' s view was that the prevalent stage of the etruggle in FtLlestine 
was that of "national liber-! ý tion" p which could "only be achieved 
tlhrougý. national unity". 
231 
Building socialism., it was declared 
. problem 
of toclay but that of tomorm7l' after indel-endence was "not the - 
haad been won, and the national economic structure establi-thed, and 
it depended; on the exi--tence of "favourable international conditio="e 
232 
Characterising Palestinian society as one where "the predominant 
values are those of f eudalism and Hamdian authoritarian, smt, . 
233 
t -he NLT, called for the reali-ation of "bourgeois democracy" and 
aidressea itself to the traditional, Arab leadership to this eff ect. 
The 1-7.11, ts perception of the struggle in Palestine led it to the 
conclusion thpt the rea]--sation of independence was in the interests 
of all classes of Palestinian society, "the industrialist, the merchant, 
the worker, the reasant, and the intellectual". 
234 It perceived a 
contradiction between the continued existence of the Mandate and the 
interests of all the constituent layers of Arab society including 
both landov. mers and the budding commercial and industrial bourgeoisie whop 
due to the Lmique feature o. f the existence of a more developed Jewish 
capitalist sector, were not taken into partnership by British 
caritalism. Hence the'I'M11 s program was based on a belief in the 
feasibility of co-operation with the Arab political parties, as 
representatives of the Arab bourgeoisie and landed interests,, in 
-, u, --suit of the common aim of independence. 
235 Yet it noted that 
despite the fact that the Arab working class appreciated the need for 
national unity and was reaay to support the Arab economy and forego 
any activity -výhicb, might "embarrass the Arab employers at this stage 
in the national liberation struggle" 
236 the other Arab classes did 
230- Statement of E. Tum to journalists. loc. cit. 
231. IT 8 October 1944. 
232. IT 5 November 1944. 
233. 'IT 9 February 1947. 
234. IMT, inPalestine (Internal Bulletin) N- 3.22 February 1944. 
This bulletin first appeared Ist February 1944, and rtopped 
with publication of "Al Ittihacl". 
235. IT 2 Decezber 1945. 
236. IT 22 October 1944. 
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not fully ap-preciate the need for Unity. 
237 It regarded it its duty 
to press home the importance of such national unity and to "draw 
the other classes into the direct struggle against Briti. -h 
imperialis=% 
238 
The NTILI s view of the traditional leadership of the Arab national 
movement remained aj: biguow.. On the one hand., it condemned their 
-he Arab struggle past record -. v' hach had led to the continuoue failure of 4%, 
for independences, and attributed this to the "op rtuniLtic class kpo 
nature" of the leadership. 
23 9 Thi-, was beet characteri. -, ed by their 
po licy of re garding Britain' s enemies as the allies of the Arab 
national movememt, and had resulted in their support for the Nazis 
during -the war, whereas: the h-LTa had conUstently called for alliance 
with "freee: io-m loving peopless" only. With the increýising oppo.,. ition 
of a section oil the Zionis"t movement to Britain, the same Arsb 
leaders who had in the past put their faith in Germany were now seen 
to be transferring their allegiance in an attempt to reach an acco. 7nodation 
with British policyp supposedly at the expense of the Zionis-14.8. 
Jr-oreover, the traditional leadership subordinated all social and 
economic demands to the independence question, declaring the 
realization of ruwh tasl--- to be of secondary importance, 
240 
a view 
vehemently rejected by the 1M. Despite this however, thelM saw 
the Arab parties as retaining a "revolutionary" nature in so far as 
they struggled for freedom and independence. Their weakneS3 was 
believed to lie in the "hesitancy of the leadership" and herein lay 
the NIZI s self-appointed task: to make "positive criticism... urging 
a transformation Of their outlook". 
241 
The ITIL continued to adhere to the policy of the pre-split 
comm. Lnist movement,, of support for the Allied cause in the war against 
the razis stressing that there was a fundamental difference between 
the two which should be recognised by the Arab national movement. 
242 
The interests of the Arabs were seen to lie on the side of the Alliesv 
237. IT 8 October 1944. 
238- IT 2 December 1945. 
239- IT 19 I'aY 1946. 
240- IT 10 FebruarY 1946- 
241- lbid. 
21+2. IT 23 July 1944. 
259 
whose victory over Nazism was regardtd as "a victory for us... for the 
principle of self-detennination". 
243 The war was characterised as 
being fought for the cause of "real democracy"., 
244 for the creation 
ol. a 11 ýree world7', 
245 
and was seen to usher in an "unprecedented 
revolutionary situation" heralding the "end of imperir-lism". 
246 The 
ML saw the Atlantic Charter as opening a n", stage of development in 
the i='.. er-national scene; the via- had created a new fact: that of 
the "international recognition of the rights of people to self- 
247 de-t e rmination he struggle of the Arabs for independence wan, 
"I as being part of this "international struggle for freedom portrgyed 
a-, d aga! =. t i=reriali =-". 
248 
in the Ught o-A" the Atlantic Charter and the declarations of 
the TehiTu-i an%, '. '& I. "oscow conSerences, the LIZ held that the task of 
the Arab national movement, whose aims were "in the spirit of the 
Charter", was to make use of this "stage of the victory of ! be 
peoples over Kazism". 
249 The*UN ChartexJs aim of "helping mandated 
nr-e% 
territories to proceed along the path of self-rule and independence"'- 
was to be siezed upon by the Arabs whose struggle for national 
independence and freedom was similar to that of several other colonial 
peoples. 
251 It saw in 'the creation of the UN, and the presence 
there of the Soviet Bloc, an important international fom-a which 
could be relied u-, cn to implement a solution favourable to Arab 
aspi-rations. This came increasingly to occtipy a central place in 
the TILL's calculations; -initially its use was urged on the grounds that 
it was an international foram Where British policy could be exposed. 
252 
By the close of the Mandate however, recourse to the UNL hadl become a 
2L3. IT 13 August 1944. 
244. TýT;, 20 August 1944-- 
245. IT 28 Way 1944. 
246. IT 4 February 1946. 
247- 17"r in Palestine N. 9.5 April 1944. 
248- jaz in Pall estine V . 10.21 April 1944. 
249- Ir T 24 September 1944. 
250- 1"he Palestine Knot and the Way to its Folution (Memo submitted 
by VIL to Prime Minister Atlees 10 October 1945s and issued as 
an Arabic pamphlet) - p. '11 
251. Ibid. p. 5- 
252. Statement on the Anniversary of the Imperialist Balfour 
Declaration. Leaflet of CC/NIZ. 2 November 1945. 
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panacea replacing any thought of internal preparation for a forth- 
coming struggle between the Arabs and the Zionist movementg in the 
event of rhich it was hoped, '--'oviet support for the Arab cause at the 
W would prove sufficient to tip the scales in their favour. 
253 
The V'IL clashed with the traditional leadership of the Arab 
national movement on the i:: sue of de:, -. ocracy writhin the national move- 
ment, and on the question of aligning the Arab movement v. -Ith the anti- 
- struggle and support for the ", oviet Union. The most imperialist 
fundamental issue hcweverp concerned the Jewish inhabitants of 
Palestine, their future status., and the nature of the forthcoming 
independent state. The NLIS regarded the problem of Zionism as 
insepara1ble from. Brill: ainl s attezTts to maintain its presence in 
Palestine. The Balfour Declaration itself was portrayed as an 
attempt to create "a little Je-vý-Ish Ulster" 
254 
and to complicate the 
Arabs' struggle for independence. British policy throughout the 
years of the 1.11andate was characterised as haviiag favoured the Yishuv 
255 
and established a "prIvIleged Jewish conmintty" 
256 
v, -Ith the aim of 
creating a permanent division between Arabs and Jews. The change in 
British policy, which was recognised as having taken place towards 
the end of the war, was seen to be based on the need for I-rab 
si; Lrport in building an anti-Soviet bloc in the Middle 'East, the 
ir, ýportant strategic location of the Lrab countries., and British 
dependence on Arab oil supplies. It was merely a "change of tactic". 
British policý, r continued to be regarded as striving to maintain its 
position in Palestine by appearing to satisfy both Lrabs and Jewsp 
and parti 1tion was siezed upon as proof cf Britain'& manoeuvres to 
maintain its hold over the countiT. 
257 
Recognizing that the Zionist movement enjoyed the support of 
the over-rhelming majority of the Jewish inhabitantas the VIL never- 
theless maintained that this support was "misguided" and likened it 
to the sur-port of the Germans for the Nazis in the pre-war period. 
256 
253- The leaders of the IM were i=pressed by Soviet support for the 
cause of Syrian and Lebanese independence in the Security Council 
and hoped for a repeat performance. Interviev7 v. -Ith E. Tuma., 
Haifa., 4 April 1974- 
254. Palestine's Road to Freedom (Memo submitted by NU to the MT, 
August 1947 and ir-sued as an Arabic pamphlet). p. 6. 
255. Ibid. pp. 55-56. 
256. Speech of E. Tuma at London Congress of the Cor=Unist Parties of 
the British Empire, in, We (Speak of Freedoms op. cit. p. 71. 
257. LT ' 19 May 1946. 
258. IT 14 July ic, 146. See also Speech of Turna at London Congress. 
op. cit. p. 69. 
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Zionism was perceived to be a "diverzionary attempt to withdraw 
the Jewish masses f rom the revolutionary struggle in the world". 
259 
Likeri--e.. the proposed Jewish state was characterised as "a baVe 
for US and Brit--4--h imperial-ism against the independence struggle 
off the I-rabs" 
20' 0 
with the Jevrlzh inhabitants manipulated as "tools 
%Io strike the national liberation movement of the Arab people and 
to drench the area in a sea of racial conflict". 
261 The Zionist 
movement was held to be unashamedly reactionary in so far as it did 
not struzgle for the achievement of self-determination for the country's 
inhabitants, and of thuz being opposed to the spirit of the Atlantic 
C 
262 
Charter. Moreover, its policies were "racialirt and extremistf, 
in that they ran counter to the A. rab!: ' "just national struggle for 
263 
self -dete=inp-tion". ýhe establi., himnt of a Jevdsh state would 
only "provide, fuel for ant-A. --serItism and reaction in Europe" 
264 
and .r 
2ead to increwsed e=ity atainEt the Jews, not only in Palestine but 
also in the neirhbour-ing Lrab statee 
265 
The roots of J, 7. ioni. -m were seen to lie in the persecution under- 
gcr., e by jers in E: urcre and in the existence of regiraes v6hich had 
openly practised racial discrimination against their Jevrish inhabitants. 
The 1'. IL, in confo--mty vý-Ith coz=ist orthodoxy,, held to the view 
timt an-Iti-se=itism wase a ==if estation of a problem of a specific 
society which could not be solved by er, -dgration and the establishment 
of a --tF-41-.. e in Falertine. It regarded the solution as lying in 
the imt--; t,, zticn of democratic regimes. 
266 The majority of the Jews 
in Palestine were secn to have arrived in the country "to escape the 
Nazi terz-or",, 
267 
and the victory of the Allies in the war., which 
suppos-edly had "put an end to racial discrimination and the oppression 
259- IT, 14 July 1946. See also Speech of Tuma at London Congress. 
or,. cit '- 
P- 70- 
260. Statement off E. Tum to joumalists. loc. cit. 
261. 'Fational Statement of NIL Congress, 13 June 1947. IT 22 June 1947. 
262. Statement of CC/L"LL: To the struggling Arab people., 8 Novenber 
1944. LT 15 Rovenber 1944. See also IT 28 May 1944. 
263- The Palestine Knot. o-D. cit. pp- 15-16. 
264. 'Palestine' s Road to Freedom. op. cit. p. 69. 
265. nm 14 July lg)+6. 
266.1--alestinel s Road to Freedm. op. cit. P. 73- 
267. '1'71 27 May and 16 March 1945. 
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of peoples", 
268 
was regarded as having signalled "the end of Zionism". 
it was held to be inconceivable that Zionism could flourish in a 
democratic societys and already in 1945 it was being clained that 
"im=igration haz now stopped" and tImt "many jews are novi returning 
to their countries of origin". 
269 
The IM held that there ey! Eted a clear-cut class division within 
the Jev7--. sh com=iritys and that the Jewish workers and peasants were 
"forced to support Zic-razm" only as a result of the "negative policy" 
of the IxF-b national movement. 
270 The traditionEd Arab leadership 
was Seen to have "never beer. able to understand lionitm" and to have 
never attez: pted to separate the non-Zionist Jews from Zionism by 
addressing the Jerd'sh inhabitants directly. The I"LL urged the 
national leadership to explain to 'he Jews that their future lay 
in "supporting the national struggle for independence", 
271 that the 
Arabs were not engaged in a "racial struggle" against them, 
272 
and 
that Zionism was the barrier to understanding and co-operation between 
tl,. e two peoples. It v; as the duty of the Arab national movement to 
guarantee the democratic rights of the Jewish inhabitants so as to 
... solate the Jews fxum 
impeealism and Zionism"s and "to tin them over I'd 
to our liberp-tion strug-le"e273 The NIZ, recognising that conflict A- be) 
would lead to parl. ition, held fir=ly to the necessity of diFtinguishing 
between the '*ar'zZ--es; si'7e Zionist movement" and the mass of the Jewish 
inhabitants in -Lie cotuitry., vdioýe interests were seen to be firmly 
linked to those of the Arab people in establishing a democratic ordeel. 
274 
Real, ising that "the independent democratic state is only possible on 
the basis of I-xib-Jewish co-operation"., 
275 
and that Zionizz could 
only be defeated if the Arab national movement was swcessful, in 
winning the majority of the Jewish inhabitants to its side, 9276 the 
268. The Palestine Fmot, op. cit. p. 21. 
269. IT 20 Kay and 3 June 1945. 
270. Tý 1 Cctober 1944. 
2T. 11- IT 29 July 1945. 
272. IT 7 kc-r-11 1946. 
273. F-tatement oil C,,, /= to the Arab parties on national unity. LT 
11 March 1945. 
274. IT 21 Yay 1944. 
275. IT 7 krril 1946. 
276. IT 18 March 1945. 
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NIL firmly held that "no solution which ignores the Jewish 
inhabitants can succeed". 
277 It increasingly directed its 
critici=s at the traditional Arab leadership for "ignoring the 
existence of the Jewish inhabitants" and for refusing to grant 
the= equal democratic rights as full citizens of the proposed 
inaePer-dent state. 
278 To the end, the TUL maintained that the 
ma4n i.: sue was the continu-ation of the Br-ltish . ýandate md 
Palestine's independence and that no solutim was possible as long 
as the 11-and4te continued to exist. 
279 
To thiý effect the Arab 
national movement's efforts, vlhich were primarily devoted to the 
stz-aggle, against Zionism, were decried as "diversionary" and -all 
talk of an "Arab-Jewish probleit" was dismissed as "artificial... 
(and) secondary". 
280 
it. 'Political ""etivi 
The political activity of the Arab communists231 centred round 
a M, -, ogrv= of 
transitional demands based on the "stage of development" 
o-4 the country, the struggle for national independence, and the 
within the Arab national movement. Their demands focused 
on four main issues: the establishment of democratic rule, the 
&ranting of wider democra4.;. c and political freedomz-, allovding the 
in'-, itants to partake in the administration of their affairs., and 
t1ne release of Arab "political prisoners". At the same time, they 
called forPalestine's independence and the establishment of a "free 
282 
Arab Pale stine"; they persisted in this call until the middle 
of 10.45 vinen it was gradually replaced by the demand for the 
i=plementation of a "democratic solution" to the Palestine problems 
Y. hich entailed the establishment of an "independent democratic 
Falestine state" guaranteeing equal rights to all its inhabitants. 
283 
277. IT 15 Ju1Y 1945. 
278. IT 18 May 1947. 
279* S"tatement of Ev. Tim- to journalists. loc. cit. 
Palevtinel s Road to. Preedom. o-P. cit. P- 5 280. 
281. For the establishment of the NLL s, ee Chapter Six pp. 191-199. 
282. IT 28 kray 1944. 
283- E-tatement of the Secretariat/NM to the Arab people of 
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'Withiii the Arab national movement, the NIII sf irst task was 
to gain recognition of itself as expressing the true aspirations of t 
the Arab inhabitant-' and a-, constituting a legitizmte representative 
of a section of the -Irab community. Its energies were directed 
ta, wards the establishment of a broad "national popular front" under 
the slogan of "national unity for national liberation". 
284 ThAs 
call for a democratically elected mtional representstive body was 
to persist throughout the remaining years of the Llmdate. 
The FIL's initial attitude to other Arab politicLl parties 
which, vithout exception, had been dormant during the - m-r years 
and were only juý-t beginning -to revive, was not one of hostility; 
i-40. sinply declared thzA these parties were non-representative and 
thus not, in a position to sreak in the name of the Irab 
inhabitants. 
285 The propaganda for national unity waz based on the 
perceived need for "popular representation", Lmd the 1711 put. forwr-rd 
its own existence and 'diat of other "popular as. -ociations ... lsbour 
orgar. 3. zations... clubs... " as reason for ter=inating the "monopoly of 
self-appointed' guardipans" . and to establish the right of the Arabs to 
"self determination" in electing their own representatives to lead 
their national movement. 
286 Articles appearing in "Al Ittihad" con- 
tinued to harp on the necesEity of establishing a "broad-based unity" 
and to Inveigh against "secrecy and private coasultations" among 
Arab leaders, for well ever a year. In its calls for the holding 
of a national congress to elect the leadership of the national 
movement and establish a national charter., theNLL received a 
measure of support f'rom other political parties and national figures. 
267 
However it was completely ignored by the dominant Husseini faction 
represented by the Arab Party, and by the Arab League, which was to 
prove instrumental in the establishment of the leadLing bodies of the 
national movement in the country. When consultations were initiated 
284. KM in Palestine N- 3.22 February 1944. 
285. NU in Palestine. N-2.14 February 1944. 
286. IT 8 October 1944. 
287. k number of nctional. leaders wrote in "Al Ittihad" expresBing 
support for the RMI s ideas: 0. Bitar, Yayor of Jaffa (IT 6 
Wgust 1944) A. '$al eh, president of the National Bloý-T IT 
16 July 1944); H. Hu, seini (IT 30 July 1944); Y. Ghussein 
president of the Youth Congress party (LT 15 April 1945). 
265 
IF-te in 1944 for the establichment of a new HAC, "Al Ittihad's 
complained that "the popular organisations" were being excluded 
from the talks,, and reminded its readers that all existing Arab 
288 
political parties had been established on "non democratic principles" 
Despite its ostracisation from the decision-making councils hoAever, 
the !, "IT extended its sujýport to the nornination of a Palestinian 
re: presentative to the AlexazOlria meeting of the . rab 
League, 
coupling this vdth yet another call for t-he e, --tablislrnent of a 
"national front" . 
269 li-ý its fir--t public meeting held in Haifa 
on the occasio*n of the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration., the 
1, -,,. r Is leaders raized the slogan of the "national front" r-nd hoped 
tnat thiz ra-11Y sUpport from other sections- of the nRtional 
movement namely, thoze rho vere not keen on the domination of the 
rufti, I&actio--* 
290 
pite its failure to elicit any positive response to its calls Des- 
fcr democrat-Isation and fcr the broadening of tLe leadership of the 
national movement, the ML published early in 1945, "practical 
, Y%roposals" for the establishment of this cherished goal. 
291 These 
proposals offered two alternatives; the first which the IM 
sap_-ported on the grounds of llsi: -ýplicityll, was based on the formation 
of a preparatory committee co: posed of an equal number of representa- 
-=ves fro= all wiftical parties and associations, which in its turn 
would cp"I for a natý. onal congress. This would establish a national 
Cha-, ter and rroceed to elect a representative HAC. The second 
7rDpozall, vhich was deemed more democratic though rather cumbersomeg 
was for a ccnference base, "' on individual fee-paying menbers who would 
elect the members of the congress in a national referendum an a 
-4 . p=po-. --. '&C)nal basis supervised by a tempomr7 committee composed of 
two mem. -bers of each Arab party; the elected delegates would 
constitute the national congress and proceed to for: Mlate future 
national policy and the election of a new leadership. 
292 This 
285. IT 24 S. Septenber 194L. 
259. IT I Oc'tcber 1944.. 
290.1", 5 Nov-ember 1944.. 
291. Y-. ZagTzouri (S-ecretary of LIM). A practical proposal to unite our 
ef-, orts. IT 4 March 1945. 
292. Y,,.. Zagmourz. A practical proposal to unite... loc. cit. 
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proposal was given f ormal shape by the issue of a statement by the 
CC of the NIL,, calling for the establishment of a preparatory 
committee made up of representatives of the six existing Arab 
parties,, to organise the congress whose members would be elected 
293 directly "by all Arabs of twenty-one years and over". A further 
statement called for the fo, -. Ta. ation of "national committees" in every 
Arab tor. n an: 1 village, as the VArst# step towards convenin, -., the 
proposed congress and the desired national front. It was pointed 
out that for the success of this scheme, it was necessary for the 
local national co=i-1I. -, tees to be "representative of all clasz: es of 
the people" 0 
294 
The 171LI s cP-1 1 for a national front , A-as doomed to f ailurre by 
its inzistence th-t' it could agree to it only on condition that the 
other conce=ed parties accepted its own solution of the Palestine 
p rob 1 em. This referre-4 pri=. arily to th, ý questicn of the country's 
Jeva--h iriMbitants and their future ýtatus in the prospective 
independent state. Thile the IM proposed to grant them "full 
citizens' rights in a democratic republic". this formula was in 
conflict with the declared policy of the leadership of the Arab 
national movement. Undaunted by this, and by its mrn characterisation 
of the tradit-: onal leadership as having "withdramn and given no lead 
or orderly retreat" during the years of the war, and of havinaý 
supp 
296 theli'M ported the Axis powers during that same period, 
launched a series of public meetings to popularise its demands for 
the establishment of the "national front". 
297 Howevers rapidly 
realis, ing the i=ppoEýsibilit-j of any I=iediate fruition of its planss 
it turned its attention to dru=: ing up support for the local Arab 
Fronts established in two of Palestine'e largest cities, Jaffa and 
Haifa. 
298 Wevertheless it continued to inveigh against the policy 
of the traditional leaders which it characterised as aiming to 
293- 'Statement to the Arab Parties on national unity. Signed on behalf 
P ol. CC/NM by E. Tum and K. Zagmouri. 1T 11 March 1945. 
294. CCATIL: Statement to the Arab people: -The popular front,, the 
problem of ==icipalities and une=ployment, ) 24 March 1945. LT 8 Apr-11 1945. 
295. IT 18 March 1945. 
296. N8 April and 20 Ilay 1945. 
297. The first meeting was held in Jaffa,, 20 April 1945. IT 22 April 
1945- 
298. Statement of CC//IUL: Decision of CC9 16 June 1945. IT 24 June 
1945- 
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"isolate radical cadres from the national movement" and impose -- 
instead "old leaders with racialist views and reactionary imperialist 
ideologies". 
299 
The establishment of a new HAC in Fovenber 1945 on the direct 
intervention of the Arab Leaguev prompted a mixed response from the 
ITLL. V, %. ile smarting over its exclusion,, it recognised the fact that 
At had a&., ieved Eome measure of recQgnition as a result of the 
consultations held by the Arab League emiszary with a number of its 
leaders. 300 . 
Its initial response was to extend suprort to the new 
EAC while deploring the fact that it excluded "the representatives of 
the new forces". 
301 A subsequent article in "Al Ittihad" declared 
at the new F-I. C "had not been created. by the people of Palestine 
but by the k-rab League"s and expressed the hope t-hnt it would 
broaaen its base by co-o- ., erating vrith 
the representatives of the 
Apopular forces" if it Y-1shed two survive and develop. 
302 An official 
statement of the CC/NILL chose to endorse the HACI s creation by 
ter=ing it a "preparatory committee for the setting-up of real 15 
national unity" and ez: phasized its belief that although it did not 
represent "all popular groups and parties",, it was nevertheless "a 
. y=bol of the national unity the = had been calling for". 
303 
soon however, the policies pursued by the new HAC drove the IML 
to -vathlraw its su7--port; this it explained in terms of the HACI s 
"lack of any mass responsibility",, and its unwillingness to "come 
out clearly again!: t British impeeialism'1.304 While putting pressure 
on the ITUC to boycott 
the -proposed Anglo American Committee of Inquiry 
and to take the Palestine problem to the Mi, the 111Z continued to 
argue that despite all their shortcomings "the traditional parties 
are still revolutionary in so far as they struggle for independence"'. 
though their leaders were characterised as weak, hesitant, and 
opportunist. 
305 The NITZ, saw its task of striving for the inclusion 
of the "popular forces" in the 1LO's as one of stiffening and 
299. IT 20 Vay 1945. 
300- IT 25 November 1945. 
301. lbiý. 
302. IT 2 December 1945. 
303- Decisions of Enlarged CC/NTZ meeting, 2 December 1945. IT 9 
Decezber 1945. 
304. IT 27 Janir--ry 1946. 
305. IT 10 Febr=-ry 1946. 
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activating national unity for the sake of national independence. 
With the return of the Mufti's leutenants J. Husseinij, to 
Palestine in May 1946 and hinj establishment of yet another HID with 
an ovemInelming majority cf Arab Party members,, the NTTL lost any 
hope c-f VLining admittance to the ranks of eie national leadership. 
'Indeeds J. F. u=-seini had tried to placate the corw., uni, -ts by 
P-ppoint! zng Dr. K. 
Fudeiri, who was generally identified with them, 
to its Tl-i! ý did not satirfy the IML rhich insisted 
on a representative of its ov-r. choosing, and Dr. Budeiri himself 
307 
was soon calling for a democratically elected HAC. This new 
body was declared by the 17Lr, to be unrepresentative and to constitute 
"tnie vo-A. Ce of the 1-rab Party only". Thile refuzing to recognic-e 
I- - had 
"false "an RAC, forced on the eo el' and claiming that it 
attributions of representation", the NIL again put forward its 
308 
-0 -I proposal of a preparatory commattee for a national congress. L avour e- I 
H. Husseinil s consequent declaration of the willingnesb of the 
F_t. C to meet with the Anglo-US Committee., in the face of the almost 
unar. j-, nous reViection of this policy by the other Arab parties# and 
his refussall to accept the FMI s advice to take the problem to the 
M;, prcvoked the LIL to come out publicly %-1th the demand for a 
ne -%; HAC - It denied reco;; nition to the existing body and condemned 
it for its total subserv--ence to the wi-. hes of the Amb League. 
309 
J. Husseini countered this by explaining his refural to allow the .1 
N, IL to par. 4-cipate in the =., on the grounds of its declared policy 
of r-wanting to co-operate with the Zionict organisations, and with 
Ben Gurion" - Thi'S brougýit an angry rebutal from the NIL v&ich 
accused J. Husseini of deliberately misrepresenting the policy of 
the Arab communists towards the Jewish inhabitants. Ilevertheless 
it, refused to retreat frcm its declared position which was based 
on the necessity of sepsr-ating the masses of the Jewish inhabitants 
from the Zionist organisations and of calling on the national move- 
306- Arab political ners. Jewish Intelligence Report 27 March 1946- 
Czt- Q 25/4139. 
307- S=-vey of Arab co=mists, 1946. op. cit. p. 6. 
308- ! -, 'tatenent of CC/N11 an situation in the national movement, 
29 
yarch lcOf46. IT 31 Yarch 1946- 
309- IT 26 11-ry - 1946. 
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ment to fornulate a positive policy to %%-in them over to its side. 
310 
"Al Ittihad" accused J. Husseini of wr-nting to keep the NIL out of 
the IjAc in order 11 to maintain his -DoEition within it" and described 
his policy, Ytdch it characterised as one of "directing the national 
movement againz; t the Jewz only and not againtt imperialism" as 
tv 311 "bankrupt ý, Tu= writing in "Al Ittihad". called on J. Hut-teini 
to retract hin statement again-t the Arab com=Lmi., tz rnd levcllcd 
an accusation against all tho. -e vdýo refu-, ed to accept a I'deviocratic 
f paving; the wky for partition of the countr7 and the solution", o& 
establishmnt of a Jewish state. 
312 
The practical response of the = to itE, ccntinued excluzion 
from the ieac3ý.. ng body of the Arab national movement was the estabIish- 
ment of an Higýierkrab F. -ont co=: po. -ed of all ý. mb political parties 
with t: ]., -, e sing-le exception of the Arab Party. 
313 The ner. organisation 
was howevers stillborn and never becam active . 
314 In May 1946 the 
Y-. uf ti had made his appearance in Cairo; hiss national standingbad 
remained untra-melled by his wartime activity,, so much so that "Al 
Ittihad" itself felt obliged to pay homage to hi-- leadership. 
315 
His hegemony over the national movement was speedily re-established. 
In Palestine this vý-as reflected in the Arab League's distolution of 
both the HAC and the Higher Arab Front. 
316 The new HAC created 
, ency of the Amb Leagues a by the Yrufti acting -through 
the ag ws 
inly staffed by his supporters317 and again excluded the Arab 
commmists. 
By the middle of 1946 it became clear that the ML had f oregone 
any possibility, if indeed one had ever existed, of recognition by 
the trad-. 1tional leadership of the Arab movement. Yet continuously,, 
until the end of t1he Ilzndate., it persisted in its calls for the 
er, tablishment of the "national front", for the holding of a "national 
310. Statement of Olecretariat/= conceming J. Husseini, 8 June 1946. 
IT 16.7une 1946. 
311- Y-T 9 JUne 1946. 
312.3-onceming statement of -T. Husseini. -IT 
9 June 1946. 
313- IT 9 June 1946. 
314. Supplement to Survey of Palestine. op. cit- P- 139- 
315. IT 23 June 1946. 
316. Hurewitz. op. citl. p. 251. 
317- ibid. p. 270. 
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congress", and for "de=ocratising" the movement. The bW s 
reasoning wa--- based on the realiý ation that alone it was incapable 
of meaningfully influencing the direction of national politics; it 
needed recognition by the traditional leadership in order to achieve 
legitimation and to partaI: e in the HAC. Only then would it be 
able to influence national decision! -. The ler. gths to Which the 
I-MI, vmz pre-cared to go to r.,, how its "sincerity" are, evidenced by its, 
acCeptance of the HPLI -- boycott of IDISCCF. it did zo in order to 
exhibit its willingness to subordinate itself to "national 
di-!, ciplinell, and hopefully convince the traditional leadership of 
,. ts wort-, as a parzticipx. t in the national movement. 
316 
The divergence between the policiec the NIL desired the national 
movement to pursue , and thoFe actually fo=ulated by the Arab Leacue 
and the RAO, became wider as the war drew to a clo. ne. Although 
initially the NU had welcomed The establi-thment of the Arab Leaguep 
defending it againý-t accusations that it arose as "a result of a 
call --f-mm the outtside. 
3-39 
and supporting Palestine's participation 
in its meetings 
320 its, position was transformed towards the end 
of 1945 to one of outright hostility. The League was now accused 
of having been the realisation of a "British reactionary scheme")321 
and indited for being more interested in aiding imperialist domination 
over a "grester Fyria" 4tlx-, i in the struggle for Palestine' s independence 
and the evacuation off Briti, -4 armies from the whole region. 
322 The 
local Arab leadership in Palestine waz similarly criticised for 
being under the domination of the Arab League, and further accused 
of blurring the Palestine issue by over emphasising the immigration 
316- While keeping the VIL out of the leadership of the national move- 
ment 'the traditional leaders could not but note its influence 
amng certain sections. of Arab society. Some attempts were 
made to accomodate the L7L such as the addition of Dr. K. 
Budeiri to the proposed Arab delegation to the UN General 
Assembly hearings of May 1947. This was foiled however by the 
refusal of the US Govexnment to grant him a visa. Seep-Ll 
Ja=mhir, 19 May 1947. Quoted in R. al Said. The EMrptian Left 
a: -A the Palestine Problem (Beirut 1974). p. 212. Inter7ievv 
-with Dr. E.. Budeiri, Jerusalem., 10 August 1974. 
319- IT 1 October 1944. 
320- (5EANTILL: Decisions- of CC Meetings 16 '-June 1945. IT 24 June 1945. 
321- IT 28 Cctober 1945. 
322. TF 14 October 1945. 
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and land sales issues. 
323 By presenting the problem of Palestine' a 
independence on the international scene as one of Arab demandc for 
the barning of i=Ligrations it had reduced it to "a bargain over the 
number of immigrants to be allowed into the country,. 
321+ 
and completely 
ignored the main root of the problem: Britain's presence in 
Palestine, and the necessity of directing the national movement's 
main efforts towards securing its expulsion. The local Lrab leader- 
Ehip was further criticised for raising extreneLst nF-tionaliEt slogans., 
explicitly refusing to live with the Jewish inhabitants of the countr 
a policy rhich the I-M wazned could only be underatood as a demand 
. Lor the establishment of 
two Eeparate, states. 
325 
-P From its. inception 
"Al Ittihad" had regularly featured articles calling on the m. ticnal 
movement to recognise the existence of differences within the Jewith 
co=mmity and to direct its efforts tovýwdz the Jewish inhabitants, 
with the aim of sep, ating them from 
326 It m. =cd that par 7icnism. 
failure to achieve understanding and co-operation between Jews and 
Arabs would inevitebly result in partition, a solution xhich the I; LL 
declared itself clete=inedly opposed to. 
The divergence in practical policies cam into the open as a 
result off Bevin' s. statement of November 1945 ind the declaration of 
the intended fonmtion of an Anglo American Co=Littee of Inquiry. 
This was to discuss the possibility of the entry of one hundred 
thousand Jewish refugees f rom Europe into Palestine., and the future 
form which Britain's continued presence was to take. The NLL 
unequivocally opposed Bevin' s p=posals. It denied the need for 
an inquiry, and called for an intemational conference to deal with 
the problem of Palestine on the basis of self -detennination for the 
country's inhabitants. It rejected the liracLng of the refugee 
problem in E'Urope with Palestine, and opposed US Intervention into 
323- State, -: ient of CCAM on the Occasion of the Balfour Declaration. 
4 November 1945. 
324- The Palestine Knot. op. cit. Introduction., pr. 3-4- 
325- Ibid. p. 10. 
326. Scarcely a month passed by without "Al Ittihad!, publishing an 
article on this subject. e. g. The Wational Movement and the 
Jewish minority. IT 1 October 1945; The Solution of our 
national problem depends on our stand vis-a-vis the Jewish 
people in Palestine. IT 8 July 1945. 
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V. 
Palestine's affairs. 
327 'he WIL went on to conde= the poEItive 
reception accorded by the Arab Leagie to Bevin' s statement and its 
reco=endation that the F-P-C should co-operate with the lnquiry 
328 
C om. -. -4 tte e. The NIL called on 
the HAC to boycott the Co=mittee, 
reminding it that Britain was "the national movement'r- first eneqj"q 
and thpt 
its 
co-operation would imply recognitor, of Britain's role 
as "juage and neutral observer,,. 
329 It propo. sed es wi rA1tcrn&tivej 
to take the problem to the Fecurity Council and thu-- remove it from 
the jurisdiction of Britain. 
330 The aim, haNever, was not to create 
yet another inquiry but t-- strive for a decision to abolish the 
mandate ar. 4 to "expoze ! --periali-sm on the. international L. rena,, 0331 
This call was to become one of the main plankc of the 17ILI s program 
and was to be repeated with increasing frequency in the next year 
and a half. It was soon to be linked to another plank stressing 
that the Arabs had "friends" at the TJN, and that they could rely on 
the support of "all progressive forces" at the head of which ctood 
the Soviet Union. 
332 
Increasingly "Al Ittihad's" attacks were directed at the Arab 
League vh. ose "evil council" was seen to lie behind the IQCI r, decisioni; 
it repudiated the "Arab League' s leadership of our national struggle" 
333 
ana expLained thato its continued meddling in Palestine' s affairs and its 
all, ter-pts lvoo direct the stniggle against the Jer. i--h inhabitants instead 
of Bnitish imperialisms, were part of an "inperialist plot" to partition 
the countzy. 
334 
in The Inquiry Co=itteel s, recommendations 9 which called for the 
e nt ry of one hundred thousand refugees and outlined the necessity of 
transferring the Mandate to aMT trusteeship, were in accordance with 
327. Ftatemnt of the Secretariat of NLL on the Declaration of the 
British Government: No solution except Independence. 16 
lloveiýber 1945. LT 9 December 1945. 
328. IT 25 Fcrveraber 1945. I- I- 
329. TIM Open Letter to the HAC, 27 January 1946. 
330- Statemnt of CC , 
AMT,: Decisions of CC s 14-15 Febiuary 1946. IT 17 Februarýv 1946. Fee also, Letter of CC, /NTZ to RAO regarding 
. Anglo-U', 
l'- Co=ittee 3 March 194-6. 
331- IT 4 Februar-V 1946. 
332. IT 1921 Kay 1946. 
333- IT 3 March 1946. 
334. IT 10 March 1946. 
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the N%rishes of the US and Briti--h Govemments respectively. 
335 The 
VILL pointed to the recommendations as proof of the correctness of its 
position in advocating the boycotting of the "imperialirt investigation 
co=-I ttee, - . 
536 The Arab leaders were castigated for having proved 
"incapable of seeing further than their o-m noses,, 
337 
and Tuma wrote 
j, _ 111,1 lt+. Lhaa" explaining the emergence of a new Pritit-h policy 
Z oni wl-. ich wanted, to placate the P. rab-- without angering the 1-i tts, 
and aimed at the partitioning of the country. 
338 "JU I ttihad" 
lamented that the 1-, rF-b League had siezed the initiative from the 
hands of Palestine' s ý-rab inhabitants and that it was "interf ýring, 
. 
339 "'he main thrust of the i. rab in our affairs large and -r,, iall" 
moveme-nt' s policy had re=ained directed to%vardz the econoiric boycott 
of the Jev-rish con=anity., and on the similarly "diversionaz7" and 
"secondary" struggle against i=igration and land sales. Thic 
wa, % seen as a deliberate policy aimed at maintaining relat-'ons with 
ý40 Britain in the hope of arriving at a mutup. -Uy satisfactory compromite 
In July 1946., the British Govemment put forward a "provincial 
autono,,: T plan" based essentially on a partitioning of the country 
under a British trusteeship, and proposed the holding of a conference 
to be attenaed by both Arabs and Jemm in addition to the representatives 
o. -& the I.. -rabs states, to discuss the problem. 
341 Tý. hereas both 
Palestinian Arabs and Jews refused. to participate in the discussionst 
the Arab states agreed. The NLL responded by calling on both the 
Arab League and the HAC to boycott the negotiations and warned that 
the eventual result could only be partition. 
342 
Moreover it 
declared its OPPO-sition to any plan, including that of federation, 
which viould lead to the establishment of a Jewish state in any part 
. of Palestine. 
335- 'Hurewitz. ci . p. 246. 
330 Statemwl of Fecretariat of NLL: We demand that our problem be 
raised at the UN wid in-ist on the establishment of a Democratic 
United Popular Pront. 5 MaY 1946- 
337. IT 5 MaY 1946. 
338- Falestine and the World. IT 19 May 1946. 
IT 2' Jime 1946. 339- 
340- IT 2 June 194.6. 
34-1- Hurewitz. op. cit. pp. 258-259. 
342. Statement of the Secretariat of NLL, on the 4th of AUgUEt 1946. 
IT 4 August 1946- 
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- The YLL did not truEt- the RAO' s declared refusal to attend the 
London conference., which it termed "ambiguous and hesitant343 and 
kept up the =esEure through "Al Ittihad" for a clear declaration 
of boycott and for going to the Fecurity Council. V: hen the 
conference was postponed by Britain,, it claimed to see this as 
"an attempt to hide its failure" bult warned that it va. - also a 
I'manoeuvre to keep U! - away from the TjT,,. 
344 At the mme time it 
criticised the FIAO for keeping silent on the Arab states' propo. --als 
at the conference, which implied that they had the agreement of 
. 
345 
and declared itself oppoted to them Palestine's Arab inhabitants, 
in so far as they "limited the freedom and independence of Palestine,, 
and tied it to "the imperialist chariot". 
346 
V, hen the London conference was reconvenedq this time with the 
participation of the HAC -, 
the YU was loud in pointing to the danger 
of "bilateral talks výrhich keep us away from the UN and. its charter"j, 
and to Britain's attempt to portray the problem as one of conflict 
between Arabs and Jewss while it itself was performing "a neutral 
role ... keeping the peace". 
347 The failure of the conference when 
Britain declared its termination in Februaxy 1947, was described 
as a failure off FIAC policy, and the 111L referred to the "rolicY of 
c tu Y,, 0348 catastrophe rhich it has been pursuing for a quarter of a en r 
SinnAtaneouslyp the conference was declared to have been a success 
for Britainvdhich ncx, - donned the m=-tle of 11concilliator of Arabs 
and jews"s a role which the Arabs thewelves were helping it to 
perform. 
Although Britain had declared at the conalusion of the conference,, 
that it was referring the problem to the T21., the ITU did not regard 
thi!? as a positive step, but as one more manoeuvre on the part of 
343- IT 28 Augwst 1946. 
344. Leaflet of Secretariel. of L-IL: Statement to the Arab People. 4 
October 1946. 
345- : [T 13 October 1946. 
346- i,, LL Leaflet: On the Arxdversary of the Imperialist Balfour 
Declaration. 2 November 1946. 
347- NM Leaflet: Palestine Tibere to? In the shadow of Zionist 
terror and negotiations with Imperialism- 31 January 1947. 
348- VML Leaflet: Take the problem back to the people. 17 Februar3r 
1947. 
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Britain to maintain its control over Palestine. 
349 It held that 
the problem was being presented to the M1 in "the wrong way"; it 
had been referred to the General A-"sembly instead of the Security 
Council and it had been taken there by Britain in3tead of by the 
Arabs. 350 It nevertheless mounted a publia campaign heralded by 
the distribution of more than ten thousand cards addressed to the 
RAC calling on it to raise the problem in the Security Council. 351 
in an effort to affect a change in the policy of the RAC. 
The formation of MTSCOP and the exclusion of both Britain and 
the US from its membemhip was regarded as a victory by the 1111,352 
but the statements by the Arab delegates to the General Assembly 
were seen to be counter-productive and were sharply criticised. 
By attacking the Jews and adopting an "ambiguous" position on the 
"democratic solution", and by remaining silent on the issue of 
continued British presence An the country, the Palestine delegation 
was deerwd to have presented international public opinion vrith a 
negative picture of the ;, rab national =; vement. 
353 The laz 
declared that failure to endorse the "democratic solution" would enable 
the Zionists to exploit the weakness of the Arab position, and lead 
to partition and the establishment of a "Jewish racialist state". 
354 
It repeated the warnings of the r'oviet delegate to the Assembly that 
Arab-Jewish Understanding was necessary if the unity of Palestine 
was to be -? reserved, and criticized the HX's deci3ion to boycott 
MSCCp. 355 At this juncture the NIL, itself under pressure from 
the HAC to boycott U. 'q"FCOP,, complied, declaring that it was doing 
this in the interest of "national unity_" zhile reaffi=ing its 
opinion of the mistaken nature of : n=h a policy and it3 continued 
faith in the international organisation. 
356 Thda volte face was 
314-9.7his is corroborated by Hurewitz, o-p. cit. pp. 284-285. 
350- IT 11 May and 27 A. -cril 1947. 
351. Y-T 16 Febru,,, ry and-30 1larch 191;. 7. 
352. NIZ, Leaflet: Let us unite our forces and est-blish a Democratic 
strategy to resist rartition, for evacuation and an independent 
Palestine united and undivided. May 191+7. p. 2. 
353. Ibid. P. 3. 
354. IT 25 May 1947. 
355- Statement of CC/=: A call to the HAC to realise the vrishes of 
the people for national unity and for keeping the Palestine 
problem outside the control of Imperialism. loc. cit. 
356. This followed a meeting of Tuma and others with J. Husiseini. 
See, IT 22 June 1947. 
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accompanied by Compliance with the HAC's ban on reporting on the 
activity Of VNSCCP While it was in Palestine. Understandably 
howeverp the IM remained uncomfortable with this decision, and 
took the opportunity of the Yugoslav delegate's appeal to the HIX 
to reconsider its position, to itself call on it to end the boycott. 
357 
Publicly the 11M remained faithful to its declared adherence to the 
Ht'ýC' -- decision but privEtely it sen-i a ler. -gthy memorandirn to the M358 
and held secret meetinc. -, vrith the Yugoslav me. iber of the WISCOP 
delegation. 359 Despite its blatantly "tailist" line, the 1,7Z 
shortly afterwarx1s declared that the HAC policy with which it had 
collaborated, was leading the comtry towards racial conflict and 
inevitable partition. 
36o 
Throuinout the last years of the Mandate the V'Ill -- policy 
remained geared to%mcards a political solution of the Palestine problem 
and totallv oppobed. to terrori, ta. Even before the ena of the var, 
terrr--'L. Em had been actively promoted by extrerdFt grours v. ithin the 
Li--huv, and in 19L7 had also become a feature of Arab Eociety. The 
IM opposed it-- practice by, either community., on the grounds that 
it created enmity between Arabs and Jezs, and thu-- blocked the way 
to understariding and co-operation v6hich were necessary for the 
establishn-ent of a united state. In addition, it was seen to serve 
British policy in its attempts to maintain its presence in the countryl 
enabling i1-0 to project the struggle in Pale-stine as a "racial" one. 
Initially, Jevurish terrorism was explained as "proof of the 
weakness of the Zionist movennent internally and externa13 ý,,,. 
361 
As 
the war was drawing to a close, the Zionists were seen to be 
attempting to "impose a Je%rish state" in part of Palestine. 
362 
357. IT 13 July 1947. 
358. I; -jZ yremo to the W. Augmt 1947. Published as an Arabic pamphlet 
entitled, Palettinel s Road to Freedom. 
359- Interviews with 1,, uficl 1ýashashibiq Beirut, 13 October 19739 and 
Dr. Y. - Budeiri, Jerusalem, 10 August 1974. 36o. IT 20 Juiy 1947. 
361. F. M- In Palestine. j;. 8.29 March 1944. 
362. 
_ 
27 January 10, LL. 
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Zionism was considered to be in a crisis; it was going through 
its "death throes" as a result of the liberation of Europe vd-dch 
had "put an end to inmigra Ilion". 
363 Although it was grudgingly 
admitted that the Zionists' policy possessed "nearly mass support 
"witl, -in the Yishuv,. thiE: was explained away as 
being the result of 
"fear cfArab domination". 
364 Yet it was siezed upon to further 
e=phasise the urgency of the Arab conw. unists' call for the national 
mcvement' s adoT: tion of the "democratic solution" and the democratic 
state. 
Increasingly however., British policy came to be regarded as 
Paiding and abetting Zioniý--t terrorisin"; 
365 by fanning the flames 
of enmity between Arabs and Jews it was perceived to be tx7ing to 
bring about the partiticr-ing of the countory,, am air- which it held 
in cor- n vnith the Zionists. 
366 In addi-'k-. ior.., British policy,, 
thxough, the cr--at5. on of an atmosphere of conflict and instability, 
was seen to be Pining at legitimising its presence in Palestine 
as a protector of the peace and of the Jevýish minority. 
367 The 
NU denied that Britainý s attempts to put an end to terrorism were 
serious368 and pointed out that this could only be acco=plished 
by "dissolving the organisations which have established secret 
- 369 sx=es a clear reference to the Jewish Agency. Various 
incidents were cilted to the effect that British police and a=7 
authorities "deliberately allmed clashes to spread" by remaining 
i=obile, and arriving late on the scene. 
370 This was seen I 
to be part cf a carefully prepared policy aimed at implementing 
the emergency regulations under the pretext of "inabil". 4ty to 
terminate the disturbances". The real aim however, was perceived 
363. IT 22 October 1944. 
364. IT 27 Januax7 1946. 
. 11 365- YT- 23 June 1946. 
366. Leaflet of Secretariat of r'LL: On the Anniversary of the Balfour 
Declaration. 2 November 1946. p. 1. 
367. CC/ML: Statement on the Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. 
4 November 1945. 
368. IT 28 July P-nd 12. A-ugcust 191+6. 
369.7L 7 Ju1Y 1946. 
370. Y-T 10 "Yovetber 1946 and in January 1947.. an NIAL delegation met The D. C. of Jaffa to complain about police inactivity and sent 
a telegram to the TJN to that effect. IT 17 Augus. t 1947. 
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to be directed at the Arab national movement and the sus-perzion of 
democratic freedoms and liberties. 
371 
With the increasing involvement of the Haganap the secret amy 
of the mainstream Zionist organisation54.. in terrorist activitys "Al 
Ittihad", viuch had alway-- insisted on a differentiation., althou&41 
ambiguous., within the Zioni-st movement, nov; declared that the 
policy of the ZhionL ts 
impossibili-ty of Lrabs 
the responsibility on 
"criminal rolicy,,. 
373 
as a whole was aimed at "showing the 
and Jev. -. s living together". 
372 It placed 
the jewish masses to put an end to this 
Particularly incensed by Z-AoniL-t claim-, that 
the policy of terror which they waged was a "stru, 7., gle of national 
liberation" directed againz t the British and aimed at securing 
independence, "Al Ittihad" e=lained that there could be no 
comparison between the J'Arab rebellion of 1936 and the terror v. hich 
accor. j: )anied it, and výhst was taking place in PuleEtine in 1947. The 
former was the expression of the Arab national moveLzient's struggle 
for the independence and liberation of the Ahole countxy, while 
that unleashed by the Zionists was "in aid of imperialist policies" 
of partitioning the countIY371+ and its perretrators were branded as 
"agents of British imperialism". 
375 
Within the. Arab co==ity., terrorism began to atsume ala--=. ing 
proportions only in the last year of the Mandate, and a major part 
of it was inte=. al, directed against political opponents of the 
Mufti and those suspected of collaboration with the Zionists. The 
IM, as early as 1945 on the occasion of the disturbances vdiich 
occurred in -Egypt and Libya, had warned that the struggle of the 
Arabs was aimed at independence, and should not be directed towards 
"racialist venues". 
376 ý%Ien internal terrorism became the hallmark 
of the Arab leadership., "Al Ittihad" wamed that "the national move- 
ment must avoid bloodshed,, and pointed to the past failure of such 
policies to rut an end to land sales or to provide any positive results. 
37 
371. Leaflet/1%7Z: Palestine where to? In 'the shadow... 1oc. cit. 
372. IT 25 May 1947. 
373. IT 23 November 1947. 
374. IT 10 August 1947. 
375. IT 11 January 1948. 
376. IT 4 November 1945. in lioverber demonstrations of solidarity 
on the occasion of the Balfour anniversary took place in many 
cities in Arab states. In Cairo and Tripoli these turned into 
violent attacks on local Jews. 
377. IT 10 Nove-z-ber 1946. 
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It called on the HAC to formally dissociate itself from all terror 
activities. Ihen the latter remained silent, it was publicly 
criticised for this failure378 and was later accused of using 
terror "to maintain its ov= leadership". 
379 The Arab press and the 
political parties were also critici! ýed for maintaining a silence 
which implied a condonance of terror acts. 
380 On numerous occasions.. 
the Arab communists warned the Arab leadership of the danger of 
transforming the struggle in Palestine into a "racial ccnflict 
between Arabs and jews,, 
381 
and pointed out that this was part of 
an imperialist plot to implement -partition, 
Alone of all Arab parties and ass! ociationz, the'1171L continued to 
condemn the "terrorist policy" advocated by A-mb leaders382 and to 
decr7 the perpetrators vitenever a terrorist outrage occured. 
383 In 
October 1947 it published a bcoklet written by one of its leadex-j, 
explaining the dangers and shortcomings of the policy of "individual 
terroi? and pointing to its negative results as far as internal uni-ty 
and understanding with the jewish inhabitants were conce--ned. 
384 In 
its instructions to its members, it urged the necessity of taking a 
public stand against terx rizmf through the organisation of meetings 
in towns and villages to explain to the Arab com: =unity the harmfulness 
of such a path, and the i=-ortance of preserving the peace in or. er 
to ward off the impending partition. 
385 
Although the NM came out very strongly against A--. b terrorism 
whether directed against zkrabs or againzt the Jewi: sh cc=inlty., as 
soon as the phenomenon made it'-self felt, it is interesting to note 
that this vms not the case conce-ming Jewish ter-. o--A---m. Mhe f i. -st 
his occurred only in October ,, 
386 , condemnation &t 
387 
0. ; 111ý,,. ý, ý :, oiic-. -ed by 
a long silence until Ma: ý 1945. It waz only to-maras the end of 
378- IT 24 August 1947. 
379. FL 2 February 1947. 
380- YT 5 October 1947. 
381- HL Leaflet: To the Arab rational Lesdership. May 1947. 
382. Letter of CC/nZ to H. ýC: ',,., 4"rL calls on all national forces to 
beware of vihat inmerialism -orcmares for our country; Racial 
conflict as a prelude to realising partitions 5 -A-U;; Ust 1947- IT 10 August 1947. 
383- IT 17 Augur t 1947. 
384- F. Nassaz-. Individual Terror and Political -'ý, Iurder 
(October 191+7). 
385- Statement of i7ecretariat of NIL: To 1.11embers of" NIL and Friends. 
17 August 1947. 
386. IT 22 Octcber 19 44. 
387- 1-T 27 114aY 1945. 
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1945 and the beginning of 1946 that frequent articles 
iegan to 
appear dealing with the problem of Jewish terrorism and these invariably 
denied any independent volition to the Yishuv, subordinating all 
its, activity to the reali, ation of what wass seen to be the 
predominantly British aim of partition. Throughout the period 
when i7ewish terrorism was exclusively directed again. -;. t the British, 
"Al ltltdhad" maintained a stony silence and ignored the activity 
'ionist groups. Y-Then Lrabs becurie the subject of of the e-xtren-ist L 
these attack-E., the JI-rab comnunist-v could no longer rez--ain silent, 
but chose to describe the events as an attempt to create instability 
in the countny. They did not accept that the ZioniE: t =rver. -ent was 
fighting on two fronts: again. -st both the Axabs and the British 
Mandate. In the interests of the declared policy of understanding 
and co-operation,, and the hoped f or establishment of a united 
democratic statep the NIL chose to underemphasise the Jewish 
term---! --t factor in the problem, and to rainirnise bot: 'l its extent 
and the unanimous support it com=ded within the ranks of the Yishuv. 
'While it iE not meaningful to speak of the IMILI s "corammist 
polipy",, it is nevertheless possible to observe the Arab communists 
self-ident-ification with the international communist movement. 
Althougýi relations rith Eoscow - non existent since before the 
, 
388 'LL dissolution off the Comintern - remajned severed the 1, 
identified itself with international communism through the publica- 
tion of numerous glorificatory erticles on life in the Soviet Union 
and through propaganda for the aims of Soviet foreign policys and 
the attitude it took on developments in the Arab world. "Al Ittihad" 
wrote at length on the long record of Soviet hostility to Zionism 
anafrequently reproduced articles froM the 0-aviet press underlining 
support for Palestine's unity and independence. 
The holding of the Congress of Corrmuni-st Parties of the British 
'm ..., InPire 
in London in February 1947 was the occasion of the MLI s 
public adherence to the ranks of the international communist movement. 
Tuma travelled to the Ccngress as the delegate of the Arab co=unists389 
388. The Co==ir-t Y"ovement in Palestine. Jevrish Intelligence Report, 
11 February 1947. CZA S 25/7533- 
389- IT 9 February 1947. 
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and later went on to Prague to confer with Czech communists, 
390 
and 
then to Belgrade where great play was made of hi-- meeting v. -Ith Tito 
and the latter's endorseaent for the NUZI s aim of a denocratic state 
in Palestine . 
391 
Despi-14. -e repeated attempts at co-operation, relations between 
the Lrab cor. =unists and the now exclusively Jewish PCP remained 
non-e; dstent. 
392 Joint activity had tel: en place on a number of 
393) 
occasions, and tLhere was superficial agreement on the basic 
objectives of independen-ce and the preservation of the unity of the 
country, but nevertheless the gulf between t1le two parties was 
widening. The YLL continued hov; ever., to give prominence to the 
activities of the Je-.. -Ish con=unists and to reproduce their state- 
Ments. 
392., T'hile nraintaining that the POP was "the only party 
which is really democratic and popular and expresses the vrishes of 
the Jeý-n-sh massee", the Arab communists declared that the PIOP had 
"deviatea from com=mist principles" as a result of the policies 
of its "o=ortunistic leadership". 
395 
The social demands of the N"LL were not put fomard at part of 
a cor: jilete socio-philosophical program but rather in response to 
specific conditions and it did not identify these demands with 
co=nizt doctrine. "A]. Ittihad" hmvever, was utilised from its 
ince-ption in Yay 1944 as a vehicle for co=nist propaganda. 
396 
vithout ever era. ploying the term "communism", the paper stressed the 
aaptability of socialism to Palestine's conditions by pointing to 
tie exa=zle of the Soviet Union. Even Islam and Marxism were 
declared to be compatible , and in the Soviet Union,, Islam was 
described as "flourishing under the protection of the state". 
397 
390. IT 6 t. pril 191+7. 
391. IT 20 April 1947. 
392. of 1-r8-b C07-ý-istsv 1946- 
-02- ci - P- 
7. 
393. e. sz. Joint '--PCPqTM leaflet on occasion of strike of Government 
emýloyees, April 1946. 
394. e. g. Testimony of Jewish Communists to Anglo-US Investigation 
Co=ittee. IT 31 March 1946. 
395.1-T 5 , "--ugust 1945. 
390'. e. g. The Ix-niversa-ry of the October Revolution. IT 5 November 1944. 
397. ", all, off Lenin and S-'talin (sic) to the Moslems; of the East was 
reproduced in IT 4 February 1945, in addition to numerous 
articles on the conditions of Moslems under Poviet rule. 
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The Arab communists were careful to peddle their wares not as 
revolutionary doctrine,, but in a rather conservative mould.. and 
to show them as the sum path to national revival and indeper-dence. 
The day-to-day activity of the Party centred on specific 
economic, social and political i8sues relating to the everyday 
lives of the krab inhabitants- Thile maintalning to the fore the 
slogar. of inae-pender=e, the YLL made clear its interest ir, the 
here-and-now. II., relegated socialism to the di, -tant future and 
laboured to appear as the champion of the Arab, ý in the,. r attempts 
to improve their existing material conditions. This activity was 
facilitated by the Cc=nict' s contml of the La and the k, ', C, v. tich 
allowed them to deliver their message to a vý, Ide audience and to 
-elligentsia and 14., he working class. mobilise the rank-- of the int 
The KLL advocated policies vdiich were aimed at securing the 
support of the widest possible sections of the Arab population. 
Thus it uphel: 1 the call for the retention of the office of ILVor 
in Jerusalem as well as in Haifa, in Lrab hands2398 and mounted a 
persistent campaign for the release of "Arab political prisoners" 0399 
initially the XMI s rlatfom centred on the struggle for the 
implementation of the 1939 VAnite Paper as the first step towards 
realising : L-iderendence. 
400 Later this was replaced by a ca=aiga 
based m tpecifid -issues such as the demand for the abolition of 
censorship 
401 
and of the Emergency Regulations,, 
402 
and it. repeatedly 
calledd on the Govex-iment to grant "democratic liberties" and to allow 
the people to partake in the administration of the country. 
403 
Special attention was paid by the NIL to the problem of 
municipal and local councils which were tenied "the only form of 
self-rule enjoyed by the country since 1925". 
404 The administration 
398- 'IT 3 September 1944,27 May 1945. 
399- IT 13 Aug=-- t 1944; 14 April 1946. 
400- EEAML Statement: To the Struggling Arab People. IT 15 November 
1944. 
401- IT 10 June 1945. 
402. TEAM: Decisions of CC - 16 June. IT 24 June 1945. 
403- IT 7 JanuarY 1945. 
404. IT 11 Mar-ch 1945. 
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was criticised for red-acing them to the role of gov(-. ý=aent 
departments, 
405 
and vms called upon to rcmove all restricticnb on 
their activ-iltý-rjy to extend their authority and to abolich all 
property and tay. qualifications both for voting and for standing 
for office. 
4-0; 5 91!, -l 
Ittihad' s11 interes. t in municipal affairs 
extended to very Frecific local issues407 and az ,: uzh sour .; 
ht tc 
esta'oli--h it J. L wý-, thc 'rz., b co=. unityl s MO' 
t ent! ýU. l - CL. t. 'C defer"jer 
of its rights. 
However, the problems of the Arab village aid the conditions 
of the peasants aid not occury a centn)l place in the YMLI z interests. 
Its proferred solutions were of a- foundly refonnist charact, r, prol 
calling for the ricodemiEat 71C'altl', ý-e, ing the 'on of. at- 
40S 
ex-3. ch-ý. r_-- 
Govem-r-ment -idth res-ponsibility for the : LnTmlemýntation of a hort oll, 
irTrovemem-tus extending from the provision of' free medical tre"otrent, 
409 to the ipavin-,, of roa .' The 171L did ncý attem-pt; to deal wit'i 
the p-reva-iling- feudal-type relaticn--. in the country.,. ide and it's 
sole "revolution. -r-y" propozal ccný-i--A. Cd of a de. nand,, made in the 
last year of the !,. -andate., 
for "the distribution of Gwernment land 
to the rearants". 
4-1.0 
Lhe maim thru%-t of the MILI -- T policies remained aimed throughout 
at appealing to the videst, possible section-- of Arab opinion and,, in 
order to achieve this "national legitimation", the . 3-rab communists 
sougý-,. to associ&te themselves with other Arab parties. Some co- 
operation was achnieveavýith two small organi. -: ýations,, the Rational 
Bloc and the Youth Congress., and communist spealmrs frequently 
appeared at platformE N, ---ith other non-commmist -pealmrs. 
in a number of. local Arab Frcnts, comm. -Usts, were co-ojýted as me=bc=. 
,. et the -'.: -ab commmists continued to be haLTered by their advocacy of 
ffunpo. tpular causes" , the most ir--, ortant of which v., as their stand 
t=ards the Jewish inhabitants. 
405. IT 12 November 1944. 
406. IT 30 Sep-ember 1945. 
407. e. g. the absence of electricity in Jerusalem's- poor quarters. 
, Qee,, IT 11 '--'arch 1945. 408- 1,11 in '7allestine. IZ-7- 22 Y'arch 194)+. 
409. Resolitionz of Congress of YLL, 15 June 1947. 
410. lbid- 
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c. Resr<m5e to Partition 
The U., SCCP submitted its report to the M General 11. zsembly at 
the end of A-ugwit 1947. It unanimously reco=cnded the termination 
of the British Kandate and that I-alestine be granted it. - independence. 
It was unable to agree horvever, on the future --hape of the 
indevendent state. Tine =ajority propoEed the establi-z, hment of 
u-o statec in Palestine, one Arab the other Jewish, v. -Ith economic 
unity bet-xeen the t-ý,, o, Emd an intemational zone in Jermalem. The 
majority report was in favour of a united Falestine in the shape of 
a bi-national federetion. 
411 The ITM' S respom, e to this was mixed. 
On the one hand,, it Welcomed tlie reco M. ition t, t the Jhp blem ewiz; ro 
coul-ý not be solved v.! th:, -n '&. e confires of Falectinc. 
412 On the 
other han:!, it rejected the partition deci sion as "aiming at 
. 
413 
ensuring the interestz- of p-, nglo-7jS imperialism" While welcoming 
the =-Lnor4-tv report's recommendations for maintaining the unity of 
the countrY3 it denied it the right to pronounce on I'the specific 
Porn. " tha-1- this independence should take, a matter which was "for 
. 
414 
%, he people of Palestine alone to decide" The ITIZ., while 
e=phazýzing its continued adherence to its ovvn proposal of a united 
democratic state3 ard t. ýiuz rejecting the recommendations. of both 
m, t-jority and minority., choEe to direct its propaganda in favcur of 
U17SOCF1 s: recommendation for independence which it termed the more 
significant part of the Committee' -- proposals. 
With partition clearly on the agenda2 the ITM turned its fuxy 
against the leadership eff the Amb national movement. It accused 
it of having paved the way for partition with its "negative" and 
"racial: iFtll iDolicy towaras Palestine's Jewish inhabitants. 
4.15 The 
traditional leaders' rejection of the "democratic solution",,. and their 
refusal to recogaise the civil rights of Jewish inmigrants Y&o had 
arrived in Pales' tine after 1916, were declared to have given credence 
to ZioniEt claims that partition was necessary as a means of 
411. Hurer-Itz- OT). cit. pp. 295-6. 
412. State-ment of the Secretariat of NM on the Recommendations of 
I ZS- IJ, 50 -ter 1947. See, Palestine's Road to Preedom. U "OP . epter 
or. cit. p- 83- 
413- TbiE: pp. 64-85. 
414.1 bid p. 86. 
43.5- iT 6 September lc47. 
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"protecting the Jewish minority f rom the aggression of the Arabs" j 
and to lie at the root of the Arabs' failure to gain intemational 
support for their "ju-, t cause" . 
416 The attitude of the IM tm-ards 
the leader--hip of the national movcment was transforred fmm one of 
pmferred collaboration to outright hostility. The 17,11, now called 
f or the in-miedi, ate establissýemer. t of 'If irm intemal organi, r- tion in 
the national, movenrnt" in orr, zer to realiý; e tkie independence decreed 
by the WT, 
417 
and put forrard a progrm for the establishme: -. nt of 
"local national comdttees" in everj tcwr. and village "to organise 
the national struggle for inderendence and for a united Palestine". 
418 
The policy of the was ccnie=ned as "bankru. -t",, for rhile rejecting 
the partition (leciSion, it did not put fOrrard itc arn alter: native 
demands and in czaisequence, alT. eared to be opposed to tho-- 
international co=nunityls support for Palestine's independence. 
419 
The NLL recogaised c-nd conden-med the fact that the leadersI-0,. p of 
the Palestinian Arabs had passed from their ovm hands to those of 
the P. mb League, and w&med of the folly of heeding the dictates 
of "Arab govemments who a-re, working hand-in-hand v. 1-1th British 
imperialiFt schemes". 
420 
In the period between cFeptenber End the 29th. of Yovember 
partition decision, the Arab cc=-, unists concentrated their eff orts 
on Yaming of the dangerous -policies pLrsued by- the Arv. b leadership 
and Britains which were ruaving the way to partition. They pointed 
to -the necessity cf arriving at a formula. for co-operation and 
understanding -,, -Ith the Jerish inhabitants of the countryp in order 
to maintain Palestine's unity and. to subvert partition. The main 
thrust of the INIL' s propaganda pointed to the danger of transforming 
-the struggle for independence, which "should be directed against 
British imperialit: m as our mp-in enemy", into "a racial conflict". 
421 
416. IT 13 September 1947. 
417. IT 28 September 1947.11.1alasti 
19 418- statemnt of CCAMIL., 17 October 1947. sees October 1947. 
43.9. IT 9 November 1947. 
420. Ibid.. 
421. Leaflet of NIL: Iroperialists eva. cuate Palestine: Long live 
the struggle of the Arab people for its freedom and the freedom 
of Palestine- 3 October 1947. 
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The leaders of the NU addressed numerous public mt:, etings at which 
they warned that "impenialicm is tr7inr to divert the national 
movement to wage a racial ý-trugZle again. - t the Jews" in order to 
shmw that the problem in Falestine was one of strife betveen the two 
co=, nities, and that the continuation of British domination was 
necessaiy to =aintair, the peace arid to avoid mas, - acres. 
422 They 
ad--onIshed =o. reover., again, -t 
the uýýe of terror a:: a political weapon 
and declare"' that "no nation has liberated itself via the mad of 
POILItical =urder" and tir--t terrorist methods vmuld result in "tearing 
apax_4_" 
423 
the Arab movement Partition wa,, - firmly rejected as 
being outside the legitý=ate authority of the UIT, and ditcus-cion 
, about the future constitutional form cf Palestine vhen the country 
was Ltill -Lmder British occupation and its -people unable to freely 
exer. cise their right cf self -determination, was declared to be a 
'diver-sion The min iF---ue waz 3. ndepencler.: -. e and the YLL 
reiterated its support fcr the slogan of a "democratic united and 
undivided Palestine" the success of which entailed a determined 
struggle for co-operation and understanding between Arabs and 
Jews*424 
The VILL recognised, as it became c3ew through the discussion 
of the Palest3me issue at. the UN, that there was a majority in 
favour of parti"Cion, srd "Al Ittihad" E)ointed out that "there is no 
possibUity ncF of convincing a majority of setting up a united 
state". 
425 This was e=lained to be a direct result of "the 
absence cf understanding between Arabs and Jews". The responsibility 
for this did not lie solely urith the Arab leadership but was shared 
with British imperialism which had long pursued "a policy of igniting 
racial hatred". 9 
ý26 
and vith the Zionist organisations which had 
unleashed a canpaiE7i of terror to further separate the two peoples 
422. e,, go Yeeting in Jerusalem., 5 October 1947 addressed by Nassar, 
Habibi and Shaheen, under the slogan: Domn with partition and 
the J ev7ish state. Let Palestine's inhabitants determine their 
ov6m fate. See, IT 12 October 1947. 
423- Ibid. Speech of Nassar. 
424. jbi(L Speech of E. Habibi. 
425. IT 20 October 1947. 
426. ;,, Hatement & CC/NIL - 17 October 1947. loc. cit. 
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and "pour oil on the ongoing racial conflict". 
427 Ileverthelers the 
"rab leaders "to go to the Jewish raz,, e-- and ask NU called on the X 
them to join the liberation struggle for independence". In the 
absence of im. ierstan ding and in the event of the outbreak. of a 
1tracial war", partition would become inevitableg and the NIL warned 
that the ý. ra7b League was already "preparing to occupy the 1, rab 
-part of Pales-tine, while the other part will 117or-m the Jewish 
state ... in accordance x-ith the sdiemez- of British imperialism". 
428 
The last statement iý sued by the ML before partition was 
officially decreed., again denied that "the MT or any state has the 
rigýit to give an opinion on the constitutional shF-pell of the future 
inderendent state, and deciared that the M. " - duty lay in "helping 
2-9 Palestine's inhabitants to exercise their rights of self-determination,, 04" 
At the sarze time, partition was condez-ned as an "imperialist plot" 
-which could only lead to , -prrviding a foothold for Anglo-US 
imperialism to thwart the national liberation roove-nnent of the Arab 
people tj " 
430 The XML turned to the Jewish inhabitants and warned them 
that it was their responsibility., and in their own best interests, 
Z 431 to put an end to Zionist terrorism arainst Arabs,, and exerciged 
its "historic duty in inffor=ing the Jewish masses of the dangers of 
following Zionist policies in support of partition and the establish- 
432 
ment of a Jevash state" .A Jewish state in part of Palestine 
would bring neither peace nor security to the Jews; moreover it would 
be a des-tabilising force in the region and its establishment would 
serve to transfer the "hatea racial conflict" from Europe to 
"Palestine and the %hole region. 
The day after the TJN passed its decision calling for the 
partition of F-alestine, an article appeared in "Al Ittihad" stating 
1+27. IT 23 liovember 1947. 
428. IT 12 October 1947. 
429. 'taternent cf Fecretariat of NLL: A call for unity of rankst 
for struggle against partition and for abolition of the Mandate, 
16 October. IT 19 October 1947. 
430- Statement of EC-AIM issued after meeting of CC in Jaffa, 17 I 
October 1947 to discuss support of majority of UN members for 
partition pmposals. S-ee,, Palastin, 19 October 1947,, and 
IT 25 October 1947. 
431- IT 23 Yoverber 1947. 
432. Statem-ent Of CC; /qM-' - 17 October 1974. loc. cit. 
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that partition war, already a reality with the Arab and Jeurish 
comimmities living in total irýolation from each other. 
433 however, 
it went on to declare that the future of Palestine did not depend 
on UN decrees but on the ability of Palestine's inhabitants "to 
avoid racial conflict and religious r-as-eacres" and to find a way 
to reduce tention and arrive at a common understanding. 
The UN decision, which had the blerr, siaig and support of the 
coviet Union., placed the N"LL in a difficult potition. It-- initial 
reaction to S'oviet support for partition, when it was still being 
debated at the U. 17, had been to assýer-t the independence of the 
t-. rab commmi!: ts, and to aecl, - re ths, 16, "not with: tanding our friend- 
-hip for the U7, SR, we do not tie our! ýelves to itr policy, but 
for=late our ov.. n f rom 
434 So=, our people". 
Soviet's pro-par' tition 
Britain expelled from I 
ment cf two states was 
ex-iýting loccal conditionz and the aim., cf 
after howevers "Al Ittihad" vae defending the 
starui as being based on the de--ire to see 
Palestine. 435 The support for the establish- 
explained as resulting from the conclusion 
that "other solutions, though more desirable, are not practicable 
436 
att the present time" . 
Once the IM decision had been taken however, the JUL had to 
make its stand Imovm. At a meeting of the 'Fecretariat held 
1 437 -a immediately after the partition decision the majority tool. 
stana in favour, on the ground's that partition was going to be 
imposea on Palestine irrespective of the wishes of the Arab population. 
The decision was also seen to have positive aspects in that it 
declared the indlependence of Palestine and the evacuktion of the 
British, that the two states would be linked in an economic union, 
and tlv--y saw it to be the commmists, task to struggle for the 
political reunification 0 A. " the country. Purthe=Aoreq Nassa-- who 
I 
headed the pro-partition faction,, argued that the Arab states would 
433- IT 30 147ove---ber 1947. 
434. Concerning the USISR' s stand on Partition. IT 19 October 1947- 
435- IT 2 Yovember 1947. 
436. IT 30 November 1947. 
437. E. Twaj, Interview., Haif a., 4 April 1974. The Fecretariat 
meeting was held in Jerusalem on the saiie day that the UN 
decision was made. The members of the FSecretariat viere: 
Tuma,, 'Nassar, T. Toubi., E. 111abibij, and R. Shaheen. 
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not figýit against partition but would content them elves with verbal 
protestations. 
438 1t was haviever, decided not to make the 
Secretariat's new stand public and a vaguely vmrded etatement was 
issued %bich directed its main attack on '13ritish machinations". 
It called on the Irabs "to struggle again! ý, t British imperialisms the 
=ain root of our proble=", and reaffirmed the MW s potsition in 
favour of k-eeping". Pi, 1-, vA-fne "united and un: livided in a dc: -,, ocratic 
ur ,: Lty,,. 
439 L r-c-eting cf the CC held --hortly c. fter, produced a 
majority in f avour of Tum-al s poý-itionp the lone opposer to partition, 
in -the Fecretwariat, and with this the control of the Party precs 
massed over to the anti-partition faction of the ,, M. 
440 It was, 
neverttheleszs dec-. 1ded to hold a second cnlarged plenL= of the OC 
to discuc-s the matter further; at this ýFecond'Tazareth Plenum, Tuma 
and mozt of his Furporters absented themselves, and the decisions 
441 
of the -First "Nazarreth Plentra vvere reversed. t. majority was 
secured fcr the pro-partition position; the rarty prerrs returned to 
the control of +I-ie Fecretal-lat and Tuama exd his supporters were 
subsequently exp 
442 
pelled from the ranks of the NIL. 
438- Tu. -, a stood alone in his oppo--ition to partition, -%,. Iiile Nassar stood 
at 4w. -. e head of the pro-partition faction. Interviews with E. Tuma) 
"Haifa, 4A ril 1974; E. Habibi. 9 Haifa b. ý s3 April 1974; F-Salfiti., 
26 'Yarch 15-74. 
439- State-men't of Fecretariat of KILL: To the 'Strugglers, for the Unity 
of Palestine; the Unity of Palestine lies in its complete 
: [ndependences 3 December 1947. IT 14 Dece=ber 1947. 
W. Tl'. iss was known as the First Nazareth Plenum, and was held some 
time in the -first half of Decenber 1947. The Editorial Board 
of IT was made up of Tuma, Habibi, and Shaheen. After the 
First Plenum.,, Tumal s faction took control of the paper; proposals 
were also made but not followed up that the NLL should approach 
other Arab communist parties to send a joint memo to Stalin 
calling on him to vdthdraw 'Soviet support for partition. In 
addition to the Fecretariat's statement against partition,. the 
sole issue produced by Tuma. carried an anti partition statement 
by E. Bakaash the 'b:. yrian ccmmunist leader. IT 14 December 1947- 
Irnterviews with Tl=a, Habibi ond S-alfiti., loc. cit. 
441- The Second Yazareth Plenum was held sometime between the 14th 
and the 21st of Dece=ber,, when IT appeared vdthout Tumal s nwne 
as Editor and was replaced by Habibi and ls, haheen of Nassarl s 
faction. IT 21 December 1947. 
442. Tuma explained his deliberate abstention as due to his 
jmv; *llinL: ness to split theXIL and uncertainty over his political 
-oosition. (Interviews with Tuma and Falfiti, loc. ci .) After 
support for partition became official YLL policy, a number of 
its members ceased their political activity and rere subsequently 
expelled. Most ho7,, ever were later to return to the ranks of 
the co==Lmist movement in Jordan and Israel. 
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The new Pm-partition policy of the NIL did not find imnediate 
and explicit expression in the pages of "Al Ittihad"; the articles 
carried by the party organ were characterised by wribiguity, in their 
pronouncements on partition, and shied away from adopting a clear 
position. In the event, the per-mit to publish "Al Ittihad" was 
revoked by the 'Government 
443 
after only five i----Ues had been brought 
out since Tu-ml s e)Tulsion as editor, and the NIL was left without 
a legal organ enabling it to deliver its political message to the 
-Axab -public. 
The last five isTuez of "Al Ittihad" continued to pay a certain 
arioun-'40 of lir. service to the slogan of a "united Palestine", although 
it was e=hasised-. that understanding between Jews -, nd Lrabs was 
necessary to a--. ieve thiz. This was acco, =anied by the declaration 
that it was "im-ractical" and "too late now to call for a united 
democratic state", becalZe of the ten-e sit, r-tion between Arabs and 
JI ews., 
444 
and the i =,,, licit message was that the "united I alestine" 
was something t,,, be attained in a distant future when such under- 
standing and co-operation proved feasible. 
The main preoccupation of "Al Ittihad" was to repeatedly warn 
of the dangers of terrorism and call on both Arabs and Jews to 
direct their energies to the co=on aim of expelling the British 
- ry. Terrorism and massacre, whether co=itted by from the count 
Arabs or by Jews were conde=ed as merely serving to realise 
British policys rhich aimed at -showing the world that its presence 
Y. 
445 in Palestine was necessa. -, j to avoid the destruction of the countr 
At the same tire, the NTIL persistently called m the Jevash working 
class "to wake =" and to repudiate acts of Zionist terrorism, 
"6 
waming that these acts were contrary to the interests of the Jewish 
inhabitants, and that "the continued silence of the Jew-ish masses 
is now a crime". 
447 
443. FIL Leaflet: ! "tatement concerning the Withdrawal of the Penrit 
to publish Al I tlihad- 31 Jan=-ry 1948. The 'Goveniment' s 
pretert for this action was a report in IT accusing British 
soldiers of actively encouraging acts oF-t-errorism on both Arab 
and Jewish sideE. 7he last issue of Al Ittihsd owne out on the 
25 January 1948. 
444- IT 28 Dece.,. mber 1947. 
445. IT 4 J-, anu=-, v and 25 J anuary 1948. 
446.1-T 4J anuary 194B. 
447. !T 11 januar-i 1946. 
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The tcne of "Al Ittihad' s" articles indicated that it was not 
so much op-posed to partition as to the way in which it was being 
implemented. It thus warned that the Arab part of ralestine was 
going to be "annexed to 6 "ordan"44B and called on the inhabitants to 
res. 
A. 
st British schemes "to join Arab Palestine to Jordan and the 
ievnish state to the Briti. ch Dominion". 
449 ; ýlready in the IaEýt 
three i, ý, sjez- of the paper, public-hed in January 1948, the demand 
for en "independent united and undivided state" was dropped and the 
E-Ml s ca-11 naa centred on the need to stru&-, le "to organi--e means 
of defence against terrorism", to "expel the British armies from 
Palestine" 1,50 and t-- realize "Palestine's freedom and independence". 
451 
21 
Yet the A. rab cogmunic-tt did not pursue a consistent line in Y 
their published propaganda. tm intemal bulletin., appearing in 
February 194B., to fill the gap created by the absence of "Al Ittihad". 
co=letely iLmored event-s in Palesti-ne and concentrated on affairs 
in I raq. 
452 A further issue of the same bulletin warned that the 
US was txying to abolish the UN decision and rob Palestine of its 
independence, but refused to meet the issue of partition head on 
and claimed that "it is not possible to arrive at a ju! t 
constitutional settlement v. ith the British still in the country". 
453 
The 171a did pronounce clearly upon its by nmv familiar assertion, 
that rartition the result of the policies o& f the Arab leaders. 
Their extreme nationaliý-'-- stand had led to a "national conflict" 
between Arab and Jews. Likewise the Arab League states were seen 
to be conniving with Britain for the British officered Lrab Legion 
Wo enter Palestine "only to stop at, prearranged boundaries" and then -4- 
"to annex the Arab paxt of Palestine to Trans-Jordan",, which was 
aescribed as "tied to Britain by a treaty of serfd= and enslavement". 
454 
44B. IT 21 December 1947. 
"9. IT 28 December 1947. 
450- IT 11 January 1948. 
451. VIUL Leaflet: State--rent Concerning withdrawal of permit ... loc-cit. 
452. Al Usba (The League). Internal Bulletin of NM. N. l. Ist February 
1948. 
453. Al Usba N-4.2 Arril 1948. 
454. Leaflet of VILL Local Committee-Haifa: To the Arab People. 2 
May 194-8. -Am ITIL Leaf let as late as July 1948 came out 
in 
suprort of the recommendationE of the MT minority report and 
called for the establishment of "a federal democratic state on 
the basis of the right of self-determination for Arabs and Jews". See 
Leaflet of NIL: For the Establishment of a Popular Front; To 
the masses of the Arab people. July 1948. 
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With the establishment of the . 2-tate of Israel in May 1948 and 
the subsequent invazion of the Arab League ar=ier,,, the NLL made its 
position clearer and it now publicly called for the application of 
the M1 T partition rer-olution Pnd iý,, e establishment of an independent 
Arab state beside the already establi. -hed Jerish state. I tz 
attituae to the entry of the Alrab Let-gue armies into I alertine was 
characteriFea by vehement condemnation, and member-, of the ]\, *U, were 
active in diEtributing leaf lets: in the areas occupied by the Arab 
axmies. 
455 The tone of these leafletr was provocative and 
seditious; Jkrab soldiers were called upon to "go back home" and 
to struggle for the overthrm., of their o-v%n rulers, and itvas 
explained to the= that the aim of. their campaign in Palestine was 
"not to liberate it... but to aimex the Arab part tc Abdullah, t2ie 
puppet cf British imperiali, =11.456 
The YLL' !: leafflets concentrated their fury on the leaders of the 
Palestinian national movement and the Arab League. The former were 
castigated for having deserted the country and for encouraging the 
Arab inhabitants to flee in their waim. 
457 They výrere de--cribed as 
"traitors ... a handful of corrupt large landoviners and proprietors 
who had been in the service of ir-perialism for the la, -t thirty years... 
w V,,. 
458 who had sold their lands in Palestine and now ran -a ki They 
were "feuaalists with the mentalities of the middle ages" tho had 
adopted "racialist policies" towards the JevviEh inhabitants, 
instituted a boycott of the JewiEh com-mmity.. declared, in international 
forums., their "refusal to live with the Jews in one country"459 and 
by the pursuit of extremi--t nationaliEt policies had erected barriers 
in the path of understanding bet%een Arabs and Jews and thux- paved 
the way for partition. 
1+60 
The Arab League was denounced as a "tool 
455- Both F. Nassar and 0. Ashahb, leaders of the NIL were arrested in 
, id 194.8 while distributing such leaflets. IT lst February 1949- 
See also, A. Kapeliuk, Vben the Comxmmists sulported the Jewish 
State. New Outlook. N. 9.1962. p. 90. 
456. Leaflet of IUL: A call to the Soldiers. Soldiers of Egypt and 
brother Arab states, Go back to your own countries and direct 
your weapons against the imperialists and tl,. eir agents. July 
1'0148- 
457. And Now. - -What is to be Done? TTM Pamphlet., September 1948. p. 4. 
458. Leaflet//ý-M: For the Establishment of a Popular Frontj loc-cit. 
459- And Now ... 7.1at is to be Done? 0- cit. P. 3- 
460. Al Usba (Regular Bulletin of Mij N. l. August 1948. 
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of imperialism" and the 17M declared that the behaviour of the Arab 
states and their connivance with Briti-,. h schemes had expoýed the 
461 1 "treason of the Arab kings and the I-rab ruling clazses". ', bile 
the Arab League's anries had entered Palestine with the ostensible 
ai= of destroying partition., their real mi. -sion was seen to have been 
t-he active i=r. lenentation of partition and the prevention of the 
ettablishment of an independent P. rab state; their annies had never 
even zjýproached Une borders. of the -. proposed Jewi--h state. 
462 The 
IUI did not regard the war in Palestine as waged to prevent the 
establishment of the Jev. -ish state, and as evidence for this it pointed 
to Ithe surrender of various parts of the country to the Jezrish forces 
Iýy, Abdullah-I s; Amb Legion, vrithout even the pretence of a fight. 
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Furth, e=ore, Abdullah v; -Ith the b1cssincy of Britain, and the conniv&nce 
of certain "reactionary elements" in the already establi-. -. hed Jewish 
state, was accutýea of planning to annex the A'rab part of Palestine 
t Trans-Jo--aan. 
464 
o TI 
The NIX, called on the Arab people to struý-, gle againct the war 
and to establish an independent Arab state based on the decisions of 
the UIT. It called for the "evacuation of Arab and Jewish -a-mies 
of occupation" from the proposed Prab state and for the return of 
areas occupied by the F. F-gana in excess of the MN. rropo,,: ed. boundary, 
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declaring that the ztznaý-gle of the ! _rabs vvas now a tru,! gle 
for the 
: right of self deter-r-ination and for an end 
to occupation by all 
foreign ar--les" . 
466 It reminded the ;.. rabs that if they had accepted 
the lReT decision on inderendence and partition, and facilitated. its 
implementation, the projected economic unity between the two states 
woulE have provided a fr-amev4ork for the eventual political re-unification 
of Palestine. 
467 It was still possible and necessaxy however, to 
struggle for the establishment of an Arab state on the basis of 
understanding between Arabs and Jews and. respect for each other' s 
rigýit to self-determination 
468 
as this would provide a stepping-stone 
461. Leaflet/IM: For the Establishment of a Popular Front. loc-cit. 
462. And Vov, -- -I'That is to be Done? on. cit. p- 7- 
463- VLL Leaflet: To the firab people. August 1948. 
464. And liow... V'hat is to be Done? loc. cit. 
465- Ibid. 
466.1,71, Leaflet: To the Arab Palestinian People., August 1948- loc-cit- 
467. ML Leaflet: For the Establishment of a Popular Front. loc-cit- 
468. Al Usba. N-1. Au,,,, u--t 194B. loc. cit. 
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an the path to eventual re-unification. 
Already in August 1948 the ITU was attempting to explain the 
switch it had perfomed in tr-anSf erring its support from the "united 
and undivided democratic state" to the "boo state" solution. While 
insisting on the correctness of its, previou, slogan,, theITM explained 
the failure of its realisation as a consequence of the reactionar7 
policy of the Arab leader! ý F-nd "reactionaries among the jews" viio 
469 thwarted the grcn-, th of understanding between the two co=unities. 
'The NUTT was already trying to find ideological justification for its 
new line, Pmd echoing the analysi: - of the Jevrish ccm-. Mists, it shyly 
in-troduced the thes.. 'LE, that "a new society potýessing nbtional 
ch-aractex-11stict had a-, peareed in Palertine" as a resýdt of ý'Ter-ish 
immigration and settlement, and that this "new nption... hBd the right 
to determine its ow, futi=e and set up its own state,,. 
470 This was 
further amplified' in a subsequent publication, v-. hich althvLgýi entitled 
'"Ukr we must stru7-, gle for the Arab Palestine -state" devoted itself to 
a self -criticism of the previous policies and ideological ponitions 
of the IUZ. 
471- The first self-criticism revolved round thel, 'LL's 
policy of llnationzl unity" which it no., 7, declared to have been mistaken 
and to have provided "a cover for the treasons of the national 
472 leadership" - The correct policy would have been to expoEe the 
reactionzi7 leaders of the krab national movement and to isolate 
them from the Irso masses. In the absence of such a policy,, the 
NU held itself partly to blame for the mistakes of the national 
movement -which had contributed to the lack of understanding between 
Arabs and Jews. The second and more significant self-critici= 
centred on its attitude to the "democratic state" and the Jewish 
minority in the country. Thile affirming that the slogan of the 
"united demcratic state" as an expression of the right to self- 
deteimination for all Palestine's inhabitants, was correct at a 
'473 - on to explain that the absence of under- certain period it went 
469. Al Usba. N-1. August 1948. loc. cit. 
470. Ibid. 
471. Why Te must Ftrurrrzle for the Arab Pe 
September 1948. 
472. Ibid. P. 4. 
473- Ibid. p. 6. 
472. 
473- 
!: ýtate. ITII Pamphlet, 
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standing had created conditions which rendered the struggle for such 
a state "unrealistic and futile". 
474 
The FM also elaborated on its new found discovery of the 
existeme of "a separate Jewish nationality" in the country. This 
new soclety had evolved during the years of the Mandate in complete 
lZolation. fro= Arab societN and was characterised by its possession 
cf a sem-rate language, culturep and economy. 
475 The existence of 
"new national seeds" in Palestine which had begun to become clear 
before and d=ing ', Vorld War Two, meant that it was wrong to force the 
"Jewish nation" in the country to accept the position of a minority 
! -- a ur-Ated state. The ccr-rect policy would have entailed 
Nrecognition of rights of both nations to self-dete=ination to the 
point of separation end the establishment of independent ctates". 
1+76 
Thus., both on the grounds c. 1 feasibility and ideological principle, 
the h7Z arrived at the position that the partit oning of the country 
a--"' the estabUshment of two separate states was correct. 
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f the IUI towardz the Jewish national question This new position o. 
in Palestine and its explicit'. support for the Jewish people's right 
to establish their own state, rendered meaningless the continued 
--eparatiw. cf A. rab and JLn-, 
ish Com=mists. Accordingly the two 
gro=s decided to amalgamate. The Jewish communists, having now 
established themselves as the Israeli Communist Party., declared that 
t1he EIL's"change in position towards the national problem in 
ralestine" had "removed the last stumbling block in the path of 
unity"., and affinned their readiness to unite with the Arab 
cormxi sts. 
478 Late in October 1948 a Unity Congress was held in 
Haifa, attended by Amb and Jewish delegates, which reaffirmed the 
internationalism of the Palestine oom=mist movement which had been 
r=tured since 1943.479 
L74. Vhy We Yust Strt-, Zgle for the Arab Palestine State. NLL Pamphlet,, 
Sep; t tember 1948. op. cit. p. - 7. 
475. Ibid. p. 8. 
476. Ibid. 
477. In October 1948, four Arab comnunist parties, the 1M. the Iraqi, 
the Syrian and. the Lebanese parties had declared their support 
for par-tition. See, Statement to the Arab peoples regarding 
the Palestine problem and Anglo-US imperialist war aims in the 
Arab East. Leaflet. October 1948. 
478. Statement of CC of Israeli Communist Party, 6 October 1948. IT 
18 October 1948. 
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co=mmists. IT 23 October 1973- 
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The Arab communists had to pay the price for their belated 
recognition of the "Jevdsh nation" and their initial hesitations 
towards partition before they could be accepted by their Jewish 
comrades. This they did in the fom of a public self-criticism 
of their past mistakes. According to this new version of the Party's 
history, the separation of the Arab communists in an independent 
organisation waE prof rred as the cause of their "inability to .. fe 
realise the new conditions in Palestine", namely the establishment 
of -an "independent Jewish nation". 
460 
This had necessitated new 
methods of struggle and the Irab communists declared themselves 
I not having raised the slogan of "the ri&hts of the Arab guilty oA 
and Jewish nations to independence and national sovereignty on 
the basis of the Maridst-Leninist principle of self-determinatim". 
They had failed to perceive this, and had consequently weakened the 
struggle of the Erab and Jewish workers. The second consequence 
of the existence of a separate Arab communist organisation was the 
rise of a "national right deviation" in the ranks of the NIL '481 
which regarded the Arab people as alone capable of freeing Palestine 
and defeating British imperialism, and disregarded the potential 
of "the revolutionary forces a ng the Jewish people". Consequently 
the Arab communists' policy had been based on a broad "national 
front" which combined within it "bourgeois and semi-feudal elements". 
What the TUI had not realised, was that this unity was doomed to 
failure as "the agents of imperialism! ' were incapable of joining a 
front aimed at its expulsion from the country. The practical outcome 
of the Arab commmists' activity had been to ignore the importance of 
"exposing the bourgeois and semi-feudal leaders of the national 
movement" and of releasing the Arab national liberation movement 
frorn their control. 
The NIL was recognisably fundamentally different from the pre- 
split PCP and not only in so far as its membership was restricted to 
one national gmup in a bi-national country. Even as an Arab party 
480. State: wnt of CC/NLL, End of September 1948. Y. H. 15 October 
1946. 
4B1. Ibid. 
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it did not constitute a continuation of the PCP. It saw itself as 
an inherent part of the Arab national move. -. r-nt and its role as the 
struggle, not for communis-z or social revolutions but for national 
independence. This viev; Yas based on its interj.., retation of the 
role of a Karx. ist party ass "being conditioned by the stage of develop- 
cent of a particular Eociety. In 'Paler-tine, where the primary 
contradiction was seen to be between Arab society C- w1iole znd the 
conti-nuing ]-ir-it-fth., occur. ation, its role was s: -en 
to be one of Supp. ort 
for -Lne nat-4cnal independence stmggle of the Arabs. The 1712T, 
denied that its support for such a struggle, or the similarity of 
ts aims v., '0_1 it.. those of the ;, Mb national movement, transformed it 
into a natiorr_, 1iE: t partýy. Yet in practices it proved itself always 
read, v to ab. -Lde by the dec-6 S ions of the national movement and, despite 
the fact that it fou&. t an%'- lost many battles with the leadership 
of the movement concernLig democracy within the national rardcs, the 
attituie to t-he Z ewls-h inhLb itants, and regarding co-operation with 
-Lhe intte=a-ltional "anti-i=erialist camp", it remained loyal to 
leadershi-P and refu-ei to diEsociate itself from it. 
The political platform of the NIL was devoid of any class 
ch. aracter and- contained no socialist plan. 1-z or even a mention of 
the form of the future state. Clas-- conflict was absent from its 
perspectives and e=, -. ninently given 
to the mridest phasis was pre-er 
possible national imi-Ity. The I'LL' s claim to 11-progressiveness" lay 
in its social demands and its support for the USSR, but even tho--e 
demands vere cf a modest character and took second place to the 
slogan of "national unity" and the need to realise class collaboration. 
The IMI atte=-ted no creative application of Marxism to local conditions, 
nor did i-11. broach any of the fundamental issues of Arab society. 
if anything, its attempted use of traditional and Moslem themes to 
-he wid-est possible sections of the population, although un- appeal to 4%. 
doubtedly conte-buting to its successp also reinforced traditional 
values and reduced its Krarxism to little more than the struggle 
against i=erialism and the demand for the establishment of a 
"welfare type" state. 
As far as the internal struggle in Palestine was concerned, the 
IM, refused to recognise the existence of a three-cornered fight 
co=rising the Arabs., the Yishuv, and the British, and reduced the 
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situation to a straight forward struggle between the frabs and the 
B riti sh. The antagonism of the Yishuv to%ards the Brýtish wejr, 
ignored as was the Arab-Jezirh struggle itself. The J711 refused 
to draw the relevant conclusion from the overwhelming support of 
the Jewish inhabitants to the Zionist program of the Jev. ish state. 
In the interests of the cherithed Jevvish, ý., Iirab co-operation and 
understanding, the NIL eaw fit to deny the exi, -tence of realities 
v; hi&. contradicted thi, -- ideal., Later in the M. andate when its 
propaganda began to portray the struggle as one of self-deterr., ination 
for the inhabitants of Palestine, the Arab communists did not 
explain the content of this slogan. The inhabitants were, after 
all, not united, but compozed of two groups with oppo-, ed national 
aspirationz. Tc the Arabe self-detemination meant an Arab state 
in all of "Fale-stine, while to the JL-.,; s, thit sa self -detert-Lination 
meant the establithm-ent of a Jevrish state over as lLrge a part of 
Palestine as was possible. In reality of course, the M identified 
itself with the aim: 9 of the Arab national movement, althou&41 it had 
its own specific solution to the problem oJ. the Jewish irihabitants,, 
and was completely opposed to the aims and aspirations of the Yishuvl 
vh. icb was both ready and des1rous of partition. 
As the Kandate drev. to a close, the IM Is call for a "peaceful 
solution" becarte more vociferous. ", 'hi- suffered from tvý, o weaknesses: 
it was directed at one razt of the population onlys and it ignored 
the realities of the situation. The armed and organised Yishuv 
constituted a "st tate výitlhin a state"; while at the same time,, the 
Arabs, tho, _,,, gh neither organised nor anned to the same degree, were 
confident of the military intervention of the neighbouring Arab 
states. . 162, oth sides were preparing for the forthcoming struggle 
and had made clear their determination to fight to achieve their 
expressed political aims. 
'From 1946 until the end of the K'andate the ITLL chose to see 
the UNI as the best medium for the solution of the Palestine problem. 
It was confident that recourse to the intemational community would 
result in the achievement of Palestine's independence. The Arab 
comm. inists co=pletely ignored the option of internal organisation as 
a means to realise their proclaimed aims of independence and the 
rejection of partition,, and were desirous of an imposed solution. 
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This car, only be explained in terms of their belief th.,. t the ýoviet 
Union would support the Arab national movement' s de. -nazK1 for an 
independent and united state. The prestige of the Foviet Union at 
the end of the war, and its po, -,, IesEion of the power of the veto at 
the recurity0ouncil, convinced the IM that a new international 
balance of forces existed in the post-war per-lod which pruaranteed 
the success ef the colonial peoples' struggle for --elf-deter. -anation 
and national inde-endence. Its calculations foundered on the 
unexpected change in the Soviet position which left the :, *Iri without a 
meaningful. policy. The iz: rosed rolution v1hich it had championed 
had., on arrival, turned cut to be the threst vhich it had warned of 
all along and strove to avoid. 
The NIL, despite its wea-ý: nerFes, was neverthele. -., - a =icue 
feature of Arab society. It was the first modern party,, organired 
not on thLe --)f traditicral family loyalt3,, but T'. oFFecsing a 
clew-cut social and political program. 'Sýtarting as a movement of 
intellectuals, it had succeeded in penetrating the ranlm of the 
working class, and to a les: Ler extent.. the intelligentsia. it 
had established a strong labour movement which provided it with 
a po-; -. er base in Arab society, and had created an alliance of Lrab 
workers and intellectuals. The main preoccupation of the founders,, 
havinz eztabli&hed their worldng class base, maz- to w-iden their 
appeal in order to increase their support among the more articulate 
section of Amb society: the predominantly "middle class" 
intelligentsia. 
The traditional leadership, ol. the Arab national movement renained 
adamant in its refusal to extend recognition to the NIL, and 
consequently the latter's role in influencing political events in 
Pale Ell. -ine rerained enmall. Yet it was the first to foresee the 
dangers of rartition and to realise the importance of Amb-Jeviissh 
understanding as the key to maintaining the unity of the country. 
Its warnings hov. -ever, were continuously disregarded by the Arab 
leaders vdio acted on an "all or nothing basis". Its belated 
recognition of partition resulted not only from the neces-, ity of 
follow-ing the F-oviet lead,, but also from acceptance of an existing 
reality and a fait accompli, which it realised the Arabs were 
incapable of overturning. The ideological justification for this 
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volte face, the "self criticiEWI and denunciation of the "nationali.,: t 
rightist deviation" were the outcome of, political exigencies, and the 
need to justifýy what had already taken place. Yet the IM alone 
did not di! ýintegrate arnng the total collapse of all Ixab 
instituti-ons in Falestine. 1tr membem continued their activity 
during the 1948 wrr and le-ter in the rankx of the 1, ýmelý Co-nuni-It 
Party and the jordanian Co.. =uniE, t 7'arty, which cor. tinued to be led 
w the com-. =iE' leaders of the forties. i'. hile in 1548 it w*. -- 'I-y 40 
"COZB*ble to regard the 7,71, as having been more succe. -,. ý. ful in the 
trade union rather than the political field, the --uccess of the 
ormier r-roved to be of -. zhort tem, , and transitory nkAure. The 
collame of , '-mb society ana the ma! s exodu,. of llo4'-, led to the 
destruction cf the labour movement F-nd the di--intecration of the 
Lrab working claz; s. Yet in the political field, the roots výhich the 
1= hadImnaged to im-, l, -.. nt during the forties proved more rez: ilient, 
and provided t2he frF-mework, foýr the subsequent activity of the Lrab 
com. -w, i: ts both in I srael and in Jordan. 
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CONCLUSIM 
Despite the unall size of the communir t movement in Palestine 
a study of its activity throws light on the dilemm of a party 
that adhervs to an intemationaliEA po. s. ition in a situntion 
characterised by acute national polarisation. In it. - atteripts to 
su=-ount, the national divisionz pertaining in the country and build 
a lasting !. rab-Jeyd. -, h communizt organivation., the co=uniEt movement' s 
reCor-. 4 rLF a mixture of success and failure. The PCF failed not 
only in its atte"rq-tE to create a la-sting Ar-, Lb-Jevd.. -, h class alliance, 
ýbut ý also in main' taining its unity. 1 -V wat unable to withstand the 
nat-Ionalist pull -Y%hich the Arab rand Jewish com=mities exercised on 
Lrab and Je-;. -! --h party meerbers and it eventually rplit into two 
co=letely separate nationall sections. Much of this failure was 
due not to subjeoll6live, conditionss but was the outcome of the 
historical- situation in which the communists found thtmelves. 
However, the Party' s activ-; ty during the Mandate can be viewed 
as the beginnings of an on-going process, and in this sense it can 
be crediteawith a measure of success. 
The co=ni--t move: zent in Palestine passed through three phases. 
The reriod 1919-1929 witnessed the birth of the mover-ent within the 
ranks- of labour Zionism, and its preoccupation mrith the tasks of 
the proletarian revolution on the intemational scene rs end the 
Jev. -ish -Arorkdng class on the national scene. The period 1930-1942 
was narkea by a preoccupation with the witi-colonial revolution, 
and the rise of a distinctly Arab orientation leading to a widening 
of the gulf between its Arab and Jewish members. The third period., 
1943-1547 saw the Arab and Jewish communists each firmly established 
within their own national communities, pursuing nationalist 
policies, and unable, despite the lip service paid to the cause of 
intemationalism and the community of interests between Arabs and 
Jews, to bridge the gap separating thems not to mention the wide 
chasm, separating Arabs from Jews. 
In the first phase of its developments the com:. -, -1Mist movement 
remained entirely faith: ful to, its origins, both in respect to its 
adherence to the primacy of the class struggle and in remaining 
within the confines of the Jewish community. Yet already its 
position was marked by ambiguity. Its total condemnation of Zionism 
cast a question mark on its own existence, but it could not COM out 
against the continued existence of the Yishuv without denying the 
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raison dletre for its awn activity. Its development on the extre= 
left vang of the Zionist movement was, however, cut short by the 
advent of the Comintem's policy of support for the ntýtional 
independence ztruggles in the colonies. 
The second phase of the communist movement's development was 
the most diffficult. C=e the decision to support the national 
in, -"eper. %A. e A- Ce st nI a Q -ruggle had been accepted, il,., was oyn turnal that 
the 
-!. rtLbs should 
become the legitimate focus of the Party' s activity. 
Desl: ite the difficulties of this path,, as a result of the disadvant- 
ageous position of the Jev., Ish communist. - as members of a newly 
estaltl-ished alien i=igr, --nt minority, cozpletely isolated from the 
indigenous inhabitants, and the general backwardness and 
unrecept tiveness of the Jlý. rab population to the novel ideology., the 
Jewish cc=urdsts succeeded in laying the groundwork for an Arab 
cc-rj=mist movit=ent. Their very success raiEed the question of 
the t-ositý -on of the Jewi_--h inhabitants and indeed the future role 
of the Jeri-sh communists themselves. A satisfactory resolution 
of the problem posed by the ever-increasing Jewish presence was 
never achieved. This was a direct outcome of the communists' 
persistence in maintaining a differentiation between the Zioni! ýt 
movement and the Jeri-sh conr=. ity as a vftle. At the base of this 
le, v the co:! munistsl inability to comprehend Zionist ideology and 
its nationalist arpeal, or to recognise its success in attracting 
relatively large numbers of Jews to Palestine. 
The a=biguity eurrounding the Party' s attitude to the Yishuv 
created tensions within its ranks between Arab and Jewish 
communists. This cane to a head at the time of the Lrab rebellion 
of 1936-1939. Support for the rebellion was in line with the 
Party's policy of entrenching itself within the Arab national 
independence movement. Yet by its very natures this support 
blurred the distinction w1hich the Party maintained between Zionists 
and the rest of the Jewish community. The resultant split of the 
Jewish Section was partly a logical outcome of the Party' s 
insistence on preserving this deep-rooted distinction between 
Zionism and the general Jevash public. 
The --plit of the Rix" into tvvo separate national sections was 
evidence o. f the inability of the Party's f ramework to withstand the 
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pull of two opposing tendexcies: support for the aims of the trab 
national independence movement, and the crystalisation of the belief 
that the Jewish co=nunity in Palestine was undergoing a process of 
tranefcrmation into a nectional entity. The appeal the two hostile 
com=nilties mde on their rxespective members proved stronger than 
the promise of an eventu. -I realisation of a cormmnity of interests 
betweem ArObs and Jms. 
The newly achieved independence of the Arab ahd Jerish 
co=anists from each other in 1943 did not prove equally beneficial 
to both. The Jewish coa=istsp continuing their opposition to 
Zioni=, re=--ined on the fringes of the Yi--huv. They reverted to 
a position siiýjaar to that hcId by the r-CIFI during its first phase, 
o- 47 pposing bo-Lh Zionizzi and the traditional leader.,. hip of the Arab 
national movement.. =d cc:, -fined their activity to the Jewrish 
working class. The Arab co=mmists on the other hands proved 
more s=cessful. 
The TULL ap7peared on 'the Palestinian scene as an Arab party 
, t. 1-se nr. tional azrirations of the I. rob - suppcr-ting. population. It 
managed to succeed where the PCP had failed and created a base 
for itself azziong the Arab working class and tlie intelligentsia, 
but th-LE very success was the outcome of its national appeal and 
owed little to it-- identification with the intemal. -ional co=nunist 
movemmt. Yet its insistence on differentiatirfg itself from the 
more extrere policies of the M I, rab leadership made it suspect in 
nationaliEt eyes, and it was unable to exert an influence in the 
Arab national movement commensurate with its actual strength among 
the Arab population. Thel-Mls stand tows-rds the Jewish minority 
con' ttimued to be marked by the same ambiguity v&ich had characterised 
the policy of the PCP. it recognised the Jewirh grouping in 
Palestine as a national =inority in all but name, yet refused to 
extend to the Yishuv the right of-national self-determination which 
Arab communists. so loudly proclaimed. N, vhen the NLL did eventually 
come out in support of rartition, 
dictates of Soviet foreign policy,, 
this was in response to the 
though the same reasons adduced 
for the adoption of this new line could have been convincinglY 
made a number of years earlier and v,, ould have followed quite 
consistently from the NMI s characterisatlon of the situation. The 
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Jewish communists on the other handt found no difficulty in JuFýtifying 
their support for partition and threw themselves wholeheartedly into 
the struggle for the establishment of the Jewish state. The 
adoption cf this position was facilitated by the Jewish communists' 
recognition of the Jevrish minority in Palestine as constituting a 
national entity. V*ith its support for partitiori, the communist 
movement in Palestine had travelled full circle from its early 
begirmings in 1919 as an outtgrarth of labour Zioni=. After more 
than twenty years of fierce hostility to Zionism,, it had arrived at 
t1he -conclusion of accepting the establishment of the Jevdsh national 
home. 
The communists'support for partition was a belated recognition 
of their failure to dizcern the existence of a new reality in the 
country: t! -ý transformation of the Jewish cozm=ity into a national 
entity. They also failed to win over the Jewish ma ses to their 
ideal of a united -Falestine ttate or to recure the agree. ment of the 
Arab national movemnt to the presence of a large Jew4zh minority 
in the c=ntry. 117urport for partition did not irnply a change in 
the interni? tional communist moverient's long-term strategy of 
support-Ing the. Lrab national indet-endence movement. v., orking actively 
within tlý. is strategy after 1948, the Palestinian co=wnists were 
able to rebuild t1neir organis ations in Jordan and : Un I srael j and 
in the case of the latter at least, have scored significant 
successes. It is doubtful rhether this could have been possible 
without the ner, direction taken by the PCP first with Arabisation, 
and later wit1i the advent of an Arab national com: a=jst movement. 
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